History Books!

Without a more concrete example of Hobsbawm's failing in your eyes, I don't see how this conversation can continue. I mean if you view a history text, or Hobsbawm's in particular, as a generic "introduction to all things historical for this place or time period" then they really have to start at square one in every book. But I don't think that's Hobsbawm's aim at all, and I believe he says so in the Preface to the first book, Age of Revolutions. His Long Nineteenth Century series is for people who already have a basic grasp of the events of history, which is why he skips around and focuses on long-term trends rather than the minutia of the event.

It's not that he needs to introduce events, but that he makes grand statements that don't rest on very much explicitly-stated data. To pull an example out from flicking through, he says in The Age of Empire that 'transport was now clearly seen as a crucial element in the class struggle' (in Workers of the World, page 123 in my edition). His evidence for this is a series of British strikes in railways and ports in 1889-90 and the Triple Alliance of striking British workers in 1914. This is in a page (and a section) which treats developments in France, Italy, Spain and Holland as one and the same: there simply must be more to the picture than this. Were the railway workers and dockers in Paris really so revolutionary? Did all British dockers - in Scotland, Ireland, Wales and England - really feel the same way? Is there evidence that this was seen as a matter of class across all of these places? He hasn't actually shown us anyone seeing themselves as fighting a 'class struggle' (as opposed to simply striking for better working conditions) at all, but this is the point he wants to make. I'm willing to believe that he's done his research, but it would be nice to see some of it.

As a broader point, though, history is always a matter of making interpretations based on evidence which doesn't really shout either way - it's entirely possible for two well-informed people to hold contradictory opinions on any number of things. If you're going to talk about (say) the reasons why imperial powers extended across the world in the late 19th century, you need to (I think) raise some of the various explanations that have been suggested, even those with which you disagree. Hobsbawm rarely does this: you'll almost never find a sentence to the effect of 'on the other hand, someone else has suggested this interpretation of the evidence, which also works', even though this is, for nearly all parts of history, happening in scholarship all the time. Admittedly, he's far from the only historian to be guilty of this.
 
Something to prick up your ears:

Franklin Roosevelt held an average of 84 presidential news conferences a year - 14 times the number given by Ronald Reagan and three to four times the output of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush or Barack Obama. Roosevelt charmed the White House press corps to within an inch of its life, leaked big news stories to favored reporters and still made time for writers from obscure trade journals and other who were technically ineligible for press credentials. He nevertheless shunned the Negro press, shutting it out of the White House press corps until the last 12 years of his office

And here's a review of a book telling the story behind it: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/b...0108&nl=bookreview&nlid=61820453&ref=headline

The Defender, How the Legendary Black Newspaper Changed America from the Pullman Porters to Obama by Ethan Michaeli.
 
That book about The Defender is supposed to be pretty good - according to the NPR review I heard yesterday. But one wonders how much white readership it will get.

As for FDR, it's understandable he had so many news conferences. The was a World War going on after all, and he didn't have the modern "Press Secretary" POTUS employs today. The White House was more accessible then than now. (...except, of course, for the "Colored") (...other than the "Butler" and Maids)
 
He was the first, as I've heard, to use radio to talk to people directly rather than through the media: it's hardly an accident that he has such a favourable reputation when he was so energetic in using his PR machinery.

Vaguely related to the subject, I've picked up David Edgerton's Britain's War Machine, which in its introduction sets out that it will demolish the myth of plucky little Britain standing alone against the Nazis in 1940 and establish it as the centre of a mighty production machine capable of waging and winning industrial warfare. Certainly ambitious: I will keep you all posted.
 
As for FDR, it's understandable he had so many news conferences. The was a World War going on after all

That world war only started in December 1941 for the US; at that time FDR was in office for his 5th year. It's more a reference to FDR press appeal in general (which he organized personally apparently).
 
That world war only started in December 1941 for the US; at that time FDR was in office for his 5th year. It's more a reference to FDR press appeal in general (which he organized personally apparently).


FDR took office in 1933. By the time of US entry to the war he'd been in office over 8 years.
 
That world war only started in December 1941 for the US; at that time FDR was in office for his 5th year. It's more a reference to FDR press appeal in general (which he organized personally apparently).

WW2 started in 1939 in Europe. The Chinese had been fighting the Japanese before that, about 1933 I think.

Some countries did not join the war until 1945.
 
Yes. Except we were focusing on the US, as FDR was president of the US. That apart, one can hardly speak of a world war when the 2 deciding powers still haven't entered it (Russia and America were 'neutral' until well into 1941).
 
If the UK and France had not gone to war because Poland was invaded, the US would not have joined WW2 latter. The USSR was in the war from 1939 not 1941. I agree that the USA was the last major power to join the fighting.
 
