Day of Infamy

[privatehudson]

Might have been a problem sinking a Japanese carrier with one of them

 

[pawpaw]

Originally posted by privatehudson
Might have been a problem sinking a Japanese carrier with one of them

i think they recalled all the subs back to pearl till they fixed the problem

 

[privatehudson]

Did that take long?

 

[YNCS]

Originally posted by Constantine
Wasn't a warning sent to the Philipines that Japanese attacks were expected there not at Pearl?

On November 27, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King, sent the following message to CINCPAC (Commander in Chief Pacific, in Pearl Harbor) and CINCAF (Commander in Chief Asian Fleet, in Manila, Philippines):

From CNO
To CINCAF, CINCPAC
Info CINCLANT, SPENAVO

This dispatch to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai[land] or Kra Peninsula [in Malaya] or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasked assigned in WPL46. Inform district and army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPENAVO inform British. CONUS districts, Guam, Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage.

NOTES: CINCLANT is Commander in Chief Atlantic. SPENAVO was the Special European Naval Office, USN liaison with the Royal Navy. CONUS is Continential United States. WPL46 was the War PLan for an attack by Japan.

So 10 days before the attack, Washington was convinced that a war with Japan was going to happen. The appropriate commanders in the Pacific were informed. However, the crystal ball wasn't good enough to show an attack at Pearl Harbor.

Source: Gordon W. Prange et al. The Verdict of History: Pearl Harbor. New York: Penguin Books, 1991. Pp 651-652.

Edited to give source.

 

[onejayhawk]

IIRC they replaced the torpedo firing pins, with pins machined from damaged aircraft propellors. Hard, lightweight, etc. The torpedo steering mechanisms were simplified, so that the depth of the run was fairly constant. The elaborate depth guage system had the depth running up and down more than 50 feet. The rudders were problematic as well. the Tang sank herself because the rudder on the torpedo stuck hard to port,, causing the torpedo to swim a circle, which happened to have its mother in it.

Torpedoes got a lot of Navy men very upset.

I personally tend to give credence to the story that the high command expected an attack, or at least suspected the possibility enough to sail the carriers for no appearant reason. Remember this is the same command staff that sniffed out Midway 6 months later. If it was playing a longshot that sent the carriers out, I would not want to sit in at the table. USNaval luck was very good in retrospect.

J

 

[privatehudson]

Though that could be checked through knowledge of the location and intent of the 3 carriers I imagine, ie if they went into dry dock in San Diego some 2 months before the attack or similar it's less likely they suspected, but if they simply sailed out of Pearl a week or so before on some routine mission that wasn't absolutely needed....

Edit: After a little browsing:

Lexington left Pearl on the 5th December to augment the Midway Island defences

Saratoga had just entering San Diego after a period in dry dock in Washington state

Enterprise was on it's return journey to Pearl and some of it's planes were caught in the attack when they flew to the ground bases prior to it.

 

[CIVPhilzilla]

Originally posted by YNCS
The most enduring World War II conspiracy theory contends that President Roosevelt and sundry other national political and military leaders "knew" that the Japanese were about to attack Pearl Harbor and, indeed, even provoked the attack. There are numerous variations on the theme. For example, one suggests that Winston Churchill "knew" but refused to tell, so that the U.S. would come to Britain's rescue against Germany. These theories all all based on "evidence," often "new" evidence which has "just come to light." Unfortunately, when all this "new" evidence is examined (which always turns out to be information of little value or relevance long available to the public, if it cared to inquire), the most charitable thing that can be said is "not proven."

Some of the theories about the attack rank with Elvis sightings. There's one contention that the attack was actually carried out by British aircraft based on one of the outlying islands of the Hawaii group!

In fact, the disaster at Pearl Harbor was the result of a lot of audacity, planning and luck on the part of the Japanese and numerous blunders by many American political and military leaders, with no particular person being criminally responsible. As historian Gordon Prange said, "There's enough blame for everyone."

I have heard this too. The government knowing about this attack before hand. Some evidence shows lots of ships and aircraft on pointless missions. Anyway Japan felt the reprasle of that attack pretty badly.

