Most Epic Screwups in History?

[Quildavyr]

Meh, that wasn't such a big deal. Bayezid Yilderim demanding tribute from Timur's vassals, now that was an epic screwup.

Well I don't think it was a screwup.He did have the chance and might have won the war,if the serbs didnt betray him.And the other turkish soldiers of anatolian beyliks eliminated by Bayezid...

He did good by eliminating other minor beyliks but his only screwup is; he didnt kill the ruler families of those.Just because he was married with their daughters

 

[Dachs]

I actually never heard the story of a Serb betrayal at Ankara, and always thought the primary reasons were that Bayezid was outgeneraled and that he had lost his water supply.

 

[Quildavyr]

I actually never heard the story of a Serb betrayal at Ankara, and always thought the primary reasons were that Bayezid was outgeneraled and that he had lost his water supply.

Yildirim was planning the siege of Constantinople,when Timur arrived(actually invited by other anatolian beyliks) Anatolia.Serbia supposed to provide Yildirim with soldiers.What really happened there I dont know.But other turkish soldiers changed their sides,because their ex leaders were fighting against Yildirim.About the serbs,it might be an alliance like thing between Serbs and Byzantium,and they went to Timur's side too.Yildirim ended up with only loyal ottoman soldiers,as he understood he is losing the game,he tried to flee,but couldn't success.

 

[Dachs]

So he got hit with both operational screwups and betrayal. That kinda sucks.

Epic screwup: Frederik II's decision to hire a mercenary army in the Nordic Seven Years' War. They captured Älvsborg just fine in the initial blitz, but the mercs' incredibly high cost (contrasted with the cheaper and more numerous Swedish levies) prevented Frederik from undertaking serious offensive operations for most of the rest of the war, consigning him to mere reaction to Erik XIV's raids and the occasional raid of his own. It also caused a political crisis in Denmark...GG?

 

[Leifmk]

Epic screwup: Frederik II's decision to hire a mercenary army in the Nordic Seven Years' War.

On the other hand, using Norwegian levies to conduct offensive operations against Sweden never worked very well for the Danish kings, largely because the Norwegian peasants didn't see any point in it. On occasions when it was tried, the guys would show up, receive whatever soldiering gear that was handed out, think "hey cool, free stuff" and promptly go back home.

 

[Dachs]

On the other hand, using Norwegian levies to conduct offensive operations against Sweden never worked very well for the Danish kings, largely because the Norwegian peasants didn't see any point in it. On occasions when it was tried, the guys would show up, receive whatever soldiering gear that was handed out, think "hey cool, free stuff" and promptly go back home.

Yeah, Fred kinda had a catch-22 there. I really don't see much of a way for him to edge out the Swedes in the war other than naval victories, but the Swedes actually had an advantage during the Seven Years' War.

 

[lovett]

Versailles wasn't in and of itself a disaster - it was just too harsh for a people who didn't see themselves as defeated. Then it was not enforced.

There's an interesting perspective which holds that the Treaty of Versailles was not harsh enough. It failed to severely weaken Germany. Germany maintained remained a sovereign political entity with much the same capabilities it had pre-war. It wasn't even occupied. Compare with the harsh conditions imposed on Russia in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Strategically one could argue that Germany was far more secure then it had been at the turn of the century. The collapse of the Austria-Hungarian Empire alongside instability in Russia (as well as the creation of Poland as an independent entity) meant that the only border Germany was threatened on was its west. The probability of war on multiple fronts was greatly reduced, unless of course Germany decided that was what it wanted

As for the West itself, Germany was far superior to both France and Belgium. As a coherent entity Germany was larger, more industrialised and more populous then both together. In 1914 France would have been overwhelmed without British support, and in 1940 it was anyway.

Thus it was not the harshness that condemned the treaty to failure. It was the fact that it was a deeply flawed compromise between Wilson's leniency and Clemenceau's inclemency.

 

[Eran of Arcadia]

That, plus Germany was able to think of itself as not having been defeated in battle. Everyone forgot that they had basically been starving.

 

[say1988]

More importantly, it wasn't enforced.

If it was enforced (which may or may not have been politically possible), then we see a greatly weakened Third Reich. While Germany beat the west in 1940, in 1936 (remilitarization of the Rhineland), or even 1938 (Munich agreement) the story likely would have been different.

 

[Brighteye]

I had been under the impression that in 1936 the story would have been very different, but we needed time by 1938 to start our own war economies.

