America's First Forgotten War: The Philippine-American War

[mrtn]

Interesting read, thank you for posting.

I assume that you've already given it to your professor (or who ever ends up with it)? If not, there's some tiny language related things you might like to change (like using the word "scathing" two times in less than ten lines).

 

[El Justo]

Three hundred years ++.

A hero all right, but a flawed one. Infighting was rife within the fledgling Philippine Republic, sometimes ending in assasination. Some people suspect that Aguinaldo, or at least his faction, had a hand in Andres Bonifacio's death, but the evidence is inconclusive.

Bonifacio was the pioneer and the peasants' hero. The "masa" guy as opposed to Aguinaldo's illustrado background. Unfortunately he was also a poor field tactician. About the only victory he had was the start of the uprising itself where his band raided an armory. He would slowly lose favor in the power struggles as his lack of real battle ability (aside from being a good underground organizer) became more and more apparent. But he was THE founder of the revolution. And chafed at being outmanuevered by someone who came later. Eventually things came to a head and someone decided that his death would be a good thing...

As for Aguinaldo, the feeling is that though the fates were not kind to him, he himself had some questionable moments. In a state of relative advantage vis-a-vis the Spanish he still accepted a peace deal and voluntarily went into exile in Hongkong, only to return with guns blazing in front of the Americans. Outgunned and outclassed while fighting the Americans, he chose to surrender and cooperate while some of his generals (like Gen. Sakay) went on to fight to the death as guerillas. I think the few Filipinos who have an inkling of history (most of our youth couldn't care less about the subject ) hold in higher esteem other generals of the era, like Antonio Luna or Gregorio del Pilar.

great comments Dann thanks for sharing.

Andres Bonifacio was indeed the pioneer. however, from what i had gathered (alongside w/ all of your comments) was that he was nasty and abbrassive and this is, imho, one of the reasons that he was inefficient at winning the hearts and minds of all Filipinos. i have a section of one of the latter chapters devoted to his movements.

as for his death, i read in a few accounts (Carlos Quirino's accounts as well as American accounts) where Aguinaldo was definitely involved in Bonafacio's death. iirc, Aguinaldo had ordered that Bonifacio be found and killed for insubordination (and a certain level of insecurity on Aguinaldo's behalf i reckon). however, if memory serves me right, Aguinaldo, for some reason, reversed track and order that if Bonifacio was found that he not be killed. sadly, this revised order did not reach Bonifacio's captors in time and it is alleged that he was killed on the spot i also have a section on this as well w/ citations.

a note on the effectiveness of Aguinaldo's soldiers:
it seems that when hostilities against the US began, Aguinaldo had a good number of 'crack' units. they cut their teeth so to speak against the Spanish during the war for independence in '96 and managed to capture Spanish Mauser rifles, a whole bunch of artillery pieces, ammo, and even some Maxim machineguns. however, once these 'crack' soldiers began getting depleted, the effectiveness of the Filipino resistance diminished accordingly.

@mrtn
it was submitted some time ago. i also noticed a few instances throughout where i could've used better words.

 

[El Justo]

American involvement in the Philippine Islands is inextricably linked with Admiral Dewey’s smashing naval victory of May 1, 1898 in Manila Bay. The American squadron clearly overpowered an outgunned and unprepared Spanish fleet. The Spanish American War was only a week old at this moment and Spain’s centuries-long grip on the archipelago was in its last days. The crown jewel of the seven thousand islands, Manila, was now subjected to the mercy of American naval superiority. However, there remained an estimated fifteen thousand Spanish defenders still entrenched in Manila. By late June of 1898, the 8th Corps, Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt commanding, had arrived in Manila safely from San Francisco courtesy of the American naval blockade and sought to encircle the old city in an attempt to dislodge the Spaniards. The first Battle of Manila ensued on July 25, 1898 and lasted until August 13 when the Spanish general, Fermin Juadenes, surrendered the city to the Americans. The next day, 11,000 American troops arrived in Manila to bolster the occupation of the city. The historical accounts of the battle vary but the finite result was that the United States now held a foreign possession for the first time in its diplomatic history. These consequences are of paramount importance when attempting to uncover the political motivations of the McKinley Administration. The Philippine issue, for all intensive purposes, had fallen into the lap of William McKinley. How he would handle this issue is the focus of this particular section.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Warren Zimmermann, First Great Triumph How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002) 291. Zimmermann details how the Spanish fleet, under the command of Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasarón, was completely unprepared for the Battle of Manila Bay. His squadron was lacking in ammunition and it is claimed that Spansih sailors were either at Mass, painting their ships or doing other “non-gunnery related tasks” when Dewey opened fire.
~ Zimmermann, 295. Zimmermann noted that recent historical authority has concluded that the battle may have been a sham insomuch that it was pre-arranged by Juadenes, Merritt and Dewey in order to preserve Spanish prestige and more importantly, to safeguard them from the nearly ten thousand Filipino insurrectos who were vying for independence.
~ Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959) p. 223. Ms. Leech’s exact text: “The capture and occupation of the capital had inevitably enlarged and confirmed the sense of American involvement with the Philippines.”

a colorful painting of the Battle of Manila Bay, 1 May 1898. it appears that USFS Olympia is depicted in the foreground of the image. the "F" in the naval prefix stands for 'Flagship'. the Olympia is now a floating museum in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. it is also the oldest floating iron-sided warship in American history. they spent lots of money a few years back refurbishing it to its original finishes. iirc, it was a private endeavour unlike the USS New Jersey several hundred meters across the Delaware River. this old Iowa class BB (ww2 & cold war era) was restored through NJ state funds; specifically, through customized automobile liscence plates that the state of NJ oversees

President McKinley labored long and hard over the Philippine issue in the days leading up to and immediately following the first Battle of Manila. Annexation of the islands or cession of them through treaty was an imminent and real possibility. It is also the first time in American history that the United States had such a magnified international responsibility or had experienced the ‘spoils’ of a foreign military conquest. He certainly did not enjoy any sort of American executive precedent in this particular area. As a result, McKinley sought the advice and opinion of many. He consulted prominent members of both parties, surveyed the variety of national newspaper editorials on the issue and is said to have “studied the thousands of letters which responded to this invitation” . Thus a hot national debate ensued. The anti-annexationists decried any sort of American colonialism and highlighted the blatant constitutional contradiction in the ‘consent of the governed’ principle. The groundswell of national support for expansion, however, had a much louder voice and the President was all ears.

The following weeks directly following the August 16 ceasefire is when McKinley heard the opinions of what Ms. Leech describes as “two large overlapping groups of citizens” who seemed to dominate the President’s attention: the “aspiration of businessmen” and the “zeal” of the Protestant missionary supporters. The economic impact of American possession of the archipelago could open up the lucrative Asian markets in China and abroad and American business interests were accordingly in full support of annexation so long as there is access to the Orient trade markets. The second group who commanded the President’s ear was the Protestant majority in the U.S. who were in full support of annexation for missionary purposes. Religious conversion of the Filipinos was discussed in several circles and McKinley was at the least convinced by his correspondence with them that the Filipinos’ main grievance was with the Catholic Church in the Philippines. McKinley was therefore falsely led to believe that the Filipinos harbored ill will towards the Church more so than against the Spaniards themselves. Furthermore, McKinley was under the impression that the native Filipinos sincerely wished to distance themselves from Rome. This did not play a tremendously significant role in the issue but it certainly is a blatant oversight on behalf of Protestant religious groups.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Leech, 324. Leech declares that McKinley “incorrectly supposed that the grievance (revolt against the Spanish) embraced hatred of the Catholic faith.” It is also stated that several of the Protestant missionaries were “colored by bigotry and self-interest” under the specter of what she described as “gunpowder gospel”.

The nation was still abuzz as President McKinley sought even more opinions on the Philippine issue. The national newspaper editorials in August 1898 relied primarily on one particular article that appeared in the July 1898 issue of an English periodical called the Contemporary Review. It was written by an Englishman named John Foreman, a long time resident of the Philippine Islands. Foreman declared that the Tagalog insurrection under the guidance of Aguinaldo “did not possess nationalistic characteristics” and that the Philippine inhabitants were “divided by fierce racial antipathies and possessed little idea of union.” Foreman continued to elaborate on the issue by stating that any form of immediate native government was completely out of the question and that foreign intervention was imminent if the natives were left to their own devices . The fundamental theme of Foreman’s article, the glaring ‘un-readiness’ of the Philippine natives to conduct self-government, was portrayed by the leading newspapers across the country. Annexationists quickly fed off of the supposed barbarity of the native populace by suggesting that American government in the Philippine Islands was necessary. McKinley still did not know for certain whether exporting American democracy in Asia was his preferred course. It is certain, however, that he clearly rejected the option of an American protectorate and immediate self-government. A closer look at Foreman’s article reveals that the most pressing issue for McKinley was the idea of foreign intervention in the event of an American withdrawal. Specifically, he was worried about possible Japanese or German claims to the archipelago should the United States not retain them.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Leech, 328. Leech states that McKinley overtly objected to the idea of an American protectorate because “he would not associate the United States with a weak sovereignty, inexperienced in resisting foreign intrigues and helpless to prevent foreign intervention.”

Spain’s crumbling empire caused a flurry of international diplomacy. The colonial powers were eagerly watching the turn of events in the Philippines. It was becoming quite clear that if the Philippines weren’t ceded or sold to the United States through treaty that they’d be sold off to another colonial power. The British urged McKinley, through his Secretary of State John Hay, that they ought to take possession of the islands simply to keep them out of the hands of their primary rival, Germany. It is even documented that British diplomats indicated to McKinley’s representatives that the English would be willing to take on the islands should the Americans opt out. The Japanese had also expressed an interest. Leech notes that this caused the Russians to become alarmed as they also sought a naval facility in the islands. Meanwhile, “urgent whispers of German diplomacy were echoing in Washington” in mid-August 1898 and it was becoming clear to McKinley and his administration that formal control of the islands was to be either officially transferred to the United States through treaty or be retained by Spain. The “consuming hatred of the Spanish” , however, precluded the option of Spanish retention of the Philippines. McKinley felt that if left under the Spanish dominion, the situation on the islands would further deteriorate and it would be even “more disastrous still.” Leech concludes that McKinley’s “decision seemed inescapable”.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Leech, 326. Leech proclaimed that the English had intended to pay the U.S. for control of the islands as a last resort so as to keep them out of the hands of both Germany and Japan.

