The Boeing Thread

[Crezth]

Boeing is having a bad run lately. First the deadly design error in the 737 max and now this. Still there are so many Boeings flying around the world some incident have to happen.

Pilots used to say “if it ain’t Boeing I ain’t going.” They say different stuff now.

Pithy remarks aside this is all obviously the result of the McDonnell Douglas management revolution and honestly the laymen have no idea how bad it’s actually become. And the worst is every American is paying these clowns through the nose in the form of Boeing’s enormous government contracts. Obviously those contracts are all gravy and the trade off is electric seat adjustment switches that push pilots into the control yoke until the autopilot disables and sends 12 guys to the hospital.

 

[Samson]

Pithy remarks aside this is all obviously the result of the McDonnell Douglas management revolution

I have heard this said, but I am not convinced from general correlation does not equal causation point of view. If this is all the result of the McDonnell Douglas management having a seat at the Boeing board then other companies have not had the same sort of thing, right?

If we look at one oft cited and easy to measure metric, share buybacks, this is what Boeing has done:


As a control group, let us look at what that looks like for the S+P 500 over that time:



Can you really look at that and say the driving factor was exactly who was sitting on which board, or if it is just a case of late phase capitalism being capitalism?

 

[Crezth]

I have heard this said, but I am not convinced from general correlation does not equal causation point of view. If this is all the result of the McDonnell Douglas management having a seat at the Boeing board then other companies have not had the same sort of thing, right?

If we look at one oft cited and easy to measure metric, share buybacks, this is what Boeing has done:


As a control group, let us look at what that looks like for the S+P 500 over that time:



Can you really look at that and say the driving factor was exactly who was sitting on which board, or if it is just a case of late phase capitalism being capitalism?

Can I ask what exactly you think these ducking measurements prove?

 

[Samson]

Can I ask what exactly you think these ducking measurements prove?

That the corporate executive profession figured out that financial engineering was more profitable for the decision makers than real engineering across all sectors in the '90s. To point at one specific corporate arrangement and say it was these individuals who caused the problem risks falling for the correlation = causation fallacy, and possibly taking the wrong action as a result.

 

[Quintillus]

I have heard this said, but I am not convinced from general correlation does not equal causation point of view. If this is all the result of the McDonnell Douglas management having a seat at the Boeing board then other companies have not had the same sort of thing, right?

If we look at one oft cited and easy to measure metric, share buybacks, this is what Boeing has done:

But that's exactly what has changed. Before acquiring McDonnell Douglas and acting as though McDonnell Douglas had acquired them, Boeing was renowned for their engineering culture, and the resulting excellent airplanes and safety record. Engineers ran the place and if a plane didn't satisfy the engineers, it wasn't flying.

McD D had the more traditional "we're here to make money and make our shareholders wealthy" mentality, and it's worth noting that the chart you quote starts one year after Boeing bought McD D. I don't think the argument is that Boeing is more capitalistic than the average company (although not all companies make products that are likely to result in deaths if they fail), but rather that by being average, it is much less focused on making great planes than it used to be, and arguably, than Airbus is today.

I don't remember on which site I read a long-form article on Boeing/McD D, but combined with all the shorter-form ones in recent years, it certainly left me with the impression that there has been a major culture shift from engineering/safety/great planes to make-the-most-money at Boeing over the past 30 years.

----

As for myself, I will fly on a 737-NG, but have intentionally avoided booking flights on the 737 Max. The risk is slight, but why take it if it's not necessary. Although it's not a forever thing - I've basically put it on a "fly safely for 5 years" timer. And just when it was getting up around 4 years since a major incident, a door flew off in mid-air, with various smaller incidents as well. So the timer has been reset.

I have fewer concerns with older models since they have flown for years or decades with good safety records. Not "zero" concerns, but fewer than the MAX. I would also have concerns with United given how many issues they've been having (including with a "Scarebus" in one of the articles Kaitzilla linked), but I haven't flown with them in well over a decade due to customer-service-related corporate management reasons.

 

[Samson]

But that's exactly what has changed. Before acquiring McDonnell Douglas and acting as though McDonnell Douglas had acquired them, Boeing was renowned for their engineering culture, and the resulting excellent airplanes and safety record. Engineers ran the place and if a plane didn't satisfy the engineers, it wasn't flying.

McD D had the more traditional "we're here to make money and make our shareholders wealthy" mentality, and it's worth noting that the chart you quote starts one year after Boeing bought McD D. I don't think the argument is that Boeing is more capitalistic than the average company (although not all companies make products that are likely to result in deaths if they fail), but rather that by being average, it is much less focused on making great planes than it used to be, and arguably, than Airbus is today.

