philippe
FYI, I chase trains.
but it did boosted Karel Martel's prestige and Pippin the short could capitalise on it, especially with the pope.
The five most important battles of all times.
- Thread starter Archbob
- Start date
- Status
but it did boosted Karel Martel's prestige and Pippin the short could capitalise on it, especially with the pope.
Perfectionist
Angel of Verdun
![[pissed]](/images/smilies/pissed.gif "Pissed [pissed]")
Surely you mean Çaldıran, Yavuz Sultan Selim, yeniçeri and Osmanlı. Or do Turks not warrant native names?
Anyway:
Las Navas de Tolosa, 1212
The Reconquista was not yet a foregone conclusion. Half of Iberia was still Islamic, and twenty years earlier, Yaqub al-Mansur had inflicted upon the Christians their greatest defeat since Guadalete, and only luck saved Toledo. In 1211, al-Mansur's son was back, with an even larger army, to have another go. The Crusader force gathered to oppose him included contingents from every Christian power in Iberia, and significant trans-Pyreneean components. The Crusaders caught the Almohads by surprise and slaughtered them nearly to a man, with the Emir escaping by the skin of his teeth. The Almohads entered terminal decline, and the close duel between Muslim and Christian Iberia became a rout, as all Andalusia save Grenada fell to the Great Reconquest in the next forty years.
Nancy, 1477
In 1475, Burgundy was probably the most powerful state in Europe. The conquest of Lorraine and Alsace, to which Charles then turned his attentions, would have united the two halves of Burgundy, secured the entire length of the Rhine, assured Burgundy's place as the dominant power in both France and the HRE, and probably brought a crown. Of course, Lorraine allied with the Swiss. Charles and his splendid army met their end, as so many others, at the end of a Swiss pike, and instead Burgundy rapidly disintegrated. The Burgundian collapse completely altered the future shape of Europe, and the ramifications were not fully realized for at least another two hundred years.
Edington, 878
The winter attack by Guthrum's Vikings caught Alfred by surprise. He was nearly captured at Chippenham and had to run for it with a handful of followers. For somewhat more than three months, Alfred hid out in the Somerset Levels while the Danes had the possession of country. When spring arrived, Alfred summoned the militias of the country and crushed Guthrum. The victory saved Wessex and virtually established England; the consequences of defeat scarcely bear thinking about.
Lechfield, 955
Not so much for the battle itself. The Magyar threat had been receding for some time. The Lech campaign was something of a last gasp by the Magyar leadership, and if memory serves they'd gotten their arse kicked by the Bavarians a year or two earlier. What Lechfield did was firmly establish Otto as the de facto Emperor; Widukind of Corvey of course credited it entirely with his elevation. Had the battle not occurred, or had Otto lost, it seems likely that he would never have received the Imperial title. It need scarcely be said that without the Empire, and the vague oecumenical claims that came with it, the whole history of Germany and Europe would have been very different.
Lincoln, 1217
Bit of a wild card, and not really sure about it - Dover holding out might be more important. Anyway, Prince Louis of France, the future Louis VII, invaded England in 1216 at the invitation of the barons rebelling against King John - the Magna Carta having failed to quiet the situation. He quickly defeated the opposition and for a few months was the de facto King of England. John's death undermined the rebellion, and barons began returning to the young Henry III. Henry's regent, incidentally, was William Marshal, whose life story is one of the more interesting of the middle ages. Louis' forces were defeated by Marshal's at Lincoln, and the Frenchman was forced to abandon England.
Honorable Mentions: Pavia, Brunanburh, Diu, the Downs, Bosworth Field.
Plus Catalaunian Fields, Soissons, Tours, Lepanto, Vienna and Trafalgar, of course.
I agree in broad terms, but there are a couple of problems with this view. First, pretty much the same thing could be said about Tariq's initial expedition to Hispania. It was only intended to scope things out, really, but when it far exceeded its initial goals the Arabs took advantage. If Charles Martel loses at Tours, there is no other effective power in Francia, and no one to coordinate resistance. Do you really think the Arabs wouldn't have tried to take advantage? Also, the claim that it was a one-off raiding party is disingenuous in the extreme. After consolidating their rule in Hispania, the Arabs mounted a concerted effort to extend their rule north of the Pyrenees, starting with the conquest of the rump Visigothic state in 718-19, and continuing through the attacks on Odo of Aquitaine that forced him to run to Martel, and the conquest of Provence. Five years after Tours, the Umayyads were in Avignon. At the very least, Tours kept France's Mediterranean coastline out of Muslim hands.
Cheezy the Wiz
Socialist In A Hurry
So did the Battle of Fornovo for Charles VIII of France, and they both had similar overall strategic results, yet it is not listed here.
