The case for moar inflation.

Hygro

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Inflation is bad, right?

Right?

It makes our savings dwindle, and risks outstripping wages making us poorer. It makes banks less interested in lending without increasing interest rates. It makes it then harder for businesses to achieve credit, which of course means that growth, expansion, hiring new workers, etc becomes more difficult hurting the economy on both the supply side and the demand side. It makes investments in general more risky as they might not beat inflation, and you can't count on breaking even in the case the venture goes nowhere and sits on its depreciating capital.

I'm currently writing a paper arguing the opposite of this thread, thanks to the concept of "anchored expectations", but in the process, will try to make the case for why we might want a big spike in inflation to get us out of this weak economy, and reduce the risk that this becomes "the new normal" (really slow economic growth).

We will make the case based on some intuition-friendly logic.

Part 1
There's a concept in monetary policy known as the "Zero Lower Bound" or ZLB which means "interest rates can't be dropped below zero." Though there are small exceptions, but people will choose to hold cash rather than put their money in negative-return accounts.

When the economy hits the ZLB, the Fed cannot do any more stimulus by cutting interest rates. Cutting interest rates is the smoothest, choicest first-step action to fix a recession. (This is why the Fed has been using other ways of stimulating the economy like Quantitative easing). Another name for the ZLB is a "liquidity trap" (this will be important) which you likely have heard of.

The ZLB is slightly adjusted by expected inflation (also important), specifically, the more we expect inflation, the lower the bottom interest rate can be. This is because holding cash in the face of inflation is losing money, so if there's a sub-zero interest rate above inflation, it's effectively a positive interest rate.

We will assume that in general, expected inflation matches real inflation since they often are.

So to conclude part one, the Fed can effectively lower interest rates by increasing inflation. The more inflation, the lower the ZLB is, and the more effective the bottomed out interest rate has on stimulating the economy.

Still with me? If not, ask for a clarification. :)

Part 2

As inflation moves, the Fed wants to adjust interest rates. If inflation is low, this means that interest rates should be low. The reason1 is simple: if interest rates were well above inflation, everyone would park their excess money in treasury bills and neither consume not invest in the private sector, hurting growth. Sure, you're loaning to the government but they can deficit spend so it's not like you're increasing the governments' ability to pay for things, (at least in the short run! And this discussion is about the short run, i.e. a few years caps). When inflation goes up, the reverse is true. To stop inflation hurting the economy, the Fed raises interest rates pulling money out of circulation, keeping prices from rising.

1. One reason, anyway. There are others.

Generally, there's a consensus that lower inflation and lower interest rates are good for the economy. Stable prices, easy investment, etc. There's such a thing as too low, but it's a much smaller gap than the infinitely too big ;)

But if inflation drops too much, the Fed cannot drop interest rates below the ZLB! Now more people want to park their money in T-Bills. ~0% is better than whatever negative inflation is going on. So as the gap between inflation and the interest rate drops, more and more businesses and individuals will park their money there. Worse2 yet, as this point is likely deflation, there is extra incentive to hold on to your now appreciating cash or stocks of T-Bills, reducing further spending/consumption and investing in private enterprise, which can cause a deflationary spiral. A bad positive feedback loop.

2. We'll assume economic recession is bad. There are counter arguments.

So here we see another angle of the problem. The ZLB means the Fed can't incentivize investment over cash holdings, and worse yet, can cause consumption to slow down creating a vicious cycle.

Part 3

If we combine parts 1 and 2, we have side of the big polygonal conundrum. If a lower inflation rate raises the ZLB, and deflation can push the ZLB above 0% nominal (like, the technical number) interest rates, and if this can create a deflationary feedback loop, the zero lower bound can continue to get worse and worse, further exacerbating the problem. Now we have not one but two variables causing the feedback loop! It's not infinite, of course, because at some point someone's gotta spend their money on something. Necessities like food, worn out clothes, etc, but also someone's going to want a new home, a new TV, a new modem, and waiting for prices to drop isn't going to be worth it. But that point will be after our economy shrinks and shrinks to the point of massive unemployment well above today's and other things that hurt people a lot.

Still with me?

Part 4
The above double feedback loop in part explains the nature that a drop in aggregate demand above the ZLB means a drop the overall economy, but the same drop in demand below the ZLB means a much bigger drop in the economy.

