How far west could the Soviets have invaded...

Perhaps in fact (though I doubt you would be able to come up with any rigorous distinction), but not in practice. Whoever launches a preemptive attack is by definition the one that started the war to everyone that matters. Nobody seriously argues that Israel didn't start the 6-day war, for instance, though what preceded it sure as hell wasn't peace.

If the Soviets launch a preemptive strike, then to the Western public, they will be the aggressors, and public opinion will react accordingly.
I've seen people argue just that on these boards. Years ago when I was just a lurker, but still....
 
I explained why in the message which you quoted.
Because the Soviets had neither will nor ability to fight another war on attrition.
USA, on the other hand was virtually unharmed during war, controlled about half of world GDP and 2/3 of world gold reserves.

Sure, but we disbanded the vast majority of our soldiers.

How can you be more likely to be the aggressor in a potential war when you are in the process of drastically reducing the size of your military?

Just because we were in better condition to fight another war doesn't mean we were more likely to start one.
 
and the entire theory is actually based on the economic superiority of the West would either crush the totalitarian East or nukes would level everything . The disarmament was how the total nuking mentality could have his way out to the top .
 
:rolleyes:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_keren

The idea of the Italian forces as a joke is a historical myth which exists largely as a result of British propaganda.

No, it's not. Some individual units in the Italian military were on par with the best on the Allied side, and in some engagements (especially in East Africa) they fought well, but most were totally inferior in pretty much all aspects of modern warfare - tactics, strategy, leadership, equipment, supply, morale, etc.

I recommend this article: The Italian Military Enigma. It pretty much sums up all that was wrong with the Italian military, from unification to the 2nd world war.

Perhaps the most comical scene depicted by Buckley
illustrates without a doubt that the Italians had had enough of
Germans and Fascists and wanted to assist the Allies any way they
could: "Men in green field uniforms were eagerly assisting in
the unloading. I rubbed my eyes and looked again. There could
be no doubt about it. This was the Italian defending force, and
they were queueing up to help the invaders disembark their
equipment and stores.

:lol:
 
They were re-armed as early as September of 1945 before they had even left China. The American Occupational forces decided it would be best for them to stay in place and maintain order against 'bandits' until Chiang's forces could control the area, and in some places they didn't leave until 1947.

Not to mention the ones in Vietnam and Indonesia.
 
Mentioned Indonesia already more than once :p

Although Vietnam is somewhat more complex than Indonesia (if we exclude Maeda et. al.) in that the Japanese generally speaking did a little bit of both: policing the Vietnamese and arming and training them. Some did both, some did one and some just handed things over to the Vietnamese on the ground and fled. The ones who tried to actively police, without providing the benefit of training, tended to get attacked by nationalists trained by other Japanese. Pretty soon, most of the Japanese figured out that trading arms and training for peace was a Good Idea for them, looking forward as they were to go home. The Vietnamese however as they gained skills and materials then had the option to eject the Japanese - sometimes semi-peacefully, sometimes not, and sometimes not at all - a process which was, as hinted already, notable for its... unpredictability. Even areas we like to say were Japanese might have large zones where the Japanese had no practical influence at all and areas that were Vietnamese might have the reverse going as well.
 
There was a post-war Asia?
 
No, it's not. Some individual units in the Italian military were on par with the best on the Allied side, and in some engagements (especially in East Africa) they fought well, but most were totally inferior in pretty much all aspects of modern warfare - tactics, strategy, leadership, equipment, supply, morale, etc.

I recommend this article: The Italian Military Enigma. It pretty much sums up all that was wrong with the Italian military, from unification to the 2nd world war.

Ethnic jokes are, of course, common, are not told maliciously, and many are admittedly funny,
Yeah, I stopped taking the article seriously about there. Again the willingness of Italian soldiers to assist the allies against Fascism is not a reflection of their ability as soldiers, but rather one of the general attitude of Italians at that time, especially, as I said before, as a result of Fascist leaders inability to properly co-ordinate any type of coherent offensive.

The section on the first world war was particularly craptastic.
 
The fact is large numbers of Italian troops were undertrained, poorly equipped, and had horrible leadership. The units that were well equipped and properly trained were quite effective. And when proper leadership arrived the Italian Army was an integral part of Rommels war in North Africa. It isn't an insult to the Italian soldiers, but an insult to the leadership that got them in a war the were utterly unprepared for.
The Navy's biggest weakness was a fear of defeat reinforced by the belief in the reputation of the Royal Navy.

As for why it persisted, it benefitted both the Germans (they blame defeat on someone else) and the Allies (make their enemies seem easy to beat).
 
The fact is large numbers of Italian troops were undertrained, poorly equipped, and had horrible leadership. The units that were well equipped and properly trained were quite effective. And when proper leadership arrived the Italian Army was an integral part of Rommels war in North Africa. It isn't an insult to the Italian soldiers, but an insult to the leadership that got them in a war the were utterly unprepared for.
The Navy's biggest weakness was a fear of defeat reinforced by the belief in the reputation of the Royal Navy.

As for why it persisted, it benefitted both the Germans (they blame defeat on someone else) and the Allies (make their enemies seem easy to beat).

I thought it was the lack of fuel.
 
