I think the Battle of Toba-Fushimi should be a contender. The reactