Could *Japan* have won?

[Glassfan]

Weren't the Japanese in a kind of death spiral (feedback loop?) - they needed more land and resources to supply their growing military, and they needed an ever growing military to continue their conquest of land and resources?

Today, Japan is run by businessmen, who can buy and sell internationally what they need for Japan to prosper - a completely different paradigm. In the 30's and 40's the country was run by militarists who could only see military solutions to their problems.

With continued expansion, it would only be a matter of time before Japan eventually bumps up against European and American colonies and protectorates in Asia. I have to think war with the allies was fairly inevitable. Success in aggressive war by dictatorial regimes requires continued war. Once they are on that ride, there's no getting off.

And no, Japan could not have won such a war against world powers with greater industrial output, larger populations, limitless resources and aggrieved revenge motive.

 

[AmnGleNathir]

in the end it was the aircraft carriers being out and Japan not continuing into mainland US that screwed them. If they had not attacked America and had gone on in Asia they might have had victory, really it all depends on the quality and quantity of the ground troops. Which, I believe, were up for the job of taking China, considering their social problems at the time.

 

[Masada]

Weren't the Japanese in a kind of death spiral (feedback loop?) - they needed more land and resources to supply their growing military, and they needed an ever growing military to continue their conquest of land and resources?

Yes, more or less. Manchuria was a good steal. Unfortunately, nobody accounted for Chinese obstinacy despite there serious domestic problems. Not the least, the Japanese who didn't even really think how they would deal with it. That it pulled them into a war with China which they couldn't win and which didn't offer them much in real terms -- they probably lost more than they gained -- wasn't intentional. There wasn't a master plan to dominate China it just kind of came about as a specific reaction to a series of events that both parties took part in. Certainly, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria was the catalyst for everything but it wasn't intended to be so... and really, it shouldn't have happened at all. There were some interesting circumstances surrounding the Japanese acquisition of Manchuria, not the least, the reluctance of the Japanese government to actually take it over.

Today, Japan is run by businessmen, who can buy and sell internationally what they need for Japan to prosper - a completely different paradigm. In the 30's and 40's the country was run by militarists who could only see military solutions to their problems.

No, that's not the case. It wasn't run exclusively by militarists. The whole period is characterised by the military effectively side-lining civilian government. The take-over of Manchuria was done against the wishes of the government by elements of the military who drummed up a case for war, had it rejected, then took control anyway. The invasion of China proper was also fairly complicated and involved much the same thing. Rogue military units effectively starting a war as a deliberate means of bending a civilian government to a military solution.

With continued expansion, it would only be a matter of time before Japan eventually bumps up against European and American colonies and protectorates in Asia. I have to think war with the allies was fairly inevitable. Success in aggressive war by dictatorial regimes requires continued war. Once they are on that ride, there's no getting off.

It wasn't inevitable by any means. It arose out a specific set of circumstances that were not what the government wanted to do. Its far better to see it as a result of having an over-assertive popular military with the capacity to ride roughshod over a relatively shallow civilian government with powers which over-time were being increasingly usurped by the military and politicians sympathetic to it. The process took, really, till the end of the war to achieve fully.

And no, Japan could not have won such a war against world powers with greater industrial output, larger populations, limitless resources and aggrieved revenge motive.

Yes, more or less. Although, having said that, it could possibly have defeated allied forces excluding America in the short-term in the Pacific. It wouldn't have invaded Australia and nor would it have had much luck in India where the British line would have stiffened. But the rest was open slather. In that case, I'm not sure if the allies could have won short of having the Soviets invade Japan proper. The land-hopping strategy wouldn't have been possible.

in the end it was the aircraft carriers being out and Japan not continuing into mainland US that screwed them. If they had not attacked America and had gone on in Asia they might have had victory, really it all depends on the quality and quantity of the ground troops. Which, I believe, were up for the job of taking China, considering their social problems at the time.

They couldn't win in China and they knew it. They had already been fighting for a not insubstantial period with huge armies in the field and were only making meagre headway. Nothing much would have changed that.

 

[Archbob]

No, its hard to fight a Naval war when you don't have the steel to build ships.

 

[frekk]

There's no oil in 1940s Siberia. There's really nothing at all worth invading for.