Part 5
There are a few reasons we, fortunately, never hit the deflationary death spiral in the latest economic crisis. The first is "anchored expectations." The Fed has been so good at controlling inflation during the Volcker-and-especially-Greenspan era that people have come to believe that inflation is more or less a given at its current rate of ~2%. The second is that despite the deflationary pressures which could change peoples' minds, fears of inflation by due to the stimulus and QE and effectively interest free bank loans put inflationary pressure on the economy. These opposing factors, combined with the first element, served to keep inflation steady.

So while the worst effects of the ZLB were largely mitigated, we are still hampered and harmed by it.

Finale (drumroll)

Because today were are below "long run equilibrium" which means we are not meeting our annual historical GDP growth rate of about ~2.5%. Interest rates are at zero and the Fed keeps doing alternative measures to boost aggregate demand in the economy like special loans to banks and buying up risky assets above their market/firesale prices. Meanwhile political gridlock meets economically misinformed Congresspeople makes fiscal stimulus an unlikely reality.

The Fed still has many tools under its belt but a simple, immediately effective, no-money-spent stimulus would be to simply announce it will pursue, say, a rate of 4% inflation per year. Because the Fed is totally capable of this, expected inflation would change very rapidly and would result in more people turning from cash to investment and consumption. In turn this would boost employment which would boost consumption further. In other words, it would speed the recovery and rate of economic growth, something we could use, since this is one of the slowest and most precarious recoveries America has ever seen.

We don't want to be like Japan, whose recovery was so slow, their long run equilibrium growth dropped, more or less permanently.
 
We don't want to be like Japan, whose recovery was so slow, their long run equilibrium growth dropped, more or less permanently.

Japanese deflation has mostly been attributable to its aging demographics. Japanese monetary policies aren't exactly tight, but old people usually don't spend that much, and a lot of Japanese people are old.
 
I don't think anybody is claiming this; at most, unexpected inflation is bad.

Inflation makes economies more mallable, by effectively redistributing from creditors to debtors, though that isn't necessarily a bad thing. The USA and the UK have very loose monetary policies that allow these countries to dominate in high-risk enterprises like IT and financials. In fact, an inflationary economy pretty much relies on risk-taking, since investors will see less real return, they are incentivized to try high-growth, high-risk businesses.

Conversely, deflationary economies change very slowly because they redistribute from debtors to creditors. Money is only lend to and invested in low-risk enterprises that are usually are already well-established, because it is more difficult to get repaid.
 
Can we discuss why interest rates are at such low levels in the first place? Is this an artificial condition or is it really the effect of a massive abundance of savings and cheap products (i.e. lower prices -> easier monetary policy)?

I tend to find the notion that there are so many savings that no borrowing spree is big enough to absorb all of them rather hard to stomach.

And what's the deal with the Chinese government continuing to systematically load up on US treasuries when the yield on them is so low? What gives them the incentive? Is there really nothing else they can do?
 
Can we discuss why interest rates are at such low levels in the first place? Is this an artificial condition or is it really the effect of a massive abundance of savings and cheap products (i.e. lower prices -> easier monetary policy)?

I tend to find the notion that there are so many savings that no borrowing spree is big enough to absorb all of them rather hard to stomach.

And what's the deal with the Chinese government continuing to systematically load up on US treasuries when the yield on them is so low? What gives them the incentive? Is there really nothing else they can do?


Supply and demand. Lots and lots of supply, very little demand. Now since the financial crisis the central banks have been keeping interest rates very low as a matter of policy. A credit crunch is a pretty unusual situation. Because you have both people reluctant to borrow and banks reluctant to lend. Too much uncertainty in the system. Further, interest rates in the long run are based in part on the expectations of inflation. And long term low rates means that the market simply has no expectations that inflation is in the cards.
 
The Fed still has many tools under its belt but a simple, immediately effective, no-money-spent stimulus would be to simply announce it will pursue, say, a rate of 4% inflation per year.

Um, duh?

It seems to me that Integral, not to mention Krugman, has been saying the same thing for quite a while.

Really, somebody just needs to slip some testosterone into Bernanke's coffee. Seriously, and almost literally. He'll need it, to take the heat. Inflation steps on a lot of powerful toes. But if our country can find volunteers to risk life and limb in misadventures in deserts halfway around the world, why can't it ever seem to find decisionmakers willing to risk cushy careers in order to save the economy?
 
Um, duh?

It seems to me that Integral, not to mention Krugman, has been saying the same thing for quite a while.

