Discussion of Anarchism

[Cutlass]

How does "reasonableness" relate to the legitimacy of the state? To go back to the Irish example, the United Irishmen had far from exhausted the legal means available to them; a number of progressive political reforms had in fact been enacted in the 1780s under the influence of the parliamentary Irish Patriot Party, and the failure of the radical insurrection would in fact be a major justification given by the Repealers for their thoroughgoing constitutionalism. But, as I said, the British state in Ireland at that time was a racist, terroristic oligarchy; not merely an illegitimate state, but the very state in regards to which the modern theory of popular legitimacy was constructed, and which was found wanting. So was this a case of reasonable or unreasonable violence?

If they are actively harming people, when it's reasonable to react with violence comes in a lot quicker.

I'm afraid I don't really understand this bit. Who can obliterate who? Do you think that Amadeus is actually arguing that private individuals and entities are entitled to coerce each other, or simply that you don't think a stateless society would be able to prevent this from happening?

Amadeus may not think it will happen. But that is an outrageously ridiculous thing to believe.

When Europeans first colonized the Americas, it wasn't the European states colonizing, it was private adventurers and business investors. Some with Crown backing, but not with Crown governance. And these were some of the most destructive and oppressive events in human history.

Government didn't do it, but it was among the worst things humans have ever done.

Of course they made their own governments afterward, but that was in the way of justifying what they had done as private actors.

Time and time again you find private actions that are as bad and worse than government actions. This whole concept of only the government doing the bad things, or the bad things private actors do only happening because of government actions or backing is ludicrous on the face of it. There is nothing in human history that makes it appear even remotely plausible.

It is not that a stateless society would be unable to prevent horror and oppression from happening, it would in fact actively aid and abet horror and oppression.

You describe anarcho-capitalists as an "aristocracy", because their program would, you claim, produce a social elite indistinguishable from an aristocracy. But that doesn't imply that anarcho-capitalists are themselves an aristocracy; in fact, as far as I know, the overlap between this potential and proponents of anarcho-capitalism is precisely nil. (This would seem to validate my earlier comments about the fundamental authoritarianism of laissez faire statists.)

So they are either horribly naive or want to set themselves up as the lords and masters. (Which for most of them is also horribly naive.)

At the risk of sounding dense, but: how so? As far as I can tell, both of you and them are working in the same basic framework of natural rights liberalism, you just draw different conclusions about the necessity of the state, the legitimacy of coercion and the inalienability of property. It amounts to an argument about which bits of Locke you like, and which bits you don't.

Drawing differing conclusions from the evidence is one thing. But this has a lot more similarity to that Global Warming thread. One side is looking at the evidence, and the other side is ignoring the evidence and looking for some nefarious motive behind their opponents instead.

But what about conflicts with the state? It seems highly unreasonable, to me, to expect the state to remain the neutral arbiter that it is purported to be in conflicts which it is actually involved. It's like setting up a peace conference and then asking one of the belligerent parties to moderate. (The separation of powers is the obvious answer, but that would only seem to satisfy in regards to conflicts with parts of the state, not with the state as such.)

You want perfection, get god to intervene directly on every issue and end Free Will. But if you are willing to settle for humans settling their own disputes, then forget perfection and try to get it to be as good as human terms can get it.

 

[innonimatu]

I'm sure you could go on and on discussing the ethics of having a state, but I'd much rather see a useful discussion that respected the limitation of the current world. And in the current world anarchy simply cannot be a stable political regime. It will inevitably degenerate into something else. Even if the whole world suddenly became anarchic government(s) would soon emerge. Along with generalized warfare.

Cutlass is right, anarcho-capitalism could only be maintained by force. At which point it would need a state structure, try to grab the "monopoly of violence" and become a plutocracy.

@Traitorfish: states are neither legitimate not illegitimate. They simply are. Talk about legitimacy or illegitimacy is part of intra-state politics. It refers to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the ruling factions within the state, of the rules defended by the state. Even the so-called "anti-state" rebellions have always actually pushed for either replacement of that ruling elite and its rules (with some others!) or secession and the establishment of some smaller state (with other ruling elites and rules). Anarchists only exist in the time in-between, the days of fighting, the contested borderlands where they carve out their own little states (and in the process themselves deny anarchism).

Sergio Leone made many very entertaining westerns. He also made one absolutely wonderful movie (where he could have given the stereotype of the evil german officer a break, though), unfortunately very little known, "Duck, You Sucker!". Your reference to the irish and their fight against the english put me in mind of it: it features an irish republican, along with an apparently anarchistic mexican bandit. I recommend you see it. Neither of those are what they seem. The irishman looks like a revolutionary but had actually embraced the only possible form of anarchism - the individual one that can only exist in those small gaps; the mexican seemed like he was an anarchist but only becomes one after losing everything. I don't think Leone himself realized how good the story was, perhaps because the whole thing was so self-evident for him. But every new generation has to relearn it...