I think you should at least have 10 battles. (But, on the other hand, I don't think battles decide history, so there you go.)
That involves using non-Latin characters.Surely you mean Çaldıran, Yavuz Sultan Selim, yeniçeri and Osmanlı. Or do Turks not warrant native names?
Which Vienna?Perfectionist said:
I don't think that the number should be set at any one specific number, and that the whole Creasyan tradition of "X Battles that Decided History" is silly.
That is because you are close-minded?JEELEN said:
While many battles do not have macrohistorical impact, and are simply the result of trends - the aforementioned ) would still have occurred had they been unable to force their will on the greatest of the Hellenistic princes, the third Antiochos himself. Defeat at Magnesia allowed the Romani to be certain of their position in the East (albeit briefly disturbed by the Third Makedonian War; that latter conflict was foregone, as far as I'm concerned, for Perseus was already running low on men and simply hadn't the resources that were at the disposal of Roma) for at least a century, allowed Euthydemos and his son Demetrios to recover from the humiliation of the Areios, and opened the door for the Pahlavan to begin their great conquest of Iran.
Mirc
Not mIRC!!!
Dachs said:That involves using non-Latin characters.
No, they are called diacritics.
K, y, j, u, w are non-Latin characters. Fine. It involves something that I can't type on my keyboard without having to resort to weird codes, and since I don't have the ability to do alt-codes on this laptop (infuriatingly; I actually know many of those), I must recourse to "the closest transliteration I feel like using". Since the ctrl-codes aren't as easy to use as alt-codes are.No, they are called diacritics.
Mirc
Not mIRC!!!
Don't worry. I was just being a smartass. 
Just felt like posting that because I think I know quite a lot about history of various characters and alphabets.
Just felt like posting that because I think I know quite a lot about history of various characters and alphabets.I don't think that the number should be set at any one specific number, and that the whole Creasyan tradition of "X Battles that Decided History" is silly.
That is because you are close-minded?ChÇaldıran probably being one of them - there are still instances of single events giving rise to major consequences. You cannot, for example, seriously claim that Roman dominance in the Mediterranean (Mesogeios?
Battles are the result of military (tactical and/or strategic) superiority; it's that quality that decides the outcome of battles. (As Sun Tzu already noticed.)
Camulodunum
Mayan Blowdart Marksman
id say mongol victory at samarkand because then then europe had a crossable bridge to china, india, indochina which was the spark that would set off european exploration
also hittite victory at babylon because it wiped out one of the most influential and culturally developed early civilizations
also hittite victory at babylon because it wiped out one of the most influential and culturally developed early civilizations
Except not? The army of the Antigonoi at Ipsos had a larger and better trained phalanx, and the cavalry superiority as well; their enemies were divided in command, too. Antigonos had proved himself an excellent commander, as had his opponents, and it is generally agreed that based on the personalities of the respective commanders, it is impossible to judge one higher than the other. Yet, whether by a whim or caught up in the heat of the moment, his son Demetrios took the entire right wing of cavalry (in which was contained the greater part of the army's horsemen, having been reinforced specifically to win a local victory and then make capital off it) and chased the enemy left (under the first Antiochos) off the field, instead of using them to clear out the enemy light infantry and then outflank the allied phalanx. I fail to see how that indicates any sort of inherent tactical or strategic superiority on the part of the allied forces, and yet the outcome of the engagement had macrohistorical effects.
By the same token, the outcome at Magnesia was by no means predetermined. Megas Antiochos, it is generally agreed, would have crushed the Romani and their Pergamene allies had he not committed Demetrios' mistake and pursued his local enemy. The entire foundation of Roman superiority in the Eastern Mediterranean lay on that single battle; without its issue, the Seleukidai would have held Asia Mikra still, the troublesome easterners would be kept in their place, and you can hardly say that Antiochos IV would have been stopped at Eleusis from his conquest of the kingdom of the Ptolemaioi by a single Roman envoy with a walking stick.
This is getting tiresome. I have provided multiple examples where tactical decisionmaking, irrespective of the systems of war employed by the respective armies, has had macrohistorical impact; all I get in return is a parroting of Sun Tzu. Please cite how the Roman military machine was inherently superior to that of the Seleukidai, and how that guaranteed victory at the aforementioned Battle of Magnesia. Or cite an equivalent statistic for Ipsos. Perhaps you would deign to describe how, without the naval control Salamis guaranteed, the Hellenes in koine would have survived the onslaught of the armies and fleets of Xsayarsa - especially when those fleets were manned by some of the best sailors of the day, the 'purple people' of Canaan - and how that engagement was not decided by Themistokles' ruses, both operational and tactical. And I would be delighted to learn of how Aquae Sextiae was not the result of the maneuverings of Marius, but instead of an inherent superiority of the Romani system of war - the same system, I would have you know, that saw eighty thousand legionaries slaughtered at Arausio against the selfsame enemy. For that matter, describe how Arausio was the result of a Cimbri inherent, predictable superiority, instead of the decision of the patrician Q. Servilius Caepio to disregard his novus homo colleague.
