Worst mistakes made by otherwise competent generals

BOTP

Warlord
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Napoleon--Russian campaign. 'Nuf said. He made other mistakes but those were political ones.

Robert E. Lee--Pickett's Charge. 15,000 men over a mile with no diversionary attack or feint. What did he think he was going to accomplish?

Caesar- Made a possibly fatal mistake when crossing to Africa. He did not give his army a specific landing location. His army was then dispersed in the crossing, and it was only his unfailing luck that allowed him to find his army and bring it together before he was attacked by Scipio and the other Pompeians.

Valens- is a classic example of flawed intelligence they spotted the infantry but failed to find the thousands of gothic cavalry rampaging though their lands at the time. Also he advanced over land that was catastrophic to his troops formations they were broke up and divided and were cut to pieces.

Macarthur twice- Dec 1941 failing to heed warnings re imminent Jap air attack on Philippines, and 1950 not taking threats of Red Chinese intervention in Korea seriously

Hooker losing his nerve on the eve of Chancellorsville despite having initially outmanouevred Lee and the ANV

Custer- He saw the single largest Native American army since the days of Techumseh, then rather than retire to await reinforcements (which would have arrived in a few days) he divided his forces in the face of a superior enemy, and charged from both sides, expecting the enemy to scatter like they usually did. Boy were they in for a surprise.

Patton and the slap :D
 
Grant - Unpreparedness at Shiloh. Only his coolness in bad
situations salvaged a stalemated battle.

Zhukov - After he fell into Henrici's trap in the Seelow Heights
(May 1945), rather than regrouping he simply kept
slugging. Won only because he had a huge advantage in
numbers, lots of who became casualties.
 
I certainly agree that it was Napoleon's invasion of Russia. There was no reason to attempt the invasion in the late fall and early winter.
 
Patton's fiasco in trying to liberate an American POW camp in Germany.

He wasn't a general, but Custer's action's at Little Bighorn.
 
Napoleon's invasion and attempts to occupy the Iberian Penninsula were also pretty damned stupid also, especially since he elected to ignore it for the better part of 2 years, attempted to control it from afar for most of the campaign, and when he wasn't doing that he was refusing to put 1 marshal in overall command leaving all sorts of problems in the country. Not far off as many troops were made casualties across the peninsula as in Russia. Also his inaction after Ligny cost him the chance to win the 1815 campaign.

Hooker btw might have been alright had he continued to drink like a fish. Lincoln persuaded him to go teetotal, only for him to become quite unlike his former self and throw away a very good battle plan.

Oh and who do you mean Andu, Ney or Blucher? :D
 
What about Operation Market Garden??

Although the whole thing seemed very nice and easy on paper, it got messed up because Monty underestimated the strength of Germans defending the bridges and overestimated the ability of the XXX Corps to strike through Holland and link up with the paras. Attributed to his overconfidence post d-day, and a little game of one-upmanship he wanted to play with Bradley (or was it Patton?).
 
Didn't help that the planning was rushed, he never recieved the required supplies and transport and some other things. Shouldn't have been launched, but it's failiure was down to more than just Monty to be fair.

For that matter, Bradley for not stopping Hurtgen Forest.
 
The lesson of history: Afghanistan always beats its invaders
by Robert Fisk, The Independent UK, 14 September 2001

On the heights of the Kabul Gorge, they still find ancient belt buckles and corroded sword hilts. You can no longer read the insignia of the British regiments of the old East India Company but their bones – those of all 16,000 of them – still lie somewhere amid the dark earth and scree of the most forbidding mountains in Afghanistan. Like the British who came later, like the Russians who were to arrive more than a century afterwards, General William Elphinstone's campaign was surrounded with rhetoric and high principles and ended in disaster. George Bush Junior and Nato, please note.

Indeed, if there is one country – calling it a nation would be a misnomer – that the West should avoid militarily, it is the tribal land in which Osama Bin Laden maintains his obscure sanctuary. Just over two decades ago, I found out what it was like to be on an invasion army in that breathlessly beautiful, wild, proud plateau. Arrested by the Russian Parachute Regiment near the Salang Tunnel, I was sent with a Soviet convoy back to Kabul. We were ambushed, and out of the snowdrifts came the Afghans, carrying knives. An air strike and the arrival of Soviet Tadjik troops saved us. But the mighty Red Army had been humbled before men who could not write their own names and whose politics were so remote that a mujahid fighter would later insist to me that London was occupied by Russian troops.

Back in 1839 we British were also worried about the Russians. General Elphinstone lead an East India Company army of 16,500 – along with 38,000 followers – into Afghanistan, anxious to put an end to Dost Mohamed's flirtation with the Tsar, took Kandahar and entered Kabul on 30 June with the first foreign force to occupy the city in modern times. Dost Mohamed – the British Superpower of the time knew how to deal with recalcitrant natives – was dispatched to exile in India, but the Afghans were not prepared to be placed under British tutelage. To garrison a foreign army in Kabul was folly, as Elphinstone must have realised when, on 1 November, 1840, a British official, Alexander Burns, was hacked to pieces by a mob in the souk and his head impaled on a stake. A 300-strong British unit in the field fled for its life back to Kabul. And when Dost Mohamed's son turned up, leading an Afghan army of 30,000, Elphinstone was doomed.