 

[Traitorfish]

@Traitorfish: states are neither legitimate not illegitimate. They simply are. Talk about legitimacy or illegitimacy is part of intra-state politics. It refers to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the ruling factions within the state, of the rules defended by the state.

I don't disagree, at least insofar as it concerns this particular use of "legitimate". But Cutlass, as far as I know, would subscribe to such a distinction, so it seemed like a good line of questioning to try and work out some of the grey areas in his position on unilateral secession.

Even the so-called "anti-state" rebellions have always actually pushed for either replacement of that ruling elite and its rules (with some others!) or secession and the establishment of some smaller state (with other ruling elites and rules). Anarchists only exist in the time in-between, the days of fighting, the contested borderlands where they carve out their own little states (and in the process themselves deny anarchism).

Arguably so, depending on how you theorise the state. The Weberian definition we're using here would certainly imply that the Paris Commune, the Ukranian Free Territory or CNT-controlled Catalonia constituted "states". (Personally, I don't find that theory of the state satisfying, because it neglects the mediatory function of the modern state which I regard as pretty central- but that's another topic.) And it's certainly true that these historical realities have implications for certain bodies of anarchist theory that haven't always been fully explored. (A lot of social anarchists have a very hard time getting over a "lost cause" view of the CNT, for example.)

The problem is, though, how you get to anarchism in the first place. Your typical anarcho-syndicalist, she's a utilitarian at heart; she rejects the state because she thinks the world is better off without it. This permits him a degree of pragmatism in the short term- to demand eight hour days or legal protections for trade unions or what have you. (Blatant opportunism, you might say, and he could only retort with: "Yes. And?") But not so Amadeus, who's rejection of the state is based in a particular interpretation of natural rights theory, or for that matter Park, who's rejection is the logical conclusion of his deontological pacifism. In both cases, the state is something which simply cannot be sanctioned on even the most pragmatic of grounds. And that makes things a bit more difficult, especially from the perspective of liberals who are themselves wedded to a number of similar prescriptions.

Sergio Leone made many very entertaining westerns. He also made one absolutely wonderful movie (where he could have given the stereotype of the evil german officer a break, though), unfortunately very little known, "Duck, You Sucker!". Your reference to the irish and their fight against the english put me in mind of it: it features an irish republican, along with an apparently anarchistic mexican bandit. I recommend you see it. Neither of those are what they seem. The irishman looks like a revolutionary but had actually embraced the only possible form of anarchism - the individual one that can only exist in those small gaps; the mexican seemed like he was an anarchist but only becomes one after losing everything. I don't think Leone himself realized how good the story was, perhaps because the whole thing was so self-evident for him. But every new generation has to relearn it...

I've actually seen the film (tragically overlooked, I quite agree), and that interpretation never occurred to me, but it certainly makes sense. I'll have to give it another watch with that in mind!

If they are actively harming people, when it's reasonable to react with violence comes in a lot quicker.

All states actively harm people; that's basically what they're for. So I'm afraid it remains ambiguous.

Amadeus may not think it will happen. But that is an outrageously ridiculous thing to believe.

When Europeans first colonized the Americas, it wasn't the European states colonizing, it was private adventurers and business investors. Some with Crown backing, but not with Crown governance. And these were some of the most destructive and oppressive events in human history.

Government didn't do it, but it was among the worst things humans have ever done.

Of course they made their own governments afterward, but that was in the way of justifying what they had done as private actors.

Time and time again you find private actions that are as bad and worse than government actions. This whole concept of only the government doing the bad things, or the bad things private actors do only happening because of government actions or backing is ludicrous on the face of it. There is nothing in human history that makes it appear even remotely plausible.

It is not that a stateless society would be unable to prevent horror and oppression from happening, it would in fact actively aid and abet horror and oppression.

I don't really think your examples work. Private colonies are still, to all intents and purposes, states or extensions of states, whatever the letter of the law may be. Otherwise we'd have to go around saying that, e.g. the Ottoman Empire was not a state, because the letter of the law stated that everything and everyone in it were the private property of the Sultan. They're basically examples of what happens when a state is allowed to function in an uncountable manner; if anything an argument for, not against, anarchism.

Now, you could argue that the sort of stateless-yet-capitalist society imagined by Amadeus would give rise to such an outcome, and I'm inclined to think that you may be right. (I haven't really given it much thought; it's a patently unrealisable goal, and unlike liberals I don't score any points by criticising it.) But that would constitute the re-emergence of state society, not the horrors of stateless society, so your conclusion is simply inaccurate.

So they are either horribly naive or want to set themselves up as the lords and masters. (Which for most of them is also horribly naive.)

Maybe so, but that's a different comment altogether.

