The lack of reinforcements for Hannibal in southern Italy was primarily due to political troubles with the main Punic leadership at Carthage, not due to some Roman blockade. Besides, if the Romans can't even blockade Syracuse properly during the siege there - just one city, upon which most disposable Roman naval resources are concentrated - how the devil are they supposed to blockade all of southern Italy, let alone the entire peninsula? And Greece, with its innumerable nooks and crannies, is even harder to cover, especially when the Romans don't particularly have any incentive to keep Hannibal from getting there.I think you could be underplaying the role of naval control a little bit. Although intel at this time of any type of military movements in a field is poor which could lead to hardship in trying to obtain "control of the seas" the Romans did obtain control of the shipping lanes in Sicily. This control did pretty much stop reinforcements and resupplying of Hannibal in southern Italy. It is not absolute control of the seas but some control can be obtained.
Without the predominance of the concept of the weather gauge in the Mediterranean at this time, either side in a naval battle can choose to avoid it. Therein lies the fundamental Roman problem: they can't actually take positions that are guaranteed to close off a shoreline unless they stay close to the shore, and that means that they cover less shore...and with the low density of force to space and the fact that an individual trireme or quinquereme can't project power like a modern aircraft carrier, prevents Rome from effectively blockading any particular point on the coast.
The ideal situation would not be to prevent a landing at all, but instead to allow the landing of enemy troops, which means that you automatically know where they will have to go to get supplies - just make sure your army and your navy are in contact, so that the navy is offshore when the army heads down to the sea to get supplies. That forces the enemy to try to live off the land, which you can also hurt with a logistical "scorched earth" strategy. Of course, I personally, being a tactics whore, would rather just fight the enemy straight up, field army on field army, but that's just me.
Anyway, IMHO it's difficult if not impossible to interdict the seas this early on, and Rome certainly can't prevent Hannibal from landing in Greece if he so chooses (the original point).
True, I did cite a relatively uncommon example. I still think Laconia would make a dandy base, because Sparta is easy to capture without Nabis' walls, and close(ish) to the sea.Spartan117 said:Siege warfare for Carthage and Rome during the first 2 Punic wars was costly and inefficient. The vast majority of cities were overtaken through betrayals(opening of gate doors, etc...) and through starvation. Both Rome and Carthage tended to avoid direct assault of cities. Although both Rome and Carthage did become more competent in the ways of siege warfare as the second punic war went on.
Not the point - it's not supposed to have a reason, but instead you just plop 'em both down in each other's vicinity and say "fight"! Sort of like the quick battle mode in RTW.Spartan117 said:However I do not see Carthage warring with any of those powers as Rome was a problem in just about all their fronts. Romans were checking the advance and strength of Carthage as a result Rome was the most immediate concern. Not to mention that many Carthaginians were still bitter over Romes action in Sardinia during their mercenary war.
Also, great name.
