Best World Leader.

The military took out a great many innocent people, and their tactics included murdering the relatives of suspected communists, burning their villages, etc. Soeharto was in charge at that point, and actively encouraged the purges, even though he did very little personal direction.

Yeah I know it did that. It was fairly endemic in most countries after an attempted coup attempt [or whatever it was].

Yes, corruption's a given, but Soeharto excelled at it. Just because it's a given in Indonesia, doesn't mean he doesn't lose points for going along with it, particularly when it damages his ability to run the country. After all, aid packages could be much better spent on infrastructure than Soeharto's wife's wardrobe.

The old joke that the most corrupt people are sitting on the anti-corruption commission holds. Sure the money would have been better used, that's a given, but the corruption did not prejudice the survival of the state, or significantly harm it. He got away with $12 billion US or so in the entirety of his reign, how much did he get alone from the Yanks?

I agree with you there. Just don't think he qualifies as great. Successful, and relatively good for his country, compared to what came before and after, but he wasn't spectacularly good at his job.

In a massively ethnically diverse state with little loyalty to the central government, and with little shared culture. The simple fact that the nation survived as a sole entity, and can now progress towards democracy and a well functioning one is a marvel unto itself. I personally think he was spectacularly successful in a great many respects, simply to have kept the state together was a monumental effort. He's not the best world leader ever, but he would be close to the top of post colonial leaders of a colonial state.
 
Timur Leng
The great administrator of Athens I think his name is Pericles but im not sure.
and Seleumon(spelling?)
 
Timur Leng
The great administrator of Athens I think his name is Pericles but im not sure.
and Seleumon(spelling?)
Timur Leng, or Lenk, or probably half a dozen other variations.
Pericles, yep.
And I think you mean Suleiman the Magnificent. Either that, or King Solomon.
 
Dude was overrated. I don't much like him. You may have noticed.
Pericles was a talented leader. Not as good as people think, granted, but still more than able.
 
There was the whole keeping Athens from being occupied by Sparta thing, at the end of that little war over Boeotia. Also, his decisions vis a vis the war, if reported accurately, were all the correct ones. Athens went against them, in a totally brilliant strategy. His great mistake appears to have been in underestimating Sparta's resolve. They certainly continued the war past his three-year estimate.

Of course, I've only read Thucydides, who certainly overhypes him. Maybe other sources differ.
 
There was the whole keeping Athens from being occupied by Sparta thing, at the end of that little war over Boeotia.
...by giving up Boeotia and Megara, a gigantic concession, and bribing the Spartans. A tremendous political and military defeat doesn't really earn him a high up spot in my book. :p
Sharwood said:
Also, his decisions vis a vis the war, if reported accurately, were all the correct ones. Athens went against them, in a totally brilliant strategy. His great mistake appears to have been in underestimating Sparta's resolve. They certainly continued the war past his three-year estimate.

Of course, I've only read Thucydides, who certainly overhypes him. Maybe other sources differ.
Thucydides does overhype him indeed...that funeral oration is probably the only part of his career that I've any regard for. His Athenian grand strategy was novel: that doesn't make it any good. Spending virtually all of the Athenian treasury, plus the sizable prewar surplus, on a siege of Potidaea, a useless colony in northern Greece, and on inconclusive naval maneuvers and raids, wasn't about to work; besides, his plan would have collapsed entirely if not for Phormio's victories off Naupactus. And then the other side of the coin is, he saw Attic production ruined for years, with a plague breaking out among all those people crammed into a tight space behind the Long Walls, and Athens' only real ally at the time, the small polis of Plataea, was left high and dry for the Boeotians and Spartans to capture and raze.
 
...by giving up Boeotia and Megara, a gigantic concession, and bribing the Spartans. A tremendous political and military defeat doesn't really earn him a high up spot in my book. :p
If I remember correctly, he didn't want Boeotia and Megara in the first place, and nor should he have. Megara was useful to Athens, so you can make an argument for it, but Boeotia was never going to be anything but trouble.