Drawing differing conclusions from the evidence is one thing. But this has a lot more similarity to that Global Warming thread. One side is looking at the evidence, and the other side is ignoring the evidence and looking for some nefarious motive behind their opponents instead.

But, again, how so? It's really not sufficient to simply insist that people who disagree with you aren't looking at the evidence.

You want perfection, get god to intervene directly on every issue and end Free Will. But if you are willing to settle for humans settling their own disputes, then forget perfection and try to get it to be as good as human terms can get it.

That's not really an answer to my question. Why is it unacceptable for private parties to play arbiter in their own quarrels, but perfectly acceptable for the state to play do just that?

 

[GhostWriter16]

@kochman- You compared talking about how good FDR was while ignoring the camps to talking about Hitler while ignoring the Holocaust, then you say you liked FDR as a President.

 

[Cutlass]

All states actively harm people; that's basically what they're for. So I'm afraid it remains ambiguous.

Maybe so. But if you're going down that route, so does everything else. So There's no where else for us to go with this.

I don't really think your examples work. Private colonies are still, to all intents and purposes, states or extensions of states, whatever the letter of the law may be. Otherwise we'd have to go around saying that, e.g. the Ottoman Empire was not a state, because the letter of the law stated that everything and everyone in it were the private property of the Sultan. They're basically examples of what happens when a state is allowed to function in an uncountable manner; if anything an argument for, not against, anarchism.

Now, you could argue that the sort of stateless-yet-capitalist society imagined by Amadeus would give rise to such an outcome, and I'm inclined to think that you may be right. (I haven't really given it much thought; it's a patently unrealisable goal, and unlike liberals I don't score any points by criticising it.) But that would constitute the re-emergence of state society, not the horrors of stateless society, so your conclusion is simply inaccurate.

Potato potahto. Essentially I think we're just circling back to semantics over substance.

But, again, how so? It's really not sufficient to simply insist that people who disagree with you aren't looking at the evidence.

Then show me some.

That's not really an answer to my question. Why is it unacceptable for private parties to play arbiter in their own quarrels, but perfectly acceptable for the state to play do just that?

Private parties certainly can arbitrate their own disputes. And in most disputes that is what happens. Where the state comes in is where private parties cannot arbitrate their own disputes fairly and without violence.

If a company contaminates my water, I have no recourse other than the state. There is no way of getting redress without some force greater than the company taking my side.

So without the state, either violence or unresolved disputes are the only options.

 

[Ayatollah So]

What this [by Cutlass] seems to amount to is a criticism of the natural rights theory of property, so I have to wonder: is this the best line to take,

Answer: yes. The truth usually is.

given that you, as a liberal, hold to a stronger version of the same theory?

Rothbard et al. may regard property rights as sacrosanct, but in rejecting any state capable of enforcing them, it amounts to no more than a series of ethical claims; in practice, property rights are founded in goodwill and are thus constantly renegotiable.

O RLY?

The absence of a monopolist of force (a state) does not imply the absence of force.

Even if the whole world suddenly became anarchic government(s) would soon emerge. Along with generalized warfare.

This. Your comment reminds me of an Iraqi woman complaining about the destruction of the Iraqi state. Paraphrasing, she said that when there was one Saddam, it was horrible but at least you had some ways of dealing with it. Now there are a million little Saddams, and no way to cope, she said.

 

[Traitorfish]

Maybe so. But if you're going down that route, so does everything else. So There's no where else for us to go with this.

I wasn't clear; I mean that states are inherently violent, that their social function revolves around their ability and will to commit acts of violence upon those who transgress against the law. In that sense, the difference between a tyrannical and non-tyrannical state is a matter of degree, not a binary quality. So how much harm, and what kind of harm, is the precondition for insurrection? Do you simply mean "more harm than good", and, if so, how do we reduce the myriad concrete forms of "harm" and "good" into an abstract form permitting comparison?

Potato potahto. Essentially I think we're just circling back to semantics over substance.

No, I think this is a pretty crucial point of theory. Describing private colonies as representing a stateless society confuses their legal relationship with the metropole, i.e. their lack of direct rule by a mutually recognise sovereign, with social-political content, i.e. the presence or absence of a functioning sate. The latter was most definitely present in the various private colonies which have existed, the proprietors inevitably claiming for themselves some political hegemony entailing a monopoly on violence. You could argue that these represents the inevitable outcome of certain forms of statelessness, but it is not in itself a form of statelessness.

Then show me some.

I don't follow.

Private parties certainly can arbitrate their own disputes. And in most disputes that is what happens. Where the state comes in is where private parties cannot arbitrate their own disputes fairly and without violence.

If a company contaminates my water, I have no recourse other than the state. There is no way of getting redress without some force greater than the company taking my side.

So without the state, either violence or unresolved disputes are the only options.

