Some great reading about chariots

A)I think it is not a good idea to just open a thread so as to link to a discussion at another forum.

B)Where is Poland in all that debate? Surely it exists somewhere. :)
 
B)Where is Poland in all that debate? Surely it exists somewhere. :)

Well it doesn't need a reminder that chariots are a distinctively Polish invention.
 
B) Where is Poland in all that debate? Surely it exists somewhere.

:) You just got wise to me! Here it is:

A) Tachanka - a form of chariot invented by Russians during the Russian Civil War and the Polish-Soviet War:


Link to video.

B) Tachanka was adopted by the Polish army in the early 1920s and remained in use until 1939.
 
Interesting hearing how much stock was placed on those chariots in that period. Wasn't there a transition away from chariots though after a point? Do you know when that happened so I could read a bit about it
 
Chariots seemed to be used in the Classical Greek world only up to mycenean times. They were then abandoned from Greek armies, although foreign(barbaric) armies regularly fielded them for aeons later.

I am not sure if chariots found some use again in the Hellenistic era. Many Hellenistic kingdoms used elephants though.
 
I am not sure if chariots found some use again in the Hellenistic era. Many Hellenistic kingdoms used elephants though.
Some Hellenistic kings fielded small forces of chariots for prestige purposes. They rarely justified even the minor amounts spent on them.
 
Some Hellenistic kings fielded small forces of chariots for prestige purposes. They rarely justified even the minor amounts spent on them.

In other words, rational irrationality.
 
Wasn't there a transition away from chariots though after a point?

With the improvement of horsemanship skills, and cavalry equipment and weapons, I suppose.

The transition away from chariots was connected mainly with the development of heavy lance-wielding cavalry.

Also horse archers reduced the role of chariots - they were simply cheaper than chariot archers.

Some Hellenistic kings fielded small forces of chariots for prestige purposes.

In the battle of Amnias in 89 BC King Mithridates VI of Pontus fielded 130 scythed chariots under Kraterus - they massacred Bithynian infantry of the opposing army of Nicomedes IV. So they were not kept just for prestige purposes, but used in battles - often to great effect.

But at Amnias in 89 BC there were just 130 chariots - a number not even comparable to that at Kadesh in 1274 BC or at Karkar in 853 BC.

So indeed, gradually the number of chariots was decreasing over time. Perhaps due to increase of the role of cavalry.

Heavy lance-wielding cavalry - such as companions or cataphracts - reduced the role of chariots as shock forces.

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Examples of Ancient battles with chariots (in some of them chariots played a crucial role) and numbers of chariots involved:

Kadesh 1274 BC - ca. 5700 chariots (both sides - Egypt and Hittite Empire)

Karkar 853 BC - at least ca. 3900 chariots (anti-Assyrian coalition)

Gaugamela 331 BC - ca. 200 chariots (Persian Empire)

Amnias 89 BC - ca. 130 chariots (Kingdom of Pontus)

Chaeronea 86 BC
- ca. 60 chariots (Kingdom of Pontus)

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Regarding the battle of Amnias in 89 BC:

In the battle of Amnias in 89 BC Ponthic scythed chariots (only 130 of them, under Kraterus) massacred Bithynian infantry, saving the day for Ponthic forces (before that, forces of Mithridates were already routed under pressure of forces of Nicomedes IV). Moreover Appian explicitly writes, that scythed chariots attacked dense formations of enemy infantry, which only later - after already seeing many of their men being literally grinded by scythes - became terrified, and their ranks started to loose cohesion (perhaps some men - seeing other men killed by scythes - started to route, at first only individuals, later entire groups, finally entire formation collapsed). So the theory that scythed chariots are not able to do anything to infantry which keeps cohesion, is not true. In the battle of Amnias, scythed chariots penetrated into ranks of victorious infantry (shortly before that clash against chariots, they routed Mithridatic light infantry), which kept full cohesion at first, and only later - after already seeing the massacre and the bloodhshed caused by enemy chariots - started to loose its cohesion, under the influence of this terrifying view (Appian describes that men were literally cut in half or into more pieces, many of them were not immediately killed but still lived, despite being cut in half - which even increased the horror - body parts of many soldiers remained on scythes and chariots were moving on, hung with pieces of flesh).

