Looking for historical GDP data

[Marla_Singer]

So, a GDP of 16.5 billion dollars for China in the year 1 AD? If true that's really impressive. My guess would have been below one billion.

340 billion dollars in 1820 is equally amazing, and equally hard to believe. IIRC, in the 70's China's GDP was around 400 billion dollars. I thinks this number is really really unlikely.

Well, according to the table from Rmsharpe I've download, China had a GDP of 26.82 billion 1990 US dollars in 1 AD and of 228.6 billion 1990 US dollars in 1820 AD. So firstly, it's weird we don't have the same figures.

Anyway, this being said, the comparison with the GDP of China in 1970 isn't relevant since I guess it was expressed in 1970 US dollars, not in 1990 US dollars. That table is supposed to show figures at constant prices. According to the same table, the Chinese GDP in 1970 was of 640.949 1990 US dollars.

I don't say that table is necessarily right, I would be pleased by the way to know the sources of those data. I'm just playing a bit the devil's advocate.

 

[superisis]

Oh? When did the Chinese decide that? And when did Chinese decide to use paper money as currency? I forget these things...

Since I don't have the book I use as my source, I'll direct you to this site instead, which speaks of the phenomenon.

http://www.sycee-on-line.com/Sycee_history.htm

 

[cyrusIII85]

Since I don't have the book I use as my source, I'll direct you to this site instead, which speaks of the phenomenon.

http://www.sycee-on-line.com/Sycee_history.htm

Great! Thanks...

 

[Rambuchan]

Rambuchan, I was wondering when you (or Silver, or all_hail_india) would join this thread.

Well I've been giving the History Forum a miss lately what with its 'greatest of the great' and 'military this that and the other' threads. I'm interested in this thread for the economics history, not to big up India (that does itself on this topic!). I'm interested because so many of the ways the world works today was decided in these times (1400s-1800s), when Europe shifted ahead of Asia in all these tables.

perhaps there is reason to the EU farm subsidies after all? Hmm...

This is an interesting suggestion. There are two points to this of interest to me but I need some help:

a) These medieval Asian economies, afaik, operated under something similar to a feudal system. In other words, farmers were not waged labourers, they were essentially serfs, peasants, living off the land. As such, their food was cheap (and the ground fertile). I haven't formed much of a view yet as to whether this can be classed as 'subsidisation' by today's standards. I'd imagine it's a bit of a stretch. Anyone got anything on this?

b) To what degree do EU farming subsidies feed the people of Europe, providing that cheap food for the economy? I think most of the food that Europeans live off is cheap food, but this typically comes from supermarkets who source cheap food from elsewhere in the world. European agricultural produce makes up a pretty small proportion of what we put in our bellies, I think. But I'm just guessing.

T'is widely known (though often ignored in highschools) that the reason for Columbus sailing to "India" was to get around the pesky Ottomans (the middlemen).

Yes, of course.

you forget to include the Chinese emperors decision (forget which one) to close off China to the world, and later to base the Chinese currency on silver. The first contributed to the decline in Chinese power, the second contributed to the increase in European power (who had recently "found" great amounts of silver in the New World)

Oh damn! This is a massive point!!!

You are absolutely right here. Silver was the substance of choice upon which to value your medieval currency. Arabs had gold, Europeans silver - because that's what they had in abundance. I don't recall the stimuli for pinning the Chinese currency onto silver (c.1500s it was) but this played into European hands MASSIVELY. As you rightly point out, those European powers swanning around The New World were flush with silver. They found it in bucket loads over there. And yes, all this silver was used directly for purchasing Asian goods (and from other sources of course), which were then traded to other parties for a profit. These 'buckets of silver' were verily like a limitless supply of cash. In fact, they had to pay with silver because the aforementioned European goods were simply not in demand in medieval Asian economies.

 

[superisis]

b) To what degree do EU farming subsidies feed the people of Europe, providing that cheap food for the economy? I think most of the food that Europeans live off is cheap food, but this typically comes from supermarkets who source cheap food from elsewhere in the world. European agricultural produce makes up a pretty small proportion of what we put in our bellies, I think. But I'm just guessing.

