At what point did 'natural science' become the only 'science'?

Yeah, math is also a religion in which "math zealots" loudly proclaim that only their numbers are right and they never, ever work things out for themselves to see if what their math teachers say is true. :rolleyes:

This contributes to the conversation how, exactly?

Or is it just an angry science believer pursuing a heretic?
 
This contributes to the conversation how, exactly?

Or is it just an angry science believer pursuing a heretic?
It contributes about as much as your post did. I'd prefer taking this back to the other thread, myself.

Since science isn't a religion, why would I consider you a heretic?
 
What i am asking is when the view became that 'science' must be defined by experiment (and not by theorem where it applies, eg math), so that science now by definition (current definition anyway) only deals with external/material/experiment-reproducible or sense-tied observable phenomena :)

1779.
 
They like it boxed up and straight-forward.
Which incidentally, coming to think of it, is also how American general culture at times looks to me. Strange.

We're really not that complicated, except when we're complicated. Sort of makes sense in the light of conversations I've had with people regarding Americans and smiling at people you don't know.
 
Originally Posted by Michel Foucault
In recent years we have often encountered … what might be called the insurrection of subjugated knowledges. When I say "subjugated knowledges," I mean two things. On the one hand, I am referring to historical contents that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systematizations. I am also referring to a whole series of knowledges that have been disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naive knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity. And it is thanks to the reappearance of these knowledges from below, of these unqualified or even disqualified knowledges, it is thanks to the reappearance of these knowledges: the knowledge of the psychiatrized, the patient, the nurse, the doctor, that is parallel to, marginal to, medical knowledge, the knowledge of the delinquent, what I would call, if you like, what people know (and this is by no means the same thing as common knowledge or common sense but, on the contrary, a particular knowledge, a knowledge that is local, regional, or differential, incapable of unanimity and which derives its power solely from the fact that it is different from all the knowledges that surround it), it is the reappearance of what people know at a local level, of these disqualified knowledges, that made the critique possible.

[My project, called ‘genealogies’ ] is a way of playing local, discontinuous, disqualified, or nonlegitimized knowledges off against the unitary theoretical instance that claims to be able to filter them, organize them into a hierarchy, organize them in the name of a true body of knowledge, in the name of the rights of a science that is in the hands of the few. Genealogies are therefore not positivistic returns to a form of science that is more attentive or more accurate. Genealogies are, quite specifically, antisciences. … This is above all, primarily, an insurrection against the centralizing power-effects that are bound up with the institutionalization and workings of any scientific discourse.

You know how many people have been asking themselves whether or not Marxism is a science for many years now, probably for more than a century. One might say that the same question has been asked, and is still being asked, of psychoanalysis or, worse still, of the semiology of literary texts. Genealogies' or genealogists' answer to the question "Is it a science or not?" is: "Turning Marxism, or psychoanalysis, or whatever else it is, into a science is precisely what we are criticizing you for. And if there is one objection to be made against Marxism, it's that it might well be a science."

To put it in … milder terms, let me say this: even before we know to what extent something like Marxism or psychoanalysis is analogous to a scientific practice in its day-to-day operations, in its rules of construction, in the concepts it uses, we should be asking the question, asking ourselves about the aspiration to power that is inherent in the claim to being a science. The question or questions that have to be asked are: "What types of knowledge are you trying to disqualify when you say that you are a science? What speaking subject, what discursive subject, what subject of experience and knowledge are you trying to minorize when you begin to say: 'I speak this discourse, I am speaking a scientific discourse, and I am a scientist.' What theoretico-political vanguard are you trying to put on the throne in order to detach it from all the massive, circulating, and discontinuous forms that knowledge can take?"

And I would say: "When I see you trying to prove that Marxism is a science, to tell the truth, I do not really see you trying to demonstrate once and for all that Marxism has a rational structure and that its propositions are therefore the products of verification procedures. I see you, first and foremost, doing something different. I see you connecting to Marxist discourse, and I see you assigning to those who speak that discourse the power-effects that the West has, ever since the Middle Ages, ascribed to a science and reserved for those who speak a scientific discourse."

Dense prose!

Actually, that very nearly makes sense to me. But it makes me work very hard to understand it.

Isn't it just saying that "science" is elitist?
 
Dense prose!

Actually, that very nearly makes sense to me. But it makes me work very hard to understand it.

Isn't it just saying that "science" is elitist?