Check the description of this battle by Appian, 12.18.

Regarding the battle of Chaeronea in 86 BC:

Few years after Amnias - at Chaeronea (86 BC) - a similar frontal charge of chariots against Roman infantry didn't succeed, but Plut. Sull. 18, says that the main reason of failure of this charge was insufficient speed of chariots ("they striked into the Romans at totally harmless speed").

However, at Chaeronea there were just 60 scythed chariots - compared to 130 scythed chariots at Amnias.

Regarding the battle of Karkar in 853 BC (one of the largest battles of Antiquity):

In the battle of Karkar (853 BC) a coalition of 12 kingdoms - including Israel, Aram and Hamat - defeated the Assyrian Empire. Aram fielded 1,200 chariots, 1,200 cavalry and 20,000 soldiers, Israel mobilized 10,000 soldiers and 2,000 chariots, Hamat fielded 700 chariots, 700 cavalry and 10,000 soldiers. Just these three most powerful kingdoms (out of 12) together fielded 3,900 chariots and 41,900 soldiers (including cavalry). Assyrian forces numbered 100,000 men. Assyrian forces were beaten and all 12 kingdoms stopped paying tribute to Assyria after that battle.

Perhaps 10,000 soldiers listed for Israel, includes both infantry and cavalry - Israel was famous for excellent cavalry at that time.

King Solomon of Israel (ca. 970 - 931 BC) had 12,000 specially bred war horses (source: The First Book of Kings, 5,6).

Such a poem from the Book of Job (39:19-25) says a lot about the importance of war horses in Ancient Israel:

Do you give the horse its strength
or clothe its neck with a flowing mane?
Do you make it leap like a locust,
striking terror with its proud snorting?
It paws fiercely, rejoicing in its strength,
and charges into the fray.
It laughs at fear, afraid of nothing;
it does not shy away from the sword.
The quiver rattles against its side,
along with the flashing spear and lance.
In frenzied excitement it eats up the ground;
it cannot stand still when the trumpet sounds.
At the blast of the trumpet it snorts, ‘Aha!’
It catches the scent of battle from afar,
the shout of commanders and the battle cry.

Original version in Hebrew:

יט הֲתִתֵּן לַסּוּס גְּבוּרָה; הֲתַלְבִּישׁ צַוָּארוֹ רַעְמָה.
כ הֲתַרְעִישֶׁנּוּ, כָּאַרְבֶּה; הוֹד נַחְרוֹ אֵימָה.
כא יַחְפְּרוּ בָעֵמֶק, וְיָשִׂישׂ בְּכֹחַ; יֵצֵא, לִקְרַאת-נָשֶׁק.
כב יִשְׂחַק לְפַחַד, וְלֹא יֵחָת; וְלֹא-יָשׁוּב, מִפְּנֵי-חָרֶב.
כג עָלָיו, תִּרְנֶה אַשְׁפָּה; לַהַב חֲנִית וְכִידוֹן.
כד בְּרַעַשׁ וְרֹגֶז, יְגַמֶּא-אָרֶץ; וְלֹא-יַאֲמִין, כִּי-קוֹל שׁוֹפָר.
כה בְּדֵי שֹׁפָר, יֹאמַר הֶאָח-- וּמֵרָחוֹק, יָרִיחַ מִלְחָמָה;
רַעַם שָׂרִים, וּתְרוּעָה.