 

[holy king]

That, plus Germany was able to think of itself as not having been defeated in battle. Everyone forgot that they had basically been starving.

starving? it was the joooos and socialists!

 

[say1988]

In 1938 the British and French economies weren't really ready for war, but they were in a better position than the Germans overall.

You can see a huge increase in the power of Britain during that year between Munich and Poland, especially in the RAF, but there is a much greater increase in power for the Germans (Czechoslovakia was huge for them).

But they lacked the political will or ability to start a war.

 

[BananaLee]

As I should, they shouldn't have invaded China in the first place. There was absolutely no reason to invade China, nothing to gain from doing so, and plenty to lose. And the US offered diplomatic solutions several times, Japan just turned them down, misunderstood them.

What!?
You need to go back to your books, dude. Japan wanted to be up there with the big boys of Europe. They initially wished to emulate the British in having a great empire and believed they had grown up and were ready to join the world - whatwith the industrialisation of the Meiji period and all.
However, the epic fail of Versailles (and Woodrow Wilson) caused the Japanese to feel highly slighted. The Washington Treaty was also handled stupidly and pissed the Japanese off even further.
Then, to seal the deal, the US told the Brits to not be so friendly with Japan - which the Brits duly did.
Isolated, slighted, and suffering from inferiority syndrome ("why don't the others treat us like equals!?"), they decided to go for their empire and expand into China. Everyone else was doing it, why not the Japanese?

I'm not saying if these actions are right or wrong, but the key is to understand why these actions came about in the first place. They didn't invade China for fun. China had resources, China has space, China had "inferior people" and China was a good chance to show the world that Japan was just as capable as the other great powers.

Then the US got heavy-handed with their deterrance policy and embargoed the crap out of Japan, which made expansion even more necessary for Japan and so on and so forth.

The roots of Japanese aggression in Asia could arguably have come from the fact that the rest of the great powers in Europe didn't give a crow's hoot to a "bunch of gooks" in the East who were trying their best to be considered equal on the world stage.

 

[Sharwood]

What!?
You need to go back to your books, dude. Japan wanted to be up there with the big boys of Europe. They initially wished to emulate the British in having a great empire and believed they had grown up and were ready to join the world - whatwith the industrialisation of the Meiji period and all.
However, the epic fail of Versailles (and Woodrow Wilson) caused the Japanese to feel highly slighted. The Washington Treaty was also handled stupidly and pissed the Japanese off even further.
Then, to seal the deal, the US told the Brits to not be so friendly with Japan - which the Brits duly did.
Isolated, slighted, and suffering from inferiority syndrome ("why don't the others treat us like equals!?"), they decided to go for their empire and expand into China. Everyone else was doing it, why not the Japanese?

I'm not saying if these actions are right or wrong, but the key is to understand why these actions came about in the first place. They didn't invade China for fun. China had resources, China has space, China had "inferior people" and China was a good chance to show the world that Japan was just as capable as the other great powers.

Then the US got heavy-handed with their deterrance policy and embargoed the crap out of Japan, which made expansion even more necessary for Japan and so on and so forth.

The roots of Japanese aggression in Asia could arguably have come from the fact that the rest of the great powers in Europe didn't give a crow's hoot to a "bunch of gooks" in the East who were trying their best to be considered equal on the world stage.

WTH are you on about? So Japan was miffed at being slighted by them whiteys. Big deal. Why invade China? Why invade the one nation that had absolutely nothing Japan wanted or needed, besides land? I reiterate:

"There was absolutely no reason to invade China, nothing to gain from doing so, and plenty to lose."

And I am well-aware of the roots of Japanese aggression. They go back to the Russo-Japanese war, if not further, and had not one damn thing to do with the Europeans treating them like a "bunch of gooks." (apologies KD). It did have everything to do with their feeling of entitlement, which the Japanese have always had, as have most other nations. "The strong do as they please, and the weak do what they must." - Thucydides. Probably an incorrect translation, but the gist is there.

 

[Agent327]

Actually, what BananaLee posted is basically how it happened - plus the failure of democrats against autocrats on the Japanese political scene. Reiterating what you said before doesn't make it true. You really should check your history books before posting your replies.

 

[Sharwood]

Actually, what BananaLee posted is basically how it happened - plus the failure of democrats against autocrats on the Japanese political scene. Reiterating what you said before doesn't make it true. You really should check your history books before posting your replies.