But, again, what about disputes involving the state? You does the unilateral use of violence become acceptable, if only in the most general sense, because it is accompanied by a flag? You criticise Amadeus' vision of stateless capitalism by observing that the common individual would be powerless against capital without resorting to violence, but is it not also true that in a state capitalist society the individual is similarly powerless against the state, and against capital insofar as it is supported by the state?

Both Amadeus and Cutlass subscribe to a natural rights theory of property. Amadeus' variant might be described as stricter, in that he regards property as wholly inalienable, while Cutlass accepts conditional alienability. However, Cutlass' variant involves a body of heavily armed men tasked with assaulting people who transgress against private property without their say so, which in concrete terms is a far stronger theory of property rights.

This is pertinent because Cutlass' criticises Amadeus for removing the shackles from corporate power, yet would appear fully supportive of the police thumping me upside the head if I, as a common citizen, attempted to challenge this power head-on by, e.g. occupying a workplace. At least on the surface of things, it's contradictory.

 

[Cutlass]

I wasn't clear; I mean that states are inherently violent, that their social function revolves around their ability and will to commit acts of violence upon those who transgress against the law. In that sense, the difference between a tyrannical and non-tyrannical state is a matter of degree, not a binary quality. So how much harm, and what kind of harm, is the precondition for insurrection? Do you simply mean "more harm than good", and, if so, how do we reduce the myriad concrete forms of "harm" and "good" into an abstract form permitting comparison?

Everything is a matter of degree. You criticize governments for being inherently violent, well so is anarchy.

You don't get a choice between violence and no violence. At best you get a choice between constrained violence and unconstrained violence.

No, I think this is a pretty crucial point of theory. Describing private colonies as representing a stateless society confuses their legal relationship with the metropole, i.e. their lack of direct rule by a mutually recognise sovereign, with social-political content, i.e. the presence or absence of a functioning sate. The latter was most definitely present in the various private colonies which have existed, the proprietors inevitably claiming for themselves some political hegemony entailing a monopoly on violence. You could argue that these represents the inevitable outcome of certain forms of statelessness, but it is not in itself a form of statelessness.

No, I really think it is a form of statelessness. Essentially no state was involved in any aspect of control over what the colonists were doing. So they invented their own. Why is that different from what we should expect from anarchy?

I don't follow.

The theories concerning what anarchy would be, according to the anarchists from what I have seen and understand are not in any demonstrable way taken from real world evidence. It appears to be all just made up from thin air.

Show me something that would give me any reason at all to think that it's not just some hallucination.

But, again, what about disputes involving the state? You does the unilateral use of violence become acceptable, if only in the most general sense, because it is accompanied by a flag? You criticise Amadeus' vision of stateless capitalism by observing that the common individual would be powerless against capital without resorting to violence, but is it not also true that in a state capitalist society the individual is similarly powerless against the state, and against capital insofar as it is supported by the state?

That's where the Rule of Law comes in.

Both Amadeus and Cutlass subscribe to a natural rights theory of property. Amadeus' variant might be described as stricter, in that he regards property as wholly inalienable, while Cutlass accepts conditional alienability. However, Cutlass' variant involves a body of heavily armed men tasked with assaulting people who transgress against private property without their say so, which in concrete terms is a far stronger theory of property rights.

This is pertinent because Cutlass' criticises Amadeus for removing the shackles from corporate power, yet would appear fully supportive of the police thumping me upside the head if I, as a common citizen, attempted to challenge this power head-on by, e.g. occupying a workplace. At least on the surface of things, it's contradictory.

Not contradictory at all. I believe in constrained action and the Rule of Law within representative government. That is far less actual implementation of violence than what should be expected under anarchy.

 

[Traitorfish]

Everything is a matter of degree. You criticize governments for being inherently violent, well so is anarchy.

You don't get a choice between violence and no violence. At best you get a choice between constrained violence and unconstrained violence.

That's not an answer to my question. I asked how "harmful" a government has to be before we may legitimately take up arms against it, and how we know when that is; anarchy does not come into it.

No, I really think it is a form of statelessness. Essentially no state was involved in any aspect of control over what the colonists were doing. So they invented their own. Why is that different from what we should expect from anarchy?

No external state, yes, but the colonies where themselves constituted on essentailly statist lines. A body of governing individuals exists, claimed a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, the right to mediate between individual inhabitants, and so on and so forth. By any reasonable definition, that would constitute a state- or would you say that Tsarist Russia also represented a stateless society, because the Empire was ultimate the personal property of the Tsar?

Now, as I've said, you can argue that this is the inevitable outcome of a stateless capitalism (and I'd be inclined to agree), but that doesn't mean it is a stateless capitalism. Hitting the ground is not identical to falling off a cliff.

The theories concerning what anarchy would be, according to the anarchists from what I have seen and understand are not in any demonstrable way taken from real world evidence. It appears to be all just made up from thin air.

