But without threatening their airfields, the British were free to continue operations. Ans so long as the British had those bases, the Germans could not achieve total superiority over the channel, let alone any landing beaches, because the British always had reserves to deploy from the rear area (and a continuous stream of fresh pilots and aircraft coming from Canada, even if most British factories were lost).
As for Germany, it wasn't until '44 that the Allies had significant numbers of long range fighters (namely P-51s) to act as escorts over Germany. Allowing for the destruction of fighters held in reserve to engage bombers. Just being able to pose a threat to British positions would have had an impact and taken away any place for the RAF to fall back to, though as shown during WWII bombing alone will not bring victory.
1944 was also when the Allies began systematic campaigns (often with those new P-51s, as fast, nimble fighters excelled against these heavily defended targets) aimed directly at airfields, up until then the focus was on industry.
Remember that attacking airfields also means destroying aircraft on the ground, where they are much more vulnerable and little threat.
As for Germany, it wasn't until '44 that the Allies had significant numbers of long range fighters (namely P-51s) to act as escorts over Germany. Allowing for the destruction of fighters held in reserve to engage bombers. Just being able to pose a threat to British positions would have had an impact and taken away any place for the RAF to fall back to, though as shown during WWII bombing alone will not bring victory.
1944 was also when the Allies began systematic campaigns (often with those new P-51s, as fast, nimble fighters excelled against these heavily defended targets) aimed directly at airfields, up until then the focus was on industry.
Remember that attacking airfields also means destroying aircraft on the ground, where they are much more vulnerable and little threat.