Comparing Foreign Policy

Simon Darkshade

Mysterious City of Gold
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I was just thinking about this matter and thought it would be nice to pick some wisdom from other brains on the issue of comparing the foreign policy making process of several countries, say Australia, Britain and the US.

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OK I ADMIT IT!!!! This isn't really just a post for the sake of knowledge; I am actually in the throes of typing a paper on the topic, and thought some new perspectives might be interesting
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Here is the actual question:
"It has been argued that unlike other forms of policymaking, the making of foreign policy is the result of the need to mediate between domestic and foreign pressures.

Furthermore foreign policymaking calls for a greater amount of secrecy, which seems to contradict the openness of democratic politics.

Is this the case for Australia, Britain and the US or do they have very different experiences in the way they produce foreign policies?"

This way, while I am typing for the next 24 hours straight ( hey, I like to work in blocks), I can take a little peak at Civfanatics, and still stay on topic
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I don't want or need any old papers, as plagiarism ain't my bag, but if anyone here knows a bit aboot US or British foreign policymaking ( I can handle the Aussie stuff), specifically examples of events which demonstrate the combination of external and internal pressures, I'll be glad to hear it.

AND, I'm not doing this out of laziness or because of intense procrastination; I have about 25 books next to me, and have read them all, and lots of journals and online stuff. I just reckon there might be some nice ideas spinning aboot out here.

Well, I'll post this baby, and then get back to work. East Timor and the Suez, here I come!!

Bork Bork Bork! Urski Birksi!

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Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you.
- N.S.Khrushchev
 
A clear difference in exposure and therefore policy between the USA & Western Europe, is with regard to strategic missile defense. Western Europe feel more threatened by the possibility of convectional war, because the are on the front line with the CIS. Thus they cling to Mutual Assured Destruction, accepting a small increase in the risk of strategic nuclear war to reduce the risk of conventional war. The USA with its ocean barrier and other factors nearly eliminated the possibility of conventional attack on its home land is of course more interested in reducing the risk of nuclear war and provide defenses against it should it occur.

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Gauis Mucius Scaevola Sinistra
Pontificator Pedanticus
Older, richer, and wiser than you.
Did I mention that I love the spellchecker?
 
Yeah, good point. On this issue, US is looking more towards domestic pressure (domestic security) than the Europeans for whom this is an affair motivated by its impact on their foreign affairs.
Thanks for that Lefty
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That idea could help fill up half a paragraph at some point.
I think, however US is aiming NMD at the PRC rather than Russia, but both will be affected.

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Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you.
- N.S.Khrushchev
 
I'm hardly very conversant on the issue, but another interesting footnote might be Japan's post-war approach to its foreign policy.

Increased foreign aid, participation in peacekeeping missions and a general expansion of Japan's military seems to have been motivated by calls from other countries for Japan to 'pull its own weight', rather than by mainly domestic pressures. (Of course not from some of its still-bitter neighbours such as China, Korea, etc)

Anyway, this strikes me as the exact opposite of what usually happens in other countries.
 
What about the Kyoto treaty upon which Clinton agreed then Bush declared it was unfeasable. That's another point US and Europe disagree on.
That's why there are so many riots here in Europe, (Goteborg for example)

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Ni !
 
The Kyoto treaty was dead in the USA even before Clinton signed it. While being drafted the US senate voted a resolution 95 to 0 rejecting key provisions of it. Clinton (another example of his dishonesty) signed it knowing the it COULD NEVER BE ADOPTED in the USA (and indeed, never even sent it to the senate) as a cynical publicity ploy. It was dead before Bush even began to run for the presidency. Most everyone in the US knows this, why do you Euro twits not?

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Gauis Mucius Scaevola Sinistra
Pontificator Pedanticus
Older, richer, and wiser than you.
Did I mention that I love the spellchecker?
 
Simon, I know you've said you have the Aussie side of things covered, but I couldn't resist putting in my 10 cents because some of the issues you raise are of great interest and things I feel strongly about.

The way in which countries develop foreign policy, and particularly Australia
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in relation to East Timor and Indonesia. Let me say at the outset that I think the task of developing and implementing foreign policy can be excruciatingly difficult and one, quite often, where the least bad option is the only choice and the benefit of hindsight is not an available tool. The case of Australia and it's policy towards Indonesia and East Timor makes an interesting study.

Following WW2 and the expulsion of the Dutch from Indonesia, Australia's 'official' policy toward Indonesia was to support de-colonization, which from memory (I'm sure you'll correct me if I'm wrong) included the fraudulent incorporation (under UN auspices), by Indonesia, of Dutch West Papua. This should have provided a warning to Australia, that under Sukarno, Indonesia was intent on expansion and hence it's 'konfrontasi' with Malaysia and Singapore which lead to Australia (along with Britain and others) fighting an undeclared war with Indonesia. This was happening against the backdrop of the Cold War and growing Australian (and American) concern at Sukarno's relationship with Communist China and with the Indonesian Communist Party.

When Suharto replaced Sukarno he was viewed by Australia and other Western Countries as a valuable ally against Communism in Asia, the fact that his methods were brutal and corrupt (and as was to become apparent later, also an expansionist) was something that Australian Cold War 'realpolitiks' could overlook (as did most of the Western World when it came to brutal anti-communist regimes).

