History Questions Not Worth Their Own Thread VIII

[innonimatu]

Did the western European countries with colonies actually benefit in any tangible way from the countries they colonized?

Did it help them gain more power? Income? Resources? Or for all practical purposes, they spent more money on the colonies/lands they invaded than they took back from it?

Did the average person in those countries (England, Spain, France, Portugal, Netherlands) benefit from these colonies in any tangible way?

also: how much difference did the colonies make in wars between powers? (such as WW1, WW2).

As countries, I think they all did. Some might have disappeared but for the usefulness of the colonies as bargaining chips. At least Portugal and the Netherlands were endangered by far larger and expansionist neighbors. Especially early on the colonial trade was very profitable, and those profits were critical to the state's capacity to finance defensive wars in Europe.

In terms of resources and economic development, it can be argued about interminably. In Portugal the argument started back in the 15th century, concerning the questionable usefulness of attempting to conquer territory in North Africa (there was a civil war over the direction the country should go), and contained down to the 20th century. And how can you even value having half a continent speak your language, share some elements of your culture and therefore be somewhat "closer"?

The less useful phase of european colonialist was the 19th century colonial occupation of Africa. That was probably more damaging that profitable. Africa was extremely harsh and the colonial occupation did not last long enough for benefits to be reaped. As with America the opening of the continent to the world led to local catastrophic changes (the cattle plague, for one example), which even now are still being repaired or adapted to.

 

[caketastydelish]

I would like to be corrected if this is wrong:

It is my understanding that Churchill was the single most decisive person for the allied cause during the war.

Many people in Britain (including people at the very top of the government) didn't want a war with Hitler and all and Hitler actually wanted peace. Churchill was the one who insisted that they fight to the bitter end. Britain's involvement in the European theater not only itself was significant, but they brought the United States with them which was even more significant.

If someone else had been the PM, and there were people with a realistic chance of getting elected, they would have been simply taken Hitler's peace deal. As such, the European conflict would not have involved the United Kingdom or the United States, thus making the outcome potentially extremely different.

It's hard to know if Japan would have still attacked Pearl Harbor because knowing that you are going to face the United States that will be 100% focused on you instead of having to fight on two fronts would make it even less appealing.

 

[innonimatu]

Hitler never offered a remotely acceptable peace deal. The UK couldn't afford to leave him in control of France and the Low Countries, and he couldn't afford to withdraw from France. After war was declared in September 1, 1939 Germany was done for, it couldn't stop until it conquered Europe (impossible) or was utterly defeated. It was just a matter of how and at what cost. Churchill only became PM in 1940.

France and the UK would not back off from the war unless they were both defeated. Leaving Germany in control of, and free to make use of, central Europe was unacceptable, it made the germans too powerful. Defeating France alone was not enough for Germany to get a favorable peace, it removed the direct military threat to Germany but not the blockade. And the USSR was arming itself...
The only way Hitler could secure a peace would be a return to the status quo ante. And that was politically impossible for Hitler because he based his popularity inside Germany on imperial expansion. The german military itself would depose him if he attempted such a peace because it would be obvious that a free France would reestablish its cordon sanitaire and arm to the teeth for a rematch, facing a Germany bankrupt, demoralized and politically unstable.

Perhaps the only chance Germany (not Hitler, he'd have to be deposed and killed) had for a peace without total defeat would be through losing the battle of France. If it devolved into a kind of stalemate and the german military offed Hitler and kicked the nazis from power, then they could have possibly been politically capable of proposing an acceptable peace deal (cut the damage short), withdraw inside Germany's (pre-1938) borders, and been left mostly alone. They'd have to made a show of hanging some Nazis, disarm again, and accept again some occupation.

It's hard to know if Japan would have still attacked Pearl Harbor because knowing that you are going to face the United States that will be 100% focused on you instead of having to fight on two fronts would make it even less appealing.

That is a good question. Japan's plans of expansion to the sough were based on the expected ease of grabbing the lightly defended european colonies there. The US just had to be knocked out of the way.