Sure there is. In the bigger picture, the Russians wouldn't have been able to survive a two-front war. They would have folded. Afterwards, Germany could concentrate all its efforts on the Western Allies, which means the Western Allies couldn't possibly make the same sort of effort against Japan that they did.

 

[xchen08]

Sure there is. In the bigger picture, the Russians wouldn't have been able to survive a two-front war. They would have folded. Afterwards, Germany could concentrate all its efforts on the Western Allies, which means the Western Allies couldn't possibly make the same sort of effort against Japan that they did.

Actually, push comes to shove, the Russians would just retreat deeper into Siberia leaving Japan occupying useless territory and unable to pursue rather than fighting a two front war. And in any case, that's a benefit to Germany, not Japan. Japan has nothing to gain from invading the USSR, only potential indirect benefits should Germany be able to take advantage of the distraction and knock out the USSR, which is very unlikely.

For that matter, Japan was entirely done for and just waiting for the end by the time any reinforcements from the European theater made its way to the Pacific. The only thing the Allies could not do to Japan if they were still tied up in Europe is invasion of the Japanese home islands (lacking the divisions and landing ships). Everything else, the blockade, mining, naval raids, firebombing of cities, all of it was possible with just the Pacific forces. And the blockade and mining alone would have starved a quarter of the Japanese population to death in winter 1945 without surrender.

 

[Masada]

... that's quite beside the point that the last time the Japanese had a shot at the Russians they got licked badly. And, as you've pointed out, there wasn't anything worth fighting over to begin with...

 

[frekk]

Actually, push comes to shove, the Russians would just retreat deeper into Siberia leaving Japan occupying useless territory and unable to pursue rather than fighting a two front war.

They wouldn't need to pursue; so long as they can prevent them using the rail lines to bring reinforcements from Siberia to the European front in 41/42.

And in any case, that's a benefit to Germany, not Japan. Japan has nothing to gain from invading the USSR, only potential indirect benefits should Germany be able to take advantage of the distraction and knock out the USSR, which is very unlikely.

It's a benefit for the Axis. That's one of the chief problems the Axis had, actually. They didn't have the right mind about it; it was no direct benefit to the US or Britain to give war materials to the Russians on loan, but that's exactly what they did, because the indirect benefits were worthwhile.

For that matter, Japan was entirely done for and just waiting for the end by the time any reinforcements from the European theater made its way to the Pacific.

This is completely wrong, since the Soviets were using eastern reinforcements to great effect in the winter of 41-42. Japan was hardly "entirely done for" at this point. They had only just begun their campaign in the Pacific.

Everything else, the blockade, mining, naval raids, firebombing of cities, all of it was possible with just the Pacific forces.

If all of Germany's resources were turned West, we aren't talking about a 1 or 2 percent increase in German efforts against the Western Allies. The vast majority of the German war effort was directed east. We're actually talking about something more like a tenfold increase in German strength directed west. There wouldn't be much in the way of Pacific forces; they'd all be needed in the European theatre.

... that's quite beside the point that the last time the Japanese had a shot at the Russians they got licked badly.

And the time before that, they made mincemeat of Russian forces. Khalkin Gol had a lasting psychological impression on the Japanese: they remained terrified of the Russians for the duration of the war. But I'm not sure their fear was all that well-grounded in reality. When Khalkin Gol happened, Russia had no other pressing distractions; it wasn't being raped by a horde of Nazi baboons. But during WW2, Russia had an awful lot on its plate. I'm not sure they were capable of mounting a credible defence in the East, at least, not without sacrificing the European front.

Not to mention that it was Zhukov at Khalkin Gol, and that kind of talent wasn't available in unlimited quanitities. If they wanted to use Zhukov again, they'd have to remove him from the European theatre. Again we're back to the limitations of overall assets, and difficult choices in where to invest under greater pressure.

 

[Ace]

The Japanese did not make "mincemeat" of the Russian forces in 1904/5. They did defeat them in a slogging match that fortold of the destruction coming in WW1.

At Khalkin Gol, Zhukov used tanks to make "mincemeat" of the Japanese. Who realized that their tanks (which they really did not know how to use) were no match for the Russian tanks in quality or quantity. And from that point on, the Imperial Japanese Army wanted no part of any rematch with the Russians.