He bartered his freedom in return for a safe passage back to the British fort in Jalalabad, close to the Indian frontier. It was one of the coldest winters on record and with few supplies, virtually no food and false promises of safety, he led his army – their columns 10 miles in length – out into the frozen desolation of the Kabul Gorge. The camp followers were left by the wayside; contemporary records describe Indian women attached to the British army's colonial force, stripped naked, starving, raped and knifed by Afghan tribesmen, their corpses left in the snow. Elphinstone had long since given up trying to protect them. Yet each new foray down the chasm of the Kabul Gorge – I was to see the remains of a Russian convoy littered across the same track almost 140 years later – led to further ambushes and massacres.

Elphinstone secured the safety of himself, a few officers and a party of English ladies. The last British guardsmen were cut down on the heights, surrounded by thousands of Afghans, firing to the last round, the company commander dying with the Union flag wrapped around his waist. Days later, the last survivor of the massacres, galloping his exhausted horse Jalalabad was attacked by two Afghan cavalry. Hacking them away from him, he broke his sword, Hollywood-style, on one of the men. But with his horse dying beneath him, he reached the British fort. It was to date the greatest defeat of British arms in history.

The British clung to Afghanistan as if it was a jewel in the crown. Under the Treaty of Gandamak, the Amir Yakub Khan could rule Kabul and a British embassy would be opened in the city. But within months, in 1879, the residency was under siege, its few occupants fighting – once more – to the last man. With the embassy on fire, the handful of Britons inside made repeated forays into the ranks of the Afghans. "When charged,'' a later British account would claim, "the Afghan soldiers ran like sheep before a wolf". But within hours, the British were fighting from the burning roof of the residency, slashed to bits with swords, stripped and their bodies burned. The Consul, born to a French father and an Irish mother, was Major Sir Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari, KCB, CSI. A British journalist with the Kabul Field Force found a few scorched bones in the residency yard; they included, no doubt, Sir Pierre's remains.

Ironically, one of Elphinstone's successors was visiting the site of the 1842 massacre in 1880 when he heard that his army – this was the Second Afghan War – had been attacked in a remote semi-desert called Maiwand where the 30th Bombay Infantry was fighting off thousands of ghazi warriors who were charging suicidally at British cannon and Egyptian colonial troops. Savage in their assaults, waving green Islamic banners and utterly heedless of their own lives – and the word "suicidal" is not used loosely here – they threw themselves among the British.

We were to conduct a military inquiry into the disaster that followed and now, in the fragile, yellowing pages of the Indian British Army's Intelligence Branch report we can find chilling evidence of what this meant. Captain Wainwaring was to recall how "the whole of the ground to the left of the 30th Native Infantry, and between it and the Grenadiers, was covered with swarms of ghazis and banner-men. The ghazis were actually in the ranks of the Grenadiers, pulling the men out and hacking them down with their swords ...''. A young Afghan woman – all we know is that her name was Malaleh – feared that the tribesmen might withdraw and so tore off her veil, holding it above her head as a flag and charging at the Grenadiers herself. She was shot down by British rifle fire. But the British fled. In all, they lost 1,320 men including 21 officers, along with 1,000 rifles and at least 600 swords.

The Great Game was supposed to be about frontiers – about keeping a British-controlled Afghanistan between the Indian Empire and the Russian border – but it was a history of betrayals. Those we thought were on our side turned out to be against us. Until 1878, we had thought the Amir Sher Ali Khan of Kabul was our friend, ready to fight for the British Empire – just as a man called Osama bin Laden would later fight the Russians on "our" behalf – but he forbade passage to British troops and encouraged the robbery of British merchants.

He had "openly and assiduously endeavoured ... to stir up religious hatred against the English,'' our declaration of war had announced on 21 November, 1878. The Amir's aiding and abetting of the murder of the British Embassy staff was "a treacherous and cowardly crime, which has brought indelible disgrace upon the Afghan people,'' Sir Frederick Roberts announced in 1879 when, yet again, the British had occupied Kabul. The Amir's followers "should not escape ... penalty and ... the punishment inflicted should be such as will be felt and remembered ... All persons convicted of bearing a part [in the murders] will be dealt with according to their deserts.'' It was an ancient, Victorian warning, a ghostly preamble to the words we have been hearing from President Bush – and, indeed, Mr Blair – in the last 48 hours.

Elphinstone was a General in the Wars against Napoleon, and was by 1840 a very old and out touch general, but still experienced.
 
I do laugh at this notion that Afghanistan beats its invaders...it is just such a worthless place, that no-one is really going to exert that much effort to take and hold it forever. Overly aggressive powers who feel threatened by it sometimes foolishly wander in, eventually realise the place is pants and then leave. I know the same could be said of the M6 corridor between Manchester and Birmingham, but it is important to keep that place pacified until a wall can be built around it ;)
 
LOL@kittenofchaos

I know very well the region should be walled in, having lived 6 months in Sheffield :D
 
Provolution said:
LOL@kittenofchaos

I know very well the region should be walled in, having lived 6 months in Sheffield :D


Sheffield is on the other side of the Pennines...

