nvm

Not really.

Ok, I don't agree with that phrase you quoted from Princeps either, but the rest - recruitment problems, the beginnings of servitude (slavery actually declined), obstruction of the central government by wealthy local oligarchs - happened, I believe. Roman citizenship w2as extend to the whole empire, but at the same time the law started distinguishing between a privileged class and the common people. The link of local power to the central government was replaced by an empire-wide oligarchic class controlling its own local interests and increasingly independent of political support by the central government.

The cities in the East had also completely lost all their privileges by the 5th century? Anyway, I had the idea that at least there were still more small landholders there, whatever the reason, and that allowed the eastern empire to keep recruiting soldiers. Wasn't the later decline of the themata there also caused by local oligarchs gaining exemptions from the central government?
 
Ok, I don't agree with that phrase you quoted from Princeps either, but the rest - recruitment problems, the beginnings of servitude (slavery actually declined), obstruction of the central government by wealthy local oligarchs - happened, I believe. Roman citizenship w2as extend to the whole empire, but at the same time the law started distinguishing between a privileged class and the common people. The link of local power to the central government was replaced by an empire-wide oligarchic class controlling its own local interests and increasingly independent of political support by the central government.
I disagree that any of those was a fundamental cause of the collapse of the Roman state, though. It all certainly helped though. :p
innonimatu said:
The cities in the East had also completely lost all their privileges by the 5th century? Anyway, I had the idea that at least there were still more small landholders there, whatever the reason, and that allowed the eastern empire to keep recruiting soldiers. Wasn't the later decline of the themata there also caused by local oligarchs gaining exemptions from the central government?
Not what I was trying to disagree with there (cities certainly retained significant self-government in the early Byzantine state; I was mostly trying to downgrade the effect of that particular cause in the collapse of either Roman state) - but I do think that the decline of the themata was the essential factor in the decline of the state that culminated in the frangokratia, but that different factors prevailed in the decline of Michael Palaiologos' state.
 
Maybe thats why they lost that war ;)
Well, I think that the fact they were facing the bulk of the Spanish Army, being constantly undermined and even attacked by the Soviet-aligned elements of their own side and completely neglected by the Western nations had more to do with it. From what I've heard, anarcho-syndicalist states like those in Spain, or the Paris Commune, actually seem to function fairly effectively until some rich arsehole inevitably comes and smashes them up. Which, of course, means their long-term success is still largely theoretical, but that still buts them a little way ahead of anarcho-capitalism...
 
From what I've heard, anarcho-syndicalist states like those in Spain, or the Paris Commune, actually seem to function fairly effectively until some rich arsehole inevitably comes and smashes them up. Which, of course, means their long-term success is still largely theoretical, but that still buts them a little way ahead of anarcho-capitalism...

So you are saying that the only socialism that had any degree of success was the one without marxism in it..... interesting.
 
From what I've heard, anarcho-syndicalist states like those in Spain, or the Paris Commune, actually seem to function fairly effectively until some rich arsehole inevitably comes and smashes them up.
I thought the Paris Commune suffered internal problems over the issue of what to do with the money from the Paris banks, even before the reactionary counterattack.
 
That...isn't really a valid argument for the collapse of the state at all.

Actually, it is an element of the accumilated problems that broke the camels back. The final nail in the coffin came from the foreign invaders and civil wars, of course. Local power concentrations helped to spur civil wars and weakened the resistence against foreign invaders in the long term.

Dachs said:
Not really.

If I remember correctly, the proto-Byzantine empire had to implement popular programs, such as somewhat fairer land policy, which, combined with a different availablity of resources, prevented serfdom of the European style in the Byzantine Empire. I believe that the Byzantine population was much more prepared to show it to the boss: in fact, in staggering riots which probably lead to concessions from the powerful. But the byzantine Empire also grew more disintigrated evantually.
 
:lol: Interesting wording there.
Fair point, fair point. I should've said "Anarcho-syndicalist communities", or something to that effect.

So you are saying that the only socialism that had any degree of success was the one without marxism in it..... interesting.
Well, no, not really. Perhaps you could say that, but it wasn't what I was getting at.

I thought the Paris Commune suffered internal problems over the issue of what to do with the money from the Paris banks, even before the reactionary counterattack.
Well, yeah, things weren't perfect, but the Commune seemed to work okay. The quality of life of the average citizen improved, and the people were given greater rights and freedoms, which, to me, signals feasability, if not perfection (if any system involving human beings could ever be perfect).
 