Yes. Except we were focusing on the US, as FDR was president of the US. That apart, one can hardly speak of a world war when the 2 deciding powers still haven't entered it (Russia and America were 'neutral' until well into 1941).

The war was a major preoccupation of the US from at least 1939 - American financial and trade assistance played a large part in the Allied war effort, even if military action was not at the stage on the table - and would no doubt have encouraged Roosevelt to want to have his actions (which were tantamount to using executive power to ignore the wishes of Congress: see Obama's recent troubles for how well that can be received) reported by a favourable press.
 
Vaguely related to the subject, I've picked up David Edgerton's Britain's War Machine, which in its introduction sets out that it will demolish the myth of plucky little Britain standing alone against the Nazis in 1940 and establish it as the centre of a mighty production machine capable of waging and winning industrial warfare. Certainly ambitious: I will keep you all posted.
Let me know what you think of it. I read it over the summer and had a mixed opinion of it. While I appreciate any attempt to point out that during WWII Britain wasn't a tiny little island but the centerpiece of a global commercial empire, I feel Edgerton downplayed America's role as an "arsenal of democracy" and glossed over the political situation in the Commonwealth and possible reluctance of the white dominions providing a large number of troops to fight a war in Europe. Plus the author seems to randomly through in some Churchill fetishizing and real dislike of Labour.

That said, I found the book a nice companion to Tooze's The Wages of Destruction which I'm working through now.
 
Let me know what you think of it. I read it over the summer and had a mixed opinion of it. While I appreciate any attempt to point out that during WWII Britain wasn't a tiny little island but the centerpiece of a global commercial empire, I feel Edgerton downplayed America's role as an "arsenal of democracy" and glossed over the political situation in the Commonwealth and possible reluctance of the white dominions providing a large number of troops to fight a war in Europe. Plus the author seems to randomly through in some Churchill fetishizing and real dislike of Labour.

That said, I found the book a nice companion to Tooze's The Wages of Destruction which I'm working through now.

The Wages of Destruction is brilliant, and not only for economics: the author manages to tie together, in my view convincingly, the inherent problems of the German economic setup, Nazi ideology and Hitler's seemingly foolish foreign policy decisions to make the case that they all need to be understood together: that changed my view of how the Second World War 'worked', especially as it runs somewhat contrary to the version you learn from (for example) AJP Taylor, which sees Hitler as essentially a gambler who carried on getting results, and so kept taking greater and unplanned risks. One initial observation is that Edgerton's book is much shorter, so I suspect we'll find less of the detail and economic nitty-gritty: I'll reserve judgement at this stage as to whether that's a good thing.
 
The Chinese had been fighting the Japanese before that, about 1933 I think.

well it's kinda complicated, and the plausible starting points look something like this:

3 May 1928 - Jinan incident, first actual shooting between GMD and IJA regulars, ended after 8 days by GMD accepting a cease-fire under Japanese pressure

18 September 1931 - Mukden incident, terrorist act engineered by IJA officers to provide a flimsy pretext for Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the set-up of a puppet regime on Chinese territory, sparking five months of fighting; first actual occupation of China by Japan (depending on how you feel about the Port Arthur and Qingdao concessions)

28 January 1932 - Shanghai War, another Japanese invasion sparked by a flimsily-manufactured IJA pretext, resulted in a month and a half of extremely heavy fighting ended unilaterally by the GMD declaring a cease-fire; Japan did not accept the cease-fire for several days until League of Nations pressure compelled it to accept a peace agreement

3 January 1933 - Battle of Shanhaiguan, prelude to a Japanese offensive on Rehe province south of the Great Wall, engineered by the IJA to secure a military buffer for Manchukuo; by late May, all allied Chinese forces had been compelled to retreat from the Great Wall

11 May 1933 - Invasion of Inner Mongolia, IJA effort following up on a filibuster by a collaborationist general a few weeks earlier, resulting in heavy fighting against nationalist Chinese forces organized independently of Jiang's GMD (which agreed to a formal truce with the Japanese at Tanggu on 31 May) for several months

14 November 1936 - Suiyuan incident, invasion of a province of Inner Mongolia outside Japanese control by filibuster troops organized by IJA advisors; comprehensively defeated by local forces and disavowed by both Tokyo and the Kwantung Army

7 July 1937 - Marco Polo Bridge incident, outbreak of badly confused fighting between IJA and GMD forces outside of Beijing; resulting in a full IJA offensive to conquer Beijing; by the end of the month, GMD forces had been forced to retreat behind the Yongding River, where the IJA stopped as the Konoe Fumimaro cabinet attempted to open negotiations with Jiang

9 August 1937 - Death of Japanese marine lieutenant Isao Ōyama, apparently shot by Chinese paramilitary police near an off-limits Chinese military airport; Ōyama's death broke up negotiations and led to an immediate military buildup by both sides in Shanghai (which had been demilitarized at the end of the 1932 war); on the afternoon of 13 August, the IJA formally crossed into Chinese territory, beginning major military operations that continued without a halt until 1945

9 December 1941 - Japan issues a declaration of war against the Republic of China

---

Most authorities use the 9 July 1937 date for the outbreak of fighting, although 13 August 1937 is not unpopular.