I personally mostly focused on his claim that it seems to (incorrectly, of course) matter more not what is to be logically termed a science, but what projected value or lack of it goes along with such a description.
Which is another way to be unscientific, in my view :)

To make a sort of parallel: it matters less if the WH40K emperor is alive or dead, and more if people tend to (or force) themselves to feel something strong through repeating the phrase "The Emperor protects!".
The cannon-fodder there has no tie to the actual state of the Emperor, or any truth tied to that. They only are shamed/accused, or nodded along positively, according to how they mention the phrase. Like many do with 'science'.
 
Dense prose!

Actually, that very nearly makes sense to me. But it makes me work very hard to understand it.

Isn't it just saying that "science" is elitist?

I think the point is more that 'science' and insisting upon the scientific method necessarily means saying that some sorts of knowledge are more worth considering than others, and that you cannot really understand the shortcomings of the whole power structure, which declares some means of knowledge 'legitimate' (ie, 'scientific') and others 'marginal', unless you bring in those knowledges deemed marginal - because 'scientific' knowledge excludes that knowledge which might cast doubt upon the validity of the whole system. Does that make any sense?
 
I think the point is more that 'science' and insisting upon the scientific method necessarily means saying that some sorts of knowledge are more worth considering than others, and that you cannot really understand the shortcomings of the whole power structure at work here, which declares some means of knowledge 'legitimate' (ie, 'scientific') and others 'marginal', unless you bring in those knowledges deemed marginal - because 'scientific' knowledge excludes that knowledge which might cast doubt upon the validity of the whole system. Does that make any sense?

It did make sense, but I have to wonder if there is a clearer way to say what you said. I can't think of it myself, but there were some dips and loops in there that would do a roller coaster proud.
 
I think the point is more that 'science' and insisting upon the scientific method necessarily means saying that some sorts of knowledge are more worth considering than others, and that you cannot really understand the shortcomings of the whole power structure, which declares some means of knowledge 'legitimate' (ie, 'scientific') and others 'marginal', unless you bring in those knowledges deemed marginal - because 'scientific' knowledge excludes that knowledge which might cast doubt upon the validity of the whole system. Does that make any sense?

I don't know.

What would those knowledges, deemed marginal, be?

Intuition, religion, magical thinking, superstition,...?

If I've understand it correctly, I think it's very hard NOT to fault science, in these terms. It seems scientists will just redefine as science anything which is capable of being included, and must exclude things which aren't.

Isn't it just another case of no true scottish scientist?

Isn't the history of science a history of gradually including more and more branches of knowledge? And why would "science" intentionally exclude any form of knowledge which it could include?
 
I don't know.

What would those knowledges, deemed marginal, be?

Intuition, religion, magical thinking, superstition,...?

If I've understand it correctly, I think it's very hard NOT to fault science, in these terms. It seems scientists will just redefine as science anything which is capable of being included, and must exclude things which aren't.

Isn't it just another case of no true scottish scientist?

Isn't the history of science a history of gradually including more and more branches of knowledge? And why would "science" intentionally exclude any form of knowledge which it could include?

Depends on the scientist.

Let's say the scientist is specifically a physicist. A physicist will express no doubt that physics is science. Probably have no doubts about chemistry and not much doubt about geology and some other things. But when you reach economics he is likely to say "oh, a social science" with a scoffing tone that clearly indicates he considers social science to not really be science at all. Hence it would be in his thinking 'marginal'.
 
Depends on the scientist.

Let's say the scientist is specifically a physicist. A physicist will express no doubt that physics is science. Probably have no doubts about chemistry and not much doubt about geology and some other things. But when you reach economics he is likely to say "oh, a social science" with a scoffing tone that clearly indicates he considers social science to not really be science at all. Hence it would be in his thinking 'marginal'.

Exactly :smug:
 
Isn't the history of science a history of gradually including more and more branches of knowledge? And why would "science" intentionally exclude any form of knowledge which it could include?

Because it can't include those forms of knowledge; they are, by definition, not scientific. Foucault's point was that a scientist will look at a collection of diary entries by mental patients in the 19th century and say that they can't be used as scientific evidence, because value judgements and personal perspectives aren't part of the scientific method. In excluding that, they make it impossible to say 'the institution of mental healthcare in the 19th century was bad', or similarly 'the prison system should be reformed', via the scientific method. At the same time they create a hierarchy in which unscientific statements and knowledge are considered less valid than scientific ones. So you have to be aware of the full implications of saying 'let's restrict what we talk about to scientific matters'. Archaeology is a great example of what can happen with that.
 
Because it can't include those forms of knowledge; they are, by definition, not scientific. Foucault's point was that a scientist will look at a collection of diary entries by mental patients in the 19th century and say that they can't be used as scientific evidence, because value judgements and personal perspectives aren't part of the scientific method. In excluding that, they make it impossible to say 'the institution of mental healthcare in the 19th century was bad', or similarly 'the prison system should be reformed', via the scientific method. At the same time they create a hierarchy in which unscientific statements and knowledge are considered less valid than scientific ones. So you have to be aware of the full implications of saying 'let's restrict what we talk about to scientific matters'. Archaeology is a great example of what can happen with that.

