Abortion: how to have a logically consistent position?

Wouldn't you say this particular norm is biological? That is, is saying that it's normal for a pregnant woman to give birth really a matter of cultural construction, or dehumanisation?
 
"Biological norm" is a contradiction in terms. A norm is necessarily cultural.
 
That's just a probability, then, and probabilities are descriptive, not normative. If a woman is pregnant, we can say "she will probably bring the pregnancy to term", but if she doesn't, we can't claim that there existed any natural compulsion towards that outcome that she somehow defied, we can only say that our prediction was incorrect. Both outcomes had to be actively realised by her, she simply opted for one realisation over the other.
 
But isn't the OP's point pretty much the same if Premise X is 'A foetus will, on the balance of probability, become a sentient being'? The point being that the conditions exist under which, more often than that, a foetus develops into something with what the OP is calling sentience, and that therefore the age of a foetus should logically be irrelevant, given that everpresent potential? Does Premise Y then not follow from that?
 
Not really.

Every person will become a dead person, so at what point this person becomes a dead person is irrelevant.

Premise Y states that the moment of transition from non-sentient into sentient is irrelevant, but doesn't explain why.
 
I don't think it's saying it's irrelevant in its entirety, but that it's irrelevant for the purposes of differentiating various stages of pregnancy. This rests on the statement that that moment of transition is after birth, and whilst that statement is wrong (I'll go with El Mac, et. al. on that one), I think Y still follows from X if you're assuming it.

But hey, I've actually lost sight of what I was arguing (I think it was something along the lines of 'tripping at the first hurdle' being harsh judgment when the perceived problem seemed to be the statement that foetuses in a womb generally are brought to term), and am just posting this due to momentum, so I'm not contending that Premise Y is actually right (given the seemingly wrong use of 'sentience').
 
But isn't the OP's point pretty much the same if Premise X is 'A foetus will, on the balance of probability, become a sentient being'? The point being that the conditions exist under which, more often than that, a foetus develops into something with what the OP is calling sentience, and that therefore the age of a foetus should logically be irrelevant, given that everpresent potential? Does Premise Y then not follow from that?
I don't think it does, no, because the connection rests on a third, unstated premise, that "potential sentience" carries moral weight. I don't believe that it does, or could, because potential is not an actually-existing property of real things, it's an inference we make from what information we have available to us, describing possible future outcomes.

It is possible, even probably, that a pregnant woman may carry the pregnancy to term. It is also possibly that she may terminate the pregnancy. Both possibilities remain unrealised until they actually happen, and as soon as one happens, the other collapses. Neither possess any sort of ontological primacy over the other.
 
As I see it we have too overriding and competing factors...

1) The women has a right not to be pregnant (especially if continued pregnancy would be harmful or potentially deadly, in which case it's easy to see that abortion is justifiable self defense.)

2) A sentient beings have a right not to be murdered.

Generally my view is that since the women is clearly MORE sentient than a fetus her rights override it's rights. Further since the fetus can't survive without her leeching away her nutrients etc. It can be seen as a parasite which she has every right to remove.

But as we pass through pregnancy the fetus becomes more sentient and eventually attains the ability to survive without the mother, my view is that there is some magic point where the relative sentience levels become close enough that the women's rights no longer clearly override those of the fetus (unless she is in danger, in which case self defense overrides everything else). Further once the fetus can survive without the women, it is hard to justify abortion as opposed to some form of extraction that doesn't kill the it. But as long as it's in the women it's a parasite and she has every right to have it removed.

That's my viewpoint and I think it is logically consistent.
 
I don't think it does, no, because the connection rests on a third, unstated premise, that "potential sentience" carries moral weight. I don't believe that it does, or could, because potential is not an actually-existing property of real things, it's an inference we make from what information we have available to us, describing possible future outcomes.

It is possible, even probably, that a pregnant woman may carry the pregnancy to term. It is also possibly that she may terminate the pregnancy. Both possibilities remain unrealised until they actually happen, and as soon as one happens, the other collapses. Neither possess any sort of ontological primacy over the other.

It should be noted that we don't know that "we" are sentient, because that is an inference.
 
On the contrary; it's not even 'cogito ergo sum', it's 'cogito ergo cogito'. By questioning our own sentience, we prove it.
 
I'm afraid I don't follow - which question is it begging? A sentient being is one that is aware of itself: by questioning whether we are aware of ourselves, we reveal to ourselves that we exist, and therefore gain knowledge of ourselves.
 
I'm afraid I don't follow - which question is it begging? A sentient being is one that is aware of itself: by questioning whether we are aware of ourselves, we reveal to ourselves that we exist, and therefore gain knowledge of ourselves.

It is from the la-la land of philosophy and in itself it has no practical purpose, but we are begging the question by assuming the we. Or rather it is the difference between something thinks and you think. If you are a computer simulation, then you are not thinking, but something is thinking. In other words - that something thinks and doubts, only means that something is doing that and "I doubt that I think, but since I doubt it, I am me" doesn't prove the "I", it only prove something is doubting. :)
 
I'm afraid I really don't follow that. When I think, whatever is doing the thinking is assigned the name 'I' - that's why Descartes' principle works. However decieved you are, something which does not exist can never be fooled into thinking that it exists, since only things that exist can do things such as thinking - hence 'I am'.

Also see below.
 
Honestly, once a 'global skeptic' feels like it's worth his time to disregard cogito ergo sum as insufficient, I think the conversation is mostly over.
 
Erm. "Disregard cogito ergo sum as insufficient"?

I don't understand. There may be too many negatives in there. Do you mean he regards it as sufficient? Why would it be worth a skeptic's time to regard it as sufficient? How much time would it take?
 
That sentence means 'disregard it because it is thought to be insufficient'. I just looked up the phrase, and found the interesting point that if it is not true, then we must accept the possibility that we do not exist, and yet are still wrong.
 
False premise. A foetus will only become a sentient being constant external intervention on the part of the mother, who must supply the foetus with nutrients and oxygen for it to survive and develop. If you remove a foetus from the womb and put it on a table, it won't continue to develop, it'll just die. Nothing remotely inevitable about it.

So, tripping at the first hurdle with that one.

I disagree. First of all, to "remove a foetus from the womb and put it on a table" is an external intervention. With regards to the mother supplying nutrients, her own body will drive her seek extra food - this wold come naturally and would require a specific decision by the mother to consume less.
 
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