Military Events
While the Gascons spent early 1512 recovering from Limotges and rounding up cash, the English, under Alfgar, the new Ealdorman of Gascony, began a campaign aimed at Bordeu itself, hoping to strike a decisive blow. Alfgar struck out in force south from Limoges early in the spring. A series of skirmishes around Neicon went England's way, and confirmed to the Gascon commander, Geoffroy of Bruelh, that he was too badly outnumbered to effectively oppose the English advance. His plea for reinforcements was answered with orders to buy time for William's fiscal efforts to bear fruit; judging his position untenable, Bruelh evacuated Peiregord and retreated to the Dordonha, where he began setting up a defensive line. Alfgar occupied an undefended Peireguers in April and immediately advanced on the Dordonha. Expecting the English to take the shortest route to Bordeu, Bruelh concentrated his defenses at Liborna, and there repulsed an English column. Alfgar was in no hurry, however, and so the greater part of his strength was deployed further east, against the Gascon fortifications at Brageirac. These fell after a short, sharp contest and the English secured the crossing. Having crossed the Dordonha, Alfgar spent May and June slowly pushing south and west, intending to isolate Bordeu from the east of Gascony before beginning the siege. The Gascons initially made little move to oppose the English advance, but by late June William's politicking was more or less finished and the Gascon army had been considerably bolstered. In mid July Alfgar launched an assault on Liborna. Perhaps overconfident, he split his force to cover both sides of the river, and when an unexpectedly large relief force, under the personal command of William, arrived from Bordeu English forces on the south bank were routed, and Alfgar fell back in disarray to Brageirac. While Alfgar was busy reforming and reinforcing, William found himself with a substantial numerical edge, for the first time in the entire war, and he wasted no time exploiting it. English positions south of the Dordonha were cleared by the end of August, though Alfgar held Brageirac. An offensive into the Charanta in October achieved significant successes, though the arrival of reinforcements from Brageirac made the hoped-for recapture of Angouleme impossible.
In 1513, the tenor of the war changed completely. For a decade the English had been content to gradually grind the Gascons into dust, while the Gascons lacked the forces to do more than react to English moves. The war had consequently been a slow affair, filled with sieges and skirmishes but with a bare handful of proper battles. Now, though, the Gascons had an edge, however slight – but attaining it had cost them most of their reserves of men, materiel, and political will. Clearly William had no choice but to go for broke; he had to win a really significant victory fast, before he lost the ability to keep his men in the field. On the English side, meanwhile, the winter of 1513 saw the arrival of a large reinforcement column from the north, headed by the Atheling Cenwulf.
While Alfgar, certain that time was on his side, delayed in Brageirac, William made the first move in 1513. Hoping to cut off the English from the north and force Alfgar into the field, the Gascons marched on Peirigord, rooted out the outlying English garrisons, and invested Peiriguers. Alfgar was indeed stirred to action, and marched, without a great deal of urgency, to the relief of the town. William declined to be trapped by Alfgar's relieving army, and instead moved to intercept him. Thanks partially to an unusual breakdown of English scouting, and partially to Alfgar's continuing overconfidence, the Gascons stole a march on Alfgar, fell on the unprepared English near Saint Amand and put them to flight. Breakdowns in discipline prevented William from really following up his victory, and English losses were in the grand scheme comparatively light, but the English army was in disarray in the immediate aftermath. Peiriguers surrendered and Alfgar retreated north, with William hard on his heels. On the Vienne, just south of Limotges, Alfgar was for a second time outmaneuvered and handily defeated; while Alfgar kept retreating, William captured Limotges, with a large store of weapons and silver as an unexpected bonus. Alfgar ordered a consolidation of garrisons to bolster the field army, and with English control of the countryside thus diminished, the Gascons quickly reoccupied most of Lemosin. After taking a brief rest to shore up his communications, William advanced towards Poitiers. By the end of July Alfgar finally took the Gascons seriously enough to try something imaginative; unfortunately, this took the form of an attempted operational envelopment near Civaux. Naturally William graciously permitted the English to split their force, and then pounced on the western prong of Alfgar's attack and smashed it to bits. Cenwulf, in command of the eastern force, extricated his men intact, and bloodied the overeager Gascon pursuit, but nevertheless, for the third time in half a year the English army was sent reeling backwards. Alfgar was unceremoniously sacked once word of Civaux reached Leofric and replaced in command by Cenwulf. While the Atheling reorganized his new command, replacing many of Alfgar's comrades in the officer corps, William captured Poitiers.
