All states are mainted by force- all governments I know of consider rebellion to be treason, including if carried out by a majority of the people.
All right, let me be clearer. Yes, all governments are maintained by force
in the sense that they will meet any attempt to remove them
by force with force of their own. However, most governments, at least most in vaguely enlightened countries, are not such that they will meet
all attempts to remove them (whether by force of not) with force of their own. If Labour lose the next election they are unlikely to respond by calling out the army and putting David Cameron under house arrest. That is what distinguishes a democratic government from one like Robert Mugabe's, which is maintained by force
alone since it meets all opposition with force.
So if you're trying to show that all governments are equally culpable when it comes to the use or threat of force, you haven't done so. If you're not trying to show that then I'm not sure what the relevance is of whatever it is that you're trying to show.
The idea of an "occupying force" implies illegitimacy, which was my original argument. I should also point out that by your logic all governments are occupying forces, as I have demonstrated above.
Not so, for the reason given above.
1- My argument is that the idea of self-determination and "freedom" in the sense you speak of are themselves trite.
I don't see an argument to this effect. At any rate you haven't addressed what I said about the degrees of self-determination.
2- Your definition of "societies" is itself arbitrary. As demonstrated by the sheer number of conflicts over borders (Tibet as an "integral" part of China, questions of an independent Pakistan nation-state, whether it covers what is now Bangladesh, and disputes with India, the collapse of Yugoslavia despite it's having been formed by nationalist ambition, etc), the borders between them are not clear. From a rational perspective, what point is there in making the distinction between them? (As opposed to between states)
The use of vagueness of borders to assert the non-existence or arbitrariness of categories is an invalid move, although people often make it. The fact that the border between one category and another is fuzzy and hard to define does not mean that the category is a purely arbitrary or fictional one. For example, it is an absolutely objective fact that my father has grey hair and that I do not. There is nothing arbitrary about saying that someone whose hair is entirely grey has grey hair, and there is nothing arbitrary about saying that someone whose hair is not grey at all (as I fondly imagine to be my case) does not have grey hair. And yet the border between the two states is notoriously hard to pin down. There is no obvious point at which a person who is going grey can be said to start being grey-haired, because the transition is gradual. And we can think of many similar cases (a 20-year-old is young, and an 80-year-old is old, but where is the point of transition? a four-foot-tall person is short, and a seven-foot-tall person is tall, but where is the point of transition? etc.).
Now there are all kinds of paradoxes one can construct as a result of this, including many versions of the famous sorites paradox (a single grain of sand is not a heap; a pile of 1,000 grains of sand is a heap; adding a single grain to a pile that is
not a heap will not turn it into a heap; it follows that if you add grains one by one to a single grain of sand it will not be a heap, but this is paradoxical). But these problems are caused by the difficulty of defining liminal cases and determining which categories they fall into. They do not disprove the existence of those categories, any more than the difficulty of saying whether partially grey person counts as being grey-haired or not disproves the existence of grey-haired people.
Similarly, the fact that one cannot clearly draw the borders of a society doesn't disprove the existence of that society. Indeed it's an obvious fact of life that societies exist from the experiential point of view. When I moved from London to Singapore I found many differences beyond the purely geographical and physical: linguistic, cultural, and practical. That is a different society. Whether or not there is an objectively existing entity to which the word "society" refers is an entirely different matter, a metaphysical one which is irrelevant to political discussions; even the most thoroughgoing nominalist can use the word "society" with meaning. The whole point of nominalism is to explain how terms of this kind can have meaning even in the absence of objectively existing abstracta. It seems to me that you're constructing nominalist-type arguments to disprove the objective existence of such abstracta, and then interpreting the conclusions in the way that a realist about such things would, with the result that you're denying the validity of such terms at all.
It demonstrates that nothing approaching a state of total freedom exists- even the ideal of people determining their own governments does not occur in the real world (including in states percieved to be democratic).
I don't see how an observation about the governments that existed in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries demonstrates anything of the kind. Still, I think what I've already said addresses your main point here.
I may be over-sensitive to such ideas, but they tend to be overly common- people talk of such ideas as "Englishmen" and "Americans" as if they were natural rather than social constructs.
Maybe so, but I think you're overlooking the fact that even social constructs are important and powerful. To put it bluntly, the mere fact that something is invented by people doesn't mean it's not real, as is demonstrated by the fact that I am managing to sit on this chair. Social constructs may not have the same kind of reality that physical artefacts do, but that doesn't stop them being real at
some level, even if it is only the experiential one. If Blair is English and Bush is American, then that is a fact, even though it is a fact that depends upon human society. One does not distinguish between them in that way purely arbitrarily; one cannot with equal legitimacy say that Blair is American and Bush is English (unless one is trying to make some kind of satirical comment about the Special Relationship, but even then it is the fact that what you're saying is in the literal sense false that draws attention to its intent).
Such an argument is admittedly consistent, but logically leads to the conclusion that all governments are illegitimate.
Only if one combines it with the assertion that all governments maintain their power through force alone, which as I've indicated would clearly be a false assertion.
To be honest, my argument is more that freedom is impossible and other things are to be valued. The question I assume is likely to be disputed is if all governments are of necessity maintained by force.
Personally I agree with you that other things are to be valued above political freedom. But I disagree that political freedom is impossible even if it can never be absolute.
The only difference is that children eventually get the vote- assuming for the sake of argument (in the real world, it is not my posistion) that freedom is an inherent human right, all of them are morally wrong.
I don't think you've answered the question whether you think that the disenfranchisement of children
is morally indistinguishable from the disenfranchisement of the other groups. Do you think that the fact that children eventually get the vote makes a moral difference to their disenfranchisement?
This of course overlooks the fact that there are obviously other salient differences too, such as the fact that children lack the ability to exercise the vote in an informed and responsible way. Give them the vote and you pave the way for the Chocolate Party to take permanent power. That seems to me a powerful
moral, and not merely expedient, reason for denying them the vote, which does not apply to the other groups mentioned. So that's a significant difference quite distinct from the fact that children eventually get the vote.