Considering the scenario of german defeat in the Battle of France, and a peace being negotiated then. It might have led to Japan doubling down on China, investing more on the army and dropping much of its navy due to lack of fuel. Might not change much in history: they'd still not manage to conquer China (too big), and the soviets would eventually kick them out and place the CCP in power. It could lead to a Cold War with a China "satellite" of the USSR and no such "satellites" in Europe. Or no cold war at all, the US would not have cause to get involved and would never expand its military hugely.

 

[Traitorfish]

I would like to be corrected if this is wrong:

It is my understanding that Churchill was the single most decisive person for the allied cause during the war.

Many people in Britain (including people at the very top of the government) didn't want a war with Hitler and all and Hitler actually wanted peace. Churchill was the one who insisted that they fight to the bitter end. Britain's involvement in the European theater not only itself was significant, but they brought the United States with them which was even more significant.

If someone else had been the PM, and there were people with a realistic chance of getting elected, they would have been simply taken Hitler's peace deal. As such, the European conflict would not have involved the United Kingdom or the United States, thus making the outcome potentially extremely different.

It's hard to know if Japan would have still attacked Pearl Harbor because knowing that you are going to face the United States that will be 100% focused on you instead of having to fight on two fronts would make it even less appealing.

Churchill was brought to power because he was a hardliner, which suggests that the mood of parliament was in favour of continuing the war, and that in his absence, they would have chosen another candidate with similar views. It also suggests that, had they disapproved of Churchill's insistence on continuing the war, would have replaced him with somebody in favour of peace. That would seem to diminish his influence compared to Roosevelt or Stalin, who were already in power at the outset of war, and for whom no straightforward mechanism existed to replace them.

 

[Wastl]

France and the UK would not back off from the war unless they were both defeated. Leaving Germany in control of, and free to make use of, central Europe was unacceptable, it made the germans too powerful. Defeating France alone was not enough for Germany to get a favorable peace, it removed the direct military threat to Germany but not the blockade. And the USSR was arming itself...
The only way Hitler could secure a peace would be a return to the status quo ante. And that was politically impossible for Hitler because he based his popularity inside Germany on imperial expansion. The german military itself would depose him if he attempted such a peace because it would be obvious that a free France would reestablish its cordon sanitaire and arm to the teeth for a rematch, facing a Germany bankrupt, demoralized and politically unstable.

Perhaps the only chance Germany (not Hitler, he'd have to be deposed and killed) had for a peace without total defeat would be through losing the battle of France. If it devolved into a kind of stalemate and the german military offed Hitler and kicked the nazis from power, then they could have possibly been politically capable of proposing an acceptable peace deal (cut the damage short), withdraw inside Germany's (pre-1938) borders, and been left mostly alone. They'd have to made a show of hanging some Nazis, disarm again, and accept again some occupation.

Not really sure what gave you that impression.

Hitler's popularity wasn't based on imperial expansion, it was based on regaining lost lands, avenging the humiliation of WW1 and thus giving Germany its pride back. All of this had already been achieved. A peace that saw the return of Alsace & Lorraine to Germany while handing over everything else (in the west) again wouldn't be a problem. In fact, the German population as a whole was wildly in favour of not having another war. Hitler's popularity went through the roof when the Sudetenland got incorporated into Germany without a war, not having realized that this didn't happen because of him. The war against Poland wasn't popular among the population, it was seen with dread, until the successes against Poland and then in the west elevated his popularity to yet another level. A quick victory had been achieved, it seemed that this would be it and Britain would soon make peace as well. There isn't really any reason to assume that a Germany that would make such a peace would somehow be demoralized and politically unstable, on the contrary, the population would be on a high, and France would be in no position to be a threat to Germany anytime soon. Even if there wouldn't have been any further regulations for France in a peace treaty, which seems rather unlikely, it still wouldn't have been in a position to rise up again on the short term. It had a smaller population and wasn't gaining any ground either, and it would have lost part of its industrial heartland in Alsace & Lorraine. That territory being so vital for its industry was one of the main reasons for the Maginot line as well. France woul have a hard time replacing its output if it had been overrun quickly. Losing it in a peace-treaty makes France's outlook for the near future rather grim. Add the factor of France probably being under Petain's control and it wouldn't seem like the nation would try to take it up with Germany yet again, so long as it got to keep its colonial empire.