Show me something that would give me any reason at all to think that it's not just some hallucination.

What does that have to do with the critique of the state? Whether or not ones alternative vision of society is valid has no bearing on the legitimacy of their critique of existing society. You'll recall that Thomas Jefferson's vision of agrarian republicanism turned out to be a load of pants, for example, but it didn't make his critique of British oligarchy any less reasonable.

That's where the Rule of Law comes in.

The "rule of law", by which I presume you mean constitutional government, simply provides a formal framework for the relationship between the individual and the state. It rarely, if ever, carries any provisions for a rejection of that framework that don't amount to "hit him until he stops complaining".

Not contradictory at all. I believe in constrained action and the Rule of Law within representative government. That is far less actual implementation of violence than what should be expected under anarchy.

I don't think you understood. My criticism is that you reject Amadeus' stateless capitalism because it would lead to unbridled corporate power (not an unreasonable criticism), but you're quite happy to support the use of state violence to protect the initial fact of corporate power. The very malign force which you identifying as demanding the existence of a state is one which only exists because the state is there to defend it. That seems, to me, a contradiction.

(And, let's make it clear, this isn't a question of markets vs central planning, so appealing to the greater efficiency of the one over the other won't resolve this. There are models of market econonomy that don't rely on titanic corporations to function.)

 

[Cutlass]

That's not an answer to my question. I asked how "harmful" a government has to be before we may legitimately take up arms against it, and how we know when that is; anarchy does not come into it.

I don't know that there is, or can be, a hard and fast rule. As a general rule, if the government is resorting to violence to prevent even attempting to change the status quo, then taking up arms is probably legitimate.

No external state, yes, but the colonies where themselves constituted on essentailly statist lines. A body of governing individuals exists, claimed a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, the right to mediate between individual inhabitants, and so on and so forth. By any reasonable definition, that would constitute a state- or would you say that Tsarist Russia also represented a stateless society, because the Empire was ultimate the personal property of the Tsar?

Now, as I've said, you can argue that this is the inevitable outcome of a stateless capitalism (and I'd be inclined to agree), but that doesn't mean it is a stateless capitalism. Hitting the ground is not identical to falling off a cliff.

OK. But in practice I don't see where your distinction has meaning. A private company buys slaves, or enslaves people it manages to capture, and then monopolizes the use of violence. Does that make it a state, or a private concern that has abrogated to itself the rights of a state?

Semantics.

What does that have to do with the critique of the state? Whether or not ones alternative vision of society is valid has no bearing on the legitimacy of their critique of existing society. You'll recall that Thomas Jefferson's vision of agrarian republicanism turned out to be a load of pants, for example, but it didn't make his critique of British oligarchy any less reasonable.

Both sides of the coin matter. You want to criticize the state, fine. Have at it.

However, once you leave off that and offer a potential replacement, that replacement is equally open to critique.

The "rule of law", by which I presume you mean constitutional government, simply provides a formal framework for the relationship between the individual and the state. It rarely, if ever, carries any provisions for a rejection of that framework that don't amount to "hit him until he stops complaining".

Offer an alternative then. We are still at the point of: State; you want out, you can flee, you can work for change within the system, you can take up arms. Anarchy; you want out, you can flee, you can take up arms.

I don't think you understood. My criticism is that you reject Amadeus' stateless capitalism because it would lead to unbridled corporate power (not an unreasonable criticism), but you're quite happy to support the use of state violence to protect the initial fact of corporate power. The very malign force which you identifying as demanding the existence of a state is one which only exists because the state is there to defend it. That seems, to me, a contradiction.

(And, let's make it clear, this isn't a question of markets vs central planning, so appealing to the greater efficiency of the one over the other won't resolve this. There are models of market econonomy that don't rely on titanic corporations to function.)

But, you see, I'm not in it for the corporations. I'm in it for the individuals and the nation. I want to make the whole of the people better off, to maximize their freedom, liberty, and prosperity. And in doing so maximize the power and wealth of the nation. The form of the economics and the business structure is incidental to that.

Now I happen to believe that maximizing the good of the individual will maximize the good of the nation. But I do not believe that maximizing the good of the corporations will do so. What is good for GM is not what is good for America. What is good for GM's employees is what is good for America (up to a point, and what they want is not necessarily what is good for them, labor can be conservative also).

The greatest good for the greatest number, including the greatest liberty for the greatest number, which is consistent with not letting private people or organizations infringe on the good or the liberty of other private people.

If I thought that socialism would maximize the liberty and prosperity of the people and the nation, I would be for that. But I do not. Nor do I think that communism or conservatism would do so. And I certainly do not think that anarchism or libertarianism would do so.

I am a liberal-progressive because that is what I believe works better than any alternative. And, quite frankly, economic history justifies my belief.

Economics requires liberty to create prosperity. But the liberty of the individual, not the liberty of the corporation.

