Relationship between Japanese Imperial Navy and Army

[Bugfatty300]

Lately I´ve been studying up on Japan´s war in asia and the pacific and one thing that I havn´t quite grasped entirely was the poor relationship between the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy.

I´ve read several accounts such the army building and operating it´s own aircraft carriers and warships to protect their merchants ships (either due to the navy refusing to help or the army refusing to cooperate with the navy in protecting their supply convoys) but I can´t seem to find detailed accounts on the overall matter.

I have some questions that I hope some here can address so I can better understand the army-navy relationship since google doesn`t seem to like me these days.

1. What were the historical roots of the poor relationship between the army and navy?

2. To what extent were the two forces willing to curtail the power and influence of the other?

3. What was Hirohito´s roll in the matter? Was he a peace maker or did he play favorites or was he just plain indifferent? How did previous emperors handle the relationship between the army and navy?

4. What effect did the lack of cooperation between the army and navy have on Japan´s overall performance in World War II?

5. Is it believed that the lack of cooperation affected the outcome of a specific battle or campaign?

6. Are there examples of the navy and army coordinating together in a campaign or battle?

 

[Cutlass]

It's been a little too long since I looked at some of this to answer all of your questions without some research. That said:

3. What was Hirohito´s roll in the matter? Was he a peace maker or did he play favorites or was he just plain indifferent? How did previous emperors handle the relationship between the army and navy?

Essentially, he had no role until he compelled the government to surrender at the end of the war. By the tradition at the time, the emperor was so far "above" the actual management of the government, that while he was technically the head of state, and could be expected to obey, the tradition was that he only express his pleasure or displeasure with the government's policies in the most oblique, and ignorable, manner.

4. What effect did the lack of cooperation between the army and navy have on Japan´s overall performance in World War II?

They had different objectives. So they, as much as possible, fought separate wars. So there was a lack of overall strategic planning.

 

[Agent327]

They had different objectives. So they, as much as possible, fought separate wars. So there was a lack of overall strategic planning.

It goes a little beyond that. Prior to WW II actually erupting in the Pacific there were different approaches as to the targets. Certain army circles lobbied for a war against Soviet Russia, while the navy obviously preferred a Pacific strategy. This had farreaching consequences, as by December 1941 it had become clear that Japan would not be a threat to the USSR, this released invaluable military and materiel that could be transferred for the decisive Battle of Moscow.

6. Are there examples of the navy and army coordinating together in a campaign or battle?

I think the attack on Singapore might be a good example of that.

 

[Verbose]

Lately I´ve been studying up on Japan´s war in asia and the pacific and one thing that I havn´t quite grasped entirely was the poor relationship between the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy.

I´ve read several accounts such the army building and operating it´s own aircraft carriers and warships to protect their merchants ships (either due to the navy refusing to help or the army refusing to cooperate with the navy in protecting their supply convoys) but I can´t seem to find detailed accounts on the overall matter.

I have some questions that I hope some here can address so I can better understand the army-navy relationship since google doesn`t seem to like me these days.

1. What were the historical roots of the poor relationship between the army and navy?

2. To what extent were the two forces willing to curtail the power and influence of the other?

3. What was Hirohito´s roll in the matter? Was he a peace maker or did he play favorites or was he just plain indifferent? How did previous emperors handle the relationship between the army and navy?

4. What effect did the lack of cooperation between the army and navy have on Japan´s overall performance in World War II?

5. Is it believed that the lack of cooperation affected the outcome of a specific battle or campaign?

6. Are there examples of the navy and army coordinating together in a campaign or battle?

1. Afaik:
Divisions between Navy and Army were partly geographical, going back to pre-Imperial Restoration and the actual Restoration in the 1860's. The Shogunate recognised "inner" and "outer" provincial lords. The "inner" ones were the allies of the Tokugawa at the battle of Sekigahara in 1600. The "outer" were the opponents, or neutrals. The "inner" got access to positions on the national level in the Shogunate. The "outer" were left to manage their individual provinces under Shogunate supervision. The Imperial Restoration came from some of the "outer" lords with the local prowerbases in their provinces. The leaders in this process, which ended with European-trained and armed forces moving on the capital of Edo, were the provinces of Choshu and Satsuma. Both were exceptionally wealthy and/or well-managed. Choshu came up with a form of "balanced" budget a century or so ahead of Keynes, and Satsuma is at the tip of the southern island of Kyushu, capable of three harvests of rice annually, and traditionally riddled by nobles (ruled by the Shimazu clan and its dependants, making up as much as 1/3 of the population, insted of the normal 2-5% making up the samurai class).
Both pre-Restoration Choshu and Satsuma had their run ins with European powers, levilling their coastal fortification in retribution of military activity against European ships. Iirc the French shelled Choshu while the Royal Navy flattned stuff in Satsuma. In both places they started modernising western fashion after these displays of military power. Choshu built a powerful military and eventually ended up, alongside nobles from a few other provinces (Ise fx iirc), providing a lot of the officer corps of Imperial Japan. The nobles from Satsuma otoh went for the navy option and ended up providing a great number of naval officers.

