More Central Powers?

[LightSpectra]

A variety of reasons. I'd like to hear what Dachs says, but the most pertinent one appears to be that Bulgaria was perceived to be too much of a wild card. Russia's foreign policy as directed by Sergey Sazonov from 1910 onward was directed at the pipe dream of absolute domination over the Bosphorus, which accounted for half of Russia's maritime influence and 2/5ths of their exports. Obviously Bulgaria would be a more useful ally in this regard, however the Bulgarian foreign policy was perceived by Russia to be so reckless and belligerent that they couldn't be relied on to be a consistent projection for Russia against the Ottoman Empire. That was by no means, however, a permanent shape of events to come: it just so happened that the July Crisis happened before another aberration could occur.

 

[SnowlyWhite]

And Russia picked Serbia because Bulgaria was behaving too independently? Or too aggressively? Or just because they lost? I know plenty about the July Crisis, but not much about what happened with the nations outside of the main six antagonists (Serbia, Russia, France, Britain, Germany and Austria-Hungary).

probably because they managed to piss all their neighbors off. And that meant picking them as allies cancels any chance of alliance with any of it's neighbors since the bulgarians wanted something from each.

all starting from disagreements in loot splitting after 1st balkan war; which led to the 2nd when everyone was against bulgaria, hence it's isolation, hence not being an interesting ally.

bulgaria would leave as possible ally only turkey, but turkey was already taken, so...

 

[Dachs]

Alternatively to the Romania question, why did Bulgaria, an historically pro-Russian state, join the Central Powers as opposed to the Entente? Yes, I know, territory, but couldn't they also have taken territory from Greece and Romania - both neutral in the early stages, with the former in a civil war - and the Ottomans rather than from a pretty worthless Serbia? What induced them to join in on behalf of the weaker party in the war? I would think even neutrality would suit them better than belligerence on Austria-Hungary's part. Was pride over their losses in 1913 that bad?

Remember, Macedonians are basically Bulgarians; the IMRO was a Bulgarian organization. Of all of the many claims the Bulgarians had against their neighbors, their goal of controlling Macedonia was probably the dearest to the heart of most revanchists in Sofia. So if there was any constant in Bulgarian relations, it was "end up on the side that permits us to acquire Serbian Macedonia".

After that, it was a matter of judging the proper moment: they had to join the Central Powers late enough to make it obvious how useful their assistance was, but early enough so that they could beat the Austrians to Macedonia. 1915 was the perfect time, especially after the successful Central Powers offensive into Poland that summer, which boosted Germany's cause a great deal in most on-the-fence countries, and the successful defense of Gallipoli, which did the same for the Ottoman Empire.

probably because they managed to piss all their neighbors off. And that meant picking them as allies cancels any chance of alliance with any of it's neighbors since the bulgarians wanted something from each.

all starting from disagreements in loot splitting after 1st balkan war; which led to the 2nd when everyone was against bulgaria, hence it's isolation, hence not being an interesting ally.

bulgaria would leave as possible ally only turkey, but turkey was already taken, so...

To an extent, yeah. Of course, some of those disagreements could theoretically be papered over; there were factions of the Greek government before the civil war that were more than willing to take a bite out of Serbia in alliance with Bulgaria, even though Greece had an outstanding dispute with Bulgaria over Western Thrace. Serbia and Bulgaria were basically irreconcilable enemies, and Romania had little reason to ally with Bulgaria unless the Romanians were being bullied into it.

 

[RedRalph]

You know, as one hair-brained corporal pointed out, one of the real problems with the "The Central Powers wanted a war" thesis is why they chose to have it in 1914. Surely there were much better opportunities if they were just waiting for the chance.

While I'm not arguing the specifics of this example with you, it makes no sense to say 'Germany couldn't have wanted a war in 1914, because it would havde made more sense for them to want one earlier on'. States make mistakes, and just because one bottled an opportunity for a war once doesn't mean they weren't pursuing it later.

Again, not claiming this is the case here, but it's a false logic.

 

[Dachs]

While I'm not arguing the specifics of this example with you, it makes no sense to say 'Germany couldn't have wanted a war in 1914, because it would havde made more sense for them to want one earlier on'. States make mistakes, and just because one bottled an opportunity for a war once doesn't mean they weren't pursuing it later.

Again, not claiming this is the case here, but it's a false logic.

Yeah, that would not be a valid thing to bring up in this case - as you clearly understand - because the argument that the Central Powers wanted and planned for this war rests on the claim that German leaders believed that Russia would be unstoppable after the completion of the great army reform program in 1917, and thus Germany needed to fight a war as soon as possible if the Germans were to have any chance of winning one at all. In such a climate, it would have been nonsensical for the Germans to have put off fighting a preventive war, because the Russians would only have gotten stronger as time went on.

It's not even a matter of assuming perfect competence, it's a matter of assuming a basic adherence to one's alleged beliefs.