You're quite versed in military history details, I'll grant you. I'll give you one example to explain: you mention yourself the superior Roman military machine - which is the deciding factor -; the Romans ususally won their battles (and if they didn't, they'd recover and try again). Now, the Seleucids weren't destroyed by Rome, but by the Parthians (who took over most of the Seleucid empire). The Romans just finished off the remains. Thinking there was any "decisive battle" in there is just missing the bigger picture; there wasn't any and the outcome was decided before any battle was fought. (Sorry, Sun Tzu again.)
If you think one example won't cut it, I can go on. (And on and on...)
If you think one example won't cut it, I can go on. (And on and on...)
North King
blech
- Joined
- Jan 2, 2004
- Messages
- 18,165
This is an eminently silly thing to say. The Arabs also never had any intention of conquering Spain; that campaign started out as a simple raid, meant to plunder the land. And what happened? Well, we all know what happened... Likewise, many other conquests started out as mere raids; Poitiers was the northernmost advance of Muslim forces for centuries, and deserves some recognition just for that fact.
Eh, there were rather more decisive battles where the Mongols are concerned. And Samarkand wasn't ever in too much doubt.
Poitiers / Tours is a bit north for Southern France.
Except I said "superior Roman military machine" facetiously. Think of the Hellenistic system of war as a rainbow; the Romani only had a few colors of that rainbow. Roma had excellent flexible heavy infantry...but the Hellenic states did too. Ever hear about the thureophoroi and the later evolution of them, the thorakitai? The Romani called them 'imitation legionaries', but the tradition actually evolved out of the Iphikratid lighter hoplitai and the heavy peltastai skirmishers. Hellenistic cavalry was consistently better than that of the Romani, from the Thessalian cavalry employed by Makedonia to the Syrian household cavalry that the Seleukidai used. The phalanx, as is well known, is impenetrable from the front on flat ground. Essentially, the Romani were up against a combined-arms warfare tactical system that, if used properly, couldn't be defeated.
Stating that the Romani "usually won their battles" is also kind of disingenuous. For example, the history of the Third Makedonian War, in which Perseus was finally defeated and his kingdom broken up, is one in which several Roman armies were beaten (one of the things that induced the fourth Antiochos to invade the kingdom of the Ptolemaioi, and successfully), but one engagement - that of Pydna - went the Roman way, and ended up deciding the war. And of course, during the Second Punic War, they lost most of the engagements as well. Roma wasn't an unbeaten colossus at any time, and you acknowledged that; they learned from their mistakes, and you acknowledged that too. The Greeks, too, learned from their mistakes. After the defeat of Kynoskephalai, where the Makedonians were undone due to the rough terrain, which hindered their left wing's deployment, Philippos V instituted the system of the hysteroi pezhetairoi, which were better suited to mountain warfare. It was this force that aided the Makedonian victories in the third war, and it was their failure to be backed up by an effective cavalry force, as well as attrition in general, which spelled the Makedonian demise at Pydna.
And why were the Pahlavan able to beat up the Seleukidai? Why were they able to break free of the near-vassalship that Antiochos III had placed upon them during his great anabasis? Perhaps because the Seleukid phalanx was cut to pieces at Magnesia, following the absenting of the King and his cavalry from the field?JEELEN said:
See, you quote these things and then pretend that they're proof. I don't see how the mutable and unproven dicta of a long-dead Chinese man has any effect on the fact that the Seleukids had the advantages at the Battle of Magnesia, yet they lost anyway. OOOooooOOOOOooo, Sun Tzu is wrong!JEELEN said:
Please do, or modify your original example?JEELEN said:
The Roman cavalry deficiency is a continuous feature of their army and got taken advantage of by various opponents (notably Hannibal and the Parthians). Curiously, they only mended this deficiency at a very late stage in the history of Rome.
Despite losing battle after battle, the Romans always came back - until the empire was stretched to the limit and they switched to a defensive strategy (around 117 AD).
The battle of Magnesia had little effect on the gradual absorption of Seleucid territory by the Parthians. (OooOOOooo, Sun Tzu was right all along!)
Now, why is Sun Tzu right when he says most battles are won before they're begun (to mention just one maxim)? I'll take Alexander's army as an example: Alexander usually took on a numerically stronger enemy, but being a great tactician, he consistently exploited any weak spot in the enemy army's deployment. Would Alexander's army have crushed the seemingly unstoppable Romans? Most definitely. (Lucky for the Romans, the hellenistic successor's armies development after Alexander gave them the edge they needed.)
