Alternate History Thread II...

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Well the Germans were almost breaking through before America intervened so right before the Americans intervened would be there victory date(you know mid-1916)and the peace treaty was almost identical to the treaty of versallies

I'd say that it was more likely for Germany to win World War I, during either 1914 (a long shot but possible with a few change made to the Schlieffen plan). 1917 (The French army revolted, if only the Germans would have found out). Or The Spring Offensive of 1918 (With Russia in a Civil War), but Germany that wins in 1918 is not likely to be able to hold on to it's gains too long after peace.
 
I don't think Germany could WIN in 1918. Britain remains inassailable and the domestic situation with detiriorate further. What we get, ofcourse, is a socialist revolution in Germany, and by extension in all of Continental Europe...

But generally, I don't like 20th century PoDs too much. Its too narrow (because, realistically, there are way too few major divergences when compared with earlier time periods), and too subjective as it is comparatively recent history. 17th-19th century is my personal favourite.
 
I have a personal preference of 16-18th century PoD's...the world is changed more drastically than in modern PoD's, but not drastically enough to be unrecognizable.

I've recently been interested in a 10-20,000 B.C. PoD, with the NES itself starting in 1 AD.
 
10-20,000 B.C. PoD,

Humans first evolve in South America, for instance. Not sure if its feasable, though.
 
Or better yet China...in that way migrating nomads first settle in Europe and the Americas at the same time, allowing for technological parity (of sorts) when Europe discovers America...or vice versa.

Interesting. Someone would have to envision what feudalism and gunpowder would be like for Mesoamericans, though. And China could create a hegemonic Roman-style Eurasian empire early on, that collapses in 100 BC due to "barbarian" invasion.
 
*shakes head* There is never a good China in althistory, either a small weak China, or a strong China ruled by Mongols, Manchus or some other nomads... :(
 
or a strong China ruled by Mongols, Manchus or some other nomads...

Don't you remember that althist I made for you? Admittedly, the China in question was quite anti-Confucian, but it was a strong native-ran one.

Or better yet China...in that way migrating nomads first settle in Europe and the Americas at the same time, allowing for technological parity (of sorts) when Europe discovers America...or vice versa.

Interesting. Someone would have to envision what feudalism and gunpowder would be like for Mesoamericans, though. And China could create a hegemonic Roman-style Eurasian empire early on, that collapses in 100 BC due to "barbarian" invasion.

IMHO China just isn't the sort of a place for that - not enough monkeys ;) . Indochina, however... Possibly a very advanced civilization will appear in south Indochina, Malaysia and Indonesia as well. If we get a set-up similar to IT II ITNES I (Kalinga, Sinhala, Indochinese states, Hong Kong) but with more little states around, possibly without as much Indian colonies in Indonesia... Well, it'll be interesting. That might be rather like OTL's Mediterranean, actually.
 
Yes, good analogy with the Med, das. But then the collapse of Classical Age malaysian civilization allows for the rise of empires farther afield. (China, India and the Middle East)

Europe would basically be the new Siberia. :lol: So then the discovery of the New World would certainly come via the Pacific...but Mesoamerican civs will also have an advanced feudal/caste society in place.
 
Europe would basically be the new Siberia.

Unlikely - the Mediterranean at least will also develop quite well. Africa will be worse off than in OTL, that's for sure. On other hand, East Africa might be more advanced - India will generally be more maritime than in OTL, and some Indian states might establish colonies in Arabia and East Africa.

Mesoamerica and the Carribean will be another area of advanced civilization. Eventually, Mediterranean, Central American and Southeast Asian worlds will clash...
 
Generally, I agree. But seriously, how could Africa POSSIBLY be worse than in OTL? :lol:

The initial period of Classical Malaysian civilization/city states could be followed by a strong, centralized Rome-type state (based in Burma, perhaps?) dominating as far afield as Australia and Mongolia, but then collapsing due to barbarian invasions from Tibet, India and Japan.

As Southeast Asia moves into the Dark Ages, new civilizations emerge in the Mediterranean.

A rapidly growing India state could act as an Abbasid Caliphate of sorts, spreading a radical form of evangelist Hinduism but also preserving and spreading knowledge between East and West, and keeping the trade routes open.

The growth of Greece as a maritime empire could begin now. Mayans develop further and create hegemonic civilizations with massive technological progress. But then a religious schism (human sacrifice/no human sacrifice?) similar to the Reformation could fragment everything. Baja Californian state acts as Portugal, mapping out S. America and founding colonies in Hawaii.

Northern Europe remains barbaric, covered in forests.

Ideas?
 