 

[fing0lfin]

Alternatively to the Romania question, why did Bulgaria, an historically pro-Russian state, join the Central Powers as opposed to the Entente? Yes, I know, territory, but couldn't they also have taken territory from Greece and Romania - both neutral in the early stages, with the former in a civil war - and the Ottomans rather than from a pretty worthless Serbia? What induced them to join in on behalf of the weaker party in the war? I would think even neutrality would suit them better than belligerence on Austria-Hungary's part. Was pride over their losses in 1913 that bad?

The main goal was Macadonia which was then part of Serbia(which was the case for the second Balkan war also). The central powers promised this expansion to Bulgaria, while the entante promised nothing, but a small border area from the Ottoman empire. Also Russia didn't interfere before the second balkan war, as it was promised. Bulgaria then was waiting fot the arbitrage of the Russian tsar, but it did not happen.
It was rather feeling of beeing betrayed than hurt pride. First by the former allies, then by the Russians, and finally by the neutral Romania. The public in oppinion in Bulgaria was that the Bulgarian army hadn't lost the war(partly true, no military disasster, the Bulgarian army managed to keep the combined Serbo-greek-montenegrian forces at bay,(even launching series of succesful offensive operations) but it was doomed by lack of support from Russia and the "backstabbing" of Romania. So when the war broke it was time for vengance...

Also when Bulgaria joined, it was not clear who was the weaker party.

 

[RedRalph]

Yeah, that would not be a valid thing to bring up in this case - as you clearly understand - because the argument that the Central Powers wanted and planned for this war rests on the claim that German leaders believed that Russia would be unstoppable after the completion of the great army reform program in 1917, and thus Germany needed to fight a war as soon as possible if the Germans were to have any chance of winning one at all. In such a climate, it would have been nonsensical for the Germans to have put off fighting a preventive war, because the Russians would only have gotten stronger as time went on.

It's not even a matter of assuming perfect competence, it's a matter of assuming a basic adherence to one's alleged beliefs.

How do you think those reforms would have gone? What were the main points of them and would they indeed* have made the Russians nigh-on* invincible?


*It's funny how discussing history makes you speak in a more refined fashion*. I would never, ever use these terms in any other circumstances...

 

[Dachs]

How do you think those reforms would have gone? What were the main points of them and would they indeed* have made the Russians nigh-on* invincible?


*It's funny how discussing history makes you speak in a more refined fashion*. I would never, ever use these terms in any other circumstances...

The Great Program's manpower requirements were filled by 1914 (an increase of some 100,000 recruits in the annual intakes); its mobilization requirements were not (in terms of train numbers), and the armaments requirements (some 8,358 artillery pieces of various types for the entire army, among other things) were not due to be filled until 1917.

I do not believe that the Great Program would have made Russia's armies invincible. In key metrics, the Russian military would still have been far behind those of both Germany and Austria-Hungary, namely: ratio of field guns to soldiers, ratio of officers to men, ratio of NCOs to men, and ratio of railroad track to space (and Russian railroad tracklaying had actually decreased in rate between the turn of the century and 1909, and only went down from there).

In addition, the Russians would have to solve the major doctrinal disputes: strategic offensive vs. strategic defensive, tactical offensive vs. tactical defensive, advocates of fortresses vs. advocates of field artillery, advocates of shock attack vs. basically everybody else, and so on. There was no real solution on the horizon in 1914; there is no reason to assume that the Russians would have solved any of these disputes by 1917, and so the use of the military would have been subpar and riven by faction. And if Sukhomlinov were defeated in the game of political intrigue by Guchkov, Polivanov, or someone else, and replaced at the head of the army, Russian preparations would have suffered further, with additional personal vendettas and conflicts splitting the army, and further doctrinal muddle.

So no, I don't think that the Russian army would have been invincible in 1917. Its chances of success would have been slightly better than those in 1914 - and its chances in 1914 were quite good! - and of course its success would depend very much on the operational approach to the war, whatever it was to be. I do think that the Germans and Austrians overstated how important the Great Program actually was.

 

[aronnax]

I still don't understand why Romania joined the Entente (yes, I know, they wanted territory) - they were almost completely surrounded by the Central Powers, what on Earth were they thinking?

You can thank Marie of Romania for that. As a British Princess, she baulked at the idea of going to war with Britain. Along with the Prime Minister, she influenced King Ferdinand to declare war on Germany and join the Entente powers. She was a very popular Queen among the Romanians and was very effective in bringing a pro-Britain sentiment to the Romanian people and parliament.

I can't seem to find other reasons though.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marie_of_Romania

 

[Dachs]

You can thank Marie of Romania for that. As a British Princess, she baulked at the idea of going to war with Britain. Along with the Prime Minister, she influenced King Ferdinand to declare war on Germany and join the Entente powers. She was a very popular Queen among the Romanians and was very effective in bringing a pro-Britain sentiment to the Romanian people and parliament.

I can't seem to find other reasons though.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marie_of_Romania

This is a joke, right? Please tell me you're joking. I know you really like monarchies for some ridiculous reason so it's hard to tell.