Really, somebody just needs to slip some testosterone into Bernanke's coffee. Seriously, and almost literally. He'll need it, to take the heat. Inflation steps on a lot of powerful toes. But if our country can find volunteers to risk life and limb in misadventures in deserts halfway around the world, why can't it ever seem to find decisionmakers willing to risk cushy careers in order to save the economy?

Bernanke is an outspoken fan of keeping inflation low. Also, yeah, Krugman's been saying it, so has Integral. In fact Integral helped with a calculation on my paper. That doesn't mean that people still think it's a bad idea. I guess I shouldn't have bothered to lay it out?

Japanese deflation has mostly been attributable to its aging demographics. Japanese monetary policies aren't exactly tight, but old people usually don't spend that much, and a lot of Japanese people are old.

*citation needed*



**
Also, there's an error in one of my descriptions. Can anyone point it out?
 
Bernanke is an outspoken fan of keeping inflation low.

Only recently, though. Prior to the crisis he's been much more "dovish" on the issue. Especially in criticizing Japanese policy. It's tempting to surmise he has been succumbing to outside pressure on this.

Cutlass said:
Supply and demand. Lots and lots of supply, very little demand. Now since the financial crisis the central banks have been keeping interest rates very low as a matter of policy. A credit crunch is a pretty unusual situation. Because you have both people reluctant to borrow and banks reluctant to lend. Too much uncertainty in the system. Further, interest rates in the long run are based in part on the expectations of inflation. And long term low rates means that the market simply has no expectations that inflation is in the cards.

You say "very little demand" and yet we see Western economies being leveraged up to 4 times their yearly income. There has been a massive surge in borrowing in the last 10 years and interest rates have not budged upward by much. Doesn't this sound dubious to you at all? Where do you suggest the savings that make these obscene debt pyramids possible are coming from? Argue how not only these 400% debt-to-GDP ratios (public + private) in two 15 trillion dollar economies (EU + US) are possible. Argue how they are possible and interest rates can go further down while these debts are being built up.
 
I definitely think we could use more inflation, temporarily, and I think the arguments for temporarily targeting 4% inflation are strong.

However, permanently raising the inflation target is typically frowned upon by conservative central banks, because it's The Inflation Target (said in deep, reverential terms, possibly by Morgan Freeman). Heck there are some countries (Canada, Australia) where the inflation target is burned into the national psyche. 2%. 2%. 2%.

But!

I think that the goal of higher inflation is a good one. I also think the 2% is a good idea. How to reconcile them? Level targeting. When we have a bad bout of disinflation, inflation falls and the price level falls, relative to the old trend line. My proposal is that the Fed targets the old trend line. That way, in the long run, we still have a 2% inflation target, but in the short run, we'll have (and expect to have) inflation higher than 2% (say, 4%) to get us back to the old trend line. It satisfies both hawks and doves. It's what FDR would do (and did!).

(Now replace "inflation" with "nominal GDP" and you have my ideal proposal.) :)



Ayatollah So said:
It seems to me that Integral, not to mention Krugman, has been saying the same thing for quite a while.
I am pleased to be referenced in the same sentence and with the same authority as Paul Krugman. :D


-

Edit: Briefly: level targeting is the answer to both "anchored expectations" and "we need more inflation in the short run." (Indeed, the latter statement isn't even necessarily true! What if "more inflation" came through an oil shock? Certainly no-one would be rejoicing then! We need a specific kind of inflation: the inflation that comes with rising AD.)
 
Really, somebody just needs to slip some testosterone into Bernanke's coffee. Seriously, and almost literally. He'll need it, to take the heat. Inflation steps on a lot of powerful toes. But if our country can find volunteers to risk life and limb in misadventures in deserts halfway around the world, why can't it ever seem to find decisionmakers willing to risk cushy careers in order to save the economy?


Bernanke does not work in a vacuum. Recall that he is, despite what people think concerning his actions in office during a crisis, a conservative at heart. But also recall that he is not running the show by himself, but instead has to convince the rest of the Fed's decision making board to go along with him. And many of them are far more hawkish that he is.



You say "very little demand" and yet we see Western economies being leveraged up to 4 times their yearly income. There has been a massive surge in borrowing in the last 10 years and interest rates have not budged upward by much. Doesn't this sound dubious to you at all? Where do you suggest the savings that make these obscene debt pyramids possible are coming from? Argue how not only these 400% debt-to-GDP ratios (public + private) in two 15 trillion dollar economies (EU + US) are possible. Argue how they are possible and interest rates can go further down while these debts are being built up.