All the Gascon success of the previous six months had not, however, fundamentally changed the hard calculus facing William: he was still running out of time and money, he still didn't have any leverage, and the English army was still powerful enough to destroy him once the money ran out. In Poitiers, however, he hit upon a possible solution to all his problems. If he could only contrive to corner and destroy the English army and capture the Atheling, he might still win the war at a stroke. This idea quickly became an obsession, and in service to it the boldness that had characterized his campaigns turned to recklessness. Ignoring advice to consolidate his gains or move against the relatively undefended strongpoints on the Loire, William instead lunged at the English army, falling back towards La Rochelle. The Gascons stormed Niort and fell upon La Rochelle so fast that they nearly caught the English unprepared. Unfortunately for William, it was only nearly. The English ensconced in La Rochelle, supplied by sea and protected by naval cannons, were completely unwilling to come out and fight, and William simply hadn't the time to reduce the place. Instead, ignoring all sensible advice, he marched towards Nantes, burning as he went, hoping to draw out the English. He succeeded. Cenwulf left La Rochelle and moved to catch the Gascons before they could retreat to the safety of the south. William managed, one last time, to steal a march on the English and engaged Cenwulf at Fontenay. Cenwulf, however, proved both organizationally and tactically far superior to Alfgar; more importantly, the Gascon army was by this point almost completely exhausted, sick, hungry and low on materiel. It's quite a testament to William's generalship that Fontenay was much of a contest at all; as it was, it was for a time in late afternoon a very near run thing, but when the English center refused to retreat morale and discipline in the Gascon army evaporated, and by evening the battle had become a rout. William and what he could gather of his army fell back south, while Cenwulf, lauded as the saviour of Imperialism, recaptured Niort and Poitiers.
In 1514 time ran out for Gascony. In January the state was forced to default; in early February the estates came close to outright revolt when the monarchy tried to force through another tax levy; by March citizens in the coastal towns were rioting against draconian fiscal measures; and through it all the army, at best underpaid and at worst not paid at all, was dwindling to desertion. In April mutinous regiments sacked Limotges to make up for back pay, whereupon William, reasoning that he couldn't hold any of it anyway, ordered the systematic looting of as much of the previous year's reconquests as possible. This kept the army more or less under control, but crushed the Gascon monarchy's popularity in the affected areas. Cenwulf followed up the retreating Gascons and by June was back on the Dordonha. William, like Bruelh before him, hoped initially to hold the Dordonha line, but a mutinous company betrayed the crossing at Liborna, and the Gascons had to quickly retreat towards Bordeu. In early July the English at last besieged the city, while the Anglo-Frisian fleet blockaded the Gironde. Conditions in the city quickly became dire and public opinion turned against the mercenaries holding the walls. The English assaulted the city while half the garrison was busy putting down a massive bread riot, and quickly breached the walls. Most of the garrison stopped fighting or tried to switch sides once it became clear that the English were inside. The die-hards delayed the English long enough for William and his children to slip out by the river, but the English forces did capture William's wife, brother and sister.
After the fall of Bordeu, the English rather hoped that Gascon resistance would halt, and indeed for a while it seemed this might be the case; a great many maritime towns and cities, alienated and taxed into oblivion over the last few years of Gascon rule, enthusiastically declared their allegiance to the Emperor. Missives sent to the inland settlements demanding their submission met with a distinctly frosty and ambiguous reception, even in the confused aftermath of Bordeu, when it was thought William might be dead. When William turned up a month later in Tolosa, very much alive and determined to continue the fight, ambiguity turned to clear rejection. Meanwhile, the Gascon army was reorganized by Bruelh around Marmanda and repulsed a lackluster offensive up the Garonne in late summer. It seems likely that Gascony has sustained a mortal wound, but it's still kicking and seemingly determined to go down fighting.