 

[amadeus]

It had nothing to do with that. The French were perfectly capable of pulling outrageous stunts on a par with anything the Germans did; Fashoda itself, had it occurred between (say) the Germans and British, would have been enough to sink any talk of alliance once and for all, but the French not only got away with their behavior, they managed to secure a colonial understanding with the British six years later.

It was less that the French were better at playing their cards, which they weren't, but that the French were dealt great cards in the first place. They were sufficiently dangerous to the British to be worth an alliance; the British believed that the Germans, on the other hand, weren't. Same with the Russians, really.

I thought Britain would be more willing to ally with Germany, seeing as how Germany had industrial and military (at least insofar as defeating France) superiority in Europe.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Yes but for all their military might, as two world wars demonstrated, they just couldn't cause Britain that much trouble. France was much closer obviously, but a war between France and Britain would have been a genuinely global war. France would threaten British Colonies and maritime trade all over the globe, Germany could...make some vague trouble in Africa and some brief problems in the far east.

 

[amadeus]

Yes but for all their military might, as two world wars demonstrated, they just couldn't cause Britain that much trouble. France was much closer obviously, but a war between France and Britain would have been a genuinely global war. France would threaten British Colonies and maritime trade all over the globe, Germany could...make some vague trouble in Africa and some brief problems in the far east.

If faced with an allied Germany, wouldn't France's immediate concern turn to the mainland?

 

[ParkCungHee]

If faced with an allied Germany, wouldn't France's immediate concern turn to the mainland?

Yes but a good deal of their assets couldn't be redirected against Germany. Troops in Indochina can't be brought to the Somme and ships in the Mediterranean can't be moved anywhere else. Britain would be looking at a global war that would be extremely damaging to them, even in victory.

 

[Lord Baal]

Yes but a good deal of their assets couldn't be redirected against Germany. Troops in Indochina can't be brought to the Somme and ships in the Mediterranean can't be moved anywhere else. Britain would be looking at a global war that would be extremely damaging to them, even in victory.

Especially since the locations of France's colonies made invasion of them difficult, whereas the French could hit British targets with impunity. It's likely Britain would win a colonnial war with France by starving France itself into submission, but she may have been permanently kicked out of some of her own colonies in the process.

 

[bombshoo]

On the subject of colonial wars in WWI, did Germany actually think they stood a chance at holding any of the colonies or were they pretty much expected to be taken? I'm aware that the East African Campaign went on an absurd amount of time given the size of the armies and importance of the theater, but was this more through actual planning or just the good leadership of Lettow-Vorbeck and a lot of luck?

Did Germany have any sort of plan for things even more far flung, like the far east possessions in the event of a Great War?

 

[ParkCungHee]

While I'm not arguing the specifics of this example with you, it makes no sense to say 'Germany couldn't have wanted a war in 1914, because it would havde made more sense for them to want one earlier on'. States make mistakes, and just because one bottled an opportunity for a war once doesn't mean they weren't pursuing it later.

Again, not claiming this is the case here, but it's a false logic.

But it's not like I gave one opportunity. I gave an opportunity in 1895, 1899-1902 and 1905, and I'm sure if I took the time to think about it, a couple more, such as the Balkan War of 1913.. It's not a matter of bungling if it's a consistent policy for decades. If they were looking for an opportunity to fight a war, they had much better opportunities, and they could expect to have much better ones later, even under the "the sooner the better" school of thought. If someone is going to seriously claim that Germany and Austria were looking for a war, they need to come up with more convincing evidence that either they came up on this decision oh, somewhere between the beginning of July and August, or come up with some compelling evidence that none of the German and Austrian politicians working so hard to prevent the outbreak of war were able to realize that they could have the war they so wanted, by not working so hard to try and prevent it.

 

[Lord Baal]

On the subject of colonial wars in WWI, did Germany actually think they stood a chance at holding any of the colonies or were they pretty much expected to be taken? I'm aware that the East African Campaign went on an absurd amount of time given the size of the armies and importance of the theater, but was this more through actual planning or just the good leadership of Lettow-Vorbeck and a lot of luck?

Did Germany have any sort of plan for things even more far flung, like the far east possessions in the event of a Great War?

The short answer is this: No. Germany had no plans to really accomplish much of anything with their colonies. They abandoned Tsingtao almost immediately, and only held onto GEA through the skill of their man on the ground. The colonies were only ever intended to serve as diversions for British effort, while the ships in those colonies were dispersed to do as much damage to Britain's commerce as possible. Germany's goals for the war were purely on the Continent - which is not to say they wouldn't have demanded some colonies of France if they'd defeated her - and her war plans were drawn up accordingly.

 

[aronnax]

This is a joke, right? Please tell me you're joking. I know you really like monarchies for some ridiculous reason so it's hard to tell.

Well then you come up with a better explanation. I can't seem to find any other reason other than bat-crazy suicide.

 

[Lord Baal]

Well then you come up with a better explanation. I can't seem to find any other reason other than bat-crazy suicide.

Entertainment value. Romania knew that in order to get true underdog status with the spectators they needed to be on the defensive from the get-go, only to come out on top in the end.