In recent months in a variety of threads I have spoken out against the Zero-Sum-Game. The Koch Brothers that you brought up earlier, they are the Zero-Sum-Game. They want to maximize the concentration of wealth and power, even though in doing so they crush not just liberty, but they crush the creation of wealth.

The Koch Brothers represent the eventual death of the Unites States of America. That is not hyperbole. A nation cannot prosper when all wealth and all power are concentrated in the hands of only a few. They will inevitably rig things such that no one else can create new wealth.

The problem with the libertarians in the US is that, for their own reasons, and their own logic, most of them are on the side of the Koch Brothers rather than being on the side of the liberty of the individuals. And Amadeus' version of anarcho-capitalism just takes that to its logical conclusion and the individual, and the individual's liberty, is entirely subsumed to the liberty of the corporation.

Now maybe Amadeus does not want the outcomes that the Koch Brothers want, but in the interim he is serving to help them get what they want, at the expense of the liberty of the people as a whole.

Even if he does not think that that is where his actions lead.

And that is where the intellectual bankruptcy of the whole concept of anarchism comes in. Because the only real result they can get is tyranny at the expense of liberty. Poverty at the expense of prosperity.

 

[Traitorfish]

I don't know that there is, or can be, a hard and fast rule. As a general rule, if the government is resorting to violence to prevent even attempting to change the status quo, then taking up arms is probably legitimate.

We're encountering the same problem we had with "harm" here, I think: change as such is an abstraction, a generalisation of varied and heterogeneous instances of change. All states will react to certain changes with violence- stealing a car, for example, will tend to get one knocked upside the head with a truncheon. But at the same time, few states have opposed all change so fully as to react to any change with violence, even if only change instigated from within the ruling elite. So we need to make the sort of changes that justify insurrection more specific.

OK. But in practice I don't see where your distinction has meaning. A private company buys slaves, or enslaves people it manages to capture, and then monopolizes the use of violence. Does that make it a state, or a private concern that has abrogated to itself the rights of a state?

Semantics.

Well, that's what I'm saying: the distinction between a formal state, and a private entity that has taken upon itself the functions of a state is a legal fiction. You're the one who suggested otherwise- or perhaps I'm misunderstanding?

Point being, that a stateless society is not merely a legal formality- something which would imply, for example, that pre-Roman Britain was a stateless society for the simple reason that its numerous polities did not adopt the legal form of the Classical state- but a social reality. Thus, if we see de facto states emerging, it isn't a stateless society. That doesn't invalidate the claim that stateless capitalism will produce the sort of private tyrannies you describe, simply that, in the moment they emerge, stateless ceases to be, and our terminology has to be revised to describe it more appropriately.

Both sides of the coin matter. You want to criticize the state, fine. Have at it.

However, once you leave off that and offer a potential replacement, that replacement is equally open to critique.

No doubt, but that's not the discussion we've been having. You can construct a critique of the present state of things without proposing an explicit alternative. (In practical terms, I'll grant you, the one might not be much good without the other, but that's not something that really needs to concern us here.)

Offer an alternative then. We are still at the point of: State; you want out, you can flee, you can work for change within the system, you can take up arms. Anarchy; you want out, you can flee, you can take up arms.

Why do you say that? Rothbardian anarchism does not, as I understand it, preclude any form of collective organisation- isn't a corporation a form of collective organisation? Just because "system" doesn't resemble the liberal state, lacks a technocracy to whom we can direct our policy proposals, doesn't mean that there is not a "system" in place.

*snip*

I'm sorry, but all you seem to be doing here is reaffirming your position at length. You say that you are not interested in corporate well-being, that you care about well-being of individuals. But the well-being of corporations is founded, fundamentally, in private property, an institution which you not merely defend, as Amadeus does, but demand be enforced through the use of violence, with no apparent regard for how any instance of this enforcement may effect actual individual person rather than some abstract generalised "The Individual". Is my liberty maximised by the fact that somebody else owns my house? Is anybody's liberty so maximised, except that of the people who own the houses? And yet if we failed to make the appropriate payments, you would endorse our violent expulsion. You can't tell me with a straight face that this is, in fact, a preferable state of affairs for the common plebeian, that he would be in a worse state if housing (to take only this one particular aspect of life) was accorded by need rather than by ability to pay. So, for me at least, the contradiction remains.

 

[Hygro]

This has been my favorite thread in quite a while.

 

[Cutlass]

We're encountering the same problem we had with "harm" here, I think: change as such is an abstraction, a generalisation of varied and heterogeneous instances of change. All states will react to certain changes with violence- stealing a car, for example, will tend to get one knocked upside the head with a truncheon. But at the same time, few states have opposed all change so fully as to react to any change with violence, even if only change instigated from within the ruling elite. So we need to make the sort of changes that justify insurrection more specific.

