Well to me: easily enough, but if you feel I am in error you can dispute the biography I've presented here. Gallipoli was bungled not by Churchill, but he took the fall for it, and admittedly someone in his position should, but there is a lot more to the story than that.
The 10 most notable modern military strategists
- Thread starter vogtmurr
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Well to me: easily enough, but if you feel I am in error you can dispute the biography I've presented here. Gallipoli was bungled not by Churchill, but he took the fall for it, and admittedly someone in his position should, but there is a lot more to the story than that.
There is certainly room for some honorable mentions between 8th and 9th place, or higher. You aren't talking about Zhukov I presume, and Ivan the Terrible isn't 'modern' by my definition, neither is Suvorov. This was intended to capture those late 19th C. and 20th C. leaders and staff officers in a strategic role. So I'm not sure which one this Russian is, but I rely on your judgement to identify these.
Actually Sun Tzu was a renowned general whose deeds remain a mystery to me. But the fame of which, as well as his book, is probably sufficient to get him a place on an honorable mention list somewhere, but not on the list of modern ones of course.
Guderian ? I assumed he would be covered with other modern generals in more of an operational or field command role, but as I said this distinction is arbitrary. There are many such generals who had strategic impact who deserve at least honorable mention on this list if not more.
Cheezy the Wiz
Socialist In A Hurry
Alexander Suvorov was indeed the man I had in mind. He was obviously more of a tactician, though.
Well - it's looking like he's finding a place on the honorable mention list of top ten military leaders of all time.
generalstaff
Steadfast
He may not have had much to do about the outcome or even the landing spot (which is what made Gallipoli doomed from the start IMO), but the the plan to land troops in Anatolia was simply a stupid plan considering that the British already had three assault points against the Ottoman Empire: The Sinai and Egypt, Kuwait, and Persia. They also could have have used Greece when they entered the war if they wanted to strike at the "soft underbelly," which I would argue would be Austria-Hungary more than the Ottoman Empire, considering Austria's failures in Serbia and against Russia and the early Ottoman success in Baghdad.
There is some truth to this but it is a long story. The war cabinet was very divided on it but there was political pressure for it as well. When Churchill conceived of a purely naval operation despite the growing hazards offered by submarines and mines it was a dangerous gamble. The Royal Navy tried this in the Napoleonic Wars and met with a similar result, but people don't realize how close this was. There were so many delays and compromises that a chance to seize the Dardanelles was missed. Even so, they actually cleared the last line of mines, silenced most of the guns, and the rest were running short of ammunition. Chance strikes with uncleared mines led to a premature withdrawal by overcautious operational commanders, and the Turks were able to rearm and lay more mine barrages. It seems far-fetched but the investment in maintaining these older capital ships, even taking some losses, may have paid off if they were able to blockade both straits, and threaten Istanbul. How would their troops on the European side get their supplies ? The Turkish Empire may very well have collapsed, at least on this sector. The firepower of this battle fleet is not something to underestimate before the era of high speed aircraft. "The reasons for the decision to turn back are unclear— if the British had pushed forward with the naval attack, as Churchill demanded, then Gallipoli might not have been a defeat. On the other hand, it is possible that they would simply have trapped themselves in the Sea of Marmara"
It is easy to see why a combined operation was the next logical step, but I can't remember all the details around those decisions. However, by this time the campaign was in Kitchener's hands, and the landings as you pointed out did not go well. Churchill had to go along with the prosecution of it as best he could, as long as it still offered a reasonable chance of salvaging the operation, though he began expressing some serious reservations to people.
He had been overzealous in promoting this before, now it was hard to back out. The futility of this campaign became apparent after a number of operational blunders, much like the western front at the time, but this was on a narrow isthmus far from home. (Gallipoli is a European isthmus by the way, not Anatolian.) The evacuation was the brightest day in the entire campaign, but many involved took a long fall over this one, even Kitchener. And Churchill, to some extent, was left holding the bag. Unfortunately his falling out with 'Jackie' Fisher at the height of this stress did much to damage his credibility further. Churchill didn't avoid responsibility for it, and the fact that he persevered and rose again in public life, despite other times of disenfranchisement gives him some dedication and durability we must respect.
You may be right that moving north from Greece into the Balkans made more sense, and that's where these guys went next, to rot in the 'Bird Cage' of Salonika with the reconstituted remnants of the Serbian army. As far as the other pressure points on Ottoman Turkey at the time, while this debacle was going on, the British were stymied, surrounded, and surrendered at Kut al Imara in Mesopotamia, a clear defeat, so this failed to even draw enough pressure off other fronts.
"Some people, such as Winston Churchill, have also argued that the landings may have helped accelerate the genocide of the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire during 1915" In short, Gallipoli stands as an unfortunate stain on the record of a gifted military man, but in no way does it overshadow everything he did, or his basic integrity.
EDIT: as a final note, we should give credit to the Turkish army for an uncommonly spirited defense, the dedication of Mustafa Kemal, and the skill of Otto Liman von Sanders.
generalstaff
Steadfast
(shortened for response)
OK, Kitchener is the one to blame for the failure. Got it. Very interesting.
However, even though Gallipoli was close the Istanbul, it was geographically a poor landing point. It basically would turn any landing into a shooting gallery. I would also not cheer the evacuation since the damage was already done psychologically.