Actually not true. Most Food that Europeans eat is made in Europe. About half of the EU budget (can't remember how many billions of euros) goes to farm subsidies, which keeps food prices low in Europe (to the point where European farmers produce too much food which the EU buys, hence the idea of mountains of butter, etc). This certainly depends on the kind of food (i.e. bananas and rice isn't usually from European farms), but in most cases, due to farm subsidies and protectionism Europeans eat europeans crops.

 

[simonnomis]

Actually not true. Most Food that Europeans eat is made in Europe. About half of the EU budget (can't remember how many billions of euros) goes to farm subsidies, which keeps food prices low in Europe (to the point where European farmers produce too much food which the EU buys, hence the idea of mountains of butter, etc). This certainly depends on the kind of food (i.e. bananas and rice isn't usually from European farms), but in most cases, due to farm subsidies and protectionism Europeans eat europeans crops.

I think there is some misunderstanding about the role of the CAP and its effect on food prices. The mechanism in essence ensures that market prices are RAISED so that European farmers can maintain agricultural production at a profit. The average EU family pays £800 per year in HIGHER food prices because of the system - the Think Tank Policy Exchange found that consumers pay 42% more for food than if the CAP was dismantled. And that of course is in addition to the cost of paying farmers direct subsidies. All in all, there is nothing cheap about European food, and if anything it has a negative impact on the economy (in the context of cheap food = competitive wages/low living costs).

 

[superisis]

Oh, yeah. My bad. The rest is true though. Since the producers get subsidies, but tariff keep the prices high, they'll produce more food than European consumers are willing to consume, so the EU effectively buys it all, hence mountains of butter. (preiously they tried to give this extra food to poor nations, until they realized what a stupi idea that was).

 

[luiz]

Well, according to the table from Rmsharpe I've download, China had a GDP of 26.82 billion 1990 US dollars in 1 AD and of 228.6 billion 1990 US dollars in 1820 AD. So firstly, it's weird we don't have the same figures.

My figures are in Sharpe's first post. I did not download the table.

Anyway, this being said, the comparison with the GDP of China in 1970 isn't relevant since I guess it was expressed in 1970 US dollars, not in 1990 US dollars. That table is supposed to show figures at constant prices. According to the same table, the Chinese GDP in 1970 was of 640.949 1990 US dollars.

I don't say that table is necessarily right, I would be pleased by the way to know the sources of those data. I'm just playing a bit the devil's advocate.

Even considering that China's GDP was of 229 billions in 1990 dollars in the year 1820 and of 641 billions in 1990 dollars in the year 1970, the difference is still too small to be credible.

Even assuming that there was no productivity growth whatsoever in China from 1820 to 1970 (which is of course absurd and ridiculous), population growth alone would have resulted in a bigger GDP growth.

It's simply not plausible that the chinese economy did not even triple in those 150 years from 1820 to 1970. This is precisely the era of industrialisation, and even though China was not fully industrialised by 1970, it sure was more than in 1820.

 

[Rambuchan]

I think Luiz makes a pretty good observation of the figures there.

 

[Marla_Singer]

My figures are in Sharpe's first post. I did not download the table.


Even considering that China's GDP was of 229 billions in 1990 dollars in the year 1820 and of 641 billions in 1990 dollars in the year 1970, the difference is still too small to be credible.

Even assuming that there was no productivity growth whatsoever in China from 1820 to 1970 (which is of course absurd and ridiculous), population growth alone would have resulted in a bigger GDP growth.

It's simply not plausible that the chinese economy did not even triple in those 150 years from 1820 to 1970. This is precisely the era of industrialisation, and even though China was not fully industrialised by 1970, it sure was more than in 1820.

Of course I agree with you. Actually, I always tend to be very sceptic towards that kind of studies which are mainly based on assumptions about what was the productivity and what was the population. That's the reason why I was interested to know the source. This way, I could maybe have access to a text describing on what those approximations were based on.