The next step for the President was to assemble the official Peace Commission delegation bound for Paris. Spanish delegates were likewise preparing for what would formally end the hostilities between Spain and the United States. The complicated issues of the Philippines, Cuba, Porto (sic) Rico and Guam were the hot topics. McKinley chose five men to head the American delegation: Cushman K. Davis, a Republican senator from Minnesota who chaired the Senate Foreign Relation Committee, Senator George Gray, a conservative Democrat from Delaware, William P. Frye, a Republican senator from Maine, Whitelaw Reid of Ohio and Judge William R. Day, a federal judge in the Sixth District Court of Appeals. McKinley instructed them to examine as much evidence as possible in order to reach a conclusion on the newly acquired territories. It was mid September 1898 and the Philippine issue as well as the other newly acquired possessions was becoming even more hotly debated. The anti-annexationists were furious at the seemingly intentional delay tactics by the War Department. The Peace Commission, however, set out to provide McKinley with what Leech describes as “the foundation of McKinley’s thought process.”

The progress of the American and Spanish Peace Commissions was very slow during the fall of 1898. Among the issues stalling the progress was the ongoing annexation debate raging in America and also the Spanish insistence of the U.S. either assuming the significant debts of the Spanish colonies or to rework the debt into the native economic system. The American commissioners focused their attentions to the Philippine Islands. They conducted testimony with Army and Navy officers, diplomats and a variety of other military figures. The commissioners were in constant contact with the President and they undoubtedly shaped his outlook on the Philippine issue leading up to the signing of the Treaty of Paris in December of 1898.
The most significant and telling testimony the Commission conducted during the weeks leading up to the Treaty centered around that of Commander R. B. Bradford, a naval officer who was the chief of the Bureau of Equipment. He had also written a study for the US Navy on the feasibility of coaling stations and possible naval base sites in the Philippine Islands. Therefore, he had an intimate knowledge of the current state of affairs in and around Manila. The gist of Bradford’s testimony would form the foundation of the Commission’s sentiments. He stated that the islands as a whole rather than only one or two islands would be easier to defend from a naval standpoint. He testified to the Commissioners that he sought the “strategic values” of the choke points and straits leading into the China Sea and that the German Navy had their eyes on the island of Palawan “for years”. Bradford continued, “their cruisers frequent the islands and their engineers have explored them”.
The following is the exact excerpt from Bradford’s testimony:
Commissioner Reid to Commander Bradford: “…if divided as you suggested (nearly the entire archipelago), would this satisfy you if any of the neighboring islands fell under the control of a possible enemy?”

Commander Bradford to Reid: “No.”

Commissioner Davis to Commander Bradford: “Would you consider Spain to be a bad neighbor?”

Commander Bradford to Davis: “Most assuredly…”

Commissioner Frye to Commander Bradford: “If we should adopt your line of demarcation, what do you think Spain would do with the balance of the islands?”

Commander Bradford to Commissioner Frye: “Sell them to Germany.”

Commissioner Frye: “Is not Germany about as troublesome a neighbor as we could get?”

Commander Bradford: The most so, in my opinion…”

Meanwhile, President McKinley toured the country in an effort to solicit the opinions of the citizenry. He spoke to crowds in Iowa, Omaha, St. Louis and Chicago. The President wasted little time extolling “the courage of destiny” and that the war had brought “blessings that are now beyond calculation.” Furthermore, McKinley began to reveal more of his sentiment in Hastings, Iowa by declaring that “we have good money, we have ample revenues, we have unquestioned national credit but what we want is new markets, and as trade follows the flag it looks very much as if we are going to have new markets.” McKinley opined at the Omaha Exposition that “the United States has sought neither the war nor the resultant international responsibilities” that the American victory in the Philippines had bestowed upon them. The “throngs” that he greeted applauded wildly. It is now that McKinley has received the validation of the people.

The Peace Commission was in continuous contact with the President via the telegraph. He was kept abreast of most ongoing negotiations and continued to seek the views of others. The Spanish Peace Commissioners had laid out the first two sections of the treaty on October 26, 1898. Judge Day cabled the White House for instructions. “The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none” replied the President. “The latter is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be required”. Leech notes that McKinley caused quite a stir in Paris with these remarks. Each of the five American Peace Commissioners subsequently sent their “individual opinions” to McKinley for final review. Four out of the five American Commissioners submitted negative reviews of possible American annexation of the islands.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Leech,336. Leech notes that McKinley had “several conversations” with Gen. Greene of the Army who essentially echoed the sentiment of the Bradford testimony where it was believed that complete annexation of the archipelago was the best option.
~ Leech, 342. Leech notes that “the President’s message caused misgivings in Paris.”
~ Leech, pp. 342-43. Frye objected to an “outright claim for territory” and Reid concurred. Gray and Day also objected.

The Spanish delegation was beginning to become restless. They had very little left to lose and knew it. They also knew that they stood to receive a large sum for the islands whether it was under American dominion or not. Negotiations had reached a standstill when McKinley once again listened to a variety of suggestions regarding financial considerations for the islands. Finally, in late November 1898, the sum of $20,000,000.00 was agreed upon for transfer of the islands to the United States.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Leech, 342. Leech notes that the Spanish delegation were so exasperated by the American delaying that they considered renewing the hostilities in order to force the Americans’ hand.

William McKinley faced a tremendous crossroad in American history when he waded through the implications of Dewey’s victory in Manila Bay. He labored tremendously hard on the issue despite not being able to find the islands on a map when war broke out with Spain. He sought an unprecedented amount of information and opinion on the matter, even by today’s standards. However, he clearly dragged his feet during the negotiations and was evidently influenced by a number of different interests and groups. The notion of added markets to the American economy certainly had an impact on McKinley as did the religious fervor and the morality issue that accompanied them. The encroachment of possible enemies upon the American spoils of war played a role as well. In the end, McKinley went against the recommendations of four out of the five Commissioners. He clearly pushed the issue and the end result was a seven thousand island archipelago located more than seven thousand miles from the continental United States. The task of administering the islands was a tremendous one. It was up to President McKinley to pick the right man to do this task.

The task of administering the newly acquired territories would fall to the War Department with the Secretary of War in command. President McKinley knew that he’d need an astute man to fulfill the “unprecedented” assignment of overseeing an American colonial empire. The governments, economies, infrastructure and industries of the new possessions were now under the sole jurisdiction of the War Department. For that reason, McKinley sought not a military man but a law man instead. On the eve of the Spanish American War, Elihu Root was fifty-three years old and a top attorney in New York City. He had cut his political teeth in the cauldron of New York City politics but was new to Washington politics and was considered a peculiar choice to replace the current Secretary of War, Russell H. Alger. Root would accept McKinley’s invitation and become what could very well be considered the first ‘wise man’ in American history. However, there was serious trouble ahead.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Zimmermann, 143. Zimmerman notes that Root’s duty of administering the newly acquired possessions of Puerto Rico and the Philippines was “a task unprecedented in American history.”
~ Zimmermann, 142. Root was defense council for Boss Tweed during the dismantling of the former’s New York City political patronage machine of the late nineteenth century. Root also lacked not only military experience; he clearly had no experience in international diplomacy either thus making his nomination a rather peculiar one.
~ Zimmermann, 148. Root left the comfortable salary of private life for the greater good of what Root describes as the “ultimate client”, the American Government Others that followed in his footsteps include his protégé and former NYC law firm partner, Henry Stimson, John J. McCloy, Robert Lovett, Averell Harriman, Douglas Dillon, Cyrus Vance, Paul Nitze and Robert Rubin.

The Treaty of Paris was not yet two months old when hostilities between the Americans and the Filipinos began on February 4, 1899. The tensions between the two had been magnified since the Americans had taken control of Manila in August of 1898. Aguinaldo and his forces had been marginalized by the American forces as well as the President. It was becoming blatantly obvious that the McKinley administration did not intend to recognize Emilio Aguinaldo’s declaration of a new Philippine Republic. Elihu Root’s task as Secretary of War had now become two-fold: a formidable military confrontation with an indigenous opposition to American authority and the cultivation and implementation of civil government throughout the archipelago. The First Philippine Commission under Jacob Gould Schurman had been appointed in January of 1899 and was assigned the task of providing a thorough assessment of the Philippine issue. They very nearly ended the hostilities in May of that year but were ultimately rebuffed by the insurgent leadership.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Zimmermann, 325. Aguinaldo officially declared the existence of the Republic of the Philippines on June 12, 1898.
~ Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root 1845-1909, Vol. 1, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1938) 353. On January 20, 1899, McKinley, at Admiral Dewey’s urging, approved of what is now referred to as the First Philippine Commission. It is also known as the Schurman Commission and its primary task was to assess the self-governing capacities of the Filipino peoples. Jessup notes that an agreement in principle between the Commission and Aguinaldo’s representatives in May 1899 where an American Governor Gen. would be in control of the islands but would have a cabinet composed of both Americans and Filipinos. Furthermore, there was also an “advisory council” comprised of Filipinos only. Aguinaldo subsequently rejected the offer and demanded complete independence.