Essentially nobody uses the date of the actual declaration of war, in 1941, because by that time Japan and China had had million-man armies slugging it out for four years, with millions more civilians dead. But that's what makes it hard to define when the war actually started, because the process of escalation only proceeded in fits and starts.

18 September 1931 is especially popular among Chinese nationalists, as is 19 September; 18 September for the actual terrorist act at Mukden, and 19 September for the Kwantung Army's invasion of Chinese Manchuria. To my mind, however, given the stop-and-start nature of fighting after the Mukden incident, the Jinan incident makes an equally good starting point. You could argue that the occupation of Manchuria was a significant break with the past, and it was, but Japan had been occupying significant chunks of China for decades at that point (Shandong especially, but also the Kwantung concession and a network of smaller districts throughout coastal China); Manchuria, obviously, was a lot bigger, but the point is that it's fuzzy.

This even applies to the 9 July issue; the Marco Polo Bridge incident did result in major ground-combat operations, but so did the first invasion of Shanghai back in 1932, and the fighting on the Wall in 1933, and even though the GMD wasn't involved there was major fighting between the Japanese and regular Chinese warlord forces for several months in 1933 in Inner Mongolia, and again for several months in 1936-37, and lower-level partisan warfare during the intervening years. There was a unilateral cease-fire after the Japanese occupation of Beijing and Tianjin starting on 31 July 1937, which held for two weeks before the Battle of Shanghai ended cease-fires for good.

Another dimension is that people attempt to draw lines between "China's war with Japan" and "Jiang's war with Japan" by arguing that they were not the same thing. Thus you will sometimes see people claiming that Jiang and his loyal forces only got into the fight in 1937, but other Chinese had been fighting Japan since 1931. This is, obviously, not true; Jiang's China was at war with Japan for a week in 1928 and for much of 1931-33, despite his preference to wait until later for war. It's true that from late 1936-37 Jiang was compelled to restructure his priorities and push for a united Chinese war against Japan, and few crises passed between that decision and the outbreak of major ground fighting. But then we get into other difficult territory: do we really say that the country of China and the country of Japan, regardless of who was actually fighting and dying at the time, were only at war from the time one admittedly important Chinese guy decided to be at war? On the other hand, if you get too slippery with the dates you end up saying that the war started with the Treaty of Portsmouth or the Twenty-One Demands and well that just doesn't help anyone.

Periodization can suck sometimes.
 
So more a tumble down a rocky slope, than over a cliff as in Europe; if you ignore the previous actions to the invasion of Poland by Germany and the USSR.
 
Even in Europe, the suddenness of it all depends on how important you consider the population of Czechoslovakia. It doesn't stop being an invasion when one side knows it can't win.
 
Just finished The Fall of Japan: The Final Weeks of World War II in the Pacific, by William Craig. Craig was recently mentioned on another thread for his more famous work, Enemy at the Gates. Fall of Japan is an interesting popular work, focusing largely on the Japanese principals in the closing days of the war, and is a telling foil to anyone who might have read Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's very challenging Racing the Enemy, a classic revisionist work.
 
Speaking of Wages of Destruction, I've recently read Tooze's latest book, The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order. Definitely an interesting and informative read, especially given that my prior knowledge of the period covered (the end of WW1 to the early '30s) was only a step or two above "Versailles was mean, the League of Nations sucked and world's economy went to hell therefore Nazis". Though I suppose that means I'm in no real place to judge how accurate it is, but given Tooze's past work, and the fact that his arguments make sense, I'd be inclined to think it's pretty good on that front too.
 
I started The Deluge a couple-three weeks ago, but I've been distracted; some of the things he had to say about the Great War in the short segment I read weren't particularly inspiring. Wages of Destruction was good, though, so when I finally finish my backlog I'll certainly be going back to it.
 
Even in Europe, the suddenness of it all depends on how important you consider the population of Czechoslovakia. It doesn't stop being an invasion when one side knows it can't win.
Also, for practical effect, the war outside of Poland started in the spring of 1940.
 
Top Bottom