It's always specific to the situation, and the cumulative actions of either side, not to any one event. You're asking for the impossible.

Well, that's what I'm saying: the distinction between a formal state, and a private entity that has taken upon itself the functions of a state is a legal fiction. You're the one who suggested otherwise- or perhaps I'm misunderstanding?

Point being, that a stateless society is not merely a legal formality- something which would imply, for example, that pre-Roman Britain was a stateless society for the simple reason that its numerous polities did not adopt the legal form of the Classical state- but a social reality. Thus, if we see de facto states emerging, it isn't a stateless society. That doesn't invalidate the claim that stateless capitalism will produce the sort of private tyrannies you describe, simply that, in the moment they emerge, stateless ceases to be, and our terminology has to be revised to describe it more appropriately.

I don't really know how to define this so that it is not a semantic distinction. You, and I think Amadeus, appear to be saying: "I don't like the results, therefor it was a state." But if that is true, then any anarchist society is also going to be states.

No doubt, but that's not the discussion we've been having. You can construct a critique of the present state of things without proposing an explicit alternative. (In practical terms, I'll grant you, the one might not be much good without the other, but that's not something that really needs to concern us here.)

I think it does. After all, this thread is "Discussion of Anarchism", not "discussion of state". The whole point that got us down this road this far is the compare and contrast.

Why do you say that? Rothbardian anarchism does not, as I understand it, preclude any form of collective organisation- isn't a corporation a form of collective organisation? Just because "system" doesn't resemble the liberal state, lacks a technocracy to whom we can direct our policy proposals, doesn't mean that there is not a "system" in place.

I don't know precisely what Rothbard has to say. I have to filter it though what people like Amadeus has to say. And in many conversations with him the point is that all forms of redress of grievance are banned. All that's left is fight or flight.

I'm sorry, but all you seem to be doing here is reaffirming your position at length. You say that you are not interested in corporate well-being, that you care about well-being of individuals. But the well-being of corporations is founded, fundamentally, in private property, an institution which you not merely defend, as Amadeus does, but demand be enforced through the use of violence, with no apparent regard for how any instance of this enforcement may effect actual individual person rather than some abstract generalised "The Individual". Is my liberty maximised by the fact that somebody else owns my house? Is anybody's liberty so maximised, except that of the people who own the houses? And yet if we failed to make the appropriate payments, you would endorse our violent expulsion. You can't tell me with a straight face that this is, in fact, a preferable state of affairs for the common plebeian, that he would be in a worse state if housing (to take only this one particular aspect of life) was accorded by need rather than by ability to pay. So, for me at least, the contradiction remains.

You aren't really representing my position fairly. But, what really is the alternative? I am not really concerned all that much with the philosophy of it, but rather the practicalities of it.

You want a house because you need one, rather than that you have worked to earn one, who provides it? Where does it come from?

You have to create wealth before you can distribute it.

 

[Traitorfish]

It's always specific to the situation, and the cumulative actions of either side, not to any one event. You're asking for the impossible.

Then we'll settle for illustration. What kind of changes do you think justify insurrection to enact?

I don't really know how to define this so that it is not a semantic distinction. You, and I think Amadeus, appear to be saying: "I don't like the results, therefor it was a state." But if that is true, then any anarchist society is also going to be states.

What we're saying is that if it looks like a state, walks like a state and quacks like a state, then it's probably a state. Point being, when people from one state establish another state, as was the case with the various private colonies, doesn't really constitute an example of a stateless society, whatever legal fictions may be draped around the place. So it does not, on the face of things, seem to prove anything one way or the other.

I think it does. After all, this thread is "Discussion of Anarchism", not "discussion of state". The whole point that got us down this road this far is the compare and contrast.

The discussion began with Amadeus' rejection of the legitimacy of forcible suppression of Souther secession, and expanded to a discussion of the anarchist cirituq of the state more generally. "Discussion of Anarchism" is just the name the Ori gave it when he split the thread, we were never actually discussing stateless models of social organisation- at least as far as I'm aware.

I don't know precisely what Rothbard has to say. I have to filter it though what people like Amadeus has to say. And in many conversations with him the point is that all forms of redress of grievance are banned. All that's left is fight or flight.

"Banned" by who? If there's no state, how can something be disallowed? I think you're confusing a rejection of the state as a means of redress with the rejection of all means by which a redress may be pursued.

You aren't really representing my position fairly. But, what really is the alternative? I am not really concerned all that much with the philosophy of it, but rather the practicalities of it.

You want a house because you need one, rather than that you have worked to earn one, who provides it? Where does it come from?

You have to create wealth before you can distribute it.

Well, I think that I've wandered wildly off track here, so it's probably best if I go back to the original point: the comparative strength of your and Amadeus' defence of private property.

