1. Actually hitler had a much better idea of where to strike then the generals. He was once quoted saying his generals knew nothing of the economy side of warfare, and he was correct. The generals wanted to take moscow and leningrad since they thought their capture would knock russia out of the war and force a peace with a large gain for germany. This was not the case. The ukraine and other areas farther east in that direction held valuable resources that the germans needed to continue their war effort and deny them to the soviets.
Actually, you are completely wrong. Hitler's big ideas included attacking refusing to allow retreats, not allowing a breakout from Stalingrad and expending massive amounts of resources on rounding up Jews and burning villages which should have been put into the front. I think you'll find that it was in fact
Hitler who knew nothing of economics, in the military sense or otherwise. Here is a man who abandoned attacks on the Caucasian oilfields in order to strike at Stalingrad, which was strategically unimportant to the campaign. Also, in case you hadn't noticed, the USSR did just fine with virtually the entire Ukraine in German hands.
Hitler is also NOT the man who suggested the lines of attack be shifted from Moscow and Leningrad in the Ukraine and Caucasus anyway. So claiming he knew where to attack, when he routinely proved his total lack of knowledge on such matters, is very dubious. I challenge you to find anything which suggests Hitler knew a damn thing about military strategy. He had advisors which did, but he had a tendency to listen to people who would agree with him, such as Paulus, rather than people who knew what they were doing, such as Manstein or Guderian. This handicapped him greatly. And that's not even mentioning the various other examples of his military stupidity outside of the Eastern Front, such as the Battle of the Bulge.
2. He DID focus on army group central, even though it was late in the campaign and too late to complete the objectives. He SHOULD have focused on army group south and held his support there the whole time instead of shifting to the north later in the campaign.
What are you basing this on? He focused greatly on Army Group South, a task force which, honestly, shouldn't even have existed. The primary thrust of the German advance was only AGC for about two months, when it should have been the primary force in the East from the beginning. The only theing the AGS accomplished of note was the capture of the Kievan Army Group, which, while impressive on paper, actually enabled the reinforcement of Moscow because it was so time-consuming.
Hitler was a military opportunist, which he proved at Kiev, not a grand strategist. I would liken him to a bull; he'd chase one target when it seemed within reach, but if he saw another he'd change his mind, wasting valuable time and energy in the process. A military leader needs to be more like a wolf; persistent in his pursuit of the more important target.
3. Leningrad starved anyway. Moscow WASNT the strategic prize though.
There was starvation in Leningrad, but the city held out. If Moscow were taken do you really think it would have held on? Especially since Leningrad received supplies across Lake Ladoga throughout the seige? Supplies which it would not have gotten if Moscow had fallen. Also, I've already stated why Moscow was so important.
4. We agree here, except for the push on moscow part.
5. It wasnt soviet incompetence. It was entirely stalin's fault, and the fact that the german generals didnt know how to wage a war, and a few mistakes on hitlers part. I could spend all day listing his mistakes, but i will only list a few.
WHen I said "Soviet incompetence" I was referring to Stalin. Primarily, anyway, though he wasn't the only Soviet leader to make mistakes. Hitler also made more than "a few mistakes." He made dozens, if not
hundreds of military errors throughout his career. The German generals were, for the most part, competent, though few of them were truly great.
a. He refused to believe that Germany had attacked, and gave the order not to return fire if attacked. He thought it could still be solved diplomatically.
b. When he finally realized this would not be solved diplomatically, stalin ordered the armies to ATTACK suwalski and lvov within 48 hours. He also ordered the armies to attack and encircle the german ones. This resulted in the annihilation of most of the armies and equipment on the front.
This is eerily similar to the actions taken by Hitler at Kursk and elsewhere in 1942-43, and in the West in 1944. He even ordered similar actions in North Africa, but Rommel ignored him.
6. I agree with the hitler thing.
7. I also agree with the winter thing, but you are leaving out another thing as well. Spring was not the only time it was muddy. It starts raining ALOT in september, and it basicly becomes all mud in october and some of november until it freezes over. That is why Von Bock delayed operation typhoon until November 15th, in addition to having to rest his troops.
That would be, what, autumn in your hemisphere? I didn't know that, but it doesn't surprise me in the least.
8. This can be debated forever. The month it took for more and better equipment to get there, may have had a benefit, but the extra month may have helped more. In fact, germany had more foces arriving through the entire campaign, although in small numbers. The forces that had arrived in that month of delay would have arrived at the front during the fighting instead, and it is arguable that if they HADNT waited a month, the initial forces would have better success since the soviets would hve been even more unprepared.
Except that Soviet movements in that month actually placed them in a worse position to defend themselves from a German invasion. That's the real clincher in that argument. Otherwise I'd agree with you that the end result was up in the air, but the Soviet movements aided and abetted Germany.
9. I disagree with this. I think hitler should have attacked SOONER, not later. His forces might have been smaller, but so would have been everyone elses. His mistake was accepting the sudetenland, instead of just attacking in '38.
Are you serious? I strongly suggest you read some of my previous threads regarding Germany's economic and military position during the years of Nazi rule. Better yet, read Richard J. Evans' trilogy on the Nazis,
The Coming of the Third Reich,
The Third Reich in Power and
The Third Reich at War. Especially the last two. If Hitler had attacked Czechoslovakia in 1938 the war would have been over before 1940. And not in his favour.