It became that, but early in the war when fuel was plentiful there was a general fear of going toe to toe with the British fleet. Of course there were engagements, but through the ranks the reputation of the Royal Navy was still strong enough to make people think twice about a fair fight.
 
Yeah, the problem with the Italian fleet was that the high command was terrified of losing it and committing it toward proper engagement, made Taranto a perfect storm.
 
Sure, but we disbanded the vast majority of our soldiers.

How can you be more likely to be the aggressor in a potential war when you are in the process of drastically reducing the size of your military?
What time period you are talking about?
Certainly Allied forces were not drastically reduced in April-May 1945, when operation against USSR could be launched.
If you mean a post-war period, Soviet army was demobilized too - you are not suggesting that Stalin would continue to keep more than 10 million army during peacetime?

Just because we were in better condition to fight another war doesn't mean we were more likely to start one.
You were not just in better condition - USSR was simply unable to fight long war anymore.
And as you know, Allies (ironically, our "allies") at least considered possibility to attack USSR in the first half of 1945.

All what USSR could hope for, should that attack happen, is to steamroll British and American forces in continental Europe, capture lots of POWs and try to sign peace on relatively favourable conditions. If you read Churchill's resolution to operation "Unthinkable", this was very much possible in his opinion - such possibility basically made British plan unfeasible. But not unthinkable.

Also, such kind of response (blitz-capturing Western Europe) was the only available Soviet counter-measure against nuclear attack from the U.S. side in period 1945-1949, until USSR got its own nukes. No surprise that the USSR continued to maintain its superiority in land forces - it was its main card to play, should another war happen.
 
What time period you are talking about?
Certainly Allied forces were not drastically reduced in April-May 1945, when operation against USSR could be launched.
If you mean a post-war period, Soviet army was demobilized too - you are not suggesting that Stalin would continue to keep more than 10 million army during peacetime?

You were not just in better condition - USSR was simply unable to fight long war anymore.

And as you know, Allies (ironically, our "allies") at least considered possibility to attack USSR in the first half of 1945.

All what USSR could hope for, should that attack happen, is to steamroll British and American forces in continental Europe, capture lots of POWs and try to sign peace on relatively favourable conditions. If you read Churchill's resolution to operation "Unthinkable", this was very much possible in his opinion - such possibility basically made British plan unfeasible. But not unthinkable.

Also, such kind of response (blitz-capturing Western Europe) was the only available Soviet counter-measure against nuclear attack from the U.S. side in period 1945-1949, until USSR got its own nukes. No surprise that the USSR continued to maintain its superiority in land forces - it was its main card to play, should another war happen.

The OP states that the period we are discussing is after the fall of Berlin. So that would be after May of 1945.

No he didn't keep 10 million men in the armed forces in peacetime, he kept 5 million :lol:

The allies demobilized far more quickly. The UK went from 5 million to 600,000 in 18 months, the U.S. from 12 million to 1.5 million over the same time period. Our demobilization process began in June 1945.

Poland was a serious political issue for Churchill. They were a major ally, and abandoning the Poles to the Soviets was a major political blow for Churchill.

The USA was certainly more able and in better condition to fight another war, of whatever length.
 
The OP states that the period we are discussing is after the fall of Berlin. So that would be after May of 1945.

No he didn't keep 10 million men in the armed forces in peacetime, he kept 5 million :lol:

The allies demobilized far more quickly. The UK went from 5 million to 600,000 in 18 months, the U.S. from 12 million to 1.5 million over the same time period. Our demobilization process began in June 1945.
And USSR reduced its army from ~11 millions to less than 3 millions in 1945-1948.
I'd say it was reasonable size for that period of time - both Britain and USA had their mainlands secured from land attacks and didn't need large ground forces.

The USA was certainly more able and in better condition to fight another war, of whatever length.
Right. And they had nukes already, which forced us to rush development of our own nuclear weapons - in devastated country with millions of starving people. I'm not blaming only USA and Britain for starting of Cold War, but IMO USSR was certainly less interested in confrontation in that period of time. Unfortunately, the Cold War was to large extent based on conflict of ideologies.
 
Yeah, I stopped taking the article seriously about there. Again the willingness of Italian soldiers to assist the allies against Fascism is not a reflection of their ability as soldiers, but rather one of the general attitude of Italians at that time, especially, as I said before, as a result of Fascist leaders inability to properly co-ordinate any type of coherent offensive.

The section on the first world war was particularly craptastic.

Thanks for proving that you didn't read it, or if you did, understand it.

Italian soldier as a person wasn't significantly different from any other. The point is that the Italian military as a system was hopeless - inefficient, inept, corrupt, obsolete, inadequate. If it hadn't been for Germany buttressing it, it would have collapsed in a year since it entered the war against the Allies.

Ergo, it was a joke, and my original point stands. Italians weren't viewed as the real enemy, they actually evoked pity among the Allied servicemen.
 
From the 1960s, American commanders themselves didn't think they could defend West Germany against a full-scale conventional invasion. The necessary men and arms weren't in Europe, and the guys there were just cannon fodder. A lot would have depended on how the French mobilized in the interval, but a conquest of these territories would have been too costly for the Soviets while the strategic priorities of both parties were moving in any case to fighting through others in the Third World and outwitting each other in the nuclear race.
 
Back
Top Bottom