---TO BE CONT'D---

 

[El Justo]

Elihu Root wasted little time in expressing his desire to squash the native insurrection. In a letter to his old college friend, Milton H. Northrup, he stated that he’d rather “play a game in the Philippines which has more the rapidity of checkers then the deliberate slowness of our old games of chess at the North College.” There were several options for Root to consider at this juncture. Some in Congress were pining for what Jessup defines as a “conciliatory approach” towards the insurgent faction. Some suggested a complete withdrawal from the islands while others proposed an act of good faith by declaring a cease fire followed by substantive negotiating. There was also a loud and demanding call for armed suppression of what was evolving into a rebellion against American authority. Root, however, chose the latter. Roosevelt notes in a letter to Senator Lodge that Root “realizes that the first thing to do is to smash the Philippine insurrection…” Accordingly, Root petitioned McKinley in August of 1899 for ten more Volunteer regiments to be sent to the islands. Zimmermann notes that by the end of 1899, Root had established “firm military rule with generous paternalism” and that America now had an “implied contract” with the Filipino peoples. It will later be shown how Root’s aggressive approach at this time had a detrimental effect on the pacification process.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Jessup, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1938) 334. Jessup noted that Root asked the President for five more regiments than were originally asked for by the military command.

Elihu Root confronted the glaring constitutional issues of the Philippine question from the viewpoint of an attorney. Jessup notes that Root admitted that any form of American colonialism was odd in the fact that the Constitution failed to outline any type of groundwork for American actions in the newly acquired territories. There was no such thing as precedent for American colonialism. Should the Constitution’s rights apply to the peoples of a foreign land under the control of American forces? Does the Bill of Rights apply to these peoples? What of the seemingly blatant contradiction of the ‘Consent of the Governed’ clause? Secretary Root had no intentions of molding the Constitution in favor of any type of American colonialism nor did he see the application of the Bill of Rights throughout the islands as a positive. Root also stated to Jessup that he felt that the Administration ought to take “a definite and positive position” on the extension of the Constitution and its inherent rights. He concluded that a series of “hopeless entanglements of contradictions” awaited the Administration should they have floundered on the issue. Furthermore, the Administration’s critics declared that McKinley and Root were in direct violation of the Jeffersonian principle of the ‘Consent of the Governed’. Root countered that Jefferson himself did not apply this concept to the peoples of Louisiana in that the inhabitants of the newly acquired territory simply weren’t fit for self-government and that the task of installing it fell primarily with the Federal Government. The task of interpreting the actual extension and application of the American Constitution, however, lies with the Supreme Court and Root, to his benefit and to that of the other pro-colonialist sentiments operating in Washington, had their interpretations of the Constitution validated in a series of Supreme Court decisions in 1900 and later published in 1901. The gist of the ground-breaking decisions essentially established that constitutional rights do not apply to the peoples of the newly acquired territories. The Court’s renderings effectively nullified any type of American rights granted to the peoples of the islands under the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Root’s remarks upon hearing of the Court’s decisions: “…as near as I can make out the Constitution follows the flag – but doesn’t quite catch up with it.”

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Jessup, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1938) 346. Root, in a letter to Judge W.W. Howe dated September 11, 1899, stated he had “no desire” to shape the Constitution so that it fit neatly into the parameters of the McKinley Administration. Furthermore, Root reiterates his belief that any application of the principles of the Bill of Rights would hinder the Government’s ability to act. However, no specifics on this particular matter were expounded upon.

Schurman’s Commission had concluded by March of 1900 that the Filipinos were unfit for self-government. Root, realizing this, submitted to President McKinley a proposal for the colonial administration of the Philippine islands in what would become the Second Philippine Commission under the control of Judge William H. Taft. The initial instructions and objectives of the Second Philippine Commission were to first attempt to establish municipal governments and to branch out once pacification of the contested areas permits. Issues such as taxation, education, civil service and the judiciary were the main tasks of the Commission. On April 7, 1900, McKinley signed the order authorizing Taft and his fellow commissioners the responsibility of building the Philippine civil government from the ground up. Jessup even went as far as to declare that, up until that time period (1930s), this order formed what he described as “the most important document in American colonial history.” It clearly is the first of its kind in that the United States had never been in this position, the position of nation building.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
Jessup, 354. Jessup notes that Taft, in response to W. Cameron Forbes’s question in the summer of 1912 regarding who it was that actually penned the initial and subsequent instructions regarding the Commission’s tasks. Taft admitted it that it was Root’s instructions with McKinley’s signature.

By early 1901, Elihu Root was beginning to believe that the next step in the Philippine question was the transfer of military governance to the Second Philippine Commission. In a letter to Taft, Root stated that it was time that the Army gets “out of the business of government and restore it to its proper and natural place as an adjunct of civil government.” By June of that year however, Root softened his stance a bit by claiming that the Army ought to retain civil and military control of the areas that remained un-pacified . President McKinley subsequently issued another order on June 21, 1901 effectively transferring civil governance authority from the U.S. military to the Second Philippine Commission effective July 4, 1901. It specified that the areas that remained un-pacified were to still be under the complete jurisdiction of the military until pacification could take root.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Jessup, 360. Root, in the same letter sent also to Gen. Chaffee, the leading military candidate to assume command of a military with a diminished role in the Philippines, acknowledged the potential difficulties that may exist for the individual who takes command; specifically, the reduction of the military’s responsibilities in the area of governance.
~ Jessup, 360. Root, in another letter to Gen. Chaffee dated June 20, 1901: Continue to suppress the insurgency and govern at the same time until the areas in question are completely pacified.

By September of 1901, Root and McKinley had overseen significant recent advances in the Philippines. Aguinaldo was captured in a daring raid by Frederick Funston and a few Macabebe native scouts in March of 1901. Both Jessup and Zimmerman note that this had a significant boost in the pacification process across the islands. The Second Philippine Commission was busy passing numerous laws and establishing the groundwork for the Philippine civil government. The tide had turned militarily against the scattered insurgent bands. The good news came to a temporary halt on September 6, 1901 when President McKinley was shot twice at the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, New York by a self-described anarchist named Leon Czolgosz. McKinley succumbed to the wounds on September 14. The nation was shook by the shocking turn of events. Czolgosz was tried, found guilty and executed on October 29, 1901. His last words before being electrocuted by three jolts of 1700 volts: “I killed the President because he was the enemy of the good people - the good working people. I am not sorry for my crime.”

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Zimmermann, 231. Macabebe native scouts were Filipinos who harbored bitter resentment towards the Tagalog population and especially Aguinaldo and the fledgling Republic. In some cases, they fought alongside the Americans but mostly they acted as scouts and guides.

Elihu Root was still not finished. He sought to clarify the economic and industrial growth of the islands by putting forth specific legislation in the U.S. Congress that would provide for “acts governing tariffs, public lands, mines and corporate franchise.” Root felt that this responsibility ought to be afforded to Taft and his Commission. “I presume that no committee sitting in Washington could work the subject out so well as Taft and his associates can do in Manila, dealing day to day with the practical problems as they arise.” At the core of Root’s beliefs was the byproduct of the Spooner Amendment which completely abolished the long-standing Spanish systems of regulation and allowance of business permits. This was having a strangling effect on Philippine commerce and industry such as mining and timber. Root felt strongly that it should be eased by passing a specific set of legislation that allowed for the Commission to take steps to develop the Philippine timber industries, the railroad systems around the archipelago and the overall modernization of the Philippine industrial systems. By July of 1902, Root’s desires became law under the scope of The Philippine Government Act of July 1, 1902. It essentially added specificity to the Spooner Bill. Among the other issues it called for included a national census, an election of a native legislative assembly two years down the road, the respect for the Philippine environment and the prohibition against environmental exploitation, the power of the Commission to borrow on government bonds, and subsidiary Philippine coins.

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Quoted in Jessup, 361. Root in a letter to Senator Lodge dated July 1, 1901.

The final primary issue that Elihu Root sought to deal with was the relation of the church and state within the archipelago. Jessup wrote that this subject “caused much concern.” Nine out of every ten Filipinos were of the Roman Catholic faith and For that reason, the Church and the friars had possessed “immense power” in the local communities. Their tasks under the yolk of the Spanish included such jobs as inspecting schools, presidents on municipal and provincial tax boards, and counselors for municipal councils and presidents on census boards. The Second Philippine Commission reported that “the priest was not just the spiritual guide, but…in every sense the municipal leader.” To dismantle that base of leadership, the Commission stripped the clergy of the ability to hold office. The larger question surrounding the separation of church and state was the redistribution of the four hundred twenty thousand plus acres of land still in the hands of the friars. The nearly sixty thousand Philippine tenants of these lands were on the brink of what Jessup describes as an “agrarian revolution” due to the exorbitant rent that was being charged. Root knew that this was a very sensitive issue to not only Catholic Americans but to Protestants alike. As a result, he sought the counsel of Catholic Archbishop John Ireland who suggested that the lands under the control of the friars be sold off voluntarily and privately. He also urged Root to exercise caution in dealing with Rome so that he did not alienate the Philippine and American Catholics. Furthermore, Ireland recommended that the Vatican help broker the transactions. Root agreed in principle to Ireland’s suggestions and wrote to Taft on September 5, 1901 indicating his desires. He also stated that the Insular Government of the Philippines ought to purchase the lands. Root did make it very clear to Taft that the United States ought not to engage in direct diplomatic negotiations with the Vatican and that a visit by Taft to Rome would be solely for a “business transaction.” Root’s critics began to clamor that the Vatican had gained access to the White House and their influence in Washington was wholly unacceptable. Rome was attempting to declare the legalities of eminent domain and proper title to the lands. Taft was subsequently sent to Rome to negotiate the legal transfer of the lands in question. The Protestant critics again voiced their displeasure. President Roosevelt appeared to be uneasy about the whole situation but relented. He and Root penned “carefully drafted instructions” to Taft. In April of 1903, Root authorized a Catholic Army chaplain, Father E.J. Vattman to travel to Rome in order to negotiate the final purchase. Nearly all of the friar’s lands were ultimately transferred to the Insular Government for a little more than $7,000,000.00. Jessup states that, in the end, Rome fully cooperated in the transfer and Root was able to diffuse what appeared to be a very touchy issue.

