UN’s top court says failing to protect planet from climate change could violate international law
The United Nations’ top court in a landmark advisory opinion Wednesday said countries could be in violation of international law if they fail to take measures to protect the planet from climate change, and nations harmed by its effects could be entitled to reparations.
Advocates immediately cheered the International Court of Justice opinion on nations’ obligations to tackle climate change and the consequences they may face if they don’t.
“Failure of a state to take appropriate action to protect the climate system ... may constitute an internationally wrongful act,” court President Yuji Iwasawa said during the hearing. He called the climate crisis “an existential problem of planetary proportions that imperils all forms of life and the very health of our planet.”
The non-binding opinion, backed unanimously by the court’s 15 judges, was hailed as a turning point in international climate law.
Notably, the court said a “clean, healthy and sustainable environment” is a human right. That paves the way for other legal actions, including states returning to the ICJ to hold each other to account as well as domestic lawsuits, along with legal instruments like investment agreements.
There is a more technical write up here, I am not sure I am really getting it but these points seem relevant:
As to legal attribution, the Court’s approach is orthodox, though it does include in paragraph 427 some curious language in relation to fossil fuels that looks more like the articulation of a primary rule than the reiteration of a basic principle of attribution: ‘Failure of a State to take appropriate action to protect the climate system from GHG emissions — including through fossil fuel production, fossil fuel consumption, the granting of fossil fuel exploration licences or the provision of fossil fuel subsidies — may constitute an internationally wrongful act which is attributable to that State.’ (On which, see also the Joint Declaration of Judges Bhandari and Cleveland). That aside, on legal attribution the Court restated the basic principle that States are responsible for the conduct of their organs, including both their acts and omissions. In relation to private conduct, moreover, the Court also reasserted the basic proposition that while private conduct is not attributable to the State, a State may nevertheless be responsible for its failures to exercise due diligence in the regulation of private conduct, including omitting to limit the quantity of emissions caused by private actors under their jurisdiction (para 428).
Beyond this point, this section of the judgment is somewhat underdeveloped, and seemingly addresses matters other than legal attribution under the law of State responsibility. The Court notes the complexity around the existence of a plurality of wrongdoing States (and injured States) but emphasizes that it is ‘scientifically possible to determine each State’s total contribution to global emissions, taking into account both historical and current emissions’ (para 429). It also finds that other courts and tribunals had ‘considered the link between GHG emissions and climate change, the link between climate change and adverse effects suffered by litigants, the link between such harm and the actions or omissions of a particular State, and the attributability of responsibility for such adverse effects.’ Perhaps inevitably, these general statements prefigure future questions.
As to the issue of multiple contributing States, the Court found that the general rules of responsibility can address the problem. Citing its Reparations Judgment in Armed Activities, the Court held: ‘in certain situations in which multiple causes attributable to two or more actors have resulted in injury . . . responsibility for part of such injury should [be] allocated among [the] actors’ (para 430). By way of aside, it may be noted that this was in contrast to the other possibility mentioned in Armed Activities, that
‘in certain situations in which multiple causes attributable to two or more actors have resulted in injury, a single actor may be required to make full reparation for the damage suffered’ (para 98). The allocation of responsibility amongst multiple actors remains under-developed in the practice of international law, although scholarship has addressed these issues in some detail. At least at the level of principle, and even if much is still to be determined, the Court’s approach is significant.