Actually, it is an element of the accumilated problems that broke the camels back. The final nail in the coffin came from the foreign invaders and civil wars, of course. Local power concentrations helped to spur civil wars and weakened the resistence against foreign invaders in the long term.
Then why didn't the empire collapse in the crisis of the third century? :p
Princeps said:
If I remember correctly, the proto-Byzantine empire had to implement popular programs, such as somewhat fairer land policy, which, combined with a different availablity of resources, prevented serfdom of the European style in the Byzantine Empire. I believe that the Byzantine population was much more prepared to show it to the boss: in fact, in staggering riots which probably lead to concessions from the powerful. But the byzantine Empire also grew more disintigrated evantually.
The prevention of serfdom part is basically right, kind of. Wasn't really a result of popular programs, though, but actually resisted by much of the urban population of Constantinople. (If you're thinking about the same thing I'm thinking about, namely the reforms of Anastasios I, which among other things involved a large-scale monetarization of the economy as opposed to the payments in kind, including labor, that had been established by the Diocletianian reforms of the late third century.) The 'preparation of the Byzantine population' is kind of...meh. Iffy. The urban population of Constantinople was really the only vaguely populistic and rebellious group that consistently attempted to assert any sort of power over the emperors for the vast majority of imperial history. (There are, yes, exceptions: the mostly religiously-motivated violence in the Levant and Egypt before those territories' losses to the Arabs, and the extremely interesting social stresses that accompanied the civil war of Kantakouzenos in the fourteenth century.)

Anyway, the point is that it's more complicated than that. Much more complicated.
 
why would they afford nothing? Why wouldnt competition between PDA-s lower prices to a competitive level,

Okay. lets assume that competition in violence lorwers the cost of violence.

It owuld means that the rich can purchase even more weapons and military. The market serves the highest bidder over others.

The ends of the rich is to get even richer, right?

There's always a reason to go to war, to oppress your fellow man. That much is obvious.

Using violence is a poor means to achieve it,

Not historically. Remember Rome, the British Empire, etc. The Roman Empire was basically a mafia state run by rich people for their own enrichment.

due to resistance having a high probability to destroy capital anyway,

Well, um capital destruction is not always a bad thing. Sometimes you want to destroy your competitors capital so that you can take over their markets. This is what the British Empire did.

especially in a modern highly specialized society in which all sides are heavily dependent on a well functioning business freedom.

The modern "highly specialized society" isn't anymore dependent on business freedom than in the previous decades.

As for rich being able to afford a strong centralised control army to oppress poor people, you gotta be kidding me man.

No I'm not.

Even the US with a defense budget 1000 times bigger than their guerilla enemies like iraqi and afghan private troops is unable to destroy resistance,

Yes, abroad, which is a whole other issue.

how the hell would the rich be able to without having such a hughe resource overhead(ie with US only being able to use tax collected in iraq against iraqi rebels)

They can establish tax regimes (worked so far!). They can establish their own private state. The US military budget is roughly 515 billion: the rich people's proto-state might not even need that much, perhaps 200 billion or less would do fine. A regime could raise that sort of money easily through reasonable tariffs and income taxes or they could obtain it through loans from shady private institutions (which would of course be much larger now) in exchange for loot or produces from their enslaved industries. They would have no need for any welfare programs for the broader population, which means that they wouldn't even need to grow large debts like the US does now.

How is arbitration tied to violence?

Because you cannot have law without violence.

Arbitrators that offer poor services and favour the aggressors go bankrupt due to vast majority of their clients being peaceful people(due to all people demanding defense services while only few want to initiate force).

Haven't you been to business collage. I have. We learn something called the 20/80 rule. It basically means that your (firm's) main customer base is largely the core 20 %, which generate 80 % of your income and overall business activity. The rest 80 % produce 20 % of your income and business activity. A private arbitrator will probably focus on its vital customers, the 20 %, while most of the 80 % can be sidelined (i.e. it doesn't matter if some of them are lost). The 20 % can be very tolerant of wrong doing or violence committed against "the others" (i.e. people of different sympahties).

A mercenary army or a private court that wants to remain secure in an extremely political business environment (such as anarcho-capitalism) will only serve the groups that are sympathetic to one side, further narrowing the core customer base to one faction and culture. Serving a diverse pool of customers is risky. So, no. The courts would be increasingly specialized, politicized and focused to provide services for one group only, instead of providing arbitration or security for a broad customer base (which brings extreme political risks).

