Kant :\

[Kyriakos]

Transcendental (to use that example) is also used in mathematics. Kant simply uses the word in a different sense.

As per Kant being unreadable or unintelligible (besides what Angst pointed out), the same was said of Herakleitos. It often helps to read a writer in the original language. I've found Kant's Kritik nor Herakleitos' fragments unintelligible or dark. I found both rather clear, actually.

^I have to doubt you read both (?), cause there is simply zero similarility in the writing style of Herakleitos to that of Kant. The former is termed "dark" not due to using convoluted terms or neologisms, but due to very deliberately (as argued also by Socrates) presenting short sentences with many possible metaphorical meaning. Eg "Time is a child playing with pawns".
Contrast that to Kant and even his first paragraphs of Critique of Pure Reason:

I. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge

That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it.

But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to be answered at first sight, whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions? Knowledge of this kind is called a priori, in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience.

But the expression, "a priori," is not as yet definite enough adequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question above started. For, in speaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience, we are wont to say, that this or that may be known a priori, because we do not derive this knowledge immediately from experience, but from a general rule, which, however, we have itself borrowed from experience. Thus, if a man undermined his house, we say, "he might know a priori that it would have fallen;" that is, he needed not to have waited for the experience that it did actually fall. But still, a priori, he could not know even this much. For, that bodies are heavy, and, consequently, that they fall when their supports are taken away, must have been known to him previously, by means of experience.

By the term "knowledge a priori," therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience. Knowledge a priori is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge a priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, "Every change has a cause," is a proposition a priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.

Already he uses a priori and a posteriori along with his new 'analytic and synthetic' knowledge to come a couple of paragraphs later, to work as subgroups of the above. Add that to pure and impure, and later on transcendental, and you have most of his work being categories that make no sense to anyone who has not read the book, and to anyone having read the book they read as arbitrary as setting own axioms to something and then arguing that in your own set axioms this has reason to be stated.

 

[Atticus]

---
You're reproducing a stereotype of academic arrogance and philosophic epeen. Now, I know that some people are like that. But some, probably many, aren't.
---

Well yes, I was painting with a broad brush there. Some of the Heidegger people really seem to be sincere and want to explain the things. Some of them seem to just want to look and sound smart (perhaps subconsciously). I don't know what would be the litmus test for differentiating them and am fully aware that my gut feeling may very well be deceptive. I've been accused of trying to sound smart too, so I know it is a below-the-belt punch. At the same time it would be naive to say that no academic ever does it.

I'm in a bit hurry, so can't discuss this in more detail (although I really would like to), but there's one way you can show me wrong: point me to a text that explains Heidegger's ideas clearly. Or at least attempts to.

[On the terms "Heideggerian" and "Heidegger people", when I was a student, he had an almost cult following in our university. By those terms I mean these cultists.]

 

[Terxpahseyton]

I think if the categories or words you create do not refer to actual things, but mere concepts - which is the case at lot in philosophy - and if you actually need those words to convey your idea / point, then you are doing something wrong. If you only use your special words to make conveying the idea more efficient, because you can use them as placeholders for other ideas already conveyed, but if you had to, you could also get by without them, then I think you are doing it right.

 

[Angst]

Well yes, I was painting with a broad brush there. Some of the Heidegger people really seem to be sincere and want to explain the things. Some of them seem to just want to look and sound smart (perhaps subconsciously). I don't know what would be the litmus test for differentiating them and am fully aware that my gut feeling may very well be deceptive. I've been accused of trying to sound smart too, so I know it is a below-the-belt punch. At the same time it would be naive to say that no academic ever does it.

Oh I know that feeling. It perhaps doesn't show in English but I kind of talk in quite technical terms a lot, and I've been berated by people a lot over it. But it's seriously not an epeen thing. I'd much prefer to be street smart (or whatever it's called) and chat more relaxed with people. I just don't.

I'm in a bit hurry, so can't discuss this in more detail (although I really would like to), but there's one way you can show me wrong: point me to a text that explains Heidegger's ideas clearly. Or at least attempts to.