Here king Solomon's stable in Megiddo can be seen:

meggido400.jpg


Regarding Persian chariots at Gaugamela in 331 BC:

It is not a coincidence that Alexander ordered his phalangites to step aside and let the chariots pass their lines (and then he ordered his skirmishers, deployed behind phalanx, to eliminate chariots), rather than ordering them to stand firm and to try to stop the chariots. It shows that even phalanx formation with long sarissas was at risk of being penetrated (or at least of suffering heavy losses) by a charge of scythed chariots and that Alexander knew about that risk - that's why he ordered his phalanx to avoid direct contact and to leave the bloody job to skirmishers.
 
So, I actually wrote out a post in response to Domen's original post, but then he totally edited it before I posted, and I don't really feel like bothering to respond to the entire new thing.
Spoiler my original comments :
Well, there are all kinds of problems with Appianus' description of the Battle of the Amnias. (The numbers in particular are hilarious; I think he gave Mithridates a force of several hundred thousand, which would be utterly absurd even for the total armed forces of the Pontic kingdom.) With that said, I did say that chariots "rarely" justified the amounts spent on them, and that particular battle is one of those rare events.

This is mostly because the chariotry was operating under conditions of maximum viability at the Amnias River. Nikomedes' Bithynian army had abandoned the safety of its hill to pursue the Pontic forces and try to complete a rout, which meant that the chariots could operate on more or less level ground. The Bithynian army also probably consisted in large part of relatively untrained, cheap levy-style troops, an assertion corroborated by their adverse reaction to the scythed chariotry. More disciplined forces facing chariots, like Sulla's Romans at Chaironeia, were not so effected. (Also, Appianus stated that the Pontic army's phalanx had not yet come up, so Archelaos and Neoptolemos were fighting Nikomedes with primarily light and medium infantry. It's hard to envision that kind of force more or less successfully standing up to a larger Bithynian army for some hours unless that Bithynian army was itself not that high-quality.)
 
Kyriakos said:
I am not sure if chariots found some use again in the Hellenistic era.

Of course they were used - just to mention the Seleucid Empire or the Kingdom of Pontus.

Perhaps also other Hellenistic states used chariots than these two mentioned above.

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Regarding that Chinese text about chariots (posted by HackneyedScribe) - let's quote it here:

Something from a Chinese source - the Six Secret Teachings:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Secret_Teachings

King Wu asked Tai Gong: "What about battle chariots?"
Tai Gong replied: (...) In general, in chariot battles, there are ten types of situations on which demise is very likely and eight on which victory can be easily achieved."
King Wu asked:"What are the ten fatal situations like?”
Tai Gong replied:”If after advancing, there is no way to withdraw, this is a fatal terrain for chariots.
Passing beyond narrow defiles, to pursue the enemy some distance, this is terrain which will exhaust the chariots.
When the land in front makes advancing easy, while that to the rear is treacherous, this is terrain that will entrap the chariots.
Penetrating into narrow and obstructed areas from which escape will be difficult, this is terrain on which the chariots may be cut off.
If the land is collapsing, sinking, and marshy, with black mud sticking to everything, this is terrain which will ‘labor’ the chariots.
To the left is precipitous while to the right is easy, with high mounds and sharp hills. This is terrain contrary to the use of chariots.
Luxuriant grass runs through the field, and there are deep, watery channels throughout. This is terrain which thwarts the use of chariots.
When the chariots are few in number, the land easy, and one is outnumbered by enemy infantry, this is terrain on which the chariots may be defeated.
To the rear are water filled ravines and ditches, to the left deep water and to the right steep hills. This is terrain on which chariots are destroyed.
It has been raining day and night for more than ten days without stopping. The roads have collapsed so that it is not possible to advance or to escape to the rear. This is the terrain that will sink the chariots.
These ten are deadly terrain for chariots. Thus they are the means by which the stupid general will be captured and the wise general will be able to escape."
King Wu asked:"What about eight conditions of terrain that result in victory?"
Tai Gong replied:"When the enemy’s ranks - front and rear - are not yet settled, strike into them.
When their flags and pennants are in chaos, their men and horses frequently shifting about, then strike into them.
When some of their officers and troops advance while others retreat; when some move to the left, others to the right, then strike into them.
When their battle array is not yet solid, while their officers and troops are looking around at each other, strike them.
When in advancing, they appear full of doubts, and in withdrawing they are fearful, strike them.
When the enemy’s whole army are suddenly frightened, all of them rising up in great confusion, strike into them.
When you are fighting on easy terrain and twilight has not ended, strike into them.
When, after traveling far, at dusk they are camping and their whole army are terrified, strike into them.
These eight situations constitute conditions in which the chariots will be victorious.
If the general is clear about these ten fatal situations and eight situations where victory is almost certain, then even if the enemy surrounds him on all sides - attacking with one thousand chariots and ten thousand cavalry from the front and the flanks - he will invariably be victorious."
"Excellent!" said King Wu.