A serious issue with the current/popular view on science, is that while:
A) Science does not include (rightly due to the limitations) fields which are either far less bounded or abstract by definition
B) Science has no issue viewing natural/material phenomena-cored examinations as more scientific than bounded-axiom flowing ones like math.

In my view this is a very problematic, but more importantly ultimately very wrong, view. Cause while math is obviously following from axioms and is a study of part of human thinking in a bounded progression made by theorems through the axioms, physics and other such sciences are trying to account for objects which by virtue of being by themselves not tied (outside of us) with our realm of thinking are inevitably just to be translated in some manner of our thinking. Ie what a human views as 'movement' or 'shape' or other parameters there does not have to be actually a good translation or account of the always external and not dependent inherently to human point of view, object and phenomena tied to it.

As noted it seems that Aristotle first pushed to that direction. It obviously is not mere coincidence that the notion of a continuum is a very famous aristotelian invention, and exactly set to move interest away from the eleatic and platonic (and socratic) focus on what a system of thought itself is.
Aristotle cared far more about how to set a way to account for physical phenomena, and most of the current science orders get their names from the ones he came up with in his works.
 
A serious issue with the current/popular view on science, is that while:
A) Science does not include (rightly due to the limitations) fields which are either far less bounded or abstract by definition
B) Science has no issue viewing natural/material phenomena-cored examinations as more scientific than bounded-axiom flowing ones like math.

In my view this is a very problematic, but more importantly ultimately very wrong, view. Cause while math is obviously following from axioms and is a study of part of human thinking in a bounded progression made by theorems through the axioms, physics and other such sciences are trying to account for objects which by virtue of being by themselves not tied (outside of us) with our realm of thinking are inevitably just to be translated in some manner of our thinking. Ie what a human views as 'movement' or 'shape' or other parameters there does not have to be actually a good translation or account of the always external and not dependent inherently to human point of view, object and phenomena tied to it.

As noted it seems that Aristotle first pushed to that direction. It obviously is not mere coincidence that the notion of a continuum is a very famous aristotelian invention, and exactly set to move interest away from the eleatic and platonic (and socratic) focus on what a system of thought itself is.
Aristotle cared far more about how to set a way to account for physical phenomena, and most of the current science orders get their names from the ones he came up with in his works.

Well, that plus without math physicists are just a bunch of guys standing around saying 'yep, things fall every time'.
 
^Ok, but i think we will do better if we have a less polemic-driven tone, so let me just note that the thread is exactly about how some uni degrees are really BS, and why it got to be that way.

Hm, wait.
 
I wasn't trying to pick a fight. Math is just the basic language of science. Without math there is neither physics nor economics. So when you bring up math as a potential 'non-science' it strikes me as odd, because I don't think any scientist would suggest that.

There are some who would exclude the social sciences. There are even a few in the 'physical' sciences that may look a little sideways on the "natural" (in this case meaning biology, anthropology, et al) sciences. There is undoubtedly a somewhat blurry boundary between sciences and engineering. But I think everyone recognizes that while math isn't exactly a science in itself it is pretty much the core of every science there is.
 
I wasn't trying to pick a fight. Math is just the basic language of science. Without math there is neither physics nor economics. So when you bring up math as a potential 'non-science' it strikes me as odd, because I don't think any scientist would suggest that.

There are some who would exclude the social sciences. There are even a few in the 'physical' sciences that may look a little sideways on the "natural" (in this case meaning biology, anthropology, et al) sciences. There is undoubtedly a somewhat blurry boundary between sciences and engineering. But I think everyone recognizes that while math isn't exactly a science in itself it is pretty much the core of every science there is.

(i was joking :D 'those degrees are 'bs' was the pun ;) - it is not like i would attack you anyway ;) ).
 
(i was joking :D 'those degrees are 'bs' was the pun ;) - it is not like i would attack you anyway ;) ).

Nor I you...and I did get the pun. But it did get me thinking that this 'what is science and what is not' question does relate to the 'degree with value' issue. The 'greater vs lesser degree' debate leaves me mostly on the sidelines.

I've always operated from the view that all a degree tells me is that someone was willing to sit through and able to pay for X additional years of education, and that applies equally to pretty much all degrees. Now, that is useful information. I know I am hiring somebody with some proven mental discipline and general ambition. But I've never met someone with a degree in 'prepared for the exact job at hand', so from a practical standpoint they are all the same to me.
 
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