If clients of arbitrators dont agree on the decision then surely their pda-s can sort it out.

Yes, which probably means war or skirmish.

the key part in all of this is that VIOLENCE is an irrational choice to make by any side

Let's assume people are rational.

It is still nonsense. Aggression is irrational only for the weaker side. If a suffiecently strong and supported faction emerges, it can attack weaker factions. It may have its risks, but all business does, and it can be extremely profitable. Why do you think wars are fought in the first place?

For example, if a private regime wants to attack another private regime, it will first form alliances with others. It could very well find business partners that are willing to collaborate. The aggressing private regime, call it firm A, could promise that 50 % of the loot from the annexed territory will be promised for a supporting firm B. So company B's participation will be short and less risky. Another supporting company could be tied into the project through trade privileges in the territory: the supporting company's participation would be more risky and long term, but it would have monopoly on the trade of certain goods in the annexed region. In turn, these collaborators would locate their own allies and benefactors.

, as it decreases the wealth of those that choose it

No, war is theft largely. Theft increases the wealth of the thief.


, counterattacks

Which is a strategic assumption. The aggressor would of course consider this, but course he'd form the political alliances necessary to counter such attacks. This is how every Empire has done it in the past. Also, if war is so unprofitable, it is moronic to then next turn suggest that all the allies of the victimized group will suddenly go to war. If there was a defensive contract, they might think it is no longer worthy to respect, since the business decision of defending a defeated or a weaker side is very risky. Instead, perhaps they might even ally with the aggressor.

When the political groups form, and acquire arms, members and funds, they also spur others to do the same in response. Thus cartels form like black holes that suck in the remaining unregulated free capitalism.

, insurance agencies suing the aggressors for inflicted trouble

Unless the insurance agencies have divisions, their papers are not going to do anything.

guerillas > centralised army working in the interests of whoever. the latter is just not economical, especially with complete freedom in gun markets

Uh, organized and standing armies perform much better in almost all circuimstances than guerillas. Organized armies can also develop technologies that are simply beyond the operational scale of guerillas.

(lol trillion dollar navy having trouble against a few kalashnikov-armed bandits cruising the coast in a cruddy motorboat)

Well, actually, the pirates are in for a trouble. Probably the only real reason why they could thrive was because of (in addition to lawlessness in the mainland of Somalia) the lack of attention they received. This is first time in over a hundred years that US citizen has been victimized by pirates, so it's not suprising that the US is little unprepared. The US practically controls all of the major oceans in the world: they've done a pretty good job or erradicating piracy. Also, the fleets were, after all, designed for the cold war after all, not for hunting speed boats.

. i feel i dont need to address your medieval speculations,cartel armies, which while interesting, could perhaps be ignored with the guerilla-argument

Well, cartel state and a military is the likely outcome of anarcho-capitalist world. Of course, they'd emerge under an ideological cloak, perhaps monarchy or something else.

yes democracy sucks with its socialist tendencies and all that.

So, I think it is a much better alternative to private totalitarianism whether communist or anarcho-capitalist.


not only would widespread civilian use of guns make it risky and probably uneconomic for pda-s to terrorise them

No. Civilians are pretty easy targets. And you don't have to kill them (preferably), you can do sabotage in their properties, perhaps kidnapping, or something.

, but the intertwined relationships of insurances and defence alliances

No. This would not happen in a political business enviroirment. Firms would be focused on providing insurance or services for one side primarily, because it reduces risks.


guerillas > centralised army working in the interests of whoever. and if you say guerillas cant form because the lack of freedom and inability to organise and arm themselves, then thats a circular argument.

Not necessarily. Again, how could guerillas resist an organized army? Guerillas are not an argument.

Guerillas are a strategy which both sides can, if resourceful enough, use. For example, the United States effectively organized a guerilla force with little local support in Nicaragua and used it to murder tens of thousands. They simply paid them a hundred dollars or so (a lot of money ... and a good example of how cheap it can be for a more powerful side to manipulate poor people) and armed them lavishly.

Why couldn't a private regime do the same? In fact, they'd do so more often because they wouldn't have a scandal.

it would require a terror state already be at effect and for the terror state's army to have the support of the people.