 

[xchen08]

They wouldn't need to pursue; so long as they can prevent them using the rail lines to bring reinforcements from Siberia to the European front in 41/42.

The Russians would be retreating back along their own rail lines. And once they pull out of the TransAmur, Japan could not follow, and therefore could not pin down divisions, which means those divisions could be sent to Europe.

It's a benefit for the Axis. That's one of the chief problems the Axis had, actually. They didn't have the right mind about it; it was no direct benefit to the US or Britain to give war materials to the Russians on loan, but that's exactly what they did, because the indirect benefits were worthwhile.

Whether it is a benefit for the Axis as a whole is questionable since 1) Russia has more than enough essentially worthless territory to retreat from to keep Japan from pinning down troops needed elsewhere, and 2) if Japan is attacking the Russian Far East, they are not attacking SE Asia, and thus would be rapidly starving of oil, rubber, and metals.

This is completely wrong, since the Soviets were using eastern reinforcements to great effect in the winter of 41-42. Japan was hardly "entirely done for" at this point. They had only just begun their campaign in the Pacific.

You might want to reread what I actually wrote there.

If all of Germany's resources were turned West, we aren't talking about a 1 or 2 percent increase in German efforts against the Western Allies. The vast majority of the German war effort was directed east. We're actually talking about something more like a tenfold increase in German strength directed west. There wouldn't be much in the way of Pacific forces; they'd all be needed in the European theatre.

False. The Germans can maybe triple the Feldheer strength in the West at the most, and that is supposing that the East would no longer require any troops, which is definitely not true in any realistic scenario of the Soviet Union being knocked out. Even in the absurd case of no garrisons required in the East, the Luftwaffe would only see maybe 50% more aircraft from mid-1942 on, tilted towards ground attack and obsolescent aircraft, and the navy would recieve no reinforcements at all. Prior to the Normandy/Salerno landings, additional Feldheer units mean nothing, since the North African theater is dependent on logistics, particularly naval, not number of men.

Not to mention that the Pacific theater was not only soaking up only 15% of American output, less for Britain, but also mainly of output not useful in Europe. The P-38, for instance that had difficulties with low temperature, carriers and other battlefleet units that have no opposition in the Atlantic or Med, submarines with no German shipping to sink, etc. For that matter with far greater German army strength, Normandy and the like are not possible, freeing up vast amounts of shipping, landing craft, and amphibiously trained troops to use against Japan.

 

[frekk]

The Russians would be retreating back along their own rail lines.

Given that they only have a single, one-line track with which to do so, this is simply not feasible. All it takes is one bomb to shut down the line for a couple of days . . . it's nothing like Europe where there is massive redundancy in the rail networks and they could just route around damaged sections. They've only got one line.

Whether it is a benefit for the Axis as a whole is questionable since 1) Russia has more than enough essentially worthless territory to retreat from to keep Japan from pinning down troops needed elsewhere, and 2) if Japan is attacking the Russian Far East, they are not attacking SE Asia, and thus would be rapidly starving of oil, rubber, and metals.

Japan wouldn't even necessarily need to launch a ground offensive. A little interdiction every now and then over that winter will do the trick just fine.

The Germans can maybe triple the Feldheer strength in the West at the most, and that is supposing that the East would no longer require any troops, which is definitely not true in any realistic scenario of the Soviet Union being knocked out. Even in the absurd case of no garrisons required in the East, the Luftwaffe would only see maybe 50% more aircraft from mid-1942 on, tilted towards ground attack and obsolescent aircraft, and the navy would recieve no reinforcements at all.

Nonsense. Production destined for tanks, artillery, ammunition etc could be shifted to aircraft, submarines, and ships. Manpower isn't a big issue, and it's ridiculous to claim that it takes as much manpower to garrison a territory as it does to conduct offensives. Moreover, the units they already have would be more active, owing to the fact they'd have an abundance of oil, aviation fuel, ammunition, etc.