(+2 English Prestige, +200,000 taris to English revenue, -400,000 taris from Gascon revenue, -30,000 taris from Gascon expenses, -Maritimers, +1 Inlanders Strength, -109 Gascon Companies, -8 Gascon Levy Companies, -66 English Companies, 5 Gascon Companies to England)
Both sides had planned to strike first, but the first blow of yet another contest between Sicily and Italy was struck by the Sicilians, while Carolus was delayed by financial concerns in Rome. In June Simon Castamara, newly created Conte di Trapani, led a Sicilian force across the straits to besiege the impressive, if somewhat undermanned, Italian fortifications at Reggio. The Neapolitans hurriedly began gathering forces around Cosenza to mount a relief of the city. The Sicilians promptly took advantage of the drawn down garrisons in Calabria and mounted amphibious descents on Crotone and Taranto, the latter personally commanded by the Admiral Ricard. The appearance of two more Sicilian forces threw the municipal commanders into momentary confusion; eventually it was decided to reduce the forces at Crotone before attempting to relieve Reggio. The Sicilian commander at Crotone, curiously enough a Genovese expat called Bartholomew di Gorgona, led his outnumbered force in a daring raid against the oncoming Neapolitans that overran an extended column and forced the Neapolitans to a dead stop. Shortly thereafter, Reggio fell to di Trapani. With the greater part of Sicily's force on its way north, the Neapolitans decided to retreat to Cosenza. There they tried to hold, hoping to contain the Sicilians in southern Calabria. They failed, and the municipal forces were scattered by the Sicilian veterans. Di Trapani occupied the rest of Calabria while di Gorgona marched his force along the coast to link up with Ricard in Taranto. After Cosenza, the Sicilians faced relatively little opposition, as the Neapolitan forces were mustering further north, and the Neapolitan leadership was busy in Rome; by the end of the year, Sicilian forces had overrun Calabria and most of Apulia, and back in Palermu Aimeric had high hopes for his policy.
(+1 Sicilian Prestige, -4 Sicilian Companies, -12 Italian Levy Companies)
In 1513 the sky fell on Sicily. Between the beginning of February and the end of March, declarations of war arrived from Egypt, the Ghaniya and Saraqusta, and Sicily shortly found itself under attack from literally every direction.
In Libya the Ghaniyans and the Campanians quickly moved against Tarabulus and Misratah and all the rest of the holdings of the Admiralty. Even less well defended than five years ago, these all fell quickly. After that the advancing Ghaniyans faced practically no resistance. By the end of the summer they were back at Qabis. After Qabis the Campanians and the Ghaniyans mostly parted ways; the Ghaniyans roamed into the interior, rooting out Sicilian outposts and trying, without much success, to recruit the local Berbers onside. The Campanians kept pressing along the coast, ending the year just short of Sfax. By 1514 the Ifriqiyans, though still more concerned with the Muwahhidun, managed to organize some credible resistance to the Ghaniyan advance. Sfax held out for a month against Campanian guns, and a Sicilian cavalry force inflicted a defeat on Ghaniyan raiders at Qafsa, and mostly pushed the Ghaniyans back to the coast by mid-summer. The Campanians were still advancing, though. By fall, reinforced by most of the Ghaniyan cavalry, they were at Mahdia, and the Sicilians decided they had to fight. Having painstakingly mustered some ten thousand men, the Sicilians engaged the Campanians just outside the city, and although they took the worse of the engagement and were forced aside, they did inflict enough damage on the Campanians that they were forced to stop in Mahdia, and make no further advance into Ifriqiya. The Ghaniyans were another story, and their raiders have reached alarmingly close to Tunis itself, but at least they aren't occupying anything, and the Sicilians are having some increasing success in countering Ghaniyan raids.
(+1 Ghaniyan Prestige, -1 Sicilian Prestige, - Admiralty of Tarabulus, -200,000 taris from Sicilian revenue, -14 Sicilian Levy Companies, -2 Ghaniyan Companies, -4 Ghaniyan Levy Companies, -6 Campanian Companies)
By 1513 the pseudo-siege of Algiers was into its third year. Used to the boredom of the siege and confident that the Berbers couldn't seriously threaten the city, the Sicilian garrison had perhaps become complacent. They were in for a rude awakening. Over the winter Al-Radi had quietly moved large numbers of guns to the Maghreb and begun preparing to mobilize a large segment of the Maghrebi askaris. In early spring the Muwahhidun began an intense bombardment of Algiers, and a strong force of askaris captured Bomardas, severing the land link with the east. Corsairs appeared and harassed shipments into the city, but couldn't cut the sea link; nevertheless, the garrison at Algiers was now cut off and badly outnumbered. A month into the bombardment the Muwahhidun guns finally opened a major breach: askaris poured in, d'Ebaccar was killed leading a counterattack, and the rest of the Sicilian force mostly destroyed in bloody street fighting. A small Sicilian force managed to retreat in good order to the Roccia in the harbour. This quickly proved to be more or less impenetrable, but the Muwahhidun didn't really care about taking it. They had bigger fish to fry than a tiny fortified islet. The border forts at Mandoura and Naciria were overrun, and Berber irregulars poured into Ifriqiya, while the main force marched along the coast.