I'm talking about the hellhole Newcastle-Upon-Lyne, Stoke, Hanley, Cannock, Wolverhampton and Brownhills :D

A wall around the entire midlands perhaps.
 
privatehudson said:
Didn't help that the planning was rushed, he never recieved the required supplies and transport and some other things. Shouldn't have been launched, but it's failiure was down to more than just Monty to be fair.

For that matter, Bradley for not stopping Hurtgen Forest.

HE could have got his supplies if he had first captured one of the Dutch port cities ( I'm sorry I cannot immediately recollect the name), but he assured Eisenhower that if he were allowed to drive through Holland without having to divert his attention to capturing the port. HE put too much faith on the RAF to get ALL the supplies to the paras, but did not take into account the fact that under inclement weather conditions, the paras would be completely doomed, which was what ultimately happened.

OF course, the ENTIRE operation cannot be blamed on Monty (one man can foul up only so much), but he was an otherwise competent general who screwed up.
 
HE could have got his supplies if he had first captured one of the Dutch port cities ( I'm sorry I cannot immediately recollect the name), but he assured Eisenhower that if he were allowed to drive through Holland without having to divert his attention to capturing the port.

Uhmmm sorry but no. Antwerp (Belgian port btw, Rotterdam didn't fall before MG) relied on the Schelde estuary near it being clear, and when they did turn their attention to it, they found it took a lot longer than a few days to achieve this, more like a month or so. The Germans controlled nearby Walacheren Island which dominated the port's entrance, and the estuary was mined. I don't doubt it would have helped to have the port opened sooner, but it's incorrect to suggest he could have achieved this and MG in time to do both. Eisenhower was well aware of the value of the port it's true, but no-one could realise the time it would take to fall.

Whether it was open or not though is still not entirely relevant to my point. Even open the two flanking corps did not recieve the transport priorities they needed in time for the operation. This meant that their vital operation of pushing northwards to protect XXX corps from attack (which is what screwed XXX corps up just as much as 1 road) never took place and XXX corps spent vital periods of the battle supporting the airborne carpet rather than pushing onwards.

HE put too much faith on the RAF to get ALL the supplies to the paras, but did not take into account the fact that under inclement weather conditions, the paras would be completely doomed, which was what ultimately happened.

Again I beg to differ, Montgomery may have put faith in them, but he and his planners were hamstrung by them also. It was the RAF that refused to do two drops on the first day, the RAF that refused to drop troops closer to Arnhem bridge, the RAF that declined the opportunity to turn the attack into a Crete style plan (ie capture an airfield to the north and fly troops in, then move south to join the coup-de-main forces at the bridge). Either way, on the issue of supplies, what other way exactly do you think Airborne troops get supplies? If the RAF refused out of hand the plan to fly them into the area, one can hardly blame him for having to airdrop them somehow. Oh and it wasn't inclement weather that was the real problem behind the supply drops (the weather hit the airborne drops themselves harder) but the lack of ability from 1st Airborne to hold the drop zones or change them. Given their lack of troops on day one (An RAF and Browning decision I'd add) and multitude of tasks, it's hardly suprising to be fair.

I don't blame Monty for most of the problems, I blame him for taking such a major risk. MG was a gamble that even if it paid off would struggle. It's problems though were not all caused by him, nor where they so impossible to resolve. I blame him for going ahead knowing these choices, but the majority of them were forced on him rather than him making the choice, so to blame him for the problems when they were not his fault seems unkind.
 
privatehudson said:
Shouldn't have been launched, but it's failiure was down to more than just [insert any general's name here] to be fair.
With a few exceptions, most failed campaigns or battles can be attributed to multiple causes. By trying to get Monty off the hook and spread the blame around, you just let most of the others off also. Custer and Blucher excepted. ;)
 
With a few exceptions, most failed campaigns or battles can be attributed to multiple causes. By trying to get Monty off the hook and spread the blame around, you just let most of the others off also

Naturally, depends on the situation though. What I'm saying is that Monty was not in charge of everything that happened during that period and can't be blamed for decisions made by others that he had no control over. He wasn't in sole charge of his country or army. Many of his "mistakes" were quite understandable ones such as Antwerp. Don't make me compare this to the 1815 campaign :mischief:

Though it's reasonably comparable to Aspern Essling in many ways :D
 
Andu Indorin said:
Leading a cavalry charge as an army commander,
...without putting your glasses on... :D
Andu Indorin said:
1632. Mistake.
It seems he may have mistaken the enemy cavalry for his own. And he wasn't wearing his glasses that day...
 
Andu Indorin said:
Blucher: How a septagenarian can survive getting his horse shot out from beneath him is beyond my comprehension.

I believe it had something to do with Brandy :lol:
 
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