Not to mention that the Pacific theater was not only soaking up only 15% of American output, less for Britain, but also mainly of output not useful in Europe. The P-38, for instance that had difficulties with low temperature, carriers and other battlefleet units that have no opposition in the Atlantic or Med, submarines with no German shipping to sink, etc.

Why on Earth would they be building P-38s for the European front? Presumably production will change. You're stuck on this idea that they have to produce the same material, regardless of circumstances (as in your above contention where Germany is still churning out tanks it doesn't need and can't shift its resources and industry to aircraft etc).

 

[xchen08]

Given that they only have a single, one-line track with which to do so, this is simply not feasible. All it takes is one bomb to shut down the line for a couple of days . . . it's nothing like Europe where there is massive redundancy in the rail networks and they could just route around damaged sections. They've only got one line.

The Trans-Siberian is not single track for those stretches that Japan, with no heavy bombers, could actually hit. More to the point, they won't have air superiority either until the Russians pull out their forces.

Japan wouldn't even necessarily need to launch a ground offensive. A little interdiction every now and then over that winter will do the trick just fine.

Which would accomplish absolutely nothing as Stalin still pulls out most of the troops and the large submarine force at Vladivostok has a field day.

Nonsense. Production destined for tanks, artillery, ammunition etc could be shifted to aircraft, submarines, and ships. Manpower isn't a big issue, and it's ridiculous to claim that it takes as much manpower to garrison a territory as it does to conduct offensives. Moreover, the units they already have would be more active, owing to the fact they'd have an abundance of oil, aviation fuel, ammunition, etc.

First, the Germans will not have any more fuel in general. The Soviets were fully prepared to blow their wells and refineries should they be forced to retreat, and in fact did so for the handful of fields that Germany was able to overrun, and Germany was never able to restore production. Next, garrisoning definitely does take as much manpower as conquest, or were you not paying attention these last 7 years...or if you prefer, WWI Germany post Brest Litvosk or WWII Germany in the Balkans. What they wouldn't need as much of would be tanks, artillery, and aircraft and ammunition expenditure would indeed go down, but they still can't pull everything out lest the Soviet rump, still kept afloat by the Urals factories and lend-lease successfully counterattack. Not to mention that all this is assuming that Japan is actually able to tie down the Eastern forces, and that this somehow causes the Soviet Union to implode when the German advances were stopped before the Eastern forces arrived.

Further, you do not seem to understand the concept of lead times, or that the real world is not a game of HOI. You cannot just switch abstract units of industrial capacity around, not even in closely related fields. Germany was unable to even stop producing obsolete tanks and aircraft because they couldn't afford the production downtime it takes to update the lines. Weapons were produced with critical flaws when the fixes were known and easy because actually applying the fixes to new production would force stoppages. Shifting tank production to aircraft would take months, to ship production, years. Hell, things like armor-rolling mills, and naval gun foundries are entirely specialized industries that must be built from scratch, and you must have skilled labor with years of experience if you want ships that are actually fit for sea. (look at the XXI u-boats for what happens when you try to cut corners) For that matter, the real bottleneck in aircraft for Germany was actually pilots. It must be a hell of a retooling to allow a factory producing rifle ammunition to switch to mass producing Adolf Galland.

Why on Earth would they be building P-38s for the European front? Presumably production will change. You're stuck on this idea that they have to produce the same material, regardless of circumstances (as in your above contention where Germany is still churning out tanks it doesn't need and can't shift its resources and industry to aircraft etc).

They build P-38s because Lockheed has the plants, equipment, and skilled workers to produce P-38s. Switching them over to produce North American's P-51 would take months, and they wouldn't reach the same efficiency for months more. Further, more P-51s would need more Merlins from Packard or Ford, while Allison's turbocharged v-1710s sit unused. So Allison would need to retool as well. Same for every other manufacturer tied to P-38 production, and there are bound to be mixups, which bottleneck production even further. So you produce the P-38 anyway, and send them to where they would be useful, ie the Pacific. Ships are the same, only far more so, with often years of leadtime and built with equipment that can't be adapted at all to producing anything else.

You might as well ask why Germany kept on producing Jumo 211s right through the end of the war when everybody and his mother wanted the Jumo 213, and they are engines in the same family produced by the same company.

 

[Masada]

And the time before that, they made mincemeat of Russian forces.