Thucydides does overhype him indeed...that funeral oration is probably the only part of his career that I've any regard for. His Athenian grand strategy was novel: that doesn't make it any good. Spending virtually all of the Athenian treasury, plus the sizable prewar surplus, on a siege of Potidaea, a useless colony in northern Greece, and on inconclusive naval maneuvers and raids, wasn't about to work; besides, his plan would have collapsed entirely if not for Phormio's victories off Naupactus. And then the other side of the coin is, he saw Attic production ruined for years, with a plague breaking out among all those people crammed into a tight space behind the Long Walls, and Athens' only real ally at the time, the small polis of Plataea, was left high and dry for the Boeotians and Spartans to capture and raze.
You obviously remember considerably more of that book than I do. You can't really blame him for the plague though. Potidaea was a rather sizeable stupidity, yes. As I said, his mistake regarding the raids and hiding behind the walls was an underestimation of Spartan resolve. Given war, they were the correct decisions. Although he should have established a sizeable base in the Pelopponesse, same as the Spartans later did in Attica, and focused more on weakening Sparta than attacking Spartan allies. I believe much of that took place after his death though.

Still, I think he was a good leader, although I certainly wouldn't put him in the 'great' category. He made his mistakes, and is certainly overrated, but he led Athens in its golden age, and was an able administrator. In warfare, he was only so-so, but if he had have fought the way the people wanted to fight, well, Athens would have lost a hell of a lot sooner.
 
If I remember correctly, he didn't want Boeotia and Megara in the first place, and nor should he have. Megara was useful to Athens, so you can make an argument for it, but Boeotia was never going to be anything but trouble.
Depends on whether Athens was going to be a thalassocracy or a real empire. Boeotians aren't fiercely independent if you know how to treat them.
Sharwood said:
You can't really blame him for the plague though.
Ignorance of the law is no excuse. :p
Sharwood said:
As I said, his mistake regarding the raids and hiding behind the walls was an underestimation of Spartan resolve. Given war, they were the correct decisions. Although he should have established a sizeable base in the Pelopponesse, same as the Spartans later did in Attica, and focused more on weakening Sparta than attacking Spartan allies.
The helots and the Peloponnese were the key. Demosthenes saw it, and it gave Athens one of its greatest victories in the war, at Pylos-Sphacteria. Alcibiades sort of saw it, when he orchestrated the Argive alliance, but didn't follow through all that well (he had that problem), partly due to political intrigues in Athens itself. Pericles...well, he went on a few raids. Raids weren't enough, as you noted.

The main problem I have with Pericles is that his strategy wasn't fundamentally offensive in any way, shape, or form, and you don't win a war by sitting around doing nothing. Don't let the bad guys have any chance of letting you die for your country: make the other bastard die for his. There weren't any inherent pressures within the Peloponnesian League that would force it to break apart with time, unless Athens did some of the legwork. He didn't recognize that, and had unrealistically high expectations of his enemy's collapse. There was no reason to have these expectations, because the 'peace' party at Sparta was easily marginalized by their excellent political system.
Sharwood said:
I believe much of that took place after his death though.
Yes, under the able direction of Demosthenes, with Alcibiades contributing equal parts genius and bungling.
Sharwood said:
Still, I think he was a good leader, although I certainly wouldn't put him in the 'great' category. He made his mistakes, and is certainly overrated, but he led Athens in its golden age, and was an able administrator. In warfare, he was only so-so, but if he had have fought the way the people wanted to fight, well, Athens would have lost a hell of a lot sooner.
That's why there's a third way. :p I don't think he really ought to be in this thread, but I suppose he was competent enough. He gets a lot of credit for a golden age that wasn't really his making, and was definitely inferior to his two predecessors at the Athenian helm, Cimon and Themistocles. But at the same time, he wasn't a total failure.
 
I'm just gunna' go ahead and say it now...

Barack Obama (ok... maybe not THE best, but definately up there)



PS-I'm telling you now, don't try to argue with Dachs and Greek history.... just a warning... I remember what happened to me, and I'm not even sure he was IN that argument :P
 
I'm just gunna' go ahead and say it now...

Barack Obama (ok... maybe not THE best, but definately up there)



PS-I'm telling you now, don't try to argue with Dachs and Greek history.... just a warning... I remember what happened to me, and I'm not even sure he was IN that argument :P
I don't argue with him on facts, just opinions derived therefrom. I'm well-aware Dachs is actually Flint from the Star Trek episode Requiem for Methuselah, and was in Greece at the time all this took place.
 