The military wouldn't have had any reason to depose him if he had made peace with France. In fact, the times they thought about getting rid of him was when they thought he would try and start a war or do something that they thought would end up in German defeat (e.g. attacking Czechoslovakia or invading France in late 1939). There was no particular desire in the military to demand territorial expansion just for the sake of it. They did in fact reach out to the Allies during the Sudenten crisis and offered to get rid of Hitler if the Allies would only back Czechoslovakia, but the Allies refused, so why would you think that this would somehow be any different later on?

Any problems in the way of making peace would come from the UK not trusting him enough to believe he would adhere to any deal, and not from any internal backlash in Germany. Even if some of the completely nutty elements of the regime had been against giving up so much territory, they wouldn't have been in a position to do anything about it. The military wouldn't have removed Hitler, Göring never would have made such a move, and Himmler was way too loyal to Hitler (and otherwise could have been persuaded by peace meaning that it would prevent "Germanic" blood from being wasted) to really attempt anything.

 

[innonimatu]

Hitler's popularity wasn't based on imperial expansion, it was based on regaining lost lands, avenging the humiliation of WW1 and thus giving Germany its pride back.

I'm putting this under imperial expansion. It can be debated, of course, France's grab of those two provinces was also imperial expansion. Back in Louis' days.
But what of the czech lands? What of Austria's annexation?

All of this had already been achieved. A peace that saw the return of Alsace & Lorraine to Germany while handing over everything else (in the west) again wouldn't be a problem. In fact, the German population as a whole was wildly in favour of not having another war. Hitler's popularity went through the roof when the Sudetenland got incorporated into Germany without a war, not having realized that this didn't happen because of him. The war against Poland wasn't popular among the population, it was seen with dread, until the successes against Poland and then in the west elevated his popularity to yet another level. A quick victory had been achieved, it seemed that this would be it and Britain would soon make peace as well. There isn't really any reason to assume that a Germany that would make such a peace would somehow be demoralized and politically unstable, on the contrary, the population would be on a high, and France would be in no position to be a threat to Germany anytime soon. Even if there wouldn't have been any further regulations for France in a peace treaty, which seems rather unlikely, it still wouldn't have been in a position to rise up again on the short term. It had a smaller population and wasn't gaining any ground either, and it would have lost part of its industrial heartland in Alsace & Lorraine

This is exactly why such a peace would be completely unacceptable to the allies. Germany's very victory in the Battle of France left it without options for peace, that was what I argued. It's not that Germany wouldn't want a peace with the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, it was that such a peace could not be imposed without a total victory by Germany. Which wasn't coming. And the same german public that at the beginning might have feared the consequences of Hitler's plans was not going to allow a withdrawal from Austria or the land it grabbed in Czechoslovakia.

 

[r16]

not having time for a regular wall of text Hitler's power was based on Fear , of what his thugs might do . Hitler based his promises for a war in the 1940s , 1942-3 for the Army , 1945 for the Navy . The Democracies provided him with Austria and the Czechs , Generals feared they would never shake him off , Poland was a result . France was an accident . Russia was the war Hitler was enabled for .

 

[Marla_Singer]

Most historians would agree that the alliances and agreements the British foreign office of the early twentieth century pursued were done in order to neutralize military threats to Britain's colonial possessions. While the USA, Japan, Russia, and France all possessed the ability to militarily threaten British colonies, Germany did not and could not develop such a power.