Elihu Root’s contributions to the American nation building effort in the Philippines are unparalleled. By the time he resigned his post as Secretary of War in 1904, Elihu Root left a definitive and positive mark on the McKinley and Roosevelt colonial policies. His aggressive approach provided immediate military gains in large portions of the archipelago. His interpretations of the Constitution were upheld by the highest court in the land. He also oversaw the influence and charter of the Second Philippine Commission and its monumental task of planting a democracy in Asia. He also succeeded in tackling the difficult issues of industry and the dissolution of the Church’s lands.

Theodore Roosevelt’s Philippine policy as President mirrored that of McKinley’s. He stayed the course that was set by Root and authorized by McKinley. Roosevelt addressed issues such as patience, duty, meritorious political appointments and the preparation of the Philippine peoples for self-government in his official 1901 Annual Message. The gist of his 1902 Annual Message was grounded in democracy’s first ever appearance in Asia, the Army’s pacification and initial implementation of civil government and the “constructive statesmanship” of American involvement in the Philippine Islands. By 1903, Roosevelt turned his attention to the industrial development of the archipelago. Roosevelt’s 1904 Annual Message preached of the continuing un-readiness for Philippine self-government and singled out the “foolish persons” who insisted to the contrary.

Theodore Roosevelt’s sentiments on the Philippine issue were a continuation of what Elihu Root and the late President McKinley had put forth. President Roosevelt announced in his 1901 Annual Message that “in dealing with the Philippine people we must show both patience and strength, forbearance and steadfast resolution.” Furthermore, Roosevelt, with a touch of McKinley, proclaimed:
“Our aim is high. We do not desire to do for the islanders merely what has elsewhere been done for tropic peoples by even the best governments. We hope to do for them what has never been done for any people of the tropics – to make them fit for self-government after the fashion of the really free nations.”

In the 1901 Annual Message, Roosevelt declared that any type of “desertion of duty on our part would be a crime against humanity.” Sticking with this theme, the newly inaugurated Roosevelt expressed a desire to see the Philippine peoples develop the ability to govern themselves . President Roosevelt seconded Secretary Root’s recommendations that Congress ought to enact specific legislation regarding Philippine industries. The 1902 Annual Message of President Roosevelt lauded the general end of hostilities throughout the islands. Roosevelt sought to address the administration’s critics who were demanding for an American withdrawal from the islands. He continued to preach patience by stating that “to hurry matters, to go faster than we are now going, would entail calamity on the people of the islands.” With a touch of virtuosity, Roosevelt stated:
“No policy ever entered into by the American people has vindicated itself in more signal manner than the policy of holding the Philippines…The triumph of our arms, above all the triumph of our laws and principles, has come sooner than we had any right to think.”

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Theodore Roosevelt, The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, State Papers as Governor and President, (Charles Scribner & Sons, New York: 1925. 177. Roosevelt’s exact quote: “We are extremely anxious that the natives shall show the power of governing themselves.”
~ note that all of the quotes are from "The Works of TR"

The 1902 Annual Message also contained high praise for the military; especially with regard to the pacification and civil government processes throughout the archipelago.
“Too much praise cannot be given to the Army…they warred under fearful difficulties of climate and surroundings; and under the strain of the terrible provocations which they continually received from their foes…”

footnotes on the above paragraph (sans numbers)
~ Roosevelt, 180. Roosevelt had been addressing the combination of the Army’s alleged atrocities against the indigenous peoples and their dual task of pacification and initial implementation of civil government.

Thus the summation of the 1902 Annual Message was that “taking the work of the Army and the civil authorities together, it may be questioned whether anywhere else in modern times the world has seen a better example of real constructive statesmanship than our people have given in the Philippine Islands.”

By 1903, Roosevelt had shifted away from the military aspects of the islands. Instead, he sought to address the economic and trade complications of the archipelago. He stated that “the Philippines should be knit closer to the United States by tariff arrangements.” Specifically, Roosevelt wished to grant Philippine goods exclusive access to the American markets by reducing the custom taxes that accompany foreign goods. By doing so, goods such as Philippine timber, hemp and sugar would have preferred status in the United States and as a result would boost the Philippine economy in the process. However, Roosevelt was careful to note that “caution and moderation” ought to be exercised by the Insular Government of the islands in this area so as to not exploit the islands’ resources. The final portion of Roosevelt’s 1903 Annual Message reported on the actual gains of the islands over the previous four years.

“The condition of the islanders is in material things far better than ever before while their governmental, intellectual, and moral advance has kept pace with their material advances…No one people ever benefited another people more than we have benefited the Filipinos by taking possession of the islands.”

The “continuation of steady progress” was the theme of Roosevelt’s 1904 Annual Message. However, he again noted caution in proceeding too fast in any type of complete transfer of self-government. He continued to extol the American virtues in the Philippines by stating that “the justification for our stay in the Philippines must ultimately rest chiefly upon the good we are able to do in the islands.” Furthermore, Roosevelt sought to partially justify American’s thrust into the Pacific by declaring that “the Philippines have played and will play an important part” in American naval strategy. More importantly, however, Roosevelt stated that “our chief reason for continuing to hold them (the islands) must be that we ought in good faith try to do our share of the world’s work.” President Roosevelt made it a point to note that “this piece of work has been imposed upon us by the results of the war with Spain.” He compared the American effort in the Philippines to the British in India and Egypt, the French in Algiers, the Dutch in Java, the Russians in Turkestan and the Japanese in Formosa. In response to those who continued to preach for complete and absolute Philippine independence, Roosevelt suggested that “within two years we shall be trying the experiment of an elective lower house in the Philippine legislature” so long as effects of such a legislative body are both “sane and efficient.” Roosevelt stressed that “they (the Filipinos) should remember that their prime needs are moral and industrial, not political” yet, on the same note, “it is a good to try the experiment of giving them a legislature; but it is a far better thing to give them schools, good roads, rail roads which will enable them to get their products to market, honest courts, an honest constabulary, and all that tends to produce order…” In sum, Roosevelt urged for “habits of intelligent industry and thrift.”

It is clear that President Roosevelt continued the course set out by President McKinley and Secretary Root. He preached for such virtues as patience, duty and industrial development of the islands. He noted that the difficulties of planting the seeds of democracy fell primarily with the Army and that their success, combined with the subsequent civil governance of the islands, equated to what Roosevelt described as “constructive statesmanship.” It is also clear that Roosevelt shared Root’s belief that the Philippine peoples were simply not ready for any form of self-government. However, he is keen to suggest the proposition of a natively elected, Philippine-only legislature. In total, Roosevelt’s action in the Philippines as President can be described as a virtuously cautious yet progressive approach to implementing self-government in the Philippines.
In sum, McKinley, Root and Roosevelt set a huge precedent in American history. In the words of Richard Hofstadter, these turn of events “profoundly altered the character of our traditional foreign policy” in that it was a sharp departure from previous endeavors. This most certainly represented “a turning point in our history” . The groundswell of the nationalistic and virtuous elements of ‘Manifest Destiny’ now had a laboratory to conduct their grand experiment: “benevolent assimilation”. However, this task, as it will be shown in the following chapter, fell to the military arm of the United States. Their significance in the pacification efforts, the initial civic decrees of the occupied indigene, and the responsibilities to maintain the general state of order will be shown to have had a gigantic impact on the American efforts in the Philippines.[/I]

---TO BE CONT'D---

 

[El Justo]

U.S. soldiers of the First Nebraska volunteers, Company B, near Manila, 1899

Uncle Sam getting into the 'ole colonial rat race

Troop E, 9th Cavalry at the Presidio in San Francisco before shipping out to the Philippines, 1900. if you close enough, you'll notice that the entire troop is African American (save the officers). these soldiers fought bravely in most instances depsite experiencing tremendous racism from their own commrades. i remember reading some diary entries by on e of the soldiers from Troop E and he wondered why he should try to do the Army's job of providing civic reconstruction to a foreign peoples when African Americans do not recieve it state-side. this is a great point i reckon...

a rare image of Filipino soldiers

the northern portion of the Philippine Islands

and finally, a link to some absoultely outstanding motion picture footage i found some time ago. note this was the first time an American war had been captured for the motion picture screen.

 

[7ronin]

Not that there's anything inconsistent about being a patriot and a scoundrel (some of us would consider them much the same thing, but that's a discussion for another thread).

There was a thread recently in which someone was insisting - contrary to all counter-examples given by me and others - that the US' foreign policy has always and at all times been enlightened and concerned only with people's welfare, and that the US has never fought a war of aggression. I mentioned the war in the Philippines and the poster simply insisted that that, too, was neither aggressive nor brutal. I don't remember exactly what the reasoning was, but it was obviously spurious. Very strange - I can sort of understand why someone might be a religious fundamentalist, but a nationalist fundamentalist? A new one to me.

Well, as Dr. Johnson said, "Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel."

As for the "nationalist fundamentalist," I think once you know what you are looking for you will find them all around you. The nf'er is congenitally unable to see, much less accept, any evidence which would show that his or her country (particularly if it is basically a "good" country) could ever do anything which was evil. This is a dangerous disease which if not treated can lead to identity crises especially in people who have a conscience. We are seeing this right now in regards to the murder of 26 unarmed Iraqis by U.S. Marines. People are repulsed by it and are scrambling to find anything which will explain it without compromising their value systems.

In December 1944, elements of the First SS Panzer Division murdered over one hundred American prisoners at a place called Malmedy. Try as I can I can never convince anyone that British and American troops carried out similar actions on a number of occasions. The worst example I can think of is the My Lai incident from the Vietnam War. Despite eyewitness accounts and the confessions of some of the participants, there are still people who swear that the massacre was actually perpetrated by the Viet Cong.

