Simon, I know you've said you have the Aussie side of things covered, but I couldn't resist putting in my 10 cents because some of the issues you raise are of great interest and things I feel strongly about.
The way in which countries develop foreign policy, and particularly Australia
in relation to East Timor and Indonesia. Let me say at the outset that I think the task of developing and implementing foreign policy can be excruciatingly difficult and one, quite often, where the least bad option is the only choice and the benefit of hindsight is not an available tool. The case of Australia and it's policy towards Indonesia and East Timor makes an interesting study.
Following WW2 and the expulsion of the Dutch from Indonesia, Australia's 'official' policy toward Indonesia was to support de-colonization, which from memory (I'm sure you'll correct me if I'm wrong) included the fraudulent incorporation (under UN auspices), by Indonesia, of Dutch West Papua. This should have provided a warning to Australia, that under Sukarno, Indonesia was intent on expansion and hence it's 'konfrontasi' with Malaysia and Singapore which lead to Australia (along with Britain and others) fighting an undeclared war with Indonesia. This was happening against the backdrop of the Cold War and growing Australian (and American) concern at Sukarno's relationship with Communist China and with the Indonesian Communist Party.
When Suharto replaced Sukarno he was viewed by Australia and other Western Countries as a valuable ally against Communism in Asia, the fact that his methods were brutal and corrupt (and as was to become apparent later, also an expansionist) was something that Australian Cold War 'realpolitiks' could overlook (as did most of the Western World when it came to brutal anti-communist regimes).
The big dilemma for Australia (and it's ally the USA) and Indonesia, arose when the leftist government in Portugal decided to relinquish control of it's colony, East Timor, with the same incompetence and lack of care that was the Portuguese hallmark in East Timor for 500 years. The subsequent civil war and victory of (the leftist) FRETILIN in East Timor represented a major threat (as perceived at the time) to not only Australia and other regional non-communist countries but the West generally - it was feared the Soviets (FRETILIN=communist=Soviet proxy) would use Dili as a naval base to threaten the important shipping lanes passing through the Malacca Straits and use East Timor as a base to destabilise neighbouring countries.
What followed, IMO, was one of the darkest hours for Australian foreign policy and certainly far worse for the East Timorese people. The subsequent Indonesian invasion of East Timor was almost certainly carried out with the support and approval of the United States, and hence left Australia little choice (I am probably being too kind to Australia's leaders and policy makers here) but to fall in step and accept a 'fait accompli'. If turning a blind eye to the fate of the East Timorese wasn't bad enough (albeit understandable in a realpolitik geo-political sense) the cringing cowardice of the Australian Government over the murder of 5 Australian journalists at Balibo by Indonesian troops was inexcusable.
Here was the classic dilemma for a middle size power like Australia particularly with the end of the Cold War. Indonesia was (and is) a nation that Australia must develop a working (if not close) relationship with and yet it was ruled by a brutal dictator who ruthlessly annexed East Timor into Indonesia. It is at this point (end of the Cold War) in Australia's relationship with Indonesia that the biggest mistakes have been made.
Australia's policy of forging closer ties with Indonesia was ill-considered for a number of reasons (yes, hindsight is a wonderful thing). The Cold War imperatives no longer applied and it is still difficult to understand why Australia needed to:
- be the only nation(?) to recognize Indonesia's annexation of East Timor
- negotiate the Timor Gap Treaty for the division of resource spoils with Indonesia
- help Indonesia train it's Kompassus (spelling?) killers
- secretly negotiate and then sign a mutual defense pact with Suharto
- and worst (by along way) consistently ignore the massacres and gross human rights abuses by the Indonesians in East Timor (and elsewhere in the archipelago) and actually try to defend them in the international arena.
All this so Australia would be considered 'Asian' (ok, I admit there were some other considerations - such as trade - but I'm on a roll) by a motley collection of people that pass as leaders of the ASEAN group of nations!
The main problem with pursuing these international policies (quite apart from moral issues) was that it opened up a huge gap between official Australian Government policy and what ordinary Australians felt on these issues. Successive Australian Governments of different political persuasions continually under-estimated ordinary Australian's:
- distaste for the brutal and corrupt Suharto regime
- unwillingness to prove our 'Asian' bona fides to the Indonesians (or anyone else) by forging closer ties with Indonesia and sacrificing the people of East Timor
- sympathy for the plight of the East Timorese and a feeling of debt to the East Timorese for helping Australian soldiers during WW2 at great cost to themselves
It is tempting to think that the Asian financial meltdown provided Australia's leaders and policy thinkers with a window of opportunity to right past wrongs and improve the lot of the East Timorese by exerting financial leverage on Indonesia (suprisingly Australia's GDP is greater than all the ASEAN nations combined). It must have come as a huge shock to these same people when (then Indonesian President) Habibie announced he would give the East Timorese a referendum to determine whether they wished to remain part of Indonesia.
Once this exercise in democracy for the Timorese began the fundamental flaws in Australia's past policy began to haunt the Australian Government and principally the previous disregard for the views of the Australian people. If the Australian Prime Minister had not vigorously lobbied it's great and powerful friends (principally the USA) - to exert pressure on Indonesia to allow the Australian led INTERFET force go into East Timor to end the bloodshed - John Howard (the Australian PM) would have reaped the bitter political harvest that his predessors sowed quarter of a century before. Put bluntly, he and his government would have been political (and possibly literally) dead ducks!
Politicians and policy makers cannot afford to move to far from the views of the electorate on foreign policy considerations or eventually it will catch up with them, even in a country as apathetic on such issues as Australia.
My apologies to one and all for the length of this but as I said it is something I feel strongly about.
Btw Simon, I'm sure you are well versed about these matters, my long winded explanations were for the benefit of those that might not be as knowledgable about these issues. If you have time I'd be interested to hear your views (and anyone else) on these issues and good luck with your paper!
OK I ADMIT IT!!!! This isn't really just a post for the sake of knowledge; I am actually in the throes of typing a paper on the topic, and thought some new perspectives might be interesting
