Kant :\

[Kyriakos]

^Wouldn't it be the 'same' if we are just examining (inevitably) our own mind, regardless of doing it via examining external stuff? Ultimately we only sense and theorise in a human manner, by definition we cannot make up any notion which is not inherently/potentially part of our consciousness.

Maybe no over-reality exists. But even if it does that doesn't have to mean that our human reality is less important than if there was no over-reality. At least that is my view.
"Man is the meter of all things" is a practical (if not an argument, of course) stance on this matter.

 

[TheMeInTeam]

I think it's more practical to take a stance where you compare your observations with those of others and behave in a way that gives predictably good outcomes relative to what you want to happen.

As far as our conceptualization goes it makes more sense that there is an over-reality than isn't, because otherwise we'd have to assume that it's simply our own observation showing us that (almost) everyone sees basic things similarly.

Each of us is master of our own universe/reality type interpretations only seem to work if we assume that our minds trick us into believing there's an external reality we can test against. I suppose that isn't impossible, but why would we be interested in that theory over other theories? Do you find the idea that your existence is only so much as my interpretation allows it to be appealing...or that you reading these lines essentially fabricated the sequence in such a way that I would ask that question and have you consider it when actually I'm not real in the traditional sense?

I can't see a way to falsify it, but it's more convoluted and detailed than an interpretation of an over-reality and so I penalize it for that.

 

[Kyriakos]

^Not all idealism is solipsism, and not all views that there is either no over-reality or there is no human access to it are leading to solipsism (or even more care for one's own world of thought; they may lead to other stuff, including nihilism or fatalism).

Personally i think that whether an over-reality exists (by which i mean some set over-real view of something; i think things do exist separated from any objerver, but not having to be tied to any hypothetical over-observer/god/analogous/isomorphic) or not is not really having to do with how we identify things mentally/thought-wise and emotionally. We are locked in our own mind, more or less. Some things are 'similar' in all humans, some (most) are not similar or stable in any system where they come across as similar. Eg if i say 'circle' you won't think i mean a square, but this doesn't mean you have an identical mental event to my own in your mind while thinking of 'circle'.

 

[Kyriakos]

PS, i was reading about the 19th century logician, Frege (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gottlob_Frege), due to his view on Kant on some problem with Kantian view of arithmetic. On another issue Frege argued that some logical statements can include both an object in the logical set (so-called 'predicate', i hate those terms though) and a 'sense' of it which may differ from the set predicate. Eg one might claim that "Socrates is a human", and another might sense Socrates or Is or Human in a manner particular which renders the sentence false in his/her own reading (eg if one thinks that Socrates literally was a goat, it follows he was not a human ).

Although this is not very refined philosophy (by Frege), and moreover it is of interest to note that Socrates himself presented this in far more depth, in the dialogue with Theaetetos, on Science. Basically there is an over-issue with logic systems, in that they cannot account for non-finite numbers of particular senses of terms, while dialectics is rooted in that. (historically, Logic was presented by Aristotle as a replacement of dialectics. The latter inherently have no axioms).

 

[Mouthwash]

As per Kant being unreadable or unintelligible (besides what Angst pointed out), the same was said of Herakleitos. It often helps to read a writer in the original language. I've found Kant's Kritik nor Herakleitos' fragments unintelligible or dark. I found both rather clear, actually.

German must be one heck of a language:

"But is it really necessary that, if effects are phenomena, the causality of their cause, which cause itself is phenomenal, could be nothing but empirical; or is it not possible, although for every phenomenal effect a connection with its cause, according to the laws of empirical causality, is certainly required, that empirical causality itself could nevertheless, without breaking in the least its connection with the natural causes, represent an effect of a non-empirical and intelligible causality, that is, of a caused action, original in respect to phenomena, and in so far not phenomenal: but, with respect to this faculty, intelligible, although, as a link in the chain of nature, to be regarded as entirely belonging to the world of sense?" -Critique of Pure Reason, page 372

 

[Flying Pig]

Not to mention that Heraclitus' fragments are only snippets of what he actually wrote, and we don't have the surrounding material, which means that their interpretation can only rest on a lot of assumption, at the best of times. At the worst, they're definitely and probably intentionally difficult to pin down to an exact meaning. To pick out a few:

The transformations of Fire: first, sea; and of the sea half is earth, half whirlwind ...
Sea pours out, and is measured by the same amount as before it became earth.

If there were no sun, on account of the other stars it would be night.

Hearing they do not understand, like the deaf. Of them does the saying bear witness: 'present, they are absent.'

This comes back to what I said about context - who are 'they'? Without that, you can't understand what Heraclitus meant. Somebody quoted it to refer to a particular group of people, but it's possible and even likely that he had a different group in mind.

 

[Kyriakos]

^"Present-absent" was already a saying in the ancient era (still is here, 'παρόντες-απόντες')

Some (not a majority of what we have, though) of the sentences by Herakleitos juxtapose what 'most people' do, to what very few do. Eg "Most people forget what they do when awake, much like they they forget their dreams". Although the 'present absent' can easily refer to a whole load of other things, as in the 'eternal flux' in Herakleitan philosophy.

 

[Agent327]

It can, but in this case there is no need to speculate. By the way, that it's an antique saying should be obvious from the fact that Herakleitos refers to it a s a saying.

Not to mention that Heraclitus' fragments are only snippets of what he actually wrote, and we don't have the surrounding material, which means that their interpretation can only rest on a lot of assumption, at the best of times. At the worst, they're definitely and probably intentionally difficult to pin down to an exact meaning. To pick out a few:

Hearing they do not understand, like the deaf. Of them does the saying bear witness: 'present, they are absent.'