The fall of Algiers sent Ifriqiya into a panic. Forgotten, for the moment, was the animosity towards the Zuray; now they were essential parts of any defense. Zuray cavalry were despatched to oppose the Muwahhidun raiders – in which they did not really have a great deal of success, being too few to oppose so many – while the Ifriqiyan gentry appealed to Sicily for immediate aid. Aimeric had bigger problems, of course, and the Ifriqiyans were brusquely told to fend for themselves. In Tunis an extraordinary council of the great landowners, merchants and bureaucrats of Ifriqiya, organized by the Chief Magister Al Hawas, met to make arrangements for opposing the Berbers. By late summer Al Hawas and his cohorts had cobbled together some fifteen thousand men out of militias, Arab tribesmen, retainers and mercenaries, and the Muwahhidun had taken Bougia. In the interior the Berbers were gradually gaining the upper hand over the Zuray and other local resisters. The scratch Ifriqiyan force, under the command of the great landowner Hugo di Biserta, moved west, gathering volunteers from the local population as it went. By the time di Biserta reached Jijel his force had swelled to over twenty thousand, though many of them were badly armed and, lacking royal officers to keep things in order, discipline was throughout atrocious. The Muwahhidun, meanwhile, were slightly outnumbered, but they were better armed, more experienced, and, thanks to Al Radi's reforms, generally more disciplined. Finding the road along the coast blocked by di Biserta's force, the Muwahhidun for the first time pivoted inland. By the time the surprised Sicilians realised what was happening, the Muwahhidun were over the mountains and marching on Tadjenat. Di Biserta couldn't beat them to Tadjenat, where the Muwahhidun army linked up with a large part of their Berber cavalry, but he did arrive in time to block the way to Constantine. There ensued a month or so stalemate, as the Muwahhidun waited while their cavalry cut off di Biserta's scouting and forage. Eventually, with the Sicilians effectively blind, the Muwahhidun moved against the larger Sicilian force in the Oued Seguin. The massive Muwahhidun cavalry advantage was put to good use, as di Biserta's force was systematically outmaneuvered, separated, and routed.
After Oued Seguin di Biserta fell back to Annaba, while the Muwahhidun captured Constantine and then dispersed for the winter. In 1514 the Muwahhidun quickly moved against Annaba; judging that he couldn't risk a repeat of Oued Seguin, di Biserta abandoned the city and moved to Tabark, where there was a stronger defensive position. The Muwahhidun briefly considered assaulting his position, but by this point their lines with the west were dangerously thin, and resistance and raiding from the unoccupied interior was becoming a serious problem. So, instead, they left a covering force at Tabark, and moved into the interior in force. The Muwahhidun spent the rest of the year systematically suppressing the Sicilian presence west of Tebessa, which by the end of the year was the westernmost Sicilian garrison. Di Biserta, conscious that his force was the only thing standing between Al Radi and Tunis, and terrified of being drawn into a trap, sat paralyzed in Tabark, issuing continuing appeals to Aimeric and Al Hawas for reinforcements.
