The 'Best' Ancient General

[markdienekes]

I know he was defeated, but he was right on the doorstep to Rome and lacked the means to break through the gates. I've also never seen anything that really shows the Carthiginian government giving as much support as they possibly could or should have.

What do you mean he 'lacked the means to break through the gates'? (Are you talking about manpower and supplies, or siege machinery or a combination of factors?)

There's been a really interesting article written by Shean called Hannibal's Mules - which delves into the matter of why he did not march on Rome. He supposes it was the simple matter of lack of food that prevented him from marching on Rome after Cannae. It is the best explanation I have read on the topic and certainly worth a read if you can get a hold of it. http://www.jstor.org/pss/4436417

 

[Fugitive Sisyphus]

When did 'ancient' times end? I thought Belisarius' time was early medieval.

 

[CELTICEMPIRE]

Alcibiades was a better general than a lot of people on this list.

 

[Dachs]

My observation here is that most of the attempts that were made to reinforce Hannibal were on the initiative of the Barcid brothers, not the Carthaginian state.

Bomilkar's wasn't, and neither was the support given to the rebellion in Sicily. There's also a weird appearance of a Qarthadastim fleet in the Ionian Sea that apparently interfered with Roman operations in the First Macedonian War.

Alcibiades was a better general than a lot of people on this list.

Pft. Thrasyboulos was much better. To quote Cornelius Nepos, "In the Peloponnesian War Thrasyboulos accomplished many victories without Alkibiades; the latter accomplished nothing without the former, yet he, by some gift of his nature, gained the credit for everything."

I would say that Alkibiades' initiative of the Peloponnesian alliance gave Athens its best chance ever of winning the war outright, but that was a political move, not an act of generalship, and in the end it came to nothing.

 

[sendos]

I chose Julius Caesar. I could have went with Alexander but I've forgotten how he managed to beat Darius. I mean, if Darius wasn't spooked by Alexander's missed javelin throw, then the battle outcome would have possibly been different. It would have been a true war of attrition, favouring the Persians due to their large numbers. But then, the Greeks were far better fighters. So I guess you do need to give them credit for their organised phalanxes.

With Caesar, he laid some good plans when conquering the Gauls. The circumvallation of Alesia was the reason why I voted for Caesar, because he's the only person who has done that.

Alcibiades was an Athenian traitor though and he brought doom to the Athenians by leading a huge expedition to Sicily. Now what kind of "good" general would do that? a good general would launch an attack on Sparta by sea, or at least starve them out by blockading Laconia, the region. I thought Demosthenes was a pretty good commander when I read Thucydides' histories and Xenophon. Then again, his enemies just had to provide a trumped up charge for cutting off the hermiae.

 

[Dachs]

Alcibiades was an Athenian traitor though and he brought doom to the Athenians by leading a huge expedition to Sicily. Now what kind of "good" general would do that? a good general would launch an attack on Sparta by sea, or at least starve them out by blockading Laconia, the region. I thought Demosthenes was a pretty good commander when I read Thucydides' histories and Xenophon. Then again, his enemies just had to provide a trumped up charge for cutting off the hermiae.

The Syrakousan expedition - and the attempt to form a counter-league in the Peloponnesos, which led to the Battle of Mantineia - were both sound ideas. (This ought to be the real foundation for his reputation: he could come up with some damn good ideas. The act of commanding troops was something he wasn't so good at. Like Cornelius Nepos said, his victories tended to be attributable to Thrasyboulos, and when Alkibiades made his own decisions, most notably at Notion, pun intended, things turned out badly.) I've spent some time talking about the attack on Syrakousai in this thread. It suffices to say that the expedition was not intrinsically a bad idea, and it almost worked despite all of the things that went against the Athenians - Alkibiades' arrest, Lamachos' death, and the appointment of Nikias to a position of any responsibility being the most important of these. It wasn't doomed to fail, and even the reinforcements led there by Demosthenes were not good money thrown after bad.

Blockade had already been shown to be colossally ineffective in the first year of the war; the Athenians would really have had to have been stupid to try to starve the Spartans out when Sparta and Messenia didn't get food from overseas (like Athens did). Of course, considering that Sparta and Athens were technically still at peace in 415 BC (although in reality the Spartans had abrogated the Peace of Nikias within a year of their agreement to it), blockading Sparta would be a dumb move even if it would have had an effect on Sparta's food supply.

 

[vogtmurr]

Alcibiades was content with a small armed diplomatic mission to Sicily; Nicias (inadverently) and the Assembly ended up endorsing a maximum effort to an objective 1500 miles away by hostile seas, when their prime antagonists were next door. Is it possible others have speculated he did have a part in the hermae, as an attempt to sabotage support for the expedition he felt was folly ?

Alcibiades never had much opportunity to demonstrate his abilities, but when he did, alongside Thrasybulos he was successful, and took risks trying to secure Persian support and win back Athenian allies. Notium as you know was in his absence, by a subordinate who didn't follow orders, so I don't get the connection. As much as the tactical successes can be attributed to Thrasybulos, Alcibiades was a master strategist who had an undeniable gift for inspiring the Athenians who had an exaggerated opinion of him. The strategic advice he gave to Athens, Sparta, Persia, and Athens again, was always sound. He was a traitor after being ostracized, but an extraordinary one, who nonetheless afterwards served as a patriot right to the end.

Personally, my favourite quote of Nepos on the matter is "Alcibiades surpassed all the Athenians in grandeur and magnificence of living"

 

[Dachs]

Alcibiades never had much opportunity to demonstrate his abilities, but when he did, alongside Thrasybulos he was successful, and took risks trying to secure Persian support and win back Athenian allies. Notium as you know was in his absence, by a subordinate who didn't follow orders, so I don't get the connection. As much as the tactical successes can be attributed to Thrasybulos, Alcibiades was a master strategist who had an undeniable gift for inspiring the Athenians who had an exaggerated opinion of him. The strategic advice he gave to Athens, Sparta, Persia, and Athens again, was always sound. He was a traitor after being ostracized, but an extraordinary one, who nonetheless afterwards served as a patriot right to the end.

Notion was absolutely Alkibiades' fault; the man left his entire combat fleet in close proximity to a superior Spartan fleet, and in the hands of a man who had never held a naval command before. Combined with his failure to take Andros earlier in the campaign, which was hard to understand given the special powers and extra resources granted to him, it quite rightly submarined his political career. His abject failure at Kyme in the aftermath of the defeat only made things worse. By 406, the man was a liability in military terms, because he felt as though he needed to justify the great powers given to him by great victories, and therefore conducted risky operations (operations that he was unable to conduct all that well without Thrasyboulos). And he was a liability in political terms due to being so polarizing; he could never accumulate enough support to push his own policies through with any consistency, but he could prevent anyone more able to get majorities from attaining any sort of preeminence.

The fact that the man gave good strategic advice is something with which I would agree; I said as much when I argued that the plan he devised for a counter-Peloponnesian League was Athens' best shot at winning the war. His inability to translate that into battlefield victories or successes on campaign without the aid of better tacticians at his side does not speak particularly well of him, though. Think of the table-setting analogy; he brought plenty of things to the table, but took an awful lot off of it, too. It's like having Rondo running your offense instead of CP3.

 

[danjuno]

Alexander. No contest.