Skipping some centuries now, let's have a look at the Mongols. It would seem their world conquest was stopped by the death of the Great Khan rather than by any battles lost. (Until the encounter with the Mamluks their expansion seemed quite unstoppable. However, was that a decisive battle or had they just reached the limits of their expansion?)
Now, why do I claim there aren't any decisive battles? For the same reason I can claim there aren't any decisive wars. (To name a 20th century example: WW I created the conditions for WW II. Was that a decisive war then? Not really, it created the conditions for the Cold War.)
And I still say there should be at least 10 most important battles of all times.
Despite losing battle after battle, the Romans always came back - until the empire was stretched to the limit and they switched to a defensive strategy (around 117 AD).
The battle of Magnesia had little effect on the gradual absorption of Seleucid territory by the Parthians. (OooOOOooo, Sun Tzu was right all along!)
Now, why is Sun Tzu right when he says most battles are won before they're begun (to mention just one maxim)? I'll take Alexander's army as an example: Alexander usually took on a numerically stronger enemy, but being a great tactician, he consistently exploited any weak spot in the enemy army's deployment. Would Alexander's army have crushed the seemingly unstoppable Romans? Most definitely. (Lucky for the Romans, the hellenistic successor's armies development after Alexander gave them the edge they needed.)
Skipping some centuries now, let's have a look at the Mongols. It would seem their world conquest was stopped by the death of the Great Khan rather than by any battles lost. (Until the encounter with the Mamluks their expansion seemed quite unstoppable. However, was that a decisive battle or had they just reached the limits of their expansion?)
Now, why do I claim there aren't any decisive battles? For the same reason I can claim there aren't any decisive wars. (To name a 20th century example: WW I created the conditions for WW II. Was that a decisive war then? Not really, it created the conditions for the Cold War.)
And I still say there should be at least 10 most important battles of all times.
Except for Zama, yes. And at Magnesia, they attempted to boost their numbers with Pergamene cavalry from their ally, Eumenes; it was these cavalry that took advantage of the unexpected gap Antiochos' headlong charge left.
...JEELEN said:
lolwut? The point is, for twenty years, from the anabasis to Magnesia, the Pahlavan were Seleukid vassals. They did not expand beyond Hekatompylos and their Parthyaian fastness. The Great King, Friapat, ceased to be beholden to the Seleukid state (as his father, the second Arshak, had been) following the destruction of the phalanx at Magnesia, and instead made gains in Khoarene and Gabiene. Long-term, the period of Pahlavan submission had relatively little impact, due to its short period; if Magnesia had gone the other way, though, Antiochos would have had the means to keep the system in place, checking the Pahlavan.
And that is even discounting the issue of Roman suzerainty, direct and indirect, in Asia Minor/Mikra, and the fact that the Baktrian descent into India - an enormous event of macrohistorical implications - "did not take place until Antiochos' power had been broken at Magnesia", as Tarn says, because beforehand Euthydemos (and by extension Demetrios) could hardly have been sure of his rear.
So you're saying that because of a quality that is only displayed during an engagement, and thus only pertinent to the engagement itself, Alexandros won. I don't see how this contradicts what I'm saying at all.JEELEN said:
Declaring that Antiochos was a "bad tactician" doesn't work either. This is the same guy who smashed the Baktrian kataphraktoi at the Areios, who won a greater victory than Cannae at Panion - the latter of which hinged on him making the very maneuver that eluded him at Magnesia. There was no pre-battle indication that he would screw up; hence there was no way to determine that the battle
I'm not saying that behind every trend is a decisive engagement. I'm saying that there are some decisive engagements that reverse or alter trends in ways that nothing else did or could have.JEELEN said:
That's nice. Wanna stay on topic and name them?JEELEN said:
aronnax
Let your spirit be free
Seeing that history can easily be changed if I go back in time 500 years and punch the first person I see, The five most important battles will be the five first conflicts of Human history.
...except not. Not every conflict is of equal intrinsic magnitude, ceteris paribus; the battle of Megiddo is not more important by virtue of being earlier than, say, the First Marne. A different outcome for the former would simply result in a slightly different pattern in the transient, ephemeral, and often shifting Egyptian control over the southern Levant; a different outcome for the latter could have a tremendous outcome on the pattern of the entire twentieth century all over the world. And it would make Gavrilo Princip a screwup.
Infantry#14
Emperor
- Joined
- Dec 26, 2006
- Messages
- 1,601
The thread title should be renamed as the five most important battles of all times of Europeans and Americans, because thats what most people listed
- Status
Similar threads