I can't. I think Heidegger in particular is too complicated to really boil down. But there's plenty of philosophers that can be boiled down real nice and simple (the reduction does however also turn the thought systems really really oversimplified - but it's possible). Descartes, Plato and Sartre are all fast understandable in a fundamental way. Husserl for example is a good example of something that's really iffy to wrap your head about but if you get the abridged version. Let's try.

~

Husserl created what is called phenomenology. It's all about trying to gain knowledge about things by looking into how the world appears for you. You shouldn't care about the world independent of what you experience. This means that subjectivity and subjective impressions shouldn't be dismissed, but that they are fundamental to gaining knowledge. Then you eventually gain objective knowledge about the world as it is subjectively experienced.

~

Of course this is, as I talked about, an oversimplification (when you get into it, it approaches some form of objectivity, it's just in a different way than other philosophical schools approach it), I think it's somewhat clear but I'm sure other people can formulate it better.

Différance is another massively complex concept that can be boiled down to, say:

~

When you think about it, you can only explain a word by using other words. As such, explaining a word moves the burden of meaning unto other words. Words don't mean anything without this system.

~

I think I succeeded more there, hm? Dunno.

The point was more that when philosophers (in general, not Heidegger in particular) speak in advanced language, many people dismiss their work as jargon, and when they speak in simplified terms, many people dismiss their work as bloated. Which may be true in some philosophers' cases, but still, it's a toxic environment, and in a democracy, people vote for things. The Danish humanities had their funding gutted recently and I don't like that. In a democracy, people's votes are driven by what they believe is important. It's the same issue in USA with the creationist/anti-scientific movement. Academia cares about what the people thinks because it taxes heavily on the resources that are needed to conduct complex research.

[On the terms "Heideggerian" and "Heidegger people", when I was a student, he had an almost cult following in our university. By those terms I mean these cultists.][/QUOTE]

Well, your position makes sense. I don't even know if I know Heidegger myself. I'm just hesitant to engage in the rhethoric because I dislike the toxic discussions of humanities overall. That is, I must be similarly irrational about the whole thing.

 

[Kyriakos]

I Kant understand philosophers who write really dense tomes. It's like they're not even Humean.

 

[Atticus]

I think I succeeded more there, hm? Dunno.

Both were excellently explained. Although, I don't know if I had understood Husserl in so short if I didn't know of his thoughts already.

Anyhow, my antipathies aren't with philosophers in general, it's just a few of them, and even those I haven't read enough to be sure if they're really trying or not.

The question worth an own thread would be how do you know when someone's just trying to sound smart and when he's got a point. This isn't only in philosophy, but elsewhere too: business, politics etc. Charlatans know that if they're confident enough they rarely get busted. I really suppose though that it's more complicated: that most people can't really tell the difference on the motives of them using one word instead of another.

 

[Angst]

Completely understand your position about certain philosophies. Husserl was actually a problem to me until the professor, after we had prepared for class, summarized something akin to the above in front of us, and then it suddently clicked.

And I agree it might be a thread's worth of material, but I'm really unsure how to determine that kind of thing. I don't think I could add anything competent to the thread beyond the position that I think more people are enthusiastic rather than manipulative about it. It's solely based on people I know myself. So it's purely anectodical, and probably a little naive.

One of my professors have claimed, probably correctly, that humanities academics have issues properly mediating their knowledge to the public, often because they cannot translate technical language correctly, because of an ivory tower-like structure in the academic world (in this instance, not a bad thing; the academics still produce relevant research, they're just bafflingly incompetent at democratizing the knowledge)

 

[Zkribbler]

Well, German is pretty big on compound words and we really do constantly make up new ones.

Wir upwurdsgemachen.

 

[Agent327]

^I have to doubt you read both (?), cause there is simply zero similarility in the writing style of Herakleitos to that of Kant. The former is termed "dark" not due to using convoluted terms or neologisms, but due to very deliberately (as argued also by Socrates) presenting short sentences with many possible metaphorical meaning. Eg "Time is a child playing with pawns".

Actually, I read both in the original - simply because I wanted to. Secondly, I just pointed out Kant wasn't making a neologism. I didn't mention Kerakleitos because of neologisms, but because both have, in different periods, been stigmatized as being incomprehensible. (Not because of their style, which obviously is quite different.)