Actually, in that kind of stories I tend to consider the description of the process leading to such figures as more interesting than the figures in themselves.

 

[jameson]

I think the figures may yet the in the right ballpark, though. Consider, the largest part of the Chinese economy has always been agriculture (which I think still provides jobs for 70-80% of Chinese even now). There have been precious few productivity gains ( and thus economic growth) in that sector up until this century. So the burden of tripling China's GDP would fall on at most 10-20% of the economy. Given the last Chinese Emperor's reluctance to open up to Western influences and investment unless forced to at gunpoint, I suspect real industrialization in China only started in the late 19th-early 20th century.

Apart from which, in the period since 1820, China has had to contend with, among others, the Opium Wars, the Taiping rebellion, the Boxer rebellion, the Japanese grab of Manchuria, a halt to world trade during WWI and the Great Depression, the revolution of 1911, Communist-Nationalist wars until 1949, WWII, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution....
It's been a few years since I last read Maddison but I remember how he showed that many economies remained essentially stagnant for hundreds of years until finally taking off. China took off later than most and arguably suffered more internal turmoil - and disastrous political and economic leadership - than most countries.

 

[luiz]

I think the figures may yet the in the right ballpark, though. Consider, the largest part of the Chinese economy has always been agriculture (which I think still provides jobs for 70-80% of Chinese even now). There have been precious few productivity gains ( and thus economic growth) in that sector up until this century. So the burden of tripling China's GDP would fall on at most 10-20% of the economy. Given the last Chinese Emperor's reluctance to open up to Western influences and investment unless forced to at gunpoint, I suspect real industrialization in China only started in the late 19th-early 20th century.

Apart from which, in the period since 1820, China has had to contend with, among others, the Opium Wars, the Taiping rebellion, the Boxer rebellion, the Japanese grab of Manchuria, a halt to world trade during WWI and the Great Depression, the revolution of 1911, Communist-Nationalist wars until 1949, WWII, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution....
It's been a few years since I last read Maddison but I remember how he showed that many economies remained essentially stagnant for hundreds of years until finally taking off. China took off later than most and arguably suffered more internal turmoil - and disastrous political and economic leadership - than most countries.

While those are fair points, you must keep in mind that:

-There were significative gains in productivity in China from 1820 to 1970. Maybe not as big as elsewhere, but still.

-Population growth in that period alone, even without increased productivity, would probably achieve such GDP growth.

 

[jameson]

While those are fair points, you must keep in mind that:

-There were significative gains in productivity in China from 1820 to 1970. Maybe not as big as elsewhere, but still.

Like I pointed out, those productivity gains only apply to a small portion of the economy.

-Population growth in that period alone, even without increased productivity, would probably achieve such GDP growth.

I'd have thought so too, but according to the one source here I found, China's population growth from 1851-1949 wasn't as big as you'd expect. It's population did about double over the whole 1820-1970 period, but the main explosion was after WWII, which is too soon to really contribute to GDP increases since baby's and teens generally don't add much to GDP yet. So that leaves a good 100-130% of total GDP increase still to increase by productivity gains.

 

[Charles Dodgson]

Any info on the Persian Empire? Specifically, I’m interested in the Persian v Indian v Greek relative GDP at the time of Alexander’s defeat of Darius

 

[innonimatu]

This is what we call one big necro reopening an 11 years old thread.

I was somewhat skeptical of trying to construct GDP numbers for the past then (never mind the present...), and I am more skeptical now. But we should be able to figure out the orders of magnitude of contemporary economies, how big was one compared to another.