King Wu asked Tai Gong: "When chariots and infantry engage in battle, one chariot is equivalent to how many infantrymen? How many infantrymen are equivalent to one chariot? When cavalry and infantry engage in battle, one cavalryman is equivalent to how many infantrymen? How many infantrymen are equivalent to one cavalryman? When chariots and cavalry engage in battle, one chariot is equivalent to how many cavalrymen? How many cavalrymen are equivalent to one chariot?"
Tai Gong replied: "Chariots are the wings of the army, the means to penetrate solid formations, to press strong enemies and to cut off their flight. (...) after the masses of the army have been arrayed in opposition to the enemy, when fighting on easy terrain, the rule is that one chariot is equivalent to eighty infantrymen, and eighty infantrymen equal to one chariot. One cavalryman is equivalent to eight infantrymen; eight infantrymen is equivalent to one cavalryman. One chariot is equivalent to ten cavalrymen; ten cavalrymen is equivalent to one chariot.
The rule for fighting on difficult terrain is that one chariot is equivalent to forty infantrymen, and forty infantrymen are equivalent to one chariot. One cavalryman is equivalent to four infantrymen; four infantrymen are equivalent to one cavalrymen. One chariot is equivalent to six cavalrymen; six cavalrymen are equivalent to one chariot.
Now chariots and cavalry are the army’s strong weapons. Ten chariots can defeat one thousand men; one hundred chariots can defeat ten thousand men. Ten cavalrymen can drive off one hundred men, and one hundred cavalrymen can drive off one thousand men. These are the approximate numbers."
King Wu asked: "What are the numbers for chariot and cavalry officers and their transformation?"
Tai Gong replied: "For the chariots - a leader for five chariots, a captain for ten, a commander for fifty and a general for one hundred.
For battle on easy terrain five chariots comprise one line. The lines are forty paces apart, the chariots from left to right should be ten paces apart, with detachments sixty paces apart. On difficult terrain the chariots must follow the roads, with ten comprising a company and twenty a regiment. Front to rear spacing should be twenty paces, left to right six paces, with detachments thirty-six paces apart. If they venture of the road more than two li in any direction, they should return to the original road.
As for the number of officers in the cavalry: a leader for five men; a captain for ten; a commander for one hundred; a general for two hundred.
The rule for fighting on easy terrain: Five cavalrymen will form one line, and front to back their lines should be separated by twenty paces, left to right four paces, with fifty paces between detachments.
On difficult terrain, the rule is front to back, ten paces; left to right, two paces; between detachments, twenty-five paces. Thirty cavalrymen comprise a company; sixty form a regiment. For ten cavalrymen, there is a captain. In action, they should not move out of the range of one hundred paces, after which they should circle back and return to their original positions."
"Excellent!" said King Wu.