No. A regime doesn't need the support of its people. Do you seriously think North Korea has genuine support of its people? It doesnt, with the exception of a narrow indoctornated or/and privileged minority.
 
xarthaz, what do you think about Sharif Sheikh Ahmad?
 
they have made decent economic growth(above average african if i recall) despite military intervention from outside parties, foreign investments. not bad. better example is the wild west from what ive heard.
Never thought I'd live to see the day that someone likes Somalia's present situation.

If Somalia is in good shape in your opinion, then don't you want to move there?
 
to protect their increasing capital which needs more troops in proportion as they are attractive targets for counterattack. rich people have the most to lose if they are to organise aggression.

They only lose if they initiate aggression against people with the same or more power. They don't lose if they initiate aggression against people who cannot defend themselves.

It's like a city gang: If they initiate war against another gang, both take casualities and if one is not significantly stronger than the other, for little gain. However on their own turf, there is little risk and much to gain by terrorising those who have objections against the gangs rule.

war to opress? only with someone elses money! irrational use of money if it doesnt earn profit.

Opression does generate revenue. As long as the cost of opression is smaller than the revenue, the money spent on opression is good investment.

authoritarian state != ancap

But how do you prevent anybody from using the power vacuum of anarchism to make an authoritarian state.

think you are overemphasizing this, the whole world isnt a gaza sector where radically different worldviews clash. and if they do, the police arent any better at solving that either. they never even go to the bad neighbourhoods of islamic france

So these islamic neighborhoods in france have anarcho-capitalism already implemented, as there is no one there to enforce the rule of the state? Why don't you move there?

uneconomical, even one lost trained troop costs a lot(after all, it takes good competitive paychecks and insurance to attract soldiers in the first place,training,insurance, falling morale among troops as theyre against aggression), which is hard to offset with any gains; and free gun trade is the great equalizer, moving risks further up. while its nearly impossible to make a profit in an area where people have risen to arms against oppressors, there is no former buerocratic power to take over that would simplify the process of controlling people.
it takes a 10:1 troop overhead to take down guerilla warfare(heard it on discovery!!). which means the area needed to attack to maintain that advantage, would be too small to provide profit anyway.

There is no need for trained troops, if you can field an army of easily replacable thugs. And fighting against guerilla warfare is much easier, if there is no need to restrain force. People won't easily join any resistance, if you threaten to torture their kids.

circular argument. enforce taxes and slave camps to gather money to run an army? with what resources? remember everyone has a gun and if they get no direct benefit from money(which would be higher than market value), wont pay tax.

Medieval Europe succeeded quite a long time with these principles. Granted, they didn't make much progress, but the feudal model was successful for thousand years.

And not everyone will have a gun. First, there is no reason why anybody running a security force should not try to control the ownership of the gun. Second, not everyone is fit enough to really make use of a gun.

And the use of force to extract money has a long tradition, even in modern times.


assumes that most pda-s are aggressive. all people want defense, very few want aggression(and why would those who already have a great successful business and money take such an UNECONOMICAL, as i specified above,risk). with free gun trades a retaliation is extremely easy(rocket launcher aimed at rich bastard's skyscrapers to create terror like in israel)

If the use of force is uneconomical, how do you explain that various mafias have a very successful business model, which contains the use of agression if they see the need for it?

If you want to have a taste of anarcho-capitalism, you can simply look at organized crime. They also have making money as the only aim and they already don't care much about laws. And there is a reason, why organized crime tends to be strong in areas where the state is weak.
 
demand for defensive services > demand for aggressive services -> supply of defensive services much bigger, due to vast majority of people being peaceful by nature.

Nonsense. If the aggressors are rich and powerful there's absolutely no reason to assume that rational entrepineurs wouldn't provide them with an assortment of aggressive services. If the victimized community is threathened and weak, there's a HUGE risk of servicing them, because your business with them might be abruptly ended.

Of course, you're also making the stupid assumption that an aggressor must rely on mercenaries alone. An aggressor could impose different recruitment policies: kidnap children and indoctornate them (African style), conscript people (almost always works, despite some objections) and so forth.

control of guns = circular argument

Don't wiggle. It is not a circular argument. You don't need an all powerful monopoly to control the distribution of weaponry. You can sabotage such trade in many other ways, assuming one even really needs to do so. An arms merchant might feel that servicing the weak, poor community is risky, since the community might be conquered the next day.
 
the entrepreneurs wouldnt have incentives to supply services unless they can make profit by doing so.