3. The emperors role? Still being debated.
The constitutional arrangements were a bit special though. Japan had its constitution drafted in the late 19th c. by the leaders of the Imperial Restoration, who used the constitution of Imperial Germany for inspiration. One of the things they did was to provide a short-cut between the military branches, both indpendantly, and the Emperor, allowing them to bypass parliament and the civilian government. The willingness of tne two branches of the military to use it varied over time. In the 1920's they pretty much consistently played by the rules of a constitutional democracy, and then changed tack in the 1930's, almost completely ignoring parliament.
The key was that they could do pretty much whatever they liked, provided the Emperor's approval could be got. Which is why Hirohito's personal role is still debated. It's obvious the army pretty much went to war in China of their own accord in the 1930's, fixing the legitimacy in retrospect from the Emperor. Questions seem to remain to what extent he was in on it, or was just faced with fait accompli.

I recommend reading an old classic like John Toland's "The Rising Sun" for more info about the unfortunate Japanese situation of militaries playing politics, the branch-rivalry etc.

 

[Camikaze]

4. What effect did the lack of cooperation between the army and navy have on Japan´s overall performance in World War II?

Reasonably large. Japan's empire had horrible supply problems, and a lack of coordination or cooperation didn't help. Particularly getting resources from Indochina and Indonesia was problematic, and resulted in a lot of waste that probably could've helped the war effort quite a bit. Citation needed for the following, but I seem to recall reading of instances where the Army and Navy wouldn't give each other oil, 'cause they wanted it for themselves, thereby reducing the ability of the war machine to function. Oh, and after the Battle of Midway, in which the Navy lost 4 aircraft carriers, the Navy reported to the Army that only one had been lost (for reasons unbeknown to the sane mind). This type of rivalry and subterfuge would certainly not have helped.

 

[Bugfatty300]

Thanks for the imput guys. Verbose was especially helpful.

 

[AesronDrosseli]

1. Afaik:
Divisions between Navy and Army were partly geographical, going back to pre-Imperial Restoration and the actual Restoration in the 1860's. The Shogunate recognised "inner" and "outer" provincial lords. The "inner" ones were the allies of the Tokugawa at the battle of Sekigahara in 1600. The "outer" were the opponents, or neutrals. The "inner" got access to positions on the national level in the Shogunate. The "outer" were left to manage their individual provinces under Shogunate supervision. The Imperial Restoration came from some of the "outer" lords with the local prowerbases in their provinces. The leaders in this process, which ended with European-trained and armed forces moving on the capital of Edo, were the provinces of Choshu and Satsuma. Both were exceptionally wealthy and/or well-managed. Choshu came up with a form of "balanced" budget a century or so ahead of Keynes, and Satsuma is at the tip of the southern island of Kyushu, capable of three harvests of rice annually, and traditionally riddled by nobles (ruled by the Shimazu clan and its dependants, making up as much as 1/3 of the population, insted of the normal 2-5% making up the samurai class).
Both pre-Restoration Choshu and Satsuma had their run ins with European powers, levilling their coastal fortification in retribution of military activity against European ships. Iirc the French shelled Choshu while the Royal Navy flattned stuff in Satsuma. In both places they started modernising western fashion after these displays of military power. Choshu built a powerful military and eventually ended up, alongside nobles from a few other provinces (Ise fx iirc), providing a lot of the officer corps of Imperial Japan. The nobles from Satsuma otoh went for the navy option and ended up providing a great number of naval officers.

3. The emperors role? Still being debated.
The constitutional arrangements were a bit special though. Japan had its constitution drafted in the late 19th c. by the leaders of the Imperial Restoration, who used the constitution of Imperial Germany for inspiration. One of the things they did was to provide a short-cut between the military branches, both indpendantly, and the Emperor, allowing them to bypass parliament and the civilian government. The willingness of tne two branches of the military to use it varied over time. In the 1920's they pretty much consistently played by the rules of a constitutional democracy, and then changed tack in the 1930's, almost completely ignoring parliament.
The key was that they could do pretty much whatever they liked, provided the Emperor's approval could be got. Which is why Hirohito's personal role is still debated. It's obvious the army pretty much went to war in China of their own accord in the 1930's, fixing the legitimacy in retrospect from the Emperor. Questions seem to remain to what extent he was in on it, or was just faced with fait accompli.

I recommend reading an old classic like John Toland's "The Rising Sun" for more info about the unfortunate Japanese situation of militaries playing politics, the branch-rivalry etc.

Crap. Not only did you beat me to it, you gave more info than I could have!

 

[Verbose]

Crap. Not only did you beat me to it, you gave more info than I could have!

It's what I remember of Edwin O. Reischauer's old classic on the history of Japan.