 

[Gallienus]

It appears that the war in the Phillipines had its own My Lai thanks to General Jacob Hurd Smith. And Robert Graves' biography, Goodbye To All That covers his experiences in WWI and contains accounts of British soldiers routinely murdering German POWs, stealing any valubles on their persons and blaming the deaths on German artillery, and that their officers covered it up because it wouldn't look very good in the newspapers back home.

One thought about the Battle of Manila Bay having been fixed: the Guinness Book of Naval Blunders by Geoffrey Regan claims that Admiral Montojo knew that his squadron could not win but national honour compelled him to seek honourable defeat in battle. He therefore positioned his fleet at Cavite, sacrificing the use of Manila's shore batteries in order to avoid civilian deaths in Manila due to stray shells, and to ensure that his men would find it easier to swim to shore after his ships (one of his cruisers, the Castilla, was made of wood) were lost.

He was made the scapegoat for decades of government neglect of the navy when he returned to Spain, but he did have one defence witness who testified to his bravery at his court martial: Commodore Dewey.

 

[Plotinus]

[7ronin] And Wilde noted that patriotism is the virtue of the vicious. Nice points, although I like to think (perhaps erroneously, especially given the forthcoming events of this summer) that nationalist fundamentalism is far less of a problem here in Britain than in the US. Certainly I've never met any British ones (on the contrary, most British people are extremely cynical about the motives of government and the character of the military). This is one of the reasons I like Singapore - they care so little about patriotism/nationalism that the government has to mount campaigns to encourage people to support their national sports teams!

[El Justo] Going vaguely back on topic, this is getting very interesting. I have to say I'm particularly intrigued by your comments about the friars. Which orders of friars are we talking about here, and how did they acquire such enormous properties?

The picture of "the white man's burden" is excellent - very true. It's been suggested that one of the main reasons why countries such as Russia fell behind Europe and the US in late modern times is that they simply didn't have overseas possessions to exploit ruthlessly. The role of the colonies in providing cheap goods and labour to build the European industrial revolution (the fruits of which, of course, we in the west still enjoy while many people in the former colonies live in poverty) is probably under-appreciated. It'll be interesting to see what you have to say about the material benefits - if any - that occupation of the Philippines brought to the US.

 

[Dann]

He was made the scapegoat for decades of government neglect of the navy when he returned to Spain, but he did have one defence witness who testified to his bravery at his court martial: Commodore Dewey.

Real fighting men of character appreciate a good man, even if he comes from the opposing side.

I have to say I'm particularly intrigued by your comments about the friars. Which orders of friars are we talking about here, and how did they acquire such enormous properties?

All of them. The Franciscan, Dominicans, Jesuits etc. all had vast land holdings in Spanish era Philippines. They were the de facto government in individual towns and cities. Alcaldes and mayores routinely have to suck up to them if they want to keep their posts.

Basically they had a couple hundred years to take over the vast encomiendas (sp?) from descendants of the initial batch of Spanish who came over with the conquistadores.

 

[Plotinus]

Very interesting - although I must point out that Jesuits weren't friars.

 

[El Justo]

thanks for the comments everyone.

i would like to add a word or two about "national fundamentalism".
while i am always a tad bit biased wrt to the US (i love my friggin' country), i will never, ever try to sugarcoat her actions. i mean, they are what they are whether it be good or bad. the gist of the passages that i post contain both critical and positive conclusions (at the very end of the essay) wrt to US actions in the Philippines. it is a complicated issue...this war was.

i recall attending a seminar as an undergrad at it was on "American Exceptionalism". i remember being infuriated after hearing some of the stuff that these neo-fundamentalists believed in. do a google search on it and you'll see what i mean.

anyhow, yes 7ronin, it is Arthur McArthur, father of Douglas of WW2 and Korean War fame. Arthur is credited w/ ratcheting up the pressure militarly and i will cover this in the next passage actually.

Plotinus: yes, the Church situation in the P.I. at this time is indeed interesting. i will have to dig through my sources some more to see if i can expound on it a little further. Dann is right though. they had (and still have to a certain degree) a great deal of 'pull'. the thing i found most interesting while drafting this section was the 'walking on eggshells' approach of the McKinley Admin when dealing w/ the Vatican. there is and always has been a certain sense of reservation w/ the American public when dealing with the Catholic Church.

i agree w/ your colonial comments. Russia, i think, didn't have the infrasturcture to operate overseas colonies; at least not to the degree of the British, french, American, or even the Germans.

natural resources in the Philippines were definitely not exploited. sure, American businessmen flooded the islands once they came under US control. however, as noted in the previous section, the US Congress took particluar measures to ensure against exploitation. after all, TR was the granddaddy of American environmentalism.

Gallienus: yeah, Jacob Smith and his 'Howling Wilderness' comments. i'll cover that in detail in the next passage. as you will see though, it was a little different than My Lai b/c the Yanks were 'returning a favor' so to speak. and yes, you're 100% correct about the Manila battle. it was very much one-sided and Montojo did indeed sacrifice his squadron for the sake of protecting the harbour.

 

[El Justo]

the following passages were perhaps my favorite of the entire essay. as many of my CFC friends know, i love military history and this is no expection. i was able to uncover some fabulous records and plenty of first-hand accounts of the pacification process in the P.I. also, i was able to C&P this passage with the footnotes! i was quite happy to find this out!

The roles of the American military in the Philippine Islands went beyond simply rooting out the insurgents. This dual-task of pacification and civil reconstruction will be shown to have a tremendous impact on the outcome of the war. However, it is important to note that these tasks varied greatly from one region of the Philippines to the next. In some areas, the resistance raged on for years while in others, it was disorganized and meager. For that reason, the variety of circumstances that the Americans encountered deserves mentioning. This chapter is not intended, however, to be a standard chronicle of military operations. Instead, the aim is to uncover the particular successes and failures that the U.S. military achieved while pacifying the Philippines. This examination begins with what is now known as the Second Battle of Manila. The goal is to uncover exactly what measures that were taken to secure the city and its surrounding barrios. The second example is the pacification efforts in the Visayan Islands. It will be shown how the American actions here had both positive and negative effects on the pacification efforts. The island of Negros is the next topic. Negros was considered to be the model for American pacification in the Philippines and as a result, it is extremely important that it be reviewed. Following this is an examination of the American efforts to pacify on the island of Samar. The goal of this section is to uncover and debunk the myths that are inevitably attached to it. The final and most interesting portion of this chapter is an analysis of the memoirs of James Parker, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Cavalry. He was responsible for occupying two different regions of Luzon and it will be shown how his efforts there form a good part of the story in the Philippines that is not very well known.

US troops on the outskirts of Manila, 1899

A half a year worth of waiting and negotiating erupted into full-scale war on February 4, 1899. Filipino accounts of the incident vary from that of the American accounts. Linn noted that the fogginess of these initial events in the San Juan del Monte section of Manila are “matters of strong dispute” among Filipino and American historians alike.[1] However, it is clear that the encounter occurred at night, several months after Aguinaldo’s Army of Liberation began digging trenches, artillery emplacements and an impressive array of earthworks on Manila’s perimeter. The U.S. Army estimated that between fifteen and forty thousand insurgent troops formed a loose ring around the city at the time hostilities commenced. The American boots on the ground in the Philippines at this time was about 800 officers and a little more than twenty thousand troops. Seventy-seven of the officers and another 2338 troops were either in the southern theater of Cavite or aboard the transports off the coast of Iloilo City. An estimated eight-thousand troops were in Manila and another eleven thousand were in a sixteen mile-wide, home plate-shaped defensive line extending from Manila to the west and extending eastwards. Two brigades were garrisoned at the western banks of the Pasig River: McArthur’s 2nd Division and Brig. Gen. Harrison G. Otis’s (no relation) 1st Brigade. Brig. Gen. Irwin Hale’s 2nd Brigade extended the American lines further eastward in order to link up with Otis’s lines. The 1st South Dakota were dug in around San Mateo near the Pasig River, the 1st Colorado at Samplac on the southern side of the Pasig, and at the point, the 1st Nebraska in Santa Mesa. The remaining American lines were made up Maj. Anderson’s 1st Division and Brig. Gen. Charles King’s 1st Brigade near Blockhouse 12. Brig. Gen. Samuel Overshine’s 2nd Brigade rounded at the southern flank as they stretched from King’s lines at Blockhouse 12 to Manila Bay. These troops that formed the American lines around Manila were referred to as the 8th Corps. These somewhat over-stretched American lines stood a good chance of being either overran or surrounded.[2]

For our European and Asian friends who may not know what a 'home plate shaped' design is. it is a reference to the game of baseball.