Any info on the Persian Empire? Specifically, I’m interested in the Persian v Indian v Greek relative GDP at the time of Alexander’s defeat of Darius

Do you have any idea of the population numbers, how many inhabitants in the Persian Empire versus the Macedonian Empire at the time (Macedonia plus Greece, the Islands and the western cities of Asia Minor? The economic output per inhabitant would be higher in some areas than others (Thessaly in Greece, or Thrace in Macedonia, were more fertile than the Peloponnese or Epirus; likewise Egypt was more fertile than Cappadocia, Mesopotamia more fertile than Media). And with agriculture being by far the largest share of the economy, you can estimate "GDP" from population guesses and local agricultural potential. It will be a terribly inaccurate estimate. When considering large regions on the same latitude and the same technology level, you may as well assume than on average they had identical productive potential and just extrapolate from population estimates alone.

Another thing to consider is that ulers could not readily appropriate this economic output for war. Other sources of wealth were probably more relevant for that purpose. Athens owed much of its power to its silver mines. Later Philip II of Macedonia paid his army with the output of the gold mines near Phillipi. Currency had just (a couple of centuries ago) been invented, and Philip supposedly said that gold was his best siege weapon...
Thus I don't think you will find an honest historian willing to give a GDP number for those regions and that time. I advice you to look at population estimates and hold those as a proxy for economic output of the regions. Keeping in mind that such economic output cannot be directly mapped to "state revenue" available to any particular ruler. The Persian Empire had accumulated a huge treasury in bullion, but failed to use it effectively against Alexander.

 

[Charles Dodgson]

This is what we call one big necro reopening an 11 years old thread.

I was somewhat skeptical of trying to construct GDP numbers for the past then (never mind the present...), and I am more skeptical now. But we should be able to figure out the orders of magnitude of contemporary economies, how big was one compared to another.



Do you have any idea of the population numbers, how many inhabitants in the Persian Empire versus the Macedonian Empire at the time (Macedonia plus Greece, the Islands and the western cities of Asia Minor? The economic output per inhabitant would be higher in some areas than others (Thessaly in Greece, or Thrace in Macedonia, were more fertile than the Peloponnese or Epirus; likewise Egypt was more fertile than Cappadocia, Mesopotamia more fertile than Media). And with agriculture being by far the largest share of the economy, you can estimate "GDP" from population guesses and local agricultural potential. It will be a terribly inaccurate estimate. When considering large regions on the same latitude and the same technology level, you may as well assume than on average they had identical productive potential and just extrapolate from population estimates alone.

Another thing to consider is that ulers could not readily appropriate this economic output for war. Other sources of wealth were probably more relevant for that purpose. Athens owed much of its power to its silver mines. Later Philip II of Macedonia paid his army with the output of the gold mines near Phillipi. Currency had just (a couple of centuries ago) been invented, and Philip supposedly said that gold was his best siege weapon...
Thus I don't think you will find an honest historian willing to give a GDP number for those regions and that time. I advice you to look at population estimates and hold those as a proxy for economic output of the regions. Keeping in mind that such economic output cannot be directly mapped to "state revenue" available to any particular ruler. The Persian Empire had accumulated a huge treasury in bullion, but failed to use it effectively against Alexander.

I’d have thought topics retain there interest, well after blog participants flutter off into the digital ocean. I'm only a recent member of this site and this thread sparked an interest.

I also appreciate your scepticism toward a difficult to quantify comparison. And I've got no idea about the relative populations of Greece, Egypt, Persia and India in the 400s BCE.

My interest is trying to place the pre-Maurya Indian economy into a context with the Persian. I'm assuming the Greek-Macedonian economy was much smaller than the Persian empire. Given Persia was the first of the Iron Age superpowers, I’d assume it’s GDP would have been significantly larger than any of its smaller - essentially still tribal - western or eastern neighbours. Magadha was the largest and richest of the 16 Indian mahajanapadas, because of its iron deposits. But even with its riches it’s population would have still have been a fraction of the Persian empire at its height.

These proportions would have drastically changed as soon as the Maurya took control of the Ganges plain, for the first time some 10 years after Alexander had defeated Darius. All I want to do is get my mind around how these political changes fit into an economic and social context.

 

[Arakhor]

Moderator Action: Please start a new thread rather than reopening one over a decade old!