For your consideration (This is actually something I'm writing for an AP credit class. That's why it doesn't follow the format of my other timelines, and also why I didn't draw up a map. Tell me what you think):


The setting is 646 CE, Imperial Japan.

Japan had been under the rule of the Emperors for some time now, a powerful entity in and of itself. However, this edifice was ever fragile, due to the tenuous nature of the Emperor’s power, and the fact that the aristocrats could oppose his rulings so easily. The Emperor Kotoku decided upon a way to combat this, and in this year, he set forth the Taika Reforms–“Great” Reforms.

These edicts were, in sum:

Article I abolished private ownership of land & workers, deriving from "namesake", succession, or other means of appropriation.

Article II established a central capital metropolitan region, called the Kinai, or Inner Provinces. A capital city was to be built there, and governors would be appointed.

Article III established population registers, as well as the redistribution of rice-cultivating land equitably. It also provided for the appointment of rural village heads.

Article IV abolished the old forms of taxes, and established a new system.

All in all, the edicts sought to reform Japanese society into something new and wondrous, that had only once been seen before–in Imperial China. They sought to establish a Confucian-style bureaucracy, a united, centralized Japanese state. There would have been no samurai warlords, but no Japan sinking into isolation, either. In reality, Japan didn’t open up until the 1800s. What if they had never closed?

******************

With some resistance from the nobility, then, the Taika reforms go forward as planned by the Emperor (who takes the name Taika–“Great Reform”. As usual, the Japanese are creative with their naming). The centralized Japanese government develops something of a court bureaucracy, but even more importantly, they conscript a standing army from the peasantry, creating a united force to fight for the Emperor.

Thus, through the 640s and the 650s CE, the Japanese absorb the entirety of Honshu into their island empire, while securing their hold on Shikoku and Kyushu. Only Hokkaido remains outside of their grasp. Meanwhile, the Chinese are flourishing under the Tang dynasty, and Japan continues to import much in the way of goods and culture from their highly refined neighbors.

Through the rest of the 7th century, rebellions are put down by the strengthening Japanese government, and Hokkaido begins to be slowly absorbed into the empire, the Ainu natives being pushed further and further north, while the Ryukyu Islands to the south of Japan (including Okinawa) are claimed for the Emperor.

The 8th century opens with the Japanese beginning to look towards the Korean Peninsula (this is a natural enough trend; only a few dozens of miles separate them). They conquer the small islands of Chubu and Tsushima without too much trouble, and without arousing the suspicion of the Silla government.

Back at home, the Japanese devise their own written language, based more upon the Japanese language, and thus far better adapted for it. This leads to something of a flowering of Japanese court literature, and poetry, too grows, including the famous haiku style.

A new, bolder Japanese emperor declares war on the kingdom of Silla. He believes that expansion into the Korean Peninsula would be quite excellent and easy. Indeed, the Japanese troops make significant advances at first. But later on, they falter, and fail, as Chinese Tang Dynasty troops come in to reinforce their allies. In the end, Japanese forces were defeated and driven back to their island kingdom.

In the 750s, however, the Tang grew weaker. Their expansion into Central Asia had been turned around by Arabs at the River Talas, and peasant rebellions increased against the lavish and extravagant administration. Japan moved again and attacked the weakened Silla, finally bringing it to its knees after a decade of hard fighting. They then started to pressure the Tang by supporting pirate groups and participating in such raids themselves.

In 780, the Tang finally fully collapsed by a peasant rebellion, but that was not the end of it. The skillful and influential Japanese emperors carefully intervened only where necessary, to stop any one rebel group or noble from getting too powerful, to set them all at odds. When the dust settled, China was divided into fairly strong states which maintained a firm independence from each other: Wei in the north, Wu in the heartlands, and Tong in the south.

Japan managed to gain the Shangdong Peninsula and the isles of Hainan and Taiwan out of the deal, and was universally recognized as the preeminent regional power. With the Japanese carefully intervening where necessary, the Song Dynasty never rose, of course, so China stayed disunited. Japan was free to expand, which they did, through the Philippines and Vietnam.

The period of the 900s through the 1200s was fairly uneventful. One of the Chinese states invented gunpowder, and all three adopted it. Their competition strengthened China in a way that the monolithic China we knew never could, and they began to replace Japan as the primary power, destroying some of the Japanese colonies. They also managed to completely destroy the Mongol invasions in the 1200s.