They didn't really... they very nearly went bankrupt and the economy suffered something terrible. It wasn't a war that Japan could afford.

But I'm not sure their fear was all that well-grounded in reality. When Khalkin Gol happened, Russia had no other pressing distractions; it wasn't being raped by a horde of Nazi baboons.

Sure, it wasn't entirely rational. But, there wasn't much for the Japanese to gain from Russia. And the Japanese had there own concerns every bit as serious as later Russian ones, namely a war against China that looked set never to end.

But during WW2, Russia had an awful lot on its plate. I'm not sure they were capable of mounting a credible defence in the East, at least, not without sacrificing the European front.

There wasn't much to take though and the Russians as has already been suggested would have traded space for time. I think your also overstating the Japanese ability to project into Siberia, remember, that it had comparatively few roads, limited rail-road interconnectivity and that the Japanese themselves had serious problems just maintaining there existing positions in China even before they consider traipsing around the vastness of Sibera.

Not to mention that it was Zhukov at Khalkin Gol, and that kind of talent wasn't available in unlimited quanitities. If they wanted to use Zhukov again, they'd have to remove him from the European theatre. Again we're back to the limitations of overall assets, and difficult choices in where to invest under greater pressure.

The pressure on Japan was worse in this respect, I believe.

Given that they only have a single, one-line track with which to do so, this is simply not feasible. All it takes is one bomb to shut down the line for a couple of days . . . it's nothing like Europe where there is massive redundancy in the rail networks and they could just route around damaged sections. They've only got one line.

... it goes both ways and hurts the Japanese far more than the Russians.

Japan wouldn't even necessarily need to launch a ground offensive. A little interdiction every now and then over that winter will do the trick just fine.

.... this achieves what? They would be probing into what? Vladivostok? The Railway. Look, Vladivostok if it wasn't taken immediately would have been garrisoned and its position strengthened substantially not to mention that the Russians would have been better placed in all respects to keep the railway open. I simply doubt that the Japanese would have been capable of making extensive probes against Russian positions. And, at the end of the day, even if they could what does this cost the Russians?

 

[frekk]

The Trans-Siberian is not single track for those stretches that Japan, with no heavy bombers, could actually hit.

We're still not talking about a terribly redundant network here. It wouldn't be difficult to shut it down.

More to the point, they won't have air superiority either until the Russians pull out their forces.

I'm not entirely sure the disposition of their air forces, but I can't imagine they have all that much out that way.

Which would accomplish absolutely nothing as Stalin still pulls out most of the troops and the large submarine force at Vladivostok has a field day.

Hmmm .... subs ... not good for Japan, which almost completely neglected ASW.

Can the Soviet sub fleet operate out of American bases? If not, we just take Vladivostok (or destroy the port) and hope the sub fleet can't do too much damage on a single excursion. If they can operate from American bases, we'll have to scrap the idea.

First, the Germans will not have any more fuel in general. The Soviets were fully prepared to blow their wells and refineries should they be forced to retreat, and in fact did so for the handful of fields that Germany was able to overrun

I wasn't even thinking about increased production - just decreased consumption.

Next, garrisoning definitely does take as much manpower as conquest

Perhaps, but we can shift the army of grandfathers and cripples on the Atlantic Wall to garrisons in Russia, and the crack troops from Russia to the West and Africa. Quantity-quality etc.

Not to mention that all this is assuming that Japan is actually able to tie down the Eastern forces, and that this somehow causes the Soviet Union to implode when the German advances were stopped before the Eastern forces arrived.

The German advances weren't stopped before the Eastern forces arrived.

You cannot just switch abstract units of industrial capacity around, not even in closely related fields. Germany was unable to even stop producing obsolete tanks and aircraft because they couldn't afford the production downtime it takes to update the lines.

The production downtime is affordable now, though. There's no great immediacy about the Western front. We don't have any use at all for obsolete tanks etc. It's not like the Eastern front, where an obsolete tank is better than no tank.

For that matter, the real bottleneck in aircraft for Germany was actually pilots.

Yes, that's pretty much a hard limit. But more planes, more fuel, more ammunition never hurts.