From my understanding, the 1904 Entente Cordiale between France and Britain was widely the result of their Empires overstretching. It was mutually beneficial for both to cooperate in their global colonial ruling as that was a lot more economically efficient to work as a peaceful alliance rather than it would have been otherwise. Both powers could mutually benefit of the facilities of one another to master sea trade as a kind of unrivaled cartel. Bringing Germany to the game was clearly not in their interests.

As a matter of fact, it seems so obvious when you think about it that we can hardly understand the logic of the "Britain and the US should have allied with Germany instead of France" usual narrative. Behaving aggressively towards France would have really endangered trade flows in the British Empire.

 

[caketastydelish]

Churchill was brought to power because he was a hardliner, which suggests that the mood of parliament was in favour of continuing the war, and that in his absence, they would have chosen another candidate with similar views. It also suggests that, had they disapproved of Churchill's insistence on continuing the war, would have replaced him with somebody in favour of peace. That would seem to diminish his influence compared to Roosevelt or Stalin, who were already in power at the outset of war, and for whom no straightforward mechanism existed to replace them.

Roosevelt and Stalin were both attacked first. That changes things immensely. Stalin, in particular, had pretty much no choice whatsoever.

 

[Traitorfish]

Roosevelt and Stalin were both attacked first. That changes things immensely. Stalin, in particular, had pretty much no choice whatsoever.

Churchill didn't chose to go to war, either. He wasn't even a member of the government until after the war began, and before assuming the premiership, he was First Lord of the Admiralty, a position essentially equivalent to the Secretary of the Navy in the US; an important office in wartime, but by no means the natural successor to a resigning premier. He was only appointed prime minister nine months into the war, and was able to assume and then remain in office because he reflected the mood in parliament, which was in favour of continuing the war. If he had changed his mind, assuming no major deviations from actual history, parliament could have replaced him with somebody who was more determined to continue. Roosevelt or Stalin, while certainly bound by circumstances not of their own making, had a greater degree of personal authority over whether their countries remained in the war and on what terms, because they could not simply be replaced if they contradicted their respective legislatures.

 

[Lexicus]

I don't think Stalin had much choice.

 

[Traitorfish]

I don't think Stalin had much choice.

Probably not, but it was his choice not to have, if that makes sense. Churchill wasn't simply constrained by circumstances, he was constrained by parliament; if they were in favour of continuing the war and he was not, he would have been removed, before it ever reached the point of discovering whether peace was on the table.

 

[Lexicus]

Probably not, but it was his choice not to have, if that makes sense. Churchill wasn't simply constrained by circumstances, he was constrained by parliament; if they were in favour of continuing the war and he was not, he would have been removed, before it ever reached the point of discovering whether peace was on the table.

I generally agree. Churchill was for standing against Hitler but afaik there was no real peace party in Britain other than Mosley's gang and they were pretty thoroughly discredited by then anyway.

 

[Cutlass]

Churchill didn't chose to go to war, either. He wasn't even a member of the government until after the war began, and before assuming the premiership, he was First Lord of the Admiralty, a position essentially equivalent to the Secretary of the Navy in the US; an important office in wartime, but by no means the natural successor to a resigning premier. He was only appointed prime minister nine months into the war, and was able to assume and then remain in office because he reflected the mood in parliament, which was in favour of continuing the war. If he had changed his mind, assuming no major deviations from actual history, parliament could have replaced him with somebody who was more determined to continue. Roosevelt or Stalin, while certainly bound by circumstances not of their own making, had a greater degree of personal authority over whether their countries remained in the war and on what terms, because they could not simply be replaced if they contradicted their respective legislatures.

FDR really didn't have a say either. While it's true that he could only really have been removed from office had he lost election in 1940 or 1944, it's also true that Congress declares war. And while the president in commander in chief, the actual running of the war was done by the Army and the Navy, with the money appropriated by Congress. Now given that the national mood was overwhelmingly for the war, had there been a president in office at the time who was not actively supporting the war efforts, he could have, and ultimately would have, been removed. Congress does have that power.