I think I misunderstood the time frames you were speaking of. If you are considering the last 10 years rather than the last 2 years, then it really is a problem of excess savings. Globally, not US specific. All those sovereign wealth funds, why do they exist? Specifically because countries have vast pools of savings that they choose not to spend or invest on anything within their own countries. And so it went looking elsewhere for a rate of return. Much of the Third World choose to build up cash reserve after the series of financial crises of the 90s. So they had vast savings, and a refusal to spend or invest that money at home. The developed nations have aging populations that have passed the point of hing consumption and are putting away pension money towards retirement. And that money could not be profitably invested at home.

There was a global glut of savings for multiple reasons. The whole problem just keeps coming back to that. It is not money being invented out of thin air. It is money flowing around the world and not being invested.

The problem is that the consumption resulting is not being generated through incomes, but through borrowing. And whenever too great a mass of borrowing is funding consumption rather than investment, then eventually those debts have to be wiped out. Inflation is one way to do that.

The US federal government may not have passed the point at which it can no longer service its debt. But much of the rest of the world, including American private citizens, businesses, state and local governments, has.
 
I think a lot of people have been arguing for nominal GDP targets for the central bank, instead of inflation targets, which would politically seem more acceptable than changing the goalposts and accepting 4% inflation. Some people even believe that the Bank of England is running a de facto nominal GDP target right now, insofar as their actions are more consistent with a nominal GDP target than an inflation target. I mean, at the very least, the BoE has been highly tolerant of the CPI being >4% throughout 2011, and >3% since 2009.
 
Cutlass said:
eventually those debts have to be wiped out. Inflation is one way to do that.

Inflating away debts does not work. It makes interest rates on newly issued debt rise in proportion to the inflation, i.e. the inflation gets priced in in the bond market. The only conditions under which it is somewhat effective are:
- when a lot of debt is held in long maturity assets (i.e. no roll-over at the higher interest rate) and the taking on of short term debt can realistically be freezed
- when the inflation is delivered in a single shock such as through the issuing of a new currency; obviously this has it's own set of risks and dangers
 
Inflation that is long term and expected ahead of time doesn't work. Sudden changes in inflation away from expectations does.
 
But also recall that he is not running the show by himself, but instead has to convince the rest of the Fed's decision making board to go along with him. And many of them are far more hawkish that he is.

It'll never work - but it's certainly worth a try. (To quote a famous philosopher.) Some browbeating might help. Remind them that they are supposed to battle unemployment too, not just inflation; that in the law creating the Fed, the inflation goal does not - contrary to recent practice - supersede the employment one. And right now unemployment is the much bigger monster.

Inflation that is long term and expected ahead of time doesn't work. Sudden changes in inflation away from expectations does.

At this point, anything over 2% demand-led inflation would surprise everyone.
 
It'll never work - but it's certainly worth a try. (To quote a famous philosopher.) Some browbeating might help. Remind them that they are supposed to battle unemployment too, not just inflation; that in the law creating the Fed, the inflation goal does not - contrary to recent practice - supersede the employment one. And right now unemployment is the much bigger monster.


The Fed chairman doesn't have that kind of power. He is appointed for a 4 year term. The other governors for 12 year terms. The regional bank presidents are appointed by the banks in their region. The regional presidents from several of the regions are traditionally the type who see inflation as the only possible concern of the Fed.



At this point, anything over 2% demand-led inflation would surprise everyone.


And would be next to impossible to arrange with monetary policy. Only oil can do it now.
 
Inflation that is long term and expected ahead of time doesn't work. Sudden changes in inflation away from expectations does.

Yes, but the expectations factor in the temptation for the government to start engineering inflation when conditions get too bad. The ability for the government to pre-empt expectations in this way is as problematic as that of beating the market at profitable investment through central planning.

Another thing I should point out: any debts held in foreign currency, both by the public and private sector, raise in proportion to nominal quantities in the domestic currency under influence of the inflation. According to economic historian Michael Hudson, this is the principle by which inflation engineering can lead to hyperinflation. The following interview is worth listening to for more information:

http://vimeo.com/154311
http://vimeo.com/155461
http://vimeo.com/159755
http://vimeo.com/162142
 
You could actually argue that the ECB has done some sort of NGDP targeting for Germany (at a 2 % NGDP growth rate):

germany-ngdp-and-hours-worked-1991-20102.jpg


http://kantooseconomics.com/2011/01/27/ngdp-level-targeting-works/
 
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