Contrast that to Kant and even his first paragraphs of Critique of Pure Reason

I will. Kant is, following a long tradition, is setting out the parameters of the Kritik. (You will find the same in, say, Spinoza's Ethica.) Something with ancient philosophers would be thoroughly unfamiliar with. (By the way, this translation is not very good. adequate, but no more than that.) If I contrast this with, say, Sartre, I'd have to say Kant is the epitomy of clarity. I read Sartre in middle school for my exam and I couldn't get out a simple answer to the obvious question: What is existentialism? (I wouldn't have any trouble now, but that's beside the point.) In short, in the paragraph quoted the essence of all is in the first line; what follows is just clarification and/or illustration.

Already he uses a priori and a posteriori along with his new 'analytic and synthetic' knowledge to come a couple of paragraphs later, to work as subgroups of the above. Add that to pure and impure, and later on transcendental, and you have most of his work being categories that make no sense to anyone who has not read the book, and to anyone having read the book they read as arbitrary as setting own axioms to something and then arguing that in your own set axioms this has reason to be stated.

Well, categories are kind of central to the Kritik, yes. (Categories being, of course, a very old term first used in Greek philosophy.) And I'm not sure why you would understand any philosophical work properly when not actually having read it. But the same applies to, say, Kafka. But the difference with Kafka is that Kant's work can actually be summarized for those who don't wish to be bothered to read it themselves. Summarizing Kafka, on the other hand, is quite pointless. The point of a writer is to be read, not to be summarized.

Coming back to the difference between Kant and, say, Plato, it will be obvious that later philosophers will be substantially more complex than ancient one - if only simply because they have digested all the philosophy in between. Plato only appears more clear and possibly simple because of the period he belongs to; this would have been impossible if he had been a late medieval or later philosopher.

 

[Kyriakos]

Actually, I read both in the original - simply because I wanted to.

^You read Herakleitos in the original? Είναι όμοια οδός η άνω και η έτερη;

 

[Kyriakos]

Agent, you are still here? I am very surprised you ventured onto claims that you even read the original of Herakleitos. I sincerely doubt it, and it was very strange a claim. Feel free to use this opportunity to present me as in the wrong, though. Will you bother to reply or are you busy trying to google a response?

The bit you edited - seemingly to try to speak against Plato - only makes your post seem all the more unfamiliar with philosophy, so do explain if you seriously argue you read ancient greek, cause we can have an exchange on that, i am sure. But i do mean to safeguard the thread against outright lies, so you should at least back your quite surprising claim to read the language and understand it that well.

 

[Agent327]

Your assumptions and insinuations are neither here nor there - nor are they touching on any actual subject. If and when you have anything to say on the subject I am willing to continue. To wit: I did not 'speak against Plato', I was making a comparison. Try and discuss that for a change.

 

[Kyriakos]

Your assumptions and insinuations are neither here nor there - nor are they touching on any actual subject. If and when you have anything to say on the subject I am willing to continue. To wit: I did not 'speak against Plato', I was making a comparison. Try and discuss that for a change.

Actually my question in greek is entirely on the subject, being tied to a wording of Herakleitos.
Well, i typed in greek, to ask you so as to see if you read greek. Apparently you do not. Yet you did not mind claiming you do.
Or do you think it would be right to just accept your claim your read Herakleitos in the ancient greek, as if you just claimed you did something everyone here does? Moreover, my question included a work of Herakleitos, so had you actually read the few fragments there you would be able to reply instead of your current answer. So pls don't make lies, moreso when i gave you the opportunity to show that i was wrong in thinking you were making this up, and you chose to redirect us to a field with singing crickets.
There can be no discussion if each of us claims whatever, but refuses to back up their claims.

 

[Valka D'Ur]

Actually my question in greek is entirely on the subject, being tied to a wording of Herakleitos.
Well, i typed in greek, to ask you so as to see if you read greek. Apparently you do not. Yet you did not mind claiming you do.

Well, I don't read Greek, at least not more than a few words I've learned to recognize, along with most of the alphabet. I couldn't string together any kind of sentence, coherent or not, to save my life (how's that for honesty? ).

And since forum rules say that you have to provide a translation, what did you type?