Before Pearl Harbor, the general consensus in the US was against the war. After Pearl Harbor, the country as a whole wanted to get in on the killing, as fast and completely as possible.

 

[r16]

the media would be surely moving the decision to war . Wasn't the USN in undeclared war against the Germans from maybe April 1941 ?

 

[Cutlass]

the media would be surely moving the decision to war . Wasn't the USN in undeclared war against the Germans from maybe April 1941 ?

FDR was responsible for the USN involved in anti-submarine warfare against the Germans before the US entered the war. So it's not like he wasn't pro-war. He wanted the US in it in alliance with Britain. But his was not the majority opinion before Pearl Harbor.

 

[r16]

ı would say that's over-estimating the power of the Isolationists . This despite it was like real hard in the Congress and the like . This despite me long "favouring" the idea that Roosevelt allowed Pearl Harbour to happen and he got away with it only through being a Navy man . His underlings could not believe that it could be happening , and like once again it revolves around the oaths the really honourable men take and follow .

 

[Absolution]

When seeing how the Indus Valley history is presented around the web, I sometimes see attempts for conrete description about the social construct of the settlements and the regional system as a whole.
It always gets me wondering - do we even know that it was in some level a single culture?

Considering the vast time-frame and territory that is counted as "Indus Valley Civilisation", isn't it highly probable that different groups of peoples, "religions", "nations", or social constructs existed throughout it?
How does the archaeology help decide on this case?

If comparison is relevant, I would calrify myself by presenting two "models":
- The Nile River model - a single (or one prominent) culture with a mostly unified linguistic and religious tradition (Egypt), which defined most of what we would credit to the Nile River Civilisation.
- The Mesopotamian model - generally started with one specific culture (Sumer), which influenced other various peoples of the wider area (Elam and northern Semites), and later being totally replaced by newer cultures of the more recent Mesopotamian periods (Babylonians, Assyrians, Mittani).

Is it likely that the Indus Valley Civilisation actually resembled the latter, contrary to the way it is mostly presented? Or can we simpy know nothing?

 

[Cutlass]

Is it likely that the Indus Valley Civilisation actually resembled the latter, contrary to the way it is mostly presented? Or can we simpy know nothing?

This is going to depend on how much archeological work has been done there. This is certainly an extremely ancient center of human settlement. And, because of that, has most likely had a lot of groups of people moving across it, taking it from others, killing past groups, or merging with them. But to separate out what has happened, that takes a lot of work. And you'll have to dig into who has done, or tried to do, that work.

The Nile Valley is unusual in being isolated by geography from invading groups. So a continuation of 1 culture is much more likely there.

 

[sophie]

When seeing how the Indus Valley history is presented around the web, I sometimes see attempts for conrete description about the social construct of the settlements and the regional system as a whole.
It always gets me wondering - do we even know that it was in some level a single culture?

Considering the vast time-frame and territory that is counted as "Indus Valley Civilisation", isn't it highly probable that different groups of peoples, "religions", "nations", or social constructs existed throughout it?
How does the archaeology help decide on this case?

Certainly. You have to work with the evidence you have, and we only really have access to material culture that was left behind. Similarities in structures, urban organization, weapons/jewelry, pottery, artistic motifs, etc. certainly speak to either a homogenous culture, or else multiple cultures linked to a productive or cultural hegemon. However that says nothing to the granular realities - absent written records we have no way of really knowing cultural demographic details, language, political realities at the ground level, etc. We do know a great deal about the Indus River Valley Civilization - the archaeological record they left behind is quite rich - but the reality is that until we decode those artifacts which academics in the field are speculatively identifying as a robust writing system - we won't know those granular details definitively.

We can only work with what we have, and as you note, attempts to align material culture/archaeological findings with reconstructive linguistic or comparative religious work has historically been a fraught endeavor (see the attempts to place the Proto-Germanics or Proto-Indo-Europeans in the archaeological record for examples of this). But that being said, I don't think you'll find a credible academic in these fields that doesn't explicitly note the inherently speculative nature of that sort of work.