They build P-38s because Lockheed has the plants, equipment, and skilled workers to produce P-38s. Switching them over to produce North American's P-51 would take months, and they wouldn't reach the same efficiency for months more. Further, more P-51s would need more Merlins from Packard or Ford, while Allison's turbocharged v-1710s sit unused. So Allison would need to retool as well. Same for every other manufacturer tied to P-38 production, and there are bound to be mixups, which bottleneck production even further. So you produce the P-38 anyway, and send them to where they would be useful, ie the Pacific.

Well you've got me there. But we can still hope to force the Americans to stream more troops and transports to Europe, even if we'll still be facing just as many planes and warships as ever. That'll put a dent in their island-hopping campaign.

Just cross our fingers and hope that they don't decide that, with Russia out of the picture, Europe is now static so it can wait while they take out the Japanese distraction.

And the Japanese had there own concerns every bit as serious as later Russian ones, namely a war against China that looked set never to end.

I know. Japan can't invest much in this. That's why I'm mainly just wanting to interdict the rail lines to Europe with an air campaign. I'm not looking to take territory . . . just prevent the Soviets from running their Far Eastern forces back to Europe.

 

[Masada]

I know. Japan can't invest much in this. That's why I'm mainly just wanting to interdict the rail lines to Europe with an air campaign. I'm not looking to take territory . . . just prevent the Soviets from running their Far Eastern forces back to Europe.

The Japanese didn't do strategic bombing all that well... and I doubt it would have been crippling of itself. The Russians as a group were hellishly innovative when it came to thinking up solutions to complex problems using bubblegum and hope.

 

[say1988]

The German advances weren't stopped before the Eastern forces arrived.

The Eastern forces were first used (in large numbers at least) in the Moscow counter-offensive, after the Germans had been stopped.

And even without them, I don't see Hitler breaking the Soviets in '42. There were maybe a half a million men and a couple thousand tanks. While useful and may allow the Germans to get a bit deeper into the USSR I doubt this would be critical to Soviet survival.

The only way this strategy could possibly work is if the US stayed out of the Pacific War.

 

[Dreadnought]

The Japanese would have had to cover a hellofalotta territory for the "two front war" to have much of an impact on Soviet Russia.

 

[frekk]

The Eastern forces were first used (in large numbers at least) in the Moscow counter-offensive, after the Germans had been stopped.

The Siberian reinforcements were already present before the Germans launched their attack on Moscow; they formed a major part of the defensive rings around the city.

 

[frekk]

The Japanese would have had to cover a hellofalotta territory for the "two front war" to have much of an impact on Soviet Russia.

It's not even necessary to open a front to have an impact; a credible threat is enough to tie down troops. In fact this is exactly what was happening until Richard Sorge, a Soviet spy in Japan, reported that Japan's generals had dismissed the notion of attacking along that front. This allowed the Soviets to transfer extensive forces from Siberia to the European front.

That's the only stake the Axis would have in this; there is, as others have pointed out, nothing to be gained in Siberia otherwise. If there was, then I'd be suggesting Japan attack after Siberia has been stripped of its forces, not before.

 

[xchen08]

Hmmm .... subs ... not good for Japan, which almost completely neglected ASW.

Can the Soviet sub fleet operate out of American bases? If not, we just take Vladivostok (or destroy the port) and hope the sub fleet can't do too much damage on a single excursion. If they can operate from American bases, we'll have to scrap the idea.

Here's the thing though, if you are only declaring war and making a credible threat to pin down Russian forces, then you won't be taking Vladivostok and denying the Russians sub bases. And that was my entire point.

The Siberian reinforcements were already present before the Germans launched their attack on Moscow; they formed a major part of the defensive rings around the city.

Are you sure about that? Eastern forces only arrived in force around December 41, when the German offensive was well out of steam. Even with no reinforcements, actually taking Moscow would require surrounding and reducing it, and the Germans were never going to be able to do that before Spring rains shut down operations.

Considering the Soviets left 40 divisons in the East even after pulling out, enough to stop the Japanese cold unless Japan invests literally everything they have to the attack (which isn't happening unless Japan commits national suicide), the USSR has more than enough time to calculate risks and pull out what they did OTL in time for the summer campaign season.