 

[Kyriakos]

Well, I don't read Greek, at least not more than a few words I've learned to recognize, along with most of the alphabet. I couldn't string together any kind of sentence, coherent or not, to save my life (how's that for honesty? ).

And since forum rules say that you have to provide a translation, what did you type?

It was about one of the most famous aphorisms by Herakleitos, one claiming that 'The road upwards is the same as the road downwards', i was asking on that, namely if it is indeed the same.

 

[Agent327]

That's not an aphorism at all, and it depends how you look at it. Perhaps you think that 'you can never step in the same river twice' is also an aphorism?

Actually my question in greek is entirely on the subject, being tied to a wording of Herakleitos.
Well, i typed in greek, to ask you so as to see if you read greek. Apparently you do not. Yet you did not mind claiming you do.

I do not read anything you write if it's in Greek, frankly. You see, this isn't a Greek forum. It's an English forum. And you're not Herakleitos either, so I'm not particularly interested in your questions.

Or do you think it would be right to just accept your claim your read Herakleitos in the ancient greek, as if you just claimed you did something everyone here does?

There's no such thing as 'ancient Greek'. it's called classic Greek. and then you have of course the various dialects used all over the (classical) Greek world.

Moreover, my question included a work of Herakleitos, so had you actually read the few fragments there you would be able to reply instead of your current answer. So pls don't make lies, moreso when i gave you the opportunity to show that i was wrong in thinking you were making this up, and you chose to redirect us to a field with singing crickets.
There can be no discussion if each of us claims whatever, but refuses to back up their claims.

You can harp on all you want, you haven't said a single thing discussing anything I said.

Summing up, on the topic of Kant you apparently have nothing much to say besides he uses neologisms and writes boring. Neologisms are actually quite common in philosophy, and that didn't start with Kant.

 

[Kyriakos]

^Agent, you already were caught making up stuff on the spot and don't seem to care about telling lies -for whatever strange reason. On my part i shouldn't have to bother reporting you just so as to get you to stop trolling. Consider this the end of myself caring of your posts here, if you will.

 

[TheMeInTeam]

Of course we are limited by our observations.

But to the best of our ability to observe, reality goes on regardless of how effectively we observe it. I like the map/territory analogy on lesswrong, as in we get better maps over time but they still don't become the latter (IE reality).

The way our knowledge progressed over time is decent evidence of "truth" beyond our ability to test/observe, even if we're very likely modeling it more closely now than 200 years ago.

 

[Kyriakos]

Of course we are limited by our observations.

But to the best of our ability to observe, reality goes on regardless of how effectively we observe it. I like the map/territory analogy on lesswrong, as in we get better maps over time but they still don't become the latter (IE reality).

The way our knowledge progressed over time is decent evidence of "truth" beyond our ability to test/observe, even if we're very likely modeling it more closely now than 200 years ago.

A question is if this truth is some truth not entirely of our own mind, though. By which i mean that we may just be observing parameters in our own mind, regardless of there being an external world. The latter just doesn't feature in any way linked to some reality of it (if that exists) as a 'thing in itself', ie as that external world would be if not formed in the mind of us or some other specific observer.

Kant thinks that we have some tie to that, but a secondary tie, much like Aristotle did. Personally i doubt we have even a secondary tie, or any tie at all. We are observing, but maybe this means we react to the existence of anything we observe, by reshaping parameters in our own mental world, and never actually retaining something of the external object.
A rather dreadful error (glaring error moreso) by Kant is that he thinks (expresses it clearly in these words) that he is the first philosopher to ask for the mind/human pov to be taken into account when dealing with external 'reality'. Considering that Plato (and others a bit before him, eg Anaxagoras, Parmenides, Protagoras etc) lived roughly 2000 years before Kant, we can safely say he is wrong there.

Another question is if there actually exists some over-reality, even if it is not for us to know. The eleatic philosophers seemed to be of such a view.

 

[TheMeInTeam]

If we reject the notion of reality outside our perception then we're stuck with the idea that our own perception is king. That line of thinking has been less useful as a model than the notion of actual truth when it comes to testing stuff and learning what happens.

It could all be a clever ruse our minds are internalizing but that's not too helpful for anticipating future outcomes or particularly well supported by evidence to spend inordinate time considering.