This comes back to what I said about context - who are 'they'? Without that, you can't understand what Heraclitus meant. Somebody quoted it to refer to a particular group of people, but it's possible and even likely that he had a different group in mind.

A different group than a particular group? So a non-particular group? Anyway, while it's true that Herakleitos only survives in fragments, that doesn't exclude the obligation to see these fragments as a whole. It is indeed remarkable that all of his fragments seem consistent - although some may be incoherent, simply because the original context is missing. In this particular case one may think of 'human (ideas) are like childrens' toys'. So indeed he may be speaking of humans in general, rather than in particular.

German must be one heck of a language:

"But is it really necessary that, if effects are phenomena, the causality of their cause, which cause itself is phenomenal, could be nothing but empirical; or is it not possible, although for every phenomenal effect a connection with its cause, according to the laws of empirical causality, is certainly required, that empirical causality itself could nevertheless, without breaking in the least its connection with the natural causes, represent an effect of a non-empirical and intelligible causality, that is, of a caused action, original in respect to phenomena, and in so far not phenomenal: but, with respect to this faculty, intelligible, although, as a link in the chain of nature, to be regarded as entirely belonging to the world of sense?" -Critique of Pure Reason, page 372

It is. I would imagine such a sentence would be daunting to anyone unfamiliar with philosophy, but it's perfectly logical. And if you read through the whole sentence it's also not obscure, simply because it's long or seemingly repetitive. Legal texts often may seem obscure to the uninitiated, but they always make sense, logically.

Although this is not very refined philosophy (by Frege), and moreover it is of interest to note that Socrates himself presented this in far more depth, in the dialogue with Theaetetos, on Science.

That should be Plato, obviously, on knowledge. We have no clue what Socrates thought of science.

^Agent, you already were caught making up stuff on the spot and don't seem to care about telling lies -for whatever strange reason.

I hate to burst your bubble, my young friend, but I haven't looked at any Greek text since 1983 (the year my pre-Socratics edition dates to).

 

[Kyriakos]

^Ok, in that case, i am willing to retract the 'lie' part. It would be very beneficial if antagonism can be toned down, though

And the socratic dialogue is termed in the original, "Peri Epistemes", and episteme is not 'knowledge', the latter being 'gnosis'. It usually is translated as 'science' in english. Tied to it is the english term 'epistemic' (and 'epistemology, by extension). Also you would recall that the famous saying by Socrates on knowing one thing, again uses another root for know, "οίδα" (itself iirc a variation of "είδα", the latter literally meaning 'to see').
Of course the dialogue is about knowledge, but with the end of establishing if an episteme can actually exist. For knowledge in the set context of a field (eg practical knowledge, such as how to make a chariot as is used as example in that dialogue) can exist. It just isn't epistemic in this context.

As for me, i know that we should not be fighting. ^^ (beats the purpose in a philosophy thread as well)

 

[Bootstoots]

That's not an aphorism at all, and it depends how you look at it. Perhaps you think that 'you can never step in the same river twice' is also an aphorism?



I do not read anything you write if it's in Greek, frankly. You see, this isn't a Greek forum. It's an English forum. And you're not Herakleitos either, so I'm not particularly interested in your questions.



There's no such thing as 'ancient Greek'. it's called classic Greek. and then you have of course the various dialects used all over the (classical) Greek world.



You can harp on all you want, you haven't said a single thing discussing anything I said.

Summing up, on the topic of Kant you apparently have nothing much to say besides he uses neologisms and writes boring. Neologisms are actually quite common in philosophy, and that didn't start with Kant.

^Agent, you already were caught making up stuff on the spot and don't seem to care about telling lies -for whatever strange reason. On my part i shouldn't have to bother reporting you just so as to get you to stop trolling. Consider this the end of myself caring of your posts here, if you will.

Moderator Action: This exchange ends now.
Please read the forum rules: http://forums.civfanatics.com/showthread.php?t=422889

 

[Agent327]

And the socratic dialogue is termed in the original, "Peri Epistemes", and episteme is not 'knowledge', the latter being 'gnosis'. It usually is translated as 'science' in english. Tied to it is the english term 'epistemic' (and 'epistemology, by extension). Also you would recall that the famous saying by Socrates on knowing one thing, again uses another root for know, "οίδα" (itself iirc a variation of "είδα", the latter literally meaning 'to see').
Of course the dialogue is about knowledge, but with the end of establishing if an episteme can actually exist. For knowledge in the set context of a field (eg practical knowledge, such as how to make a chariot as is used as example in that dialogue) can exist. It just isn't epistemic in this context.

I appreciate your explanation. but the point was that the dialogue is about knowledge, not science. (That's why the title is usually translated as 'On knowledge' and not as 'On science'.) Science is knowledge, and so is gnosis (in the Gnostic sense), but they're not identical or interchangeable.

 

[Kyriakos]

^

Has to do with the platonic view that while there is knowledge in specific contexts/systems (eg in a practical issue of how to make something, or in proving a theorem, etc) this knowledge is not examined - or inherently allowing for such examination - far enough to be able to stand regardless of context. Tied to the issue of logic vs dialectics, lack of axioms and existence of an axiom base

Also part of why Plato seems to not have liked fields of knowledge which feature external objects, such as astronomy and physics.

 

[Agent327]

Yes, that would be actual science, wouldn't it? Which might not really fit in well with his Ideas. Mind you, there actually is a philosophy of science, but Plato doesn't feature large in it.