Arthur MacArthur

Brig. Gen Harrison G. Otis

As soon as the hostilities erupted on the evening of February 4, Gen. Robert P. Hughes ordered three regiments of the city’s Provost Guard onto the streets of Manila to quell the disturbances as they began “sealing off thoroughfares, dispersing large gatherings, and keeping a close watch on the suspected neighborhoods.”[3] The Guards arrested “dozens, perhaps hundreds” of suspects and fended off a possible disaster for the 8th Corps.[4] However, the street battles continued in other sections of the city. Lt. Col. Victor Duboce and four companies of the 1st California of King’s Brigade were taking heavy sniper fire from the buildings in the Manila suburb of Paco. A house-to-house fight ensued and King ordered all buildings suspected of housing or providing cover for the snipers to be torched. The troops complied and the whole village was essentially burnt to the ground.[5] There would be several other instances similar to the two described above and their impact on pacification efforts in the Philippines would have varying degrees of effect.[6]

The battles raged on into the morning of February 5. It was to become what Linn termed as the “biggest of the entire Philippine War.”[7] The key element to the American victory in Manila was Col. Stotensburg and the 1st Nebraska’s securing of Manila’s water supply. The attack was launched at ten in the morning on 5 February with the support of the 1st Colorado, a few mountain guns from the Utah Battery and a few captured Nordenfelt artillery pieces. The Volunteers “took hill after hill, trench after trench” from the enemy.[8] They eventually captured the waterworks building but found that the fleeing insurgents had disassembled the apparatus. However, the missing parts were found hidden in a coal pile. “The pumps were soon put into order and running smoothly; Manila now had a secure supply of water, and the army could continue using the capital (Manila) as a showpiece for benevolent assimilation.”[9]

The Second Battle of Manila was waged along the aforementioned sixteen-mile American front lines and it involved all or parts of thirteen different U.S. regiments and thousands of Filipinos. American casualty numbers for the conflict report that 194 were wounded and 44 killed, half of whom were Regulars from the 14th Infantry and the 3rd Artillery.[10] Linn suggested that “Filipino losses can only be estimated.” Official army reports claimed the insurgents suffered four thousand wounded and seven hundred killed.[11] It is difficult to determine exactly how many Filipinos perished, both civilians and combatants. However, news of the Second Battle of Manila finally reached Washington in the days following its completion. The news had “stunned the administration.” It was largely believed in the capital that the “situation in Manila had been cooling.”[12] McKinley had recently sent a commission to the Islands to meet with Aguinaldo’s representatives in a sign of good faith. For that reason, the outbreak of hostilities was “emphatically not desired in Washington,” not at this particular time and place.[13] Root’s comments upon hearing of the news: “Our forces were attacked by the Tagalogs, who attempted to take the city.”[14] However, despite the grim possibilities that could have occurred, the 8th Corps effectively snuffed out the offensive capacities of the enemy forces on Luzon during the battles of 4-5 February 1899. Aguinaldo’s Army of Liberation suffered incalculable losses and was now on the run. Gen. Otis would spend the next two years sending columns into the dense hills and jungles of northern Luzon in the chase for Aguinaldo and the ultimate destruction of the Republic.

Gen. Otis dispatched Brig. Gen. Marcus P. Miller of the 1st Separate Brigade to the Visayas on 24 December 1898 with the orders to occupy the port of Iloilo City on the island of Panay. Otis did not anticipate any form of organized resistance and put Miller in command of only the 18th Infantry and Provisional Machine Gun Battery along with the 1st Tennessee. The objective for Miller and his troops would be to peaceably enter the city and lay the groundwork for civil government while maintaining the general order in Iloilos City.[15] However, trouble lay ahead. According to a reconnaissance of the island of Panay prior to the hostilities, it was reported to Otis that insurgent forces had entered the city and formally declared the Federal State of the Visayas which pledged nominal allegiance to Aguinaldo’s Philippine Republic.[16] It was also estimated that some 19,000 insurgent troops were on the island.[17] Miller took notice and promptly arranged for negotiation with the insurgents. He sought to peacefully transfer to American authority on the island but found out that the insurgent government had no intentions of relinquishing their position in favor of the Americans. It became clear that hostilities would be inevitable.

the Visayas

The Americans initiated hostilities in the Visayas on 11 February 1899 when the U.S. Navy commenced with a naval bombardment of Iloilos City. What occurred next is a matter of dispute between the U.S. Army and the Navy. Each claimed to have “captured” the city even though it lay in ruins from the bombardments and a series of fires set by fleeing insurgents and residents. Admiral Dewey claimed that “naval forces captured, occupied and held the fort and city of Iloilo, and drove the Filipinos out, with absolutely no assistance form the Army.”[18] Miller declared that his troops had “captured five sixths of the city”[19] and that the Army held the main square, all of the trenches surrounding the city and all of the bridges leading in and out of Iloilo. Linn notes that Miller now “occupied a burned-out and deserted town, surrounded on three sides by enemy forces” and that he was now burdened with the task of rebuilding “all public services – water, sanitation, trade and government – and also deal with a substantial military threat” in an effort to “combine civil projects with military operations, to find a proper balance of conciliation and coercion.”[20]

Miller issued an official proclamation on 21 February 1899. The premise of the decree was the establishment of military government in Iloilo and it was promised that private property was to be respected as well as freedom of religion, the retention of local municipal officials save for misconduct and the opening of the port for trade. Miller proclaimed the Americans “have not come to the Island of Panay as conquerors” and that the locals need to “unite as one people in suppressing crime and lawlessness in the Island.”[21] It was also said that a general amnesty would ensue should the insurgents lie down their arms. Miller’s message was beginning to sink in. Local elites began to recognize that the resistance in and around Iloilos was generally comprised of outside influences, most notably the Tagalogs under the direction of Aguinaldo. By early March of 1899, Miller had set up “a thin five mile perimeter” around Iloilo.[22]

By mid-March, the situation on the ground was beginning to deteriorate. Guerilla bands “roamed the countryside extorting money, kidnapping women, and terrorizing the inhabitants.”[23] On 16 March 1899, insurgent Gen. Martin Delgado launched a one thousand man assault on the American perimeter of Iloilo. The lightly defended American garrison near the Iloilo suburb of Jaro was besieged by the insurectos but the 18th Infantry dug in and repelled the onslaught. The waves of bolomen were met by fierce machine gun fire and volley after volley of artillery fire[24]. Delgado and the insurgents quickly retreated to the nearby town of Santa Barbara in an attempt to regroup. However, many of troops sensed the futility of forcibly resisting the Americans. Linn notes that the rebel soldiers “quietly returned to their villages and limited their military activity to service in the local militia.” Furthermore, this essentially crushed the insurgent “offensive capacity” on the island of Panay and “they would never again try a concerted push to drive the invaders off the island.”[25] American casualty figures for the battle stood at one killed and fourteen wounded while the insurgents were believed to have lost at least fifty killed and maybe as high as two hundred[26]. Despite this setback, Delgado and his troops continued to harass Miller’s perimeters around Iloilo City.

pictured above is a 'bolo' which is very much like a machete. some Filipino soldiers were armed w/ these weapons (and no rifles either). they were famous for charging American lines and being struck down in a hail of gunfire. i even convinced CivArmy1994 to make a 'Boloman' unit for civ3 and he did!

On 5 May 1899, Gen. Otis replaced Miller in favor Brig. Gen. Robert P. Hughes. Otis was insistent upon concentrating the bulk of American manpower in Luzon and around Manila and Miller had petitioned for more troops on several occasions.[27] Thus Hughes’s task was to root out the remaining resistance on Panay while maintaining the military government and general peace. Linn noted that Hughes went into this task with the mindset that Visayans, in general, were friendly and receptive to the Americans and that the ill will was harbored solely towards the Tagalog sector of the island. Hughes quickly discovered that it was not simply Aguinaldo’s Republican and Tagalog supporters. It was now becoming clear that Visayans “were committed to independence.”[28]

Hughes was now becoming “more and more frustrated”[29] with the unconventional and harassing tactics that the insurrectos were now conducting. For that reason, he set out to completely obliterate the remaining resistance by employing a scorched earth campaign in order to deprive the enemy of sustenance. Search-and-destroy missions were undertaken by Hughes’s troops in an effort to squash the rebel army in Panay. By August of 1899, the remaining elements of resistance dispersed and Iloilo City was about to receive a significant boost courtesy of Brig. Gen. Hughes.

The key to the pacification and implementation of civic government in Iloilo City rests wholly with the actions of Robert P. Hughes. The ‘total war’[30] strategy had compounded the already famine-like conditions that surrounded Iloilo City. The rebel army had already stripped much of the island’s livestock, grain and other foodstuffs during the course of resisting the Americans. Hughes’s aggressive approach simply magnified the dilemma. During the summer of 1899, Hughes cleverly initiated a directive that forbade any and all foodstuffs to leave the city of Iloilos. However, he allowed for the provisions to enter the city. In combination with this, it was directed that any persons living outside the city limits of Iloilo would be subjected to meager daily rations. Delgado, the rebel leader still in nominal control of some portions of the countryside surrounding the port city, denounced Hughes’s tactics and countered with a blockade of his own for all food coming into the city. It backfired and by mid-August 1899 the conditions of the famine greatly subsided due in large part to Hughes’s tactics; the city’s population had doubled since June 1899.[31]

The next examination is of the island of Negros. This rich sugar-producing island is located in the central Philippines archipelago. The revolutionary sentiments against Spain had arrived “quite late” on Negros and Linn notes that whatever angst against Spain that existed was restricted to the local levels and that there was no “violence or popular participation” of Negrenses”[32] of the Spanish who departed the island for good on November 22, 1898. However, a flurry of political activities quickly ensued. Aguinaldo promptly claimed Negros as part of the newly created Philippine Republic. The Federal State of the Visayas, those who pledged only nominal allegiance to Aguinaldo’s Republic, also claimed the island. The dilemma became a bit more complicated when the inhabitants of Negros shunned both claimants and officially declared two separate states. El Gobierno Republicano Federal de Canton de Ysla de Negros (The Federal Republican Government of the Canton of Negros Island), which consisted of Negros Occidental, and La Republica Federal Filipina del Canton de Ysla de Negros Oriental (The Federal Philippine Republic of the Canton of Negros Island Oriental) declared shortly thereafter their independence from both Spain and Aguinaldo’s Republic. Both Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental did not prefer Aguinaldo’s rigid, centralized set-up for the Republic and the Negrenses sought a more autonomous and decentralized format. Prior to the American-Philippine hostilities, the Negros Occidental contingent petitioned the Americans for a “protectorate” status. It was promptly rebuffed.[33] Shortly afterwards, Aniceto Lascon, the first president of Negros Occidental, unfurled an American flag in Bacolod as a sign of peace. He also sent a petition to Gen. Otis highlighting the desires for American protection.[34] There appears to have been a certain amount of uncertainty in the American military command regarding this offer. However, by March of 1899, Otis had no choice but to accept the offer from the Negrenses in lieu of the recently initiated hostilities in Manila. For that reason, Gen. James F. Smith was appointed as military governor of the new Sub-District of Negros, part of the new Visayan Military District. A four hundred man force was deployed under the command of the 1st California and Maj. Hugh T. Sime.