This led to a large amount of differences to our world. The Muslim states, unaffected by the Mongol Hordes that never came, were much stronger in this timeline. Yet at the same time, several positive effects never really happened; the Ottomans stayed a minor tribe around Samarkand, unmoved by attack. The nation that they would have replaced, the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum, took much longer to fell the state of Byzantium. On the other hand, Persian and Mesopotamian Muslims grew in prosperity under new states. Trade flourished, especially with the east.

Because of the rising Indian Ocean trade, the Peninsular Indian states such as Travancore and Calicut grew in wealth as well, acting as the middlemen, and becoming powerful merchant states. Islam, having not entered a period of decline, continued to infiltrate further into the African continent. Meanwhile, Europe remained a backwater, with Muslim intrusions impossible to drive out.

With the New World discovered by a Japanese explorer in the 1400s, these new lands were open to slow, gradual colonization by the Chinese and Japanese states, who competed for trade with these new native Empires. While the Incas survived the contact (albiet in shrunken form), the diseases of the Old World struck the Aztecs too hard, so that even without a nation bent on conquering them, they fell apart into smaller states, like the Tlaxcala and the Tarsacan.

The Hapsburgs, rulers of Austria, would never rise to prominence in Europe, so a Valois Dynasty France (not Bourbons) remained unchallenged for dominance, advancing into Italy and taking much of this region for themselves. Novgorod, at this point still the dominant Russian state (no Mongol yoke), united the Russias into one Empire, and as Constantinople fell, Alexander VI took the title of “Czar of all the Russias”, and declared Novgorod the “Third Rome”, as successor to the Byzantines.

England was the only European power who could partake in colonization. Spain was too busy fighting the French, the French too busy fighting the Germans, the Germans the Poles, the Poles the Russians. England alone had the body of water separating it from this turmoil, and they alone were able to colonize the Americas.

Their colonization of the Americas prompted the formation of the “River League”, a group of Native Americans to oppose them, such as the Creek, Cherokee, Choctaw, Alabama, etc. Thus, the world as it stood in 1700:

China was split into several smaller nations, who were more technologically advanced than our China, and more outward looking. Japan was a powerful Pacific nation, but no longer did it dominate affairs on the mainland; only Korea and Kamchatka were under its rule now.

India was dominated by the trade states of the south, who had formed something of a league, with colonial ambitions in Africa, and Indonesia (which in our history were often colonized by the Indians in any case; here they just have more energy to focus on it).

The Arabs were much more powerful, with Seljuk sultanates dominating the Balkans, Anatolia, North Africa, Southern Spain, and even Sicily. Thus, Europe was reduced to a backwater. France was the most dominant European state, with Novgorod and Poland following close behind. England was the only real European colonial power, with some holdings in the Americas.

The Americas, as it happened, were fractured. England was mainly limited to the Northeast, the Japanese and the Chinese colonizers to the west. Mexico was fractured among several states, while a relatively reformed and advanced Inca state still existed. Brazil was slowly absorbed into the Portugese colonial empire.

Most significantly of all, Africa was split among several centralized, advanced Islamic states (like Songhai in our world). Hindu influences were felt from Indian colonization in the East, but overall, Africa was much less bloody and war-torn than in our world.

******************

From that little venture into the fantastical world of the unknown, we get a sense of how truly important East Asia was even in medieval European affairs. If Japan had been a more powerful, outward looking entity, would the Mongols have ever risen? And if the Mongols hadn’t risen, then surely the Arab states would have grown more? Novgorod never fallen from prominence?

We see from this that what results from our little adventure into the unknown is a world quite different from ours. Something much more multi cultural, much more a world of trade and prosperity than ours of domination and imperialism. It is a whole different world than ours, and not a bad change at all... Now if only I had a time machine...



I just noticed that most of my timelines seem to turn out into a much better world than we have now. Either we're really just getting the crappy end of the shaft, or I'm just an idealist. I think I know which.
 
That, or perhaps we're all being a bit too pessimistic about the state of the world as it is. At least we don't have von-Dunkelheitesque armageddon looming over us all.

Well....

*cough*Iran*cough*North Korea*cough*

Not exactly.

EDIT: And I would strongly prefer if you answered that little piece of diplo before you go, please.
 

You, or someone else, could make a fresh start NES based on that. ;)

Here's a CZ map for "Oriental World".
 

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Now for NK... *grins and rubs hands*

in reality, Japan didn’t open up until the 1800s.

It "closed" in 17th century, actually...

without arousing the suspicion of the Silla government.

Why that?

They also managed to completely destroy the Mongol invasions in the 1200s.

Did they destroy the Mongols or did they just fight back their invasions? Not very clear.

