Lockean labour theory of value needs only to apply to use value. Labour theory of value is usually taken to apply primarily to exchange value.
To whit, the economic labour theory of value (usually) holds that the exchange value of a good -how much a good is worth on the market- is essentially linked with the labour
that goes into producing that good.
But Locke need say nothing about the market value of goods. He believes that the use value of goods increases primarily because of the input of labour. Labour magnifies the utility (interpret utility as you will) garnered from the use of a good. Cultivated land is much more valuable than uncultivated land. Because the increase in use value is so great, Locke thinks, mixing our labour with things in the world gives us rights over those things. Most of their use value comes from our labour and, since we own our own labour, we own that thing (or the vast majority of its use value).
I think I probably need to elaborate on my point, because I'm clearly being far too obscure here.
Lockean property theory claims that property rights derive from labour. You invest labour into natural substances, and as this labour represents an extension of yourself, and you own yourself, you therefore own any substance thus invested with your labour. Fair enough so far.
The problem I see emerges when you reach the issue of commerce. Taking the labour theory of property outlined above at face value, it's not possible to transfer ownership of an item between individuals, because the item remains and will always remain a product of their labour. We could certainly
lend each other items, but we would never truly own them; I would be sitting in a flat full of things which I don't own, and which could in principle be recalled at any time.
Of course, what can we say is that what is being traded is not the items, but the labour which they represent. But concrete labour is heterogeneous, so we could only trade like labour for like. A potter
might be able to trade pots with a potter, and a pig-farmer
might be able to trade pork with a pig-farmer, but that's not much good to anyone. We want to figure out how a potter can trade with a pig-farmer, which means figuring out some way to homogenise labour.
The solution is to identify the trade as not a trade of concrete labour, but of abstract labour. A "unit" of pots is worth a "unit" of porks, and the potter and farmer are able to trade them without engaging in an elaborate series of loans.
Arguably, that doesn't constitute a labour theory of value, because as you say it doesn't follow that exchange is actually conducted on the basis of abstract labour. But it would certainly imply some sort of just price theory based around abstract labour, which brings back all the standard Marxian criticisms of exploitation, capital-as-vampire, blah blah blah, which advocates of Lockean property theory are pretty firmly hostile to.
So how do we square that?
Ownership, as I've defined it, is an effect you have on material reality. You feed yourself, right? Sleep? Maybe exercise? We have to do work to keep our bodies alive- we own them. How could ownership be an "external relationship" when it always involves an internal subject?
When I say "external relationship", what I mean is it a relationship between two (or more) things that are constituted prior to their engagement. This is as opposed to an internal relationship, in which two (or more) things are mutually constituting.
In this case, what I mean is that property is conceived of as a relationship between a subject and an object, e.g. between "this guy" and "this bicycle". This is a logic which I do not think can be coherently applied to the the body, because the body is not something distinct from the subject, but the subject itself; not "this guy" and "this body", but "this guy-body". This body-subject cannot enter into an external relationship with itself, so it cannot enter into an ownership relationship with itself. Thus, I don't consider it valid to say that "I own my body".
Also, the exclusivity of your hand is that you-exclusively- get to *choose* who to give your hand to.
Nobody can coerce that out of you if you don't want to- that's what I mean by non-negotiable.
I don't think it's a choice between insisting upon exclusivity and non-negotiability on the one hand, and permitting coercion on other. I would claim that the non-exclusivity and negotiability are at the end of the day ontological facts; my body is not mine alone to dispose of, and I am regularly forced to negotiate my possession of it with others. Every time I help somebody lift something, I am engage That doesn't mean, however, that we concede to any and all coercion, because it is still possible- necessary- to construct an ethics which addresses aggression between subjects. By the same token, I don't think that I possess my couch in an exclusive or non-negotiable fashion, but that doesn't mean I'm cool with any old sod wandering in and nicking it.
See, 90% of philosophical disagreements are actually around definitions. I'm sure we actually agree when it comes right down to it.
I mean, you don't use violence to get your way on a day to day basis, right?
I think you're being over-optimistic. As far as I can tell, we don't even agree on what a person is, let alone how we should go about being one.