And you and he should both check my posts before you make yours. Give me a reason to invade China. Give me something to be gained. Tell me what Japan didn't have to lose. Point out where anything I said was wrong. This invitation is open to BL as well, who failed to do so in his first post.

Now, you can make an argument that there was plenty for Japan to gain from invading and conquering Manchuria. Which they did. And they damn well should have stopped there. China proper was a whole other kettle of fish, and any intelligent group of people would have realised that. Unfortunately, those people were on their lunch break in Japan from about '34 onwards.

Japan's militarism steadily increased from the Russo-Japanese war on. It didn't become predominant until the 1930s, and was directed primarily against China, the one nation in the area Japan had absolutely no logical reason to attack, and no gain to be had from attacking. Counter-point? You have one?

 

[Dachs]

Japan's militarism steadily increased from the Russo-Japanese war on. It didn't become predominant until the 1930s, and was directed primarily against China, the one nation in the area Japan had absolutely no logical reason to attack, and no gain to be had from attacking.

You can actually make an argument that Japanese militarism had its genesis much earlier. For example, the samurai revolt in that Tom Cruise movie had a real-life analogue, the Satsuma Rebellion, which was caused in large part because the feudal lords of Satsuma, who had previously allied with the Meiji government in the Boshin War, had a falling-out with the Emperor et al because the warlords wanted to go on a military adventure and invade Korea. Korean invasion plans were constantly floated during the early days of the Meiji state, and were actually acted upon in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5. A case can be made to say that during the earlier Taisho state things were a bit different, and certainly figures like Saionji Kinmochi had a moderating effect on politics, but even then the Army and Navy held serious power over the Cabinet (I think both land and naval staffs had veto power over the imperial cabinet ) and by the early 1930s there really wasn't much voice for non-militarism in Japan.

 

[Sharwood]

You can actually make an argument that Japanese militarism had its genesis much earlier. For example, the samurai revolt in that Tom Cruise movie had a real-life analogue, the Satsuma Rebellion, which was caused in large part because the feudal lords of Satsuma, who had previously allied with the Meiji government in the Boshin War, had a falling-out with the Emperor et al because the warlords wanted to go on a military adventure and invade Korea. Korean invasion plans were constantly floated during the early days of the Meiji state, and were actually acted upon in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5. A case can be made to say that during the earlier Taisho state things were a bit different, and certainly figures like Saionji Kinmochi had a moderating effect on politics, but even then the Army and Navy held serious power over the Cabinet (I think both land and naval staffs had veto power over the imperial cabinet ) and by the early 1930s there really wasn't much voice for non-militarism in Japan.

*ahem*

And I am well-aware of the roots of Japanese aggression. They go back to the Russo-Japanese war, if not further, and had not one damn thing to do with the Europeans treating them like a "bunch of gooks." (apologies KD). It did have everything to do with their feeling of entitlement, which the Japanese have always had, as have most other nations. "The strong do as they please, and the weak do what they must." - Thucydides. Probably an incorrect translation, but the gist is there.

I'm well-aware of all that, but didn't feel it worth mentioning, since it had nothing to do with Europeans, which is what BL's rant was about.

 

[Dachs]

I'm well-aware of all that, but didn't feel it worth mentioning, since it had nothing to do with Europeans, which is what BL's rant was about.

Who was correcting you? I was agreeing. Stop being so defensive.

 

[dosed150]

And you and he should both check my posts before you make yours. Give me a reason to invade China. Give me something to be gained. Tell me what Japan didn't have to lose. Point out where anything I said was wrong. This invitation is open to BL as well, who failed to do so in his first post.

Now, you can make an argument that there was plenty for Japan to gain from invading and conquering Manchuria. Which they did. And they damn well should have stopped there. China proper was a whole other kettle of fish, and any intelligent group of people would have realised that. Unfortunately, those people were on their lunch break in Japan from about '34 onwards.

Japan's militarism steadily increased from the Russo-Japanese war on. It didn't become predominant until the 1930s, and was directed primarily against China, the one nation in the area Japan had absolutely no logical reason to attack, and no gain to be had from attacking. Counter-point? You have one?

not really a counter point but pre ww1 everyone wanted a piece of china so there must be something worth possessing there, its been suggested that if ww1 hadnt happened china may have gone the way of africa

and as for versailles i think it was more a bad compromise than anything else, just tryed to please everyone there they should have either decided to be harsh or be lenient but they went for some confused middle ground