I don't remember on which site I read a long-form article on Boeing/McD D, but combined with all the shorter-form ones in recent years, it certainly left me with the impression that there has been a major culture shift from engineering/safety/great planes to make-the-most-money at Boeing over the past 30 years.

----

As for myself, I will fly on a 737-NG, but have intentionally avoided booking flights on the 737 Max. The risk is slight, but why take it if it's not necessary. Although it's not a forever thing - I've basically put it on a "fly safely for 5 years" timer. And just when it was getting up around 4 years since a major incident, a door flew off in mid-air, with various smaller incidents as well. So the timer has been reset.

I have fewer concerns with older models since they have flown for years or decades with good safety records. Not "zero" concerns, but fewer than the MAX. I would also have concerns with United given how many issues they've been having (including with a "Scarebus" in one of the articles Kaitzilla linked), but I haven't flown with them in well over a decade due to customer-service-related corporate management reasons.

Roughly the same thing happened in board rooms across the S+P 500. It may be that a big part of HOW it happened at Boeing was the takeover, but the REASON it happened is because the system is set up such that the decision makers make a lot more money running a business like that.

 

[Cutlass]

My brother in law is at a multinational in the chemical industry. His take is that the deregulation culture has simply made it cheaper to stop testing and quality control, and just pay out the occasional lawsuits.

 

[Quintillus]

Roughly the same thing happened in board rooms across the S+P 500. It may be that a big part of HOW it happened at Boeing was the takeover, but the REASON it happened is because the system is set up such that the decision makers make a lot more money running a business like that.

I would say the reason it happened is that Boeing put Harry Stonecipher in charge, with many other McD D executives also put in high positions of power. Enough that commentators noted that it was unusual how many of the acquired company's executives wound up running the show, relative to the acquiring company's executives.

IMO, your argument is that the average-ization of Boeing was inevitable due to the trends and forces theory of history. I don't think it was inevitable, but the result of conscious choices that were made initially at Boeing around the time of and in the years after the acquisition, and subsequently by originally-McD D people who were then in positions of power at Boeing.

I'll grant that without background on Boeing and McD D, it probably looks like it's just another company following the corporate trend. But Boeing had been an exceptional example of consistent quality engineering for decades, including decades where major automakers in the U.S. were doing the typical "just enough in engineering to satisfy the marketing needs, only what is required by the government in safety and lobby them to prevent any more of that, pay out maximum profits to shareholders." Example A of such American automotive negligence while Boeing was excellent: The Oldsmobile diesel. Other exhibits include all the rusting out (convenient planned obsolescence!) even after solutions to the problem were available, the Ford Pinto, and the extended resistance to seat belts.

I also think competition of lack thereof plays a part. Why did the Big Three automakers eventually get less bad about quality/reliability/safety*? Largely, there lunch was being eaten by Japanese and later Korean, Swedish, and German imports. Today it's not too hard to avoid a 737-MAX, but part of the reason airlines keep buying them is the lack of alternatives that can be delivered in time to replace their aging existing fleets.

* - Still wouldn't buy a Stellantis (aka Chrysler, aka Fiat Chrysler) product though

 

[Lexicus]

American companies compete to deliver value to shareholders, not to, to quote Civ 4 "Industrialism" tech, "make the best quality goods possible at the lowest cost possible, paying the highest wage possible"

 

[Samson]

I would say the reason it happened is that Boeing put Harry Stonecipher in charge, with many other McD D executives also put in high positions of power. Enough that commentators noted that it was unusual how many of the acquired company's executives wound up running the show, relative to the acquiring company's executives.

IMO, your argument is that the average-ization of Boeing was inevitable due to the trends and forces theory of history. I don't think it was inevitable, but the result of conscious choices that were made initially at Boeing around the time of and in the years after the acquisition, and subsequently by originally-McD D people who were then in positions of power at Boeing.

I'll grant that without background on Boeing and McD D, it probably looks like it's just another company following the corporate trend. But Boeing had been an exceptional example of consistent quality engineering for decades, including decades where major automakers in the U.S. were doing the typical "just enough in engineering to satisfy the marketing needs, only what is required by the government in safety and lobby them to prevent any more of that, pay out maximum profits to shareholders." Example A of such American automotive negligence while Boeing was excellent: The Oldsmobile diesel. Other exhibits include all the rusting out (convenient planned obsolescence!) even after solutions to the problem were available, the Ford Pinto, and the extended resistance to seat belts.

I also think competition of lack thereof plays a part. Why did the Big Three automakers eventually get less bad about quality/reliability/safety*? Largely, there lunch was being eaten by Japanese and later Korean, Swedish, and German imports. Today it's not too hard to avoid a 737-MAX, but part of the reason airlines keep buying them is the lack of alternatives that can be delivered in time to replace their aging existing fleets.