Alaric I King of the Visigoths (c.370 - 410) A great leader he displayed great intelligence, honesty and proved himself to be a great military mind. Searching for new homelands for his people while fleeing from present day Bulgaria from the Huns he would actually become the reason the Western Roman Empire began to decline. Having made a deal with one of the high ranking officials in the government Alaric was convinced that he would be able to settle his people within Roman Territory (in I believe the province of Norcium?) However this official would be later assassinated and the deal fall apart. Feeling betrayed by the Emperor and seeing the vulnerability of Rome which had been left mostly undefended due to conquests in distant lands Alaric marched his army 30,000 strong on the city. Emperor Honorious was indecisive and due to this and bad advisors his decisions would ultimately lead to Alaric sacking the city (which also marked the begin of the decline of Western Rome). Alaric died several months later having been unsuccesful in finding a new homeland for his people however his brother who would succeed him would settle his people in modern day France and Spain. Alaric is glorified for bringing the Roman Empire to it's knees.
 
considering that the Huns only had approximately 5000 men army and the entire population of the vandals is estimated at 60000-80000 poeple, i have a difficult time believing Alaric could have an army of 30000 under his command.
 
considering that the Huns only had approximately 5000 men army
This isn't really accurate. Besides, one must take into account the fact that the Huns had a large number of subject peoples upon which to draw. 50,000 is a fair estimate, though for the Gaul campaign it was probably a little higher.
philippe said:
i have a difficult time believing Alaric could have an army of 30000 under his command.
He had anywhere from 30,000 to 40,000 men under his command in 410. From the combination of the Tervingi and Greuthungi, there were perhaps 20,000-25,000 warriors in his 'Visigothic' supergroup before the Italian campaign started; survivors from Radagaisus' horde and escaped slaves brought it up to 40,000 in 409. Alaric certainly had enough men to blockade the city of Rome effectively enough, since Honorius' 409 attempt to sneak in a 6,000 man garrison failed miserably, with only a hundred of them getting through the Gothic lines.
 
This isn't really accurate. Besides, one must take into account the fact that the Huns had a large number of subject peoples upon which to draw. 50,000 is a fair estimate, though for the Gaul campaign it was probably a little higher.

I asked my professor what the number was becuase i was curious and he claimed 5000.

He had anywhere from 30,000 to 40,000 men under his command in 410. From the combination of the Tervingi and Greuthungi, there were perhaps 20,000-25,000 warriors in his 'Visigothic' supergroup before the Italian campaign started; survivors from Radagaisus' horde and escaped slaves brought it up to 40,000 in 409. Alaric certainly had enough men to blockade the city of Rome effectively enough, since Honorius' 409 attempt to sneak in a 6,000 man garrison failed miserably, with only a hundred of them getting through the Gothic lines.

are you sure the women and children aren't counted in? It's not like the goths said to their spouses: wait here, brb.
 
I asked my professor what the number was becuase i was curious and he claimed 5000.
Might be the number of purely Hunnic fighters, though I am mystified as to how he got it. We don't have adequate sources on that.
philippe said:
are you sure the women and children aren't counted in? It's not like the goths said to their spouses: wait here, brb.
Well, I have Heather here, who is theoretically an expert on the barbarians of late antiquity, who specifically says that these were warriors that he's counting. It's not particularly unbelievable, and is in fact far lower than the number Zosimus gives (Zosimus being one of the more unreliable chroniclers of the era); for example, our boy Z says that the number of fighting leftovers from Radagaisus' horde was ~30,000, which he probably confused with the number of men in the original force Alaric led into Italy (number given by Olympiodorus of Thebes).

After all, you're going to need a pretty enormous number of combatants and associated noncombatants to be able to wander your way through Illyricum and Italy to southern France. A number lower than ~30,000 wouldn't be able to occupy Italy all that well (especially considering the large field army Stilicho's and Honorius' regime kept back to defend the peninsula, Italocentric as they were), and certainly wouldn't have lasted through attrition to be able to shift the balance in the 410s and 420s fighting in Spain, fighting as foederati on the Roman side.
 
It's probably Augustus or someone predictable like that.

But my gut wants to go with T. G. Masaryk of Czechoslovakia.
 
I think Phillipos II of Macedon deserves a shout out. The man came to the throne in absolutely the worst possible time. The former king, Perdikkas, and Phillip's army, newly trained in his theories learned from Epaminondas, were completely annihilated in Illyria, Athens was attempting to reassert its power in the Chalcidice and Pydna, Thracians pressing in from the North, and Thessalians making border skirmishes in the South just for fun. With that to work with, he systematically paid off, bested in battle, or outright tricked every single one of his opponents, constructed a coherent war machine out of a multi-ethnic empire and traditionally independent-minded peoples, unified Greece, and in every way, shape, and form, set Alexandros up for the greatness he went on to achieve. When you read Il Principe and daydream about all the great and terrible things you could do if you ever got the chance to do anything Machiavelli talked about, you're thinking about Phillippos II of Macedon.
 
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