 

[Case]

Originally posted by pawpaw

i think they recalled all the subs back to pearl till they fixed the problem

Nope - the Navy refused to admit that there was any problem with the torpedos until early 1943. When the problem was finally admitted to, the sub skippers were told to stop using the (incredibly) defective magnetic detonators and stick to the (still flawed) contact detectors, using modifed tactics to avoid the worst of the torpedos known problems. From memory, the US subs didn't have properly working torpedos until late 1943 (or early 1944?) and this explains the subs relatively poor performance until that time.

At no stage were patrols canceled due to torpedo problems.

I personally tend to give credence to the story that the high command expected an attack, or at least suspected the possibility enough to sail the carriers for no appearant reason. Remember this is the same command staff that sniffed out Midway 6 months later.

They didn't 'sniff out' the attack on Midway - they knew it was coming thanks to the superhuman efforts of their codebreakers (more then one of whom suffered a breakdown as a result of the strain prior to Midway). Furthermore, much of the staff commanding the Pacific Fleet at the time of Pearl Harbour were long gone by the time of Midway.

Anyway, if they did think an attack was coming, sending two lightly escorted carriers off on individual missions towards the direction any Japanese attack would come from hardly attests to the brilliance of the US Pacific Fleet's staff - as it was, they were probably lucky that the Japanese didn't find and sink at least one of the carriers.

The Allies did fully expect a Japanese attack somewhere in the Pacific, most likely in the East Indies and Philipines, and considerable reinforcements were flowing into those areas in late 1941. Combinded with the allies later sucesses with codebreakring this historical fact seems to have been the basis for the belief that the Allies knew exactly what the Japanese were planning, thereby providing Roosevelt and/or Churchill with the means by which they could enact a Machiavelian plot win the American public's support for the war via the sacrafice of the 'unimportant' battleships of the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour. As is often the case with conspiricy theories, occums razor cuts this to shreds.

 

[Arvln]

Speaking of RN carrier, I found out that USN actually did borrow A carrier from RN in WW 2 for operation in pacific ocean. It was HMS Victorious if I have not mistaken

http://www.fleetairarmarchive.net/Ships/Victorious.html for more information

 

[Sarevok]

sounds interesting...

 

[pomsa]

The US knew that theyw ere going to be attacked during December 1941. They had, in 1931, created a simulation battle plan that they thought the Japanese would use. They even tested the plan, and won easily. The only thing that happened different was that the Japanese attacked 2 and 1/2 hours later.

 

[Mrogreturns]

Originally posted by pomsa
The US knew that theyw ere going to be attacked during December 1941. They had, in 1931, created a simulation battle plan that they thought the Japanese would use. They even tested the plan, and won easily. The only thing that happened different was that the Japanese attacked 2 and 1/2 hours later.

So- it should really be called a "day of tardiness" rather than a "day of infamy"?

 

[pomsa]

I guess. Although, Roosevelt couldn't say that and have the Republicans support him, could he?

 

[Mrogreturns]

Originally posted by pomsa
I guess. Although, Roosevelt couldn't say that and have the Republicans support him, could he?

I always forget the big picture.

 

[pomsa]

Besides, I'm not even sure he knew. Most of the military leaders who authored the plan and ran the exercises were rabidly pro-air power, and a good many of them were court-martialed for disobeying orders that in effect relegated the Air Force to a second-class citizen compared to the Signal Corps

 

[MattII]

Not only were the torpedoes not exploding, they often ran deeper than normal, and the problem continued till september 30 1943. Premature firings were also not unheard of.

 

[yaroslav]

About Pearl Habour it's interesting to see how different appears to have been treated by Western press the surprise attack of Port Arthur by Japanese Empire in 1904, that is similar in spirit to Pearl Habour. In my humble opinion, both are days of infamy...

 

[Sarevok]

that is the traditional Japanese way: attack without a declaration of war.

 

[rilnator]

Originally posted by Sarevok
that is the traditional Japanese way: attack without a declaration of war.

Always the best way to attack though.

 

[Sarevok]

I agree.