And a further fragment from the Six Secret Teachings about chariots:

"(...) As for the basic numbers when employing the army, if commanding ten thousand armed soldiers the rules for [the various types of equipment and their] employment are as follows.
Thirty-six Martial Protective Large Fu-hsu Chariots. Skilled officers, strong crossbowmen, spear bearers, and halberdiers - total of twenty-four for each flank [and the rear]. The chariots have eight foot wheels. On it are set up pennants and drums which, according to the Art of War, are referred to as 'Shaking Fear.' They are used to penetrate solid formations, to defeat strong enemies.
Seventy-two Martial-Flanking Large Covered Spear and Halberd Fu-hsu Chariots. Skilled officers, strong crossbowmen, spear bearers, and halberdiers comprise the flanks. They have five foot wheels and winch-powered linked crossbows which fire multiple arrows for self protection. They are used to penetrate solid formations and defeat strong enemies.
One hundred and forty Flank-supporting Small covered Fu-hsu Chariots equipped with winch-powered linked crossbows to fire multiple arrows for self-protection. They have deer wheels and are used to penetrate solid formations and defeat strong enemies.
Thirty-six Great Yellow Triple-linked Crossbow Large Fu-hsu Chariots. Skilled officers, strong crossbowmen, spear bearers, and halberdiers compromise the flanks, with 'flying duck' and 'lightning shadow' arrows for self-protection. 'Flying duck' arrows have red shafts and white feathers, with bronze arrowheads. 'Lightning's shadow' arrows have green shafts and red feathers, with iron heads. In the daytime they display pennants of red silk six feet long by six inches wide, which shimmer int he light. At night they hang pennants of white silk, also six feet long by six inches wide, which appear like meteors. They are used to penetrate solid formations, to defeat infantry and cavalry.
Thirty six Great Fu-hsu Attack Chariots. Carrying Praying Mantis Martial warriors, they can attack both horizontal and vertical formations and can defeat the enemy.
Baggage Chariots [for repelling] mounted invaders, also called 'Lightning Chariots.' The Art of War refers to their use in 'lightning attacks.' They are used to penetrate solid formations, to defeat both infantry and cavalry.
One hundred and sixty Spear and Halberd Fu-hsu Light Chariots [for repelling] night invaders from the fore. Each carries three Praying Mantis Martial knights. The Art of War refers to them as mounting 'thunder attacks.' They are used to penetrate solid formations, to defeat both infantry and cavalry... [continues to other equipment that has nothing to do with chariots] ..."

And from another Ancient Chinese source - Wuzi attributed to Wu Qi (aka Wu Ch'i):

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wuzi

Marquis Wu asked: "In general are there methods for taking care of the chariots and cavalry?"
Wu Ch'i replied: "Now the horses must be properly settled, with appropriate grass and water and correct feeding so as to be neither hungry nor full. In the winter they should have warm stables, in the summer cool sheds. Their mane and hair should be kept trimmed and their hooves properly cared for. Blinders and ear protectors should be used so as to keep them from being startled and frightened. Practice their galloping and pursuit, exercise constraint over their advancing and halting. Men and horses must be attached to each other; only thereafter can they be employed. "
"The equipment for the chariots and cavalry - such as saddles, bridles, bits, and reins- must all be complete and durable. Normally, the horses do not receive their injuries near the end of the battle but invariably they are injured at the start. Similarly, they are not injured so much by hunger as by being overfed. When the sun is setting and the road long, the riders should frequently dismount for it is better to have the men weary than to overlabor the horses. You should always direct movements so as to keep some strength in reserve against the enemy suddenly turning on us. Anyone who is clear about this can traverse the realm without hindrance."

And here HackneyedScribe posted info from Han Dynasty period Donghai commandery Military Inventory:

http://historum.com/asian-history/45323-han-dynasty-donghai-military-inventory.html

As you can see, there were in total 7174 chariots of various types in that inventory in year 13 BC.
 
As for Dachs' response to my post:

Hilarious numbers is something very typical for Greek and Roman historians - their numbers are often exaggerated (especially regarding enemy forces). Just to mention hilarious numbers given by Greek historians regarding the size of Persian forces in various battles.

In this case, Appian also exaggerates the number of Ponthic forces, which fought against Nicomedes IV who was a good ally of Rome.

However, the number of 130 chariots does not sound hilarious - it sounds very realistic.