I've responded to this already. The aggressor could very well provide them with lucrative contracts within the annexed territory, loot and booty, access to annexed resources like oil or minerals, direct payments, and so on and so on. There are many ways of rewarding people.

Of course, the aggressor's backers would preasure the aggressor to be more profitable, thus compelling the aggressor to disregard the occupied population's welfare in the extraction of profit. The existence of such a volatile relationship between the capitalist allies and the aggressor would only make the situation worse for the occupied, who might even be wiped out totally or enslaved.

Which they cant, if everyone has an assault rifle

A beset and ravaged population (even if armed) wouldn't stand a chance against organized armies. This absurd Swiss myth should die.

AND it would require:
the community being "victimized community is threathened and weak", how do they become like that in the first place?

Because of the inherent disparity of power between the rich and the poor.

this is a circular argument man,

No, it's not a circular argument. All of your arguments are circular as well according to your logic. The assumption I make is that that there would be those who are stronger and more powerful and willing to exploit that position. Since there's no accountability in economic, political and cultural power, there's no reason to assume that there wouldn't be those who are capable and willing to aggress or coerce.

it requires there to be a lack of defensive PDA-s and insurances to achieve a lack of defensive PDA-s and insurances

It doesn't need a lack of it. But simply distorted incentives and disparity of supply between the strong and the weak, both of which would almost certainly exist.

you cant make a profit by doing it, and you face the gun suppliers' pda-s who want to kick your ass for hurting their clients.

Again, so what? It would mean war. Or likely, the gun traders might think its not worth the risk to fight against a strong faction and its mercenary army, just so that the barely profitable and risky gun trade could continue with a weaker faction. They might try to smuggle weapons, but that raises the cost for the already weakened faction.

I mean, look. The gun traders who operate in volatile regions wouldn't probably have any insurance at all due to the extreme risk. Even if they did, it wouldn't probably guarantee any retaliation from any PDA. A gun trading group alone with its PDA probably wouldn't have the resources to subvert a larger and richer private Empire.
 
no private organisation would be stupid enough to waste money on such a lost cause,

Private militias had done all sorts of atrocities.

even if they could subvert it with a massive(10:1) overhead in power, they wouldnt make a profit due to the operational costs exceeding any loot they would get!

That's unlikely due to the reasons I explained already.

And IMO that's an exaggeration of the costs of fighting against guerillas. The nazis controlled Europe with far less resources than the Soviets and the US controls tiny countries. The Nazis were just more savage and cleaver.

the disparity of capital needed to protect is even bigger than the money they have to use!

An axiom: more capital confers more power. ALL FACTIONS must protect their capital in war time, not just the rich. When the USSR invaded my country (Finland), my grand father wasn't send to the front, but like so many others, he was sent to guard bridges and roads. Both the NS Germany and the Soviet Union probably had more soldiers guarding their CAPITAL than in the fronts. Huge resources were mobilized to protect industry, infrastructure, city buildings and so forth. But the USSR won the war due to FAR GREATER capital, which could produce more ordinance than the NS Germany.

It terms of percentage, the rich probably wouldn't have any more or less men protecting their capital. It depends on their military strategic situation, not on cosmological economics or incentives.

And they have more capital they can sacrifice if necessary: short term capital losses can be tolerated in the search for long term benefit and power.

the poor can get by with little ownership, renting everything, owning a gun.

Hence he has less power to influence the events. His land can be annexed, he can be enslaved, and so forth.

the rich owns a lot, and needs a lot of capital to protect it. which means that if anything, the RICH are the prime targets for attack, which makes the assumption that the rich would also be the aggressors, a logical contradiction.

Nonsense. And the weaker side might not necessarily be poor: it could be a middle income country, but weaker politically.

i assume that the demand for protection is far bigger for the demand for aggression and thus the supplies of both services will be aswell,

Perhaps but that's not a guarantee of anything. The defense and offensive markets would be intricately intertwined: you can use weaponry for defense as well as for aggression. The same firms that provide defense might very well provide weapons for offensive needs elsewhere. And its not that easy to draw the distinction between aggression and defense: one can accumilate offensive weapons as a deterrence. The supply for aggression and defense would both exist and compete. When one faction accumilates aggressive weapons, others would be prompted to do so as well as a deterrence. Everyone wants to show that they can't merely defend themselves, but also to effectively attack others. But as the interbellum period, the Napoleonic wars, and so many other historical events have demonstrated, an arms race doesn't stop wars it only makes them so much worse when the war finally erupts. Only when the (now nuclear powered) states got so powerful that they'd destroy everything in a war and as democracy expanded, the states stopped directly attacking others of roughly equal power. Having many small factions (ruled by private dictatorships) would guarantee many more wars and confrontations.
 
a more thorough explanation would be necessary. you said the us funded gorillas won but that wasnt economical.