Novgorod, at this point still the dominant Russian state (no Mongol yoke), united the Russias into one Empire, and as Constantinople fell, Alexander VI took the title of “Czar of all the Russias”, and declared Novgorod the “Third Rome”, as successor to the Byzantines.

Novgorod became "dominant" only after all other competitors were defeated by the Mongols. If anything, it was greatly strenghthened by the Mongol yoke. Furthermore, it never was interested in uniting Russia - a stronger Novgorod would have remained independent and would have pressed west, into Finland and the Pribaltic.

But this world probably won't see Novogord ever getting as strong as in OTL. Russia will still be united earlier - either by Vladimir or by Galich. If its Vladimir, then we might see it develop not entirely unlike in OTL, but earlier. If Galich, then it will be much more Westernized, possibly leading to the union of the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches.

then surely the Arab states would have grown more?

They would've been crushed by the Turkic states instead, and much more completely. :p

I just noticed that most of my timelines seem to turn out into a much better world than we have now. Either we're really just getting the crappy end of the shaft, or I'm just an idealist. I think I know which.

It is all a matter of perspective. IMHO no AH world is better or worse than our own, it is simply different. One could always find some things that are better and some things that are worse.

In the world that you described, for instance, there will be much more bloodshed in China. Unchecked by Mongols, Turkic invaders, who didn't have time to become as assimilated as in OTL, will destroy much more - no Ottoman Empire will appear, for one thing, and its equivalent will be rather more Timurid. Hagia Sophia might be destroyed altogether for all we know. With a briefer Crusading period (due to stronger Turkic states), Europe will be generally less advanced, will take up much less Islamic knowledge. No Renaissance will come, naturally. Europe will also be much more of a battleground, and technically, Islam will also be weakened by strife with European powers. Aztlan will still fall, btw - not like in OTL, but rather like OTL's India.
 
Northern Europe remains barbaric, covered in forests.

Northern Europe (Finland, Scandinavia, Denmark, Karelia (Kola Included) and Estonia) were not during OTL Viking era (or before) Barbaric. If you asked Romans or other Mediterranian peoples of the time, yes. But they were certanly not barbaric. The Varangian Guard even fitted to be part of the Byzantine Army, although they were Nordic. ;)
 
Excerpt from the Origins of the Great Gulf War a book written in 2020

With every passing year the instability of the Gulf region grew. By the beggining of 2006, nearly all the combustible ingredients for a conflice - far bigger in its scale and scope that the wars of 1991 or 2003 - were in place.

The underlying cause of the war was the increase in the region's relative importance as a source of pretoleum. On the one hand, the rest of the world's oil reserves were being rapidly exhausted. On the other, the breakneck growth of the Asian economies had caused a huge surge in the global demand for energy. It is hard to believe today, but for most of the 1990s the price of oil had averaged less that $20 a barrel.

A second precondition of war was demographical. While European fertility has fallen below the natural replacement rate in the '70s the decline in the Islamic world had been much slower. By the late '90s the fertility rate in the eight Muslim countries to the south and east of the European Union was 2.5 times higher than the European figure.

This tendency was especially pronounced in Iran, where the social conservatism of the 1979 reveolution combined with the high mortality rate of the Iran - Iraq war and the subsquent baby boom to produce, by the first decade of the new century and quite extraordinary surplus of young men. More than two-fifths of the population of Iran in 1995 had been aged 14 or younger. This was the generation that was ready to fight in 2007.

This not only gave Islamic societies a youtful energy that contrasted markedly with the slothful senescence of Europe. It also signified a profound shift in the balance of world population. In 1950, there was three times as many people in Britian as in Iran. By 1995 the population of Iran had overtaken that of Britian and was forecast to be 50 per cent higher by 2050. Yet people in the West struggled to grasp the implications of this shift. Subliminally, they still thought of the Middle East as a region they could lord it over, as they had in the mid-20th century.

The third and perhaps most important precondition for war was cultural. Since 1979 not just Iran but the greater part of the Muslim world had been swept by a wave of relgious fervour, the bery opposit of the process of secularisation that was emptying Europe's churches.

Although few counteis followed Iran down the road to full-blown theocracy, there was a transformation in politcs everywhere. From Morrocco to Pakistan, the feudal dynasties or military strongmen who had dominated Islamic politics since the '50s came under intense pressure from relgious radicals.

The idelogical cocktail that produced Islamism was as potent as either of the extreme idelodies the West had produced in the previous century, communism and fascism. Islamism was anti-Western, anti-capitalist and anti-Semitic. A seminal moment was the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's intemperate attack on Israel in December 2005, when he called the Holocaust a myth. The state of Israel was a "disgraceful blot", he had previously declared, to be "wiped off the map".