The big dilemma for Australia (and it's ally the USA) and Indonesia, arose when the leftist government in Portugal decided to relinquish control of it's colony, East Timor, with the same incompetence and lack of care that was the Portuguese hallmark in East Timor for 500 years. The subsequent civil war and victory of (the leftist) FRETILIN in East Timor represented a major threat (as perceived at the time) to not only Australia and other regional non-communist countries but the West generally - it was feared the Soviets (FRETILIN=communist=Soviet proxy) would use Dili as a naval base to threaten the important shipping lanes passing through the Malacca Straits and use East Timor as a base to destabilise neighbouring countries.

What followed, IMO, was one of the darkest hours for Australian foreign policy and certainly far worse for the East Timorese people. The subsequent Indonesian invasion of East Timor was almost certainly carried out with the support and approval of the United States, and hence left Australia little choice (I am probably being too kind to Australia's leaders and policy makers here) but to fall in step and accept a 'fait accompli'. If turning a blind eye to the fate of the East Timorese wasn't bad enough (albeit understandable in a realpolitik geo-political sense) the cringing cowardice of the Australian Government over the murder of 5 Australian journalists at Balibo by Indonesian troops was inexcusable.

Here was the classic dilemma for a middle size power like Australia particularly with the end of the Cold War. Indonesia was (and is) a nation that Australia must develop a working (if not close) relationship with and yet it was ruled by a brutal dictator who ruthlessly annexed East Timor into Indonesia. It is at this point (end of the Cold War) in Australia's relationship with Indonesia that the biggest mistakes have been made.

Australia's policy of forging closer ties with Indonesia was ill-considered for a number of reasons (yes, hindsight is a wonderful thing). The Cold War imperatives no longer applied and it is still difficult to understand why Australia needed to:

- be the only nation(?) to recognize Indonesia's annexation of East Timor

- negotiate the Timor Gap Treaty for the division of resource spoils with Indonesia

- help Indonesia train it's Kompassus (spelling?) killers

- secretly negotiate and then sign a mutual defense pact with Suharto

- and worst (by along way) consistently ignore the massacres and gross human rights abuses by the Indonesians in East Timor (and elsewhere in the archipelago) and actually try to defend them in the international arena.

All this so Australia would be considered 'Asian' (ok, I admit there were some other considerations - such as trade - but I'm on a roll) by a motley collection of people that pass as leaders of the ASEAN group of nations!

The main problem with pursuing these international policies (quite apart from moral issues) was that it opened up a huge gap between official Australian Government policy and what ordinary Australians felt on these issues. Successive Australian Governments of different political persuasions continually under-estimated ordinary Australian's:

- distaste for the brutal and corrupt Suharto regime

- unwillingness to prove our 'Asian' bona fides to the Indonesians (or anyone else) by forging closer ties with Indonesia and sacrificing the people of East Timor

- sympathy for the plight of the East Timorese and a feeling of debt to the East Timorese for helping Australian soldiers during WW2 at great cost to themselves

It is tempting to think that the Asian financial meltdown provided Australia's leaders and policy thinkers with a window of opportunity to right past wrongs and improve the lot of the East Timorese by exerting financial leverage on Indonesia (suprisingly Australia's GDP is greater than all the ASEAN nations combined). It must have come as a huge shock to these same people when (then Indonesian President) Habibie announced he would give the East Timorese a referendum to determine whether they wished to remain part of Indonesia.

Once this exercise in democracy for the Timorese began the fundamental flaws in Australia's past policy began to haunt the Australian Government and principally the previous disregard for the views of the Australian people. If the Australian Prime Minister had not vigorously lobbied it's great and powerful friends (principally the USA) - to exert pressure on Indonesia to allow the Australian led INTERFET force go into East Timor to end the bloodshed - John Howard (the Australian PM) would have reaped the bitter political harvest that his predessors sowed quarter of a century before. Put bluntly, he and his government would have been political (and possibly literally) dead ducks!

Politicians and policy makers cannot afford to move to far from the views of the electorate on foreign policy considerations or eventually it will catch up with them, even in a country as apathetic on such issues as Australia.

My apologies to one and all for the length of this but as I said it is something I feel strongly about.

Btw Simon, I'm sure you are well versed about these matters, my long winded explanations were for the benefit of those that might not be as knowledgable about these issues. If you have time I'd be interested to hear your views (and anyone else) on these issues and good luck with your paper!
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yeah, you got it fairly close to the mark, andy. That is virtually what I wrote on the matter, but took the slant that this illustrated the changing balance in priorities(domestic vs foreign realpolitik) in our foreign policymaking. In other words, relating it back to the question
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, and adding in copious amounts of supercilious verbosity in true academic fashion
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You hit the nail on the head. This shows how Australia has never yet had, and oesn't look like getting in the forseeable future, its own foreign policy.

Keep em rolling in people, I am still at the grind stone.

Here's one: Know any examples of US foreign policy making that illustrate the mediation between domestic and external pressures?
I'm already using Kosovo, NMD, Kyoto, support of Israel, and maybe Grenada.

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Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you.
- N.S.Khrushchev
 
YES!!!!!!!!!!
I have almost finished the little bastard. Only just under 1000 words to do, and then fixing the copious footnotes. Caloo, Callay, Oh Frabjous Joy!!!
Thanks for the assistance to those who helped
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Now, I can go out 2morrow night and try to break Dylan Thomas' drinking record: 36 double Irish whiskies in an hour.
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Of course, he did die afterwards.

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Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you.
- N.S.Khrushchev
 
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