map showing location of the island of Negros

James F. Smith is an interesting study. Linn described him as an “experienced politico” who had close ties with Gen. Otis and that he avowed the concept of ‘benevolent assimilation.’ Furthermore, Smith is said to have had a great interest in humanitarian endeavors and that he had a particular “interest in political issues.”[35] He arrived in Bacolod on March 4, 1899 and his immediate tasks as military governor was to “control customs and trade, communications and the police.”[36] Smith’s situation in Negros differed greatly from that of his peers’ insomuch that resistance did not initially exist upon the arrival of the Americans. For that reason, a direct route towards civil government was in the offering. Smith promptly left the “day-to-day business of local government in the hands of the locals, or at least the wealthy pro-American Negrenses.”[37] This expedited pace of pacification and installation of civil government allowed Smith to form a Negrense delegation in order to attempt to adopt a local constitution. However, as Linn noted, it “exploded into factional battles” and any such consensus on a constitution would have to wait.[38] Frustrated by the non-consensus, Smith re-organized the format of the local governments and essentially stripped them of most of their municipal authority. Instead, Smith redefined their roles as an “advisory council” in support of American military governance with an eye on a much broader and inclusive local governmental structure. Its participants would be decided in local elections slated for October 1899.[39] In the meantime, Smith “insisted that the 1st California do nothing to disturb the harmonious relations with the public.” In order to facilitate this, Smith “established a list of prices for goods and services – a dozen eggs for a quarter, twenty cigarettes for a nickel” so as to nip any potential conflicts between soldiers and the local merchants in the bud.[40] This, in effect, defused any potential tensions in the market districts of Bacolod and at the same time, stabilized the local economic markets.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] Linn, The Philippine War 1899-1902, 42. It is noted that Filipino accounts center on the unnecessary provocation by the American sentries. American accounts claim that armed insurgents were seen scurrying about the Manila suburb. The darkness and the seemingly chaotic and unorganized nature of the conflict surely complicates the matter.
[2] Linn, The Philippine War, 44. Linn noted that the defensive troop formations in and around Manila was a “most precarious position” to be in and that the 1st Nebraska, at the extreme eastern point of the lines, suffered from an “extreme vulnerability” to being cut off or surrounded by the enemy.
[3] Linn, The Philippine War, 47.
[4] Linn, The Philippine War, 47. Linn: “Suppression of the Manila disturbances was a crucial, if often overlooked, part of the battle of 4-5 February.” Furthermore, “the Guard’s prompt action secured the city and prevented the terrifying prospect of the 8th Corps facing attack in all directions.”
[5] Linn, The Philippine War, 50.
[6] See Linn, The Philippine War, pp. 42-64.
[7] Linn, The Philippine War, 52.
[8] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 56.
[9] Linn, The Philippine War, 57-58.
[10] Linn, The Philippine War, 52.
[11] Linn, The Philippine War, 52.
[12] Linn, The Philippine War, 54.
[13] Linn, The Philippine War, 55.
[14] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 52.
[15] Linn, The Philippine War, 38. The author notes that “Otis gave extensive instructions for setting up a military government” in Iloilos City.
[16] Linn, The Philippine War, 38. The newly arranged Visayan state had a government that was composed primarily of wealthy and influential Panayans and nothing else thus leaving one ethnic group in charge of the entire island chain of the Visayas. They recognized Aguinaldo’s Republic but refused to forward taxes and sought to “pursue independent policies.” This caused a certain amount of friction between the two sides. Some wanted to dig in a fight while other pleaded for a peaceful transition. Others were adamant and promised that they’d burn the city upon the arrival of American troops.
[17] Linn, The Philippine War, 38. According to Linn, an estimated 4,000 tiradors (riflemen), 14,000 macheteros (bolomen – machete-wielding infantry) and an additional 1,000 to 1,500 crack troops sent from Luzon under the direction of Aguinaldo.
[18] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 68.
[19] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 68.
[20] Linn, The Philippine War, 69.
[21] Quoted in Linn, The Philippine War, 69.
[22] Linn, The Philippine War, 70.
[23] Linn, The Philippine War, 70.
[24] Linn, The Philippine War, 70. It is stated that approximately three quarters of all the insurgent attackers were bolomen. Linn also notes that the rebel officers convinced the machete-wielding infantry that the American soldiers would simply flee upon sight of the bolos!
[25] Linn, The Philippine War, 70.
[26] Linn, The Philippine War, 70.
[27] Linn, The Philippine War, 71-72.
[28] Linn, The Philippine War, 72. Numerous Iloilo elites presented evidence to suggest that they wanted no part of American rule and instead preferred complete autonomy.
[29] Linn, The Philippine War, 72.
[30] This is a direct reference to William T. Sherman’s concept of ‘scorched earth’ or ‘total war’ in that the intention is to deny the enemy of any and all means of sustenance. For more on ‘total war’ see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_war.
[31] Linn, The Philippine War, 73.
[32] Linn, The Philippine War, 75.
[33] Linn, The Philippine War, 75. It is noted that Captain Henry Glass of the USS Charleston was approached on 12 November 1898 by the leaders in Bacolod regarding the possibility of an American protectorate in Negros Occidental. Glass deferred on the grounds that Otis and the McKinley Administration had yet to set the official policy for the Islands.
[34] Linn, The Philippine War, 75.
[35] Linn, The Philippine War, 76.
[36] Linn, The Philippine War, 76.
[37] Linn, The Philippine War, 76.
[38] Linn, The Philippine War, 76.
[39] Linn, The Philippine War, 76. Smith was apparently fed up with the grid-lock that the native legislative body had created within the Balocod.
[40] Linn, The Philippine War, 76.

 

[El Justo]

All you say about the Philippines, the conflict there between the Americans, military and civil, and the pig headedness of the military and their habits of setting "bulldogs to catch rabbits" is immensely cheering to me, because it is precisely what we are doing in South Africa.

--Rudyard Kipling

Take up the White Man's burden
Send forth the best ye breed
Go, bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need:
To wait, in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild
Your new-caught sullen peoples,
Half devil and half child.

--Rudyard Kipling

here's a wonderfully preserved photo of two unidentified privates from the 8th Corps in Manila, 1900.

B Troop of the 4th US Cavalry crossing a river. the American cavalry units played a humongous role in the Philippines. their ability to navigate to rough and dense terrain of the P.I proved tremendously effective as we will see in a later passage.

here's an image of none other than Fred Funston. this dude was the first American bad-ass of the 20th century. some called him dastardly for his deeds.

here's an image of the medals that were awarded to US troops for service in the P.I. note that is says 'Philippine Insurrection' on the medal. it is a long held belief that conflict was deemed as an 'insurrection' instead of a war so that A.) congressioanl approval for funding, etc was not needed and therefore bypassed and B.) veteran services would not need to be provided to the returning soldiers b/c the conflict was not an official 'war'. for some reason, i just don't buy this theory. however, i wasn't able to ever find evidence to refure it. maybe i will look into it at some point.

 

[Dreadnought]

Great job Some nice information in there!

 

[7ronin]

here's a wonderfully preserved photo of two unidentified privates from the 8th Corps in Manila, 1900.

Get those shoes shined, men.

B Troop of the 4th US Cavalry crossing a river. the American cavalry units played a humongous role in the Philippines.

Judging from this photograph, the engineers also had an important role.

here's an image of none other than Fred Funston. this dude was the first American bad-ass of the 20th century. some called him dastardly for his deeds.

In one of those odd coincidences of history, the sons of Aguinaldo and Funston were in the same class at West Point. Funston is one of the more interesting officers to have served in the U.S. Army. There are several good books about him including one account of his capture of Aguinaldo.

Aguinaldo and many of the other leaders of the independence movement were Freemasons. So were Arthur MacArthur and most of the other Americans including possibly Funstan. It could be that Funston used this relationship to help effect his capture of Aguinaldo.

Still waiting to hear about Moros and 45's.

edit: fixed my spelling

 

[El Justo]

Get those shoes shined, men.



Judging from this photograph, the engineers also had an important role.




In one of those odd coincidences of history, the sons of Aguinaldo and Funston were in the same class at West Point. Funston is one of the more interesting officers to have served in the U.S. Army. There are several good books about him including one account of his capture of Aguinaldo.

Aguinaldo and many of the other leaders of the independence movement were Freemasons. So were Arthur MacArthur and most of the other Americans including possibly Funstan. It could be that Funston used this relationship to help effect his capture of Aguinaldo.

Still waiting to here about Moros and 45's.

haha...very nice my friend

the Signal Corps (and the engineers, too) in the P.I. most definitely played an important role. they laid hundreds and hundreds of miles of telegraph cable through dense jungles and over rough terrain. and if it weren't for their swift workmanship during a time of war, many more American soldiers could've lost their lives. i touch on this a little in the next passage. the US troops were spread really thin throughout central Luzon at one point and if it weren't for the 'instant' transmittal of the telegraph messages, the light American garrisons could've potentially have been overrun.

that is nuts that the Aguinaldo and Funston offspring were classmates like that. i did not know that! i still need to read up more on Funston. i only really read of his actions in the P.I., Cuba, and the SF earthquake of '06 (?) i know he served during WW1 (stateside iirc) and dies suddenly of a heart attack in his 50s

btw, what is the name of that book that you mentioned to me some time ago?

i also wasn't aware that both Funston and Aguinaldo were Freemasons. i do know though that Aguinaldo was part of a similar Filipino group called the Katipunan. i think i touch on this some in a later chapter. Dann mentioned it, too.

ahh...the Colt 45 revolver. no, unfortunately i didn't cover too much from the Mindinao theater. however, it is an interesting story. you should share it with us

 

[Dann]

i also wasn't aware that both Funston and Aguinaldo were Freemasons. i do know though that Aguinaldo was part of a similar Filipino group called the Katipunan. i think i touch on this some in a later chapter. Dann mentioned it, too.