(+90 Sicilian Levy Companies, +70 Muwahhidun Levy Companies)
(-1 Sicilian Prestige, -300,000 taris from Sicilian revenue, +1 Tunisian Gentry Strength, -1 Tunisian Gentry Confidence, -1 Maghrebi Arabs Confidence, -16 Sicilian Companies, -52 Sicilian Levy Companies, -8 Muwahhidun Companies, -28 Muwahhidun Levy Companies)
Saraqusta, with Muwahhidun and Isbunan backing, assembled a force in Barcelona over the winter of 1513. In spring the force, under the askari general Ibn Sirin, moved to Valencia, where it was joined by both a large corsair fleet organized by Al Radi, and an Isbunan fleet. The combined force, after the expected squabbles over command, then sailed against the Baleares. There the corsairs broke off to do piratey things, while the Saraqustans and Isbunans moved against Medina Mayurqa, the capital of the Admiralty. Although Ricard, most of the fleet, and most of the men were away in the east, Ricard's lieutenant Adolfo di Palmaria did have a few thousand men and a dozen ships at his disposal to resist the invasion, and the seaward defences of the islands were generally pretty strong. At any rate, di Palmaria managed to throw back the initial Saraqustan assault on the city, whereupon Ibn Sirin elected to land on the other side of the island at Alcudia. The Sicilian squadron attempted to interfere, but was driven off by the Isbunans. With di Palmaria forced to concentrate all his defense on Mayurqa, the Muwahhidun corsairs, meanwhile, had a field day, ravaging the rest of the Baleares, obliterating local attempts at resistance and carrying away thousands of slaves. When Ibn Sirin sent detachments to occupy Manurqa, Ibiza and Formentera, they met no resistance, a devastated countryside and a populace that, if anything, was grateful for the protection. On Mayurqa, the Saraqustans quickly occupied the east of the island, and then began reducing the network of fortresses surrounding Medina Mayurqa, while the Isbunan fleet sat in the harbour and conducted a (mostly ineffective) bombardment. Di Palmaria did his best, but of course he hadn't the men to really contest the countryside; by midsummer he was under siege in Medina Mayurqa. With the Isbunans making resupply by sea difficult and their naval artillery pounding the walls, di Palmaria nevertheless held out for two months before surrendering. But surrender he did, and after half a year's campaign the Baleares were lost to Sicily.
(-1 Sicilian Prestige, -Admiralty of the Baleares, +Navy, -2 Saraqustan Companies, -2 Saraqustan Ships)
In Calabria di Trapani hoped at the beginning of the year to at least hold something, as a bargaining chip if nothing else. Sicilian garrisons in Apulia were withdrawn to focus on the defense of Calabria. The imperial army, commanded once again by the reliable old war horse Federico di Urbino, mustered at Potenza, where it was joined by the remnants of the Neapolitan force defeated the previous year, and what additional levies the Neapolitans would contribute. Di Urbino's force, numbering well over thirty thousand, advanced on Sicilian positions in mid spring. Unwilling to commit to an early battle, di Trapani led his main force back to Cosenza, while small detachments harassed and ambushed the oncoming Italians. This did little to slow them, and once di Urbino realized what was happening most of the Sicilian forces, with few safe fortifications to retreat to, were run to ground and destroyed. Still, to the Sicilians that was only a minor setback; the main force at Cosenza was still certainly strong enough to halt di Urbino. And so it proved: when the Italians arrived at the town they dared not assault it. Di Urbino and di Trapani skirmished for a while around Cosenza, while an Italian detachment moved slowly down the eastern coast of Calabria towards Crotone, but it seemed unlikely, at least to the Sicilians, that the Italians could evict the Sicilian army by force. It was at this point that the Egyptians arrived.