* - Still wouldn't buy a Stellantis (aka Chrysler, aka Fiat Chrysler) product though

Interesting you should mention cars. I was thinking about using them to demonstrate my point, in that in the same 25 year time scale one could say the same thing happened to Mercedes, Volvo and BMW.

 

[Crezth]

That the corporate executive profession figured out that financial engineering was more profitable for the decision makers than real engineering across all sectors in the '90s. To point at one specific corporate arrangement and say it was these individuals who caused the problem risks falling for the correlation = causation fallacy, and possibly taking the wrong action as a result.

Oh I see. Yes, I agree. McDonnell Douglas merely took point because they were the foremost exponents of it but the movements and the ideas of liquidation and horizontal reintegration and so on were all part of a bigger milieu. Yeah that’s fair.

 

[EgonSpengler]

My brother in law is at a multinational in the chemical industry. His take is that the deregulation culture has simply made it cheaper to stop testing and quality control, and just pay out the occasional lawsuits.

I was just thinking about whether and how Boeing being allowed to self-inspect and self-certify its aircraft plays into it. Google says that happened in 2009.

 

[Hygro]

I remember the first time I got on a new 787 and thought this a corner cutting piece of junk.

 

[Crezth]

I was just thinking about whether and how Boeing being allowed to self-inspect and self-certify its aircraft plays into it. Google says that happened in 2009.

Oh it definitely does. It’s how they can get away with their subsidiaries instructing the guys responsible with doing final walk throughs to “report nothing.” It’s why they’re in “huge” trouble now that it’s obvious they haven’t done any of the documentation they were supposed to be doing on work done re: these door plugs. The whole idea of Boeing taking it in hand was to save the FAA time and money, two things the FAA has in very short supply. But apparently, the average tenure of a Boeing quality controls engineer is like 8 months.

 

[EvaDK]

I remember the first time I got on a new 787 and thought this a corner cutting piece of junk.

 

[Lexicus]

Oh it definitely does. It’s how they can get away with their subsidiaries instructing the guys responsible with doing final walk throughs to “report nothing.” It’s why they’re in “huge” trouble now that it’s obvious they haven’t done any of the documentation they were supposed to be doing on work done re: these door plugs. The whole idea of Boeing taking it in hand was to save the FAA time and money, two things the FAA has in very short supply. But apparently, the average tenure of a Boeing quality controls engineer is like 8 months.

At Boeing’s Everett, Washington, facility, each quality assurance inspector was assigned to examine the work of 15 mechanics; in Charleston, that number was 50, and the mechanics themselves more often than not were guys who had been “flipping burgers” a month ago, as Swampy [John Barnett, the "suicided" whistleblower] put it in multiple interviews.

The Strange Death of a Boeing Whistleblower

There’s no way America’s last great manufacturer murdered a prominent critic … is there?

prospect.org

 

[Farm Boy]

It's not really a question of if he was murdered. The only real question is if* they got government "regulators" to do it.

*or more likely, which ones

 

[Crezth]

boeing has slowed down production stopping a practice known as “traveling work” in which if a plane was being assembled in stage 1 of the process, stage 1 work that had not been completed would be allowed to progress to stage 2 where the stage 1 workers would also be allowed to come in and finish their work.

Sometimes the work would be left for stage 3.

But at least they kept a good pace eh

 

[Plains-Cow]

Oh I see. Yes, I agree. McDonnell Douglas merely took point because they were the foremost exponents of it but the movements and the ideas of liquidation and horizontal reintegration and so on were all part of a bigger milieu. Yeah that’s fair.

Top. Camel.

 

[Marla_Singer]

boeing has slowed down production stopping a practice known as “traveling work” in which if a plane was being assembled in stage 1 of the process, stage 1 work that had not been completed would be allowed to progress to stage 2 where the stage 1 workers would also be allowed to come in and finish their work.

Sometimes the work would be left for stage 3.

But at least they kept a good pace eh

There is currently a gigantic global demand for civil airplanes and Boeing isn't the only one struggling to deliver. Speaking from a French perspective, it's been over 20 years that I hear about Airbus struggling to deliver their orders. And this has only gotten worse with covid which heavily disturbed supply chains. The industry relies in a particularly large diversity of suppliers, many of whom are building very niche products, meaning there's a very strong inertia. It's not an industry that you can easily switch off and on again as was done with the pandemic. Ramping up production is a very slow process taking many years.

In French media, Airbus managers always express their concerns about Boeing problems. They have many suppliers in common, therefore they are indirectly affected by supply chain disruptions. Also internally they are obsessed by the fear to face similar issues as Boeing and they aren't immune from that risk. Also they're convinced that if that would be the case, that would kill them faster than Boeing.