Before 2007, the Islamists had seen no alternative but to wage war against their enemies by means of terrorism. From Gaza to Manhattan, the hero of 2001 was the suicide bomber. Yet Ahmadinejad, a vetran of the Iran-Iraq war, craved a more serious weapon than strapped-on explosives or airplanes turned into missiles. His decision to accelerate Iran's nuclear weapons program was intended to give Iran the kind of power North Korea already wielded in East Asia: the power to degy the United States; the power to obliterate America's closest regional ally.

Under diffrent circumstances, it would not have been difficult to thwart Ahmadinejad's ambitions. The Israelis had shown themselves capable of pre-emptive air strikes against IRaw's nuclear facilities in 1981. Similar strikes against Iran's were urged on President George W. Bush by neo-conservative commentators throughout 2006. The United States, they argued was perfectly placed to carry on such striked. It has bases in neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan. It had the intelligence proving Iran's contravention of the nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty.

But the President was advised by his Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, to opt instead for diplomacy. Not just European opinion but American opinion was strongly opposed to an attack on Iran. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 had been discredited by the failure to find the weapons of mass destruction Saddam Hussein had suposedly possessed and by the failure of the US-led coalition to quell a bloody insurgency. Americans did not want to increase their military commitments overseas; they wanted to reduce them. Europeans did not want to hear that Iran was about to build its own WMD. Evern if Ahmadinehad had broadcast a nuclear test live on CNN, liberals would have said it was a CIA con-trick.

So history repeated itself. As in the 1930s, an anti-Semitic demagogue broke his country's treaty obligations and armed for war. Having first tried appeasement, offerin gthe Iranians economic incentives to desist, the West appealed to international agencies: the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN's Security Council. Thanks to China's veto however, the UN produced virtually nothing.

Only one man might have siffened Bush's resolve in the crisis; not British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who had wrecked his domestic credibility over Iraq and was in any case on the point of retirement, but Israel's Ariel Sharon. Yet he had been struck down by a stroke as the Iranian crisis came to a head. With Israel leaderless Ahmadinejad had a free hand.

As in the '30s too, the West fell back on wishful thinking. Perhaps, some said Ahmadinehad was only sabre-rattling because his domestic postion was so weak. Perhaps his politcal rivals in the Iranian clergy were on the point of getting rid of him. In that case, the last thing the West should do was to take a tough line; that would only bolster Ahmadinejad by indlaming Iranian popular feeling. So in Washington and in London people crossed their fingers, hoping from the deus ex machina of a home-grown regime change in Tehran.

This gave the Iranians all the time they needed to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium at Natanz. The dream of nuclear non-proliferation already interrupted by Israel, Pakistan and India, was definiteivley shattered. Now Tehran had a nuclar missled pointed at Tel Aviv, and the new Israeli Likud government of Benhamin Netenyahu had a missile pointed right back at Tehran.

The optimists argued that the Cuban Missile Crisis would replay istelf in the Middle East. BOth sides would threaten war, and then both sides would blink. That was Rice's hope - indeed her prayer - as she shuttled between the capitals. But it was not to be.

The devastating nuclear exchange of August 2007 represented not only the failure of diplomacy, it marked the end of the oil age. Some even said it marked the twilight of the West. Certainly, that was one way of interpreting the subequent spread of the conflict as Iraq's Shia population overran the remaining US bases in their country and the People's Republic of China threatned to intervene on the side of Iran.

Yet the historian is bound to ask wether or not the true significance of the 2007-11 war was to vindicate the Bush administations's orginal principle of pre-emption. For, if that had been adhered to in 2006, Iran's nuclear bid might have been thwarted at minimal cost. And the Great Gulf War might never of happened.
 
The Varangian Guard even fitted to be part of the Byzantine Army, although they were Nordic.

Not all of them, though the first ones were. Do realize that recruiting barbarians into a special unit is a very widespread practice. Had the Varangians been civilized, they wouldn't have gone all the way towards Constantinople...

Sheep:
a) That was posted before.
b) It isn't alternate history (yet), so its entirely off-topic.
c) How exactly do you expect WWIII to take FOUR years, especially if it is pointed out that nuclear weapons will be used?
d) The scenario is rather unrealistic. China doesn't have anything to gain from the situation in question by intervenning in it - it is in China's best interests that Islam and the West weaken each other as much as possible, so that it then could displace whoever "wins".
 
Having said that the above is from the national newspaper, The Australian and I thought the idea deserves some exploration. Keep in contact as I will be building upon this, and taking it to 2020.
 
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