Dachs said:
This is mostly because the chariotry was operating under conditions of maximum viability at the Amnias River. Nikomedes' Bithynian army had abandoned the safety of its hill to pursue the Pontic forces and try to complete a rout, which meant that the chariots could operate on more or less level ground.

I fully agree with you that chariots needed proper conditions to be efficient - and these conditions included level ground.

Even the Chinese source I quoted above, says that there were 10 situations / types of terrain in which chariots were useless.

The Bithynian army also probably consisted in large part of relatively untrained, cheap levy-style troops

This is actually an unsupported claim.

If not a claim that contradicts facts (there surely are some descriptions of Bithynian infantry in various Ancient sources).

an assertion corroborated by their adverse reaction to the scythed chariotry.

At first their reaction to scythed chariots was firm resistance - only after being defeated by chariots, they lost their morale.

This is explicitly described by Appian who writes that they resisted chariots, but chariots nevertheless grinded them into pieces of meat.

And only after many of them had already been grinded into pieces of meat, the rest of them lost their morale.

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It's something very typical for all ancient and medieval historians. Somebody needs to go over ancient Chinese numbers with Delbrück's fine-toothed comb; I imagine the ludicrous Goguryeo-Sui War would be one of the first casualties.
 
But please note that inventory is something different than army size.

There can be more equipment than soldiers.

And if there are 7000 chariots in the inventory it doesn't mean that all are used in battle at the same time.

Or it doesn't even mean that all of them are combat-effective (some can be damaged or very old and requiring repairs).
 
Sure, that's a possibility. Or the number could just be exaggerated.
 
That Chinese source claims that one chariot is worth ten cavalrymen. Granted, this was back when cavalry seem to have had smaller, weaker horses, simpler (if any) saddles, and no stirrups, but what advantages did a chariot have over horsemen? After all, they were eventually abandoned entirely in favor of cavalry, and they can't turn on a dime like a skilled horse and rider can.
 
Also, decreased mobility (due to the wheels) and increased cost.
 
Sure, that's a possibility. Or the number could just be exaggerated.

Or just could be true. Ancient China already had population of several dozen million people.

Is producing several thousand chariots impossible for such a large civilization?

Mithridates fielding several hundred thousand chariots sounds cool

Mithridates fielded 130 chariots. 7000 were in the Donghai commandery military inventory in year 12 BC.

Granted, this was back when cavalry seem to have had smaller, weaker horses, simpler (if any) saddles, and no stirrups,

They usually had saddles - Parthians and Sassanids were using very advanced saddles (including four-horned saddles which provided good stability).

As to smaller, weakers horses - perhaps some armies were using such horses, but some other armies were already using good horses. Just to mention that King Solomon of Israel had 12,000 specially bred war horses - I do not thing that they included small and weak horses.

Of course there were also types of cavalry which did not use saddles - but those usually fought as light cavalry / skirmish cavalry / horse archers.

but what advantages did a chariot have over horsemen? After all, they were eventually abandoned entirely in favor of cavalry, and they can't turn on a dime like a skilled horse and rider can.

Chinese scythed chariots were large ones - with crews numbering several men (perhaps usually 3 men).

So when he writes that one chariot is equivalent to 6 cavalrymen, it means that 3 or more charioteers = 6 cavalrymen.

After all, they were eventually abandoned entirely in favor of cavalry

Maybe this had something to do with their cost. Chariots were maybe simply too expensive.

And cavalry was more flexible as you noticed - chariots required special conditions to be efficient, cavalry was more versatile.

Moreover, chariots could be used only in battle - while cavalry also for patrolling, pursuit, reconnaissance, etc.

Also chariots were large targets, easy to hit by enemy skirmishers (javelin throwers or archers).

nd they can't turn on a dime like a skilled horse and rider can.

Exactly. Another disadvantage of chariots.

Chariots were like heavy King Tigers and heavy cavalry like T-34 medium tanks. :)

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