The Katipunan was the name of the secret rebel organization that Bonifacio founded. Not sure of its connection with Freemasonry.

At one time they approached Jose Rizal (while he was in exile in Dapitan and before he was executed) and offered him leadership but he declined. Rizal was a reformist but loyal to Spain at heart. Now he was a Freemason.

 

[7ronin]

btw, what is the name of that book that you mentioned to me some time ago?

The title of the book is Sitting in Darkness by David Bain. You can have my copy if I can ever find it. It's boxed up in the garage with the rest of the unshelved portion of my library. If you don't want to wait Amazon has used copies starting at $1.55.

Here is the Washington Post's book review:
"The Washington Post, February 24, 1985

IN WHICH WAR was the term "****" invented? When did American soldiers conduct their first body count and pioneer the use of the "water cure" to persuade Asian guerrillas to betray their comrades?

After which battle did a young rifleman write home to the folks in Kingston, New York, "I am in my glory when I can sight my gun on some dark skin and pull the trigger"?

Modern as it all sounds, the answer is not Vietnam, or even Korea or World War II. The American conquest of the Philippines barely rates a mention in school history books, usually as a cryptic footnote to the short war which President William McKinley and publisher William Randolph Hearst waged on Spain in 1898 for the independence of Cuba and the circulation of Hearst's newspapers. Yet 126,458 Americans fought in the Philippines between 1898 and 1902, of whom 4,234 died, while 16,000 Filipinos died in battle and another 200,000 in "reconcentration camp." There were in addition massacres of civilians in reprisal for guerrilla attacks and similar sideshows all too familiar in subsequent Asian wars.

The story of how, and why America liberated the Philippines from Spain and then took the islands back from their inhabitants two weeks later is a complicated one, already well told in one of the classics of American historiography, Leon Wolff's Little Brown Brother, published in 1960. But the writing of history is never finished, and David Haward Bain has managed another fine book on the subject, not disagreeing with Wolff's conclusions, but making them fresh and vivid for a generation which has seen yet another Asian war.

This is not, however, simply another tale of savagery in the rice paddies. Almost as if he could read tomorrow's newspapers, Bain has brought his account up to the minute, with perceptive entries, for instance, indexed under Aquino Benigno and Ver, General Fabian (the latter currently on trial for complicity in the former's assassination). This energetic young historian has thus pulled off that rarest of publishing coups, a scholarly historical work of bang-on topicality. He has, what's more, found a most original way of bringing his story to life.

From this distance, and even at the time, the American conquest of the Philippines has always been difficult to fathom. But, then and now, two figures jump forth from a cast of thousands: Emilio Aguinaldo, not quite 30, brave and passionately patriotic, the president of the republic of the Philippines proclaimed as the beaten Spaniards departed (and the first republic in Asia) and Colonel Frederick Funston, six years older, who drove the last nail into the republic's coffin by capturing Aguinaldo on March 23, 1901, after a long and daring hunt through the jungles and mountains of northern Luzon.

Aguinaldo, who looked remarkably like his current successor, Ferdinand Marcos, survived his capture and lived a long life, long enough to welcome the arrival of the Japanese in 1942 (understandably, perhaps; the new invaders also promised liberation), to march in the Manila independence parade of 1946, carrying the flag he first raised against Spain in 1896, and to see a new American war just getting under way in Asia in 1964, the year of his death. A largely forgotten figure now, even in the Philippines, Aguinaldo emerges from Bain's book an authentic hero and his republic a tragically missed chance for the United States to have been the protector of Asia's first genuine democracy.

His captor, the adventurous son of a Kansas politician known as "Foghorn Funston, the farmers' friend" was plainly just as archetypal a figure. "I am afraid that some people at home will lie awake nights worrying about the ethics of this war, thinking that our enemy is fighting for the right of self-government" he told a New York Times correspondent. "The word independent, which these people roll over their tongues so glibly, is to them a word, and not much more . . . . they are, as a rule, an illiterate, semisavage people, who are waging war, not against tyranny, but against Anglo-Saxon order and decency." Funston's feat, a mixture of reckless daring and ingenious double-cross, or what used to be known in Vietnam as a "John Wayne stunt," was the stuff of movies, and would have made a splendid vehicle for James Cagney (Funston was 5 feet 4 inches tall and touchy about it) if Hollywood had blossomed before American imperialism went out of fashion.

BUT, LIKE MANY a veteran from the East, Funston could not settle down to life back home, took to the bottle and died at 51 in 1917, when he was being seriously considered for command of the American Expeditionary Force that went to France that year. But for his heart attack, in fact, we would very likely now be debating the merits of the Funston rocket instead of the one named for his deputy, General John Pershing, who got the job instead.

Here, unmistakably, we have the Green Beret, or cowboy turned romantic military stuntman. In fact, Funston's boss, General Arthur MacArthur, father of the even more famous Douglas, was an old Indian fighter, and so were many of his buddies in the 20th Kansas infantry he led to the Philippines. The fact that the Far East is West of the Wild West has profoundly shaped America's wars there, a point made in the insightful and absurd movie The Deer Hunter.

It is hard to quarrel with Bain's conclusion that the years of American rule did little or nothing to solve the basic political problem of the Philippines. After three centuries of Spanish colonial government, the islands had none of the institutions of self-rule and no experience of it. All the new rulers achieved was a superficial Americanization of the illustrades, the Hispanicized native upper class, leaving the masses in pious poverty and the way open for a native-born dictatorship to follow the authoritarian rule of slippery Spaniards and decent Anglo-Saxons. People learn self-government by governing themselves and making their own mistakes, and America put off the Philippines' fateful day for 50 years, failing, in the end, even to supply the military protection that is the only justification for empire.

But Americans are still well thought of in the Philippines, as Bain and a group of friends, including his photographer-brother Christopher, discovered when they repeated Funston's epic trek through the Luzon jungle in 1982, talking to the same locals, fording the same streams, and being bitten by descendants of the same mosquitoes which bit the pint-sized adventurer and his party 80 years earlier. Melding past and present, and interweaving the historical background with present politics brings vividly home the long shadows still cast by America's first adventure in Asia. This is an important story, honestly researched and well told -- a second classic, in fact, on a fascinating subject."

 

[7ronin]

I'm amazed! The "system" edited the Washington Post. It deleted a four letter word starting with "g." Oh, well.

 

[Adler17]

The Manila Conflict

Or Germany's role in the Spanish American War

After the Monroe Doctrine was no longer part of the US political agenda also the German and US interests clashed in several occasions before WW1. One of them is called Manila Conflict or Manila Crise.
This is an amendment to El Justo's posts here. He was so kind to allow me to post it here.

The war with Spain brought the Phillipines at least for a short time into the flash light of the international policy. These islands were suddenly claimed not only by the US and Spain but also France, Britain and Russia. And also the Japanese were in the race. Wilhelm II. and the German foreign secretary, v. Bülow, made clear that Germany, despite British press reports, did not have any claims about the islands. (The British press however, like today, went on with her anti German reports and soon the US press followed. This should be known as background information.)
However since so many states had claims on the islands and the situation there was everything else than clear, the Kaiser sent Vizeadmiral Otto von Diederichs to Manila to look after the situation there. His only instruction however was the news Germany had no claims. So v. Diederichs went to Manila to investigate the situation.
In this moment v. Diederichs was the commander of the German East Asian squadron. Following ships belonged to it:
SMS Kaiser as flagship, an old battleship, now rated as Großer Kreuzer (Large cruiser ~Armoured cruiser)
SMS Deutschland, SMS Kaiser's sister
SMS Kaiserin Augusta, a new armoured cruiser
SMS Irene, a light cruiser
SMS Prinzeß Wilhelm, light cruiser
SMS Arcona, light cruiser
SMS Gefion, light cruiser
SMS Cormoran, also a light cruiser

Several nations did have sent already warships to Manila with the same task like v. Diederichs, when he arrived on June 12th on SMS Kaiserin Augusta, as SMS Kaiser was in repair. SMS Cormoran and SMS Irene were already waiting there. None of these three ships had trouble so far entering the port.
V. Diederichs made his first report: The situation was described as chaotic. The US would rule the seas and the shores, but only so long the ship guns would fire. On the islands the Spanish would still fight and also another party, the Phillipinos, would fight both not willing to exchange one colonial master for the other.
However soon nearly another party would have been involved in the war: the Germans. Until the 18th there were no problems with the US ships. However this changed dramatically when SMS Prinzeß Wilhelm and two days later SMS Kaiser arrived. Although the US commander, Rear Admiral Dewey, was told the ships would only bring fresh crews, the relationship between the Germans and Americans became colder and colder. Although v. Diederichs again made clear that Germany has no own claims on the islands, rumors, one of which saying Konteradmiral (rear admiral) Heinrich Prinz von Preußen would soon arrive with the rest of the squadron, and some small struggles between German and US ships nearly lead to an escalation of the situation on July 10th. Admiral v. Diederichs flag officer, Kapitänleutnant Hintze, had the order to make the German position clear, as the US demanded an inspection of the German ships as they flamed the Germans to break the blockade. In the following communication Admiral Dewey got more and more furious. He "forgot himself (er fiel aus der Rolle)" as v. Diederichs wrote in his official report. Dewey threatened with war: "... and this means war, young man!"
V. Diederichs at once talked personally with Dewey. He complained about the situation and the threat. He was mild in the words but strong indeed. Dewey's behaviour is even more unexplaineable as SMS Irene left already the harbour and SMS Cormoran would follow soon, on July 15th, as also Dewey knew (in the US however the NY state Newspaper wrote, Dewey should destroy the German squadron and the other US forces the rest of the German fleet).
Nevertheless the situation soon calmed down after a meeting of the international commanders with Dewey. After that an agreement was made and the crise was over (in my sources it is said between the words that Dewey was taught in law of the seas in this meeting).
So a war with the US was avoided. For this time.

Adler