sydhe said:
And pepper (black, white or green) is too a spice, as well as a condiment. We just don't think of spices as being common.
Yui108 said:
Yeah, how is pepper not a spice?
Hornblower said:
Yes we need to remember that the concept of spices in 1824 is not the same as how we perceive spices today.
It wasn't
spice,
spice refers instead to clove, nutmeg and mace. I had thought I made the difference rather obvious? I italicised it for impact and was rather careful with how I used the word "That's quite right spice wasn't important" "Pepper isn't spice!" as opposed to a formulation like "That's quite right
pepper/spices wasn't important" or "pepper isn't
a spice" for instance.
sydhe said:
Since it came from India, you don't need to go to Indonesia for it.
Hornblower said:
Whether it was important enough to grab Sumatra is arguable as it has already quite rightly been pointed out... it could be sourced elsewhere much cheaper.
All these theories would be great if there was an iota of evidence to support them. But to begin: India wasn't a major exporter of pepper in the 1820s and what it did export was considered to be 'inferior' to Sumatran pepper: soils, export specialisation and relative distance favoured Sumatra. Relative distance to where? China the
largest single purchaser of pepper until well into the 1840s. And when the 'great transition' finally hit and European taste for pepper exceeded Chinese demand, Java was there to pick up the pieces thanks to the forced growth of export croup under the
cultuurstelsel. As a result of these Dutch extractions Java became the largest export of pepper from the mid-1840s until well into the 1880s when the Liberals (Max Havelaar!) caught up with the
cultuurstelsel and population growth reduced the amount of pepper under cultivation.
I also said nothing about there not being a pepper based inducement to invade. The intention in 1824 had been to clean up some of the more pressing Sumatran issues before Diponegoro began to tear Java apart in 1825, something that forced the Dutch to make hard decisions including putting the Padri War on effective hold until 1830. The Java War alone torn up the Dutch tax base in the Indies, forced it to spend up big on troops and left it with control of an island it didn't have the infrastructure in place to rule, the problems for which were compounded by the costs of the Padri War's resumption. All three forced a radical Dutch move in the
cultuurstelsel which was intended to help pay for the costs ongoing costs of policing and ruling Java. The happy result (for the Dutch) was an influx of cash that allowed it in the 1860s to strut its stuff a bit more forcefully, leading it to make some unintended acquisitions in the 1860s particularly in Borneo. However by this time the economic value of Sumatra and the collapse of effective Acehnese power - and the resulting truncation of the territory it controlled - had left the Dutch without much of an incentive to do all that much conquering and without the usual steady stream of entreats from hard-pressed Datus to liberate them from Achenese interference. These Borneo additions were built on more assiduously in the period 1870-1900 when the situation in Java was deemed to be 'safe' and the costs - in cash and diplomatic terms - were lower and the benefits - in terms of plantations - were on the increase. Pepper such as it was, was still a hot ticket but it was one of a number of options: plantation rice was the Big Thing around Medan, tea and coffee were grown in the hills, sugar-cane was grown in the deltas, gold was extracted in a number of places and so on.
The British were content not to get involved in Sumatra because British interests were satisfied. Aceh was put under the British sphere in the 1824 Treaty which owed more to the threat of another power getting involved that some fear of Dutch invasion. It was also cheaper for the British to palm off the enforcement costs to the Dutch who were obliged to 'defend' their claimed territories and keep their 'side' of the straits clear of pirates. This was of course all informed by the understanding that the Dutch were still reeling from the Java War well into the 1840s and thus weren't capable of making good on their pretensions in any case. And when they were, the British made sure to improve on their rights in respect of the Indies trade in exchange for an understanding not to interfere. There were some cases where the British refused on the understanding that peace was more desirable than war, something the Dutch listened to and ultimately places Dutch policy in Sumatra under a distinctly British umbrella: Aceh in the 1880s springs to mind. But in general it wasn't that the Dutch didn't want to but simply that they couldn't in the financial position they were in. The British for their part were content to let the Dutch take stuff so long as they got their fair share.
aronnax said:
Thanks Masada! You sorta answered my question. I blame myself for bad wording but I was wondering what was the possibility for Sumatra to fall into a British sphere of influence so that in a progressive timeline, the Dutch East Indies never held Sumatra and Sumatra was another British colony in South East Asia.
Eh, could do it that way or you could just have the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814 fall through. The other possibility would be to have the agreement that Raffles negotiated with the Minangkabau Sultanate hold, insofar as it granted the Britain sovereignty over the region. (The Minangkabu didn't fall under the 1814 Treaty because it guaranteed Dutch holdings as at 1803 and seeing as how the Padri War hadn't started in 1803, Dutch claims were not enforceable under the earlier 1814 Treaty). Or just have the Brits move harder into Aceh (and take an expansive reading of Aceh's territory which would place the northern half of Sumatra under the British sphere) as per the 1824 Treaty.