10. They could have had a VERY large effect. The only reason stalin transfered ther troops from the far east, was that his spies had reported that japan was about to attack the usa. If they had decided not to, then stalin would never have transfered the troops. Many here have said that stalin would have traded space for time, but this is not true. Stalin was not like other people. He would never have done that. He had a very unique mind, one that i do not pretend to understand. But judging by his decisions in '41 on the european front, he would have told the forces in the far east to either hold against the japs or die trying. More likely still, he would have told them to attack the japs instead.
Except that those troops in the East had an entirely negligible effect on the war in the West. The battle for Moscow was already decided in favour of Russia before those reinforcements arrived, the Japanese weren't capable of invading Russia in large numbers - as I asked before, what possible reason would they have to invade other than to help the Germans anyway? - and the Russians had spanked them with stunning ease in every border skirmish the two had had recently, leaving them reeling and frightened of tussling with the northwestern neighbour. Japan would have accomplished absolutely NOTHING if it invaded the USSR.
You see, many, including me, believe that he was living in the mindset of the first world war, where weeks could pass instead of hours before any attack or defense was made. This is probably why he ordered them to attack, since he didnt think the germans would come so soon. Therefore, if the japs had attacked, they would ahve pinned down ALOT of divisions and that would have resulted in very bad things against the germans. They would have likely taken moscow and pushed even further in the ukraine, posisbly taking and holding rostov and the area around it.
This is extremely unlikely. Not that Stalin would order a counterattack against the Japanese; while I think he wouldn't have been
quite that stupid, he was capable of such action in a panic. The simple fact is that the Japanese couldn't really accomplish anything except hold down Russian troops, and those same Russian troops were stationed in the East to defend against a postential Japanese attack until mid-November anyway. Moscow was successfully defended without their assistance, and a counterattack was even launched, though prematurely. They certainly sped up the Russian victory over Germany, but they weren't essential to it.
11. That makes more sense.
12. You are still wrong, although not by much. Yes, moscow was an important transport hub and such, but so was leningrad, rostov, kharkov, minsk, and basicly every other major city there. But the thing is, even in those cities the roads were VERY poor. It wouldnt have made much of a difference. Nothing would starve, at least not as much as you make it out as. Basicly the only thing worth taking in moscow was the industries and factories, and those would be moved to the urals if it looked like moscow would fall.
Moscow was the single most important of those transport hubs in all of Russia though. And while roads were important, it was the railroads which were more so. And Moscow was by far the most important hub for those. Eliminate that hub and the supplies elsewhere whither.
13. Actually, most of the lend lease was shipped through iran (which, in addition to iraq, were basicly puppets of the UK) already, and therefore would not have made much of a difference. Very little was shipped to murmansk (probably due to german norwya and the many subs in the area), although some was shipped to archengalesk (i know i mispelled that). Still, most of the shipments went through iran (which was called persia then). Tehren was even used as the metting for the combined chiefs and stalin for a war meteting in '43.
Iran and Iraq were both Axis sympathisers who only switched sides after Anglo-Russian intervention in their affairs. I forgot about Archangelsk. But you are incorrect about the majority being shipped through Iran. Much was, but not the majority. And those supplies shipped through Murmansk and Archangelsk were of higher and more immediate priority in any case. You are also completely wrong about Iran being known as Persia at the time. It hasn't been known as Persia since the early twentieth century.
14. Not really.
15. Cities DONT PROVIDE FOOD. If they did dont you think the allies would have made paris much more of a priority? Instead it forced them to ship in 400 tons of rations(something like that, cant remember the exact stat) every day for the POP of paris. Moscow would ahve been worse. And trust me, and hubs or roads, or admin places would have been bombed flat, either by the germans, or by the soviets in later years.
I don't know what you're on about here. I never said Moscow would provide food, just that it would provide more than the Russian countryside, which was suffering the effects of the scorched earth policy. With the exception of canned goods, of which there was probably a bit, and whatever the Germans could confiscate from the remaining locals, there would be very little food there. It would, of course, be easier to supply troops in a city than scattered across the countryside, which would likely lead to a net increase in the available food for German troops in the area.
You underestimate the survivability of existing administration and logistical systems. Not every building in Moscow would have been destroyed, nor would every road, railroad, vehicle, etc.. These would provide the Germans with residences in which to set up shop, the vehicles and roads with which to link them, and presumably low-level collaborators to continue the day-to-day functions of the city, now under German auspices. Local police forces in occupied nations are an excellent example of the latter. Certainly there would be much destruction in Moscow if it fell, but it would still be better than a bunch of tents in an empty field.
Shelter would have been good whether it was bombed or not. Ruins are good for defense and shelter.
Indeed.
16. And stalin only refused to leave moscow after he deliberated on it for almost a week. If it looked like it would fall, he would certainly leave. He seriously considered abandoning moscow, although he decided against it.
Yes? Again, I don't see what you're disagreeing with me on.
Minor nitpicking here, but Moscow was burned after Napoleon took the city. In fact, he awoke in the Palace and could see the city burning in the night.
Indeed. It's not even certain to this day if the city was burnt by the Russians or if a bunch of drunken French troops managed to light it up.
Anyway, I agree with Lord Baal in almost everything, although I do think he underestimates the German chances of succes. As he says, they almost pulled it off, even though making lot's of stupid decisions. Had they made a... well, normal amount of stupid decisions, they would come even closer to succes. Perhaps close enough.
The Germans never really stood a chance of winning the war though. It's incredible how close they came to defeating the Russians, really, considering how poorly the campaign was planned and executed. They came close, but even the fall of Moscow wouldn't have won them the war. And once Moscow didn't fall, the result was never really in doubt.