I agree that it is important to not overlook the great fleet, but the Ottoman strategy already took British control of the Eastern Mediterranean as granted since the British controlled the Suez and Cyprus.
Of course, none of this would have happened if Britain kept its side of the deal, and delivered the ships the Ottomans paid for. The Ottoman Empire would not have been tempted into joining the Central Powers and remained neutral if the British delivered (They would never join the Allied side due to Russia being on that side). How great are the "what ifs" of history?
The second attack on Baghdad in 1917 was successful. It makes me think that continued pressure would have been successful. With British India, manpower was not a problem.
The Armenian genocide/massacres (I do not like using either term since it is too complex an event to label, but the forced marches cause me to lean to the term "genocide") of this time has little to do with the British. It had more to do with the Armenian Patriarch issuing a holy war, which resulted in Armenians and Kurds massacring each other and Envar's poor command turning eastern Anatolia into a battlefield with the Russians. Of course, it is easy to see how the chaos led to the forced marches.
Maybe Mustafa Kemal deserves a place on the list, also considering the Greco-Turkish War and resistance in Libya (It is my opinion that if WWI did not happen when it happen, local resistance in Libya would have resulted in an Italian withdrawal).
If Atatürk is on the list, Yudenich will have to go as well, for beating him.
He was competent, and well able to take advantage of things that were handed to him on a platter (British and French arms and supplies) and of less competent opponents (Konstantinos I), but I don't particularly credit him with any special characteristic. A soild professional, not a genius.For what it's worth I don't like Zhukov being on the list.
It's hard to blame one person for even half the debacle. There were many poor decisions made at all levels. It doesn't help that Churchill had a low estimation of Kitchener since the time he served under him, and Kitchener did nothing to justify any faith either. I believe that Churchill had one early opportunity to nay-say the amphibious operation but at that time believed he would still have enough control to salvage the operation, and if it was going ahead anyway, he did not want to lose that. To bow out now would have illustrated a real lack of faith - but he soon realized otherwise. Part of the awkward position he found himself in can be attributed to political inexperience and misplaced faith in some of his peers.
Maybe it was - but getting a quarter million men out of a tight spot with hardly a loss is pretty miraculous, and kept a defeat from being a disaster. The Turkish army suffered just as many casualties as the allies in this campaign.
But not the blockade of Istanbul and the straits. The fact this battle was as big as it was proves it was the hingepin.
I doubt that the ships alone would have kept Turkey out of the war - they were seized because of the impending hostilities were they not ?
Well maybe not, but the allied landings may have given the Armenians false hope at that time. The first stage of this genocidal repression began before the war. Churchill seemed prepared to accept that the British action was an indirect cause of it.
I was feeling off for a day or so - but I didn't see anyone rise to Zhukov's defense. His placement in the list is quite a bit lower than I once thought it was. I realize there is some controversy around his generalship, that the high casualties were unnecessary, but don't see how this list could be complete without him. In a cynical kind of way, he may have recognized that given the disasters other Russian commanders suffered, that such losses were inevitable, and were at least spent in securing significant, demoralizing victories over the enemy. And there is also the self-preservation instinct; without his success he would not have survived Stalin.
Khalkin Gol is all his and it had strategic implications. Even if you only give him partial credit for Kursk and Stalingrad, there is also his key role in the Defense of Moscow, the First Russian Winter Offensive, relief of Leningrad, Bagration etc. All of which had severe strategic consequences for Germany.
generalstaff
Steadfast
The evacuation prevented a disaster from turning into a complete catastrophe IMO. My guess is the Ottomans would expect to take heavy losses in any engagement with the British, which prevented it from being a Pyrrhic victory.
They were seized due to the beginning of WWI, yes. However, it was the German ships being given which pushed the Ottomans over to the Central Powers.
Its just my opinion that the events in the Russians had much more to do with it than events from the British. Of course, the number of fronts (Caucus, Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Egypt to name the main ones at this time) makes things difficult to place one source of blame, though.
It looks like ANZAC day is upon us, it honors the anniversary of the landing at Gallipoli - and an old thread has been resurrected. I'm not sure how this is depicted or who gets the most blame in today's media, but we can all agree the outcome was terrible, that kind of sacrifice should not have been necessary.
fugazi
King
Am I horrible for asking how you'd rate Rommel? I know that his humanity and African tour made him famous, but I ain't no expert at all.
LightSpectra
me autem minui
If Atatürk is on the list, Yudenich will have to go as well, for beating him.
For what it's worth I don't like Zhukov being on the list.
Perhaps I am misunderstanding you; but if you think the man who defeated Ataturk should be on the list, then shouldn't Zhukov also be on the list, being that he's the one who defeated Manstein?
Rommel is a worthy mention as a tactical commander, along with Yudenich, Guderian, Patton, Slim, Cunningham, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, and who else ? we should probably also do Montgomery, in part mention of O'Connor and Auchinleck.
That's not primarily why I think he's noteworthy; it's called a joke.
Yudenich's conduct of operations on the Caucasus front was actually quite genial from what I understand, and he's usually ranked as the best Russian commander of the war.Just read that - does make a good story.
I'd probably get around to doing a short story up on this guy eventually, unless you want to ! But you can check this out:
LightSpectra
me autem minui
Tomoyuki Yamahorsehockya deserves a spot more than Yamamoto. Malaya and Singapore were Japan's most impressive victories.
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