Amadeus defends private property as a moral principle and this moral obligation; we should respect the property of others because it is moral to do so, and acting morally will allow society to function harmoniously without the involvement of a state. His propertarianism is strong in a philosophical sense, in that he regards it as inalienable, and any attempt to take somebody's rightful property without their consent is immoral. (He rejects involuntarily taxation, for example.) However, in practical terms it is a fairly weak strain of propertarianism, because he rejects the legitimacy of any state capable of enforcing it through violence. Property is constructed through mutual goodwill, and any party that acts to harm others loses this goodwill, and so cannot expect others to respect their property claims.

Contrasting with this, you defend private property as an aspect of the law; we should respect the property of others because big men will hit us with sticks if we do not. It's a philosophically weak version of propertarianism, open to the appropriation of property on utilitarian grounds. (Continuing the example given above, you support involuntary taxation.) But in practical terms it is a relatively strong form of propertarianism, because you support the use of state violence to sustain it. Property is sustained through what amounts to a form of terror, the constant threat that those who refuse to respect the state-endorsed distribution of property-claims will be met with violence- even fatal violence, should the situation so escalate.

What this amounts to is the fact that, in terms of practical policy, you are far more supportive of corporate power than Amadeus is, because only you argue that there should exist a body of men who militantly defend the initial fact of corporate power, and, indeed, that this body should be funded through a generalised expropriation of wealth, i.e. taxation. Thus, it seems to me contradictory that you should raise a warning of unchecked corporate power against Amadeus, when the only one of you arguing that (not to put too fine a point on it) people who transgress against corporate power should be killed is you.

 

[Cutlass]

This has been my favorite thread in quite a while.

Why so?
Who so?
What so?

 

[ParkCungHee]

You know, for all the talk of unbridled corporate power in this thread, does Amadeus even believe that corporations would exist without the state?

Seems pretty obvious to me that without the state to enforce the fiction of a corporations existence, they'd quickly disappear.

 

[Cutlass]

You know, for all the talk of unbridled corporate power in this thread, does Amadeus even believe that corporations would exist without the state?

Seems pretty obvious to me that without the state to enforce the fiction of a corporations existence, they'd quickly disappear.

Why? They're too useful. I don't know what Ama believes on the issue, because he's let TF fight the battle for him.

However, would they disappear, or would they simply recreate as much as they needed of the state functions? What's stopping them from hiring their own police and army?

Of course, the wholesale collapse of the economy might take them out. But barring that, they would be more pervasive than ever.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Why? They're too useful.

Many things are useful about the state. If you imagine corporations would continue to exist without a state to enforce them, why not a standing military (and military-industrial complex), or a wellfare. The entire state apparatus exists because it's "too useful."

However, would they disappear, or would they simply recreate as much as they needed of the state functions? What's stopping them from hiring their own police and army?

Well, first, that would sort of remove the whole "stateless" aspect of it, but second, that would remove the thing of being "corporations."
I'm pretty familiar with the concept of economy by groups of armed men enforcing law and seizing property as they see fit, and limited liability doesn't factor into it much. Of course, if we're talking about a "breakdown of state power" not "an emergence of a stateless society", experience has shown that corporations very rarely get very far in armed conflict, at least not without a separate state offering them shelter.

 

[Ayatollah So]

Both Amadeus and Cutlass subscribe to a natural rights theory of property. Amadeus' variant might be described as stricter, in that he regards property as wholly inalienable, while Cutlass accepts conditional alienability. However, Cutlass' variant involves a body of heavily armed men tasked with assaulting people who transgress against private property without their say so, which in concrete terms is a far stronger theory of property rights.

If you'd said "Cutlass endorses property rights," you'd have a point. But the attribution of "a natural rights theory" of property remains unjustified.

 

[Cutlass]

Many things are useful about the state. If you imagine corporations would continue to exist without a state to enforce them, why not a standing military (and military-industrial complex), or a wellfare. The entire state apparatus exists because it's "too useful."

But corporations do not require taxes to function.

Well, first, that would sort of remove the whole "stateless" aspect of it, but second, that would remove the thing of being "corporations."
I'm pretty familiar with the concept of economy by groups of armed men enforcing law and seizing property as they see fit, and limited liability doesn't factor into it much. Of course, if we're talking about a "breakdown of state power" not "an emergence of a stateless society", experience has shown that corporations very rarely get very far in armed conflict, at least not without a separate state offering them shelter.

A rose by any other name... They may lose the official protection of being a "corporation". But in return for the loss of limited liability they gain immunity from liability. Since no one would have the ability to hold them responsible for their actions.

Anarchy is not good for large scale economic enterprises. A multinational would be well advised to retreat from a place where there is chaos. But if the corporations existed in a place where the government was then peacefully disbanded, it would certainly be in their economic interest to attempt to impose order. Failing that, essentially all economic activity would cease. And so there would be no way to have any organized firm.