The Egyptian fleet had mustered at Crete early in the spring. There were problems with the ship's biscuit, and difficulties organizing the transports, and so the expedition was delayed for a month, but it did eventually set out, with di Fayum commanding the fleet and Enzo di Disuq in command of the land forces. The Egyptians arrived first in Taranto, where they tarried for a time, resupplying and conferring with their Italian counterparts. It was eventually decided that the Egyptian and Italian fleets should join up; this was something of a problem, since the Italian fleet was mostly in the Tyrrhenian, and the Sicilian fleet guarded the Straits of Missina. Di Fayum and the fleet moved to a planned rendezvous with the Italian fleet off Reggio. Communications being what they are, it proved impossible to exactly coordinate with the Italians; the Italian fleet arrived first, and found, instead of the Egyptians, Ricard and his Sicilians waiting for them. The Italians unwisely tried to force the strait and were, naturally, beaten up. Fortunately for them, the Egyptians arrived in time to force Ricard to disengage and run to the safety of Missina, though the Italians noticed that perhaps the Egyptians hadn't moved quite as fast as they might to intercept. Anyway, the combined fleets constituted absolutely overwhelming force, and the Egyptians had no difficulty landing their army at Reggio, which quickly fell to an assault backed by Egyptian naval artillery. The Egyptian promptly began marching north, intending to take the Sicilians in the rear. Di Trapani was by this point aware of the various setbacks that had befallen Sicily elsewhere; as commander of the largest Sicilian field army, he felt that he had to preserve his force at all costs. He consequently decided to attempt to evacuate his army by sea before the Egyptians arrived to crush him. Pulling out of Cosenza, he forcemarched to the wetlands at the mouth of the Amato, with di Urbino hard on his heels. There the Sicilian army met Ricard with his fleet, who had commandeered merchantmen to act as transports and slipped out of Missina at night. The evacuation was, in the end, more or less successful, but it very nearly was catastrophic. If di Fayum's van had been a little bit faster, they might have spoiled the whole thing, instead of only overrunning the stragglers; even more seriously, the Egyptian fleet appeared on the horizon just as the evacuation concluded. But, once again, the Egyptians seemed strangely reticent to engage, and Ricard escaped. The Italians were furious that di Fayum had thrown away 'another Gibraltar', and heated allegations of collaboration with the Sicilians were thrown around before cooler heads prevailed.
With the Sicilians evicted from Italian soil, the allies moved on to the next phase of the war. The Italian army crossed the strait and invested Missina, which, unlike a decade earlier, was somewhat reasonably garrisoned. The garrison was not, however, large enough to pose a real threat if they sortied, so the Italians simply erected lines of circumvallation and waited for either their artillery to bring down the fortifications, or the Sicilians to mount a futile relief effort. Things were slightly more exciting further south, where the Egyptians captured Catania by a ruse and destroyed the militia that had been mustering there. The Egyptians then, curiously, stopped for more than a month. Di Disuq claimed it was to conduct necessary preparations and fortify his hold on Catania; the more paranoid and excitable of the Italians claimed that it was to give the Normans time to work out the next phase of their plot. Anyway, during that month Missina fell; given Italian numbers, the outcome had never been in doubt. Remembering his earlier mistake, di Urbino then began marching straight west, on Palermu, shadowed by the Egypto-Italian fleet.
Meanwhile, di Trapani was busy getting his army back into fighting trim, and Aimeric was desperately trying to raise money and men to combat the invasion. An enormous emergency hearth tax was levied on the principality, forced loans raised from all the major banking houses, and a massive levy imposed on the Church. This all contributed considerably to the disruption of the Sicilian economy, but at least it raised enough cash to go on a tremendous recruiting spree. In fact, between Al Hawas' efforts and Aimeric's, the manpower of the principality is considerably depleted. As access to other recruiting grounds is difficult at best, this may be problematic in the future. But that's the future; all that mattered at the time was that by late summer of 1513 Sicily had roughly achieved numerical parity with the the invaders, although of course the quality of many of the new Sicilian troops was lackluster at best. Judging di Urbino to represent the greatest threat, Aimeric despatched di Trapani and the greater part of the new army to oppose the Italian westward march, while Giuseppe Patenno took a smaller force to oppose the Egyptians, now advancing on Syracuse. The Italians had advanced to Carunia, halfway to Palermu, before di Trapani arrived to block the road. Having caught, so he believed, the Italians out of position, and with a numerical advantage, di Trapani decided to chance an attack. On the Sicilian left flank their advance ran into the stone wall of di Urbino's veterans and was stopped in its tracks. On the on the right, repeated massed pike charges up the slopes eventually forced the Italians back, at great cost. The Italians delayed long enough, however, for di Urbino to pull his right flank back before di Trapani could swing around and trap him against the sea. Carunia was a Pyrrhic victory for the Sicilians; they stopped the Italian march and took the field, but suffered more than three times as many casualties as the Italians. And di Urbino fell back only a little way, to Santu Frateddu, where he dug in, repulsed a probing attack from the Sicilians, and waited for the Sicilian army to either fall apart from lack of pay, or leave to fight the Egyptians. For Patenno had not succeeded in stopping the Egyptian advance: for a second time a Sicilian army tried to block the road to Syracuse at Austa, and for a second time it had failed. Patenno's shattered force retreated west after Second Austa, and the Egyptians mounted a triumphal entry into Syracuse, the city fathers having decided at the last moment not to attempt a futile defense.