It was a successful model and could be replicated: and the victimized country was small and therefore easy to subvert, which is perfectly fitting for my argument. As for whether it was uneconomical; no, absolutely not. It was uneconomical perhaps in the short term, but in the long term the US without a doubt benefitted from subjugating these Latin American countries under a certain regime of rules. The US was stopped largely by domestic preasure, which would not exist in anarcho-capitalism.

or maybe i missed something you could point out
but now youre again plotting states against states. which have very different incentives from private companies

Can discern your hypocrisy? When I use real life examples you complain that they don't fit your conception. But the anarcho-capitalists have no qualms about citing real life examples for their argument.

In anarcho-capitalism the companies and communities would be totally political entities, because the political enforcement that creates laws would be totally and utterly subject to moneyed power. So no, the behaviour of political entities in anarcho-capitalism wouldn't be any different from the behaviour of countries in history and in todays world. They'd be private tyrannies run by unaccontable narrow families, which would make things worse.

please point out where the statement's errors are, so that i could address them or agree with your refutation.

A rich entity can benefit from the subjugation of a poorer entity, absolutely. Its population could be enslaved, its lands turned to profiteers, its natural resources could be harvested, its meagre banks emptied and so forth.

Also, rich doesn't necesserily mean strong. A strong and rich entity maybe widespread, and not easy to victimize: also its defense and retaliation would be overwhelming. A small medium income or a rich country/entity would probably be victimized first.

yeah they can supply. but there isnt that much demand for it, thats the point!

Well, its a very shoddy point, because it holds no water. Defensive markets would be intricately intertwined with offensive markets: almost indistinguishable even. Now, imagine an alliance of private entities, which exist in a volatile, risky, political market. They don't just want defensive forces, they want deterring forces (i.e. offensive capacity). Therefore, even non-aggressive factions will have demand for offensive weaponry and therefore will stimulate the weapons and military market for offensive weapons and services.

However, still, there would be those who are willing to work anywhere. There will be mercenaries who don't really care about ethics, as history has shown. Or there will those who are willing to provide offensive services for certain factions which they believe are justified in their aggressiveness. My point is that your argument is full of holes basically.

most of the business will be done concerning defense services, because there arent that many people who want to kill other people!

Yes, but there is enough of demand for offensive military. Of course no one wants to just kill people -- few kills for the sake of killing -- but there are much more people who are willing to grab a profit illegally, even kill in the process. Kill and main for the sake of profit or a cause.

but he has no land, if hes renting, he doesnt own anything! its the rich that have it, and the poor persons labour value as a slave is much lower than the value of a trained soldier that could be lost capturing it(and his insuranace, etc)

Ok, let's assume that this is true. You don't need trained soldiers to take down a pathetic peasant, do you?

But you're being too reductionist. Proportionately, you can subjugate a population of millions with few ten thousand well organized and trained soldiers. Use the methods of the nazis. Take hostages that can be readily executed in case of revolt or insurgency. Burn down the entire village if one villager guns down your soldier. And don't bluff.

only if its profitable, which i think you havent really made clear how it would work.

Again. Close the area from foreign competition, and force the population to purchase goods of your or your allies manifacture. Strip mine resources. Enslave the population. Move in people from elsewhere if the native population is uncoperative: and let them develop the country. etc.

the state definitely has incentives to take part in arms race as it doesnt care if it has profit potential, but a company doesnt.

Of course the states cares whether the war is profitable or not! That doens't mean that states haven't fought unprofitable wars, but often they've done so under the believe that it would be profitable or it was necessary.

But anyway. In modern democracies, the state is quite unlikely to wage war like in the old days of monarchies and totalitarianism. In anarcho-capitalism, the political entities would likely be totalitarian as well.

so how would the dictators win the guerillas if their resource base is in the same scale as guerillas' AND MAKE A PROFIT.

And you're simply assuming that everyone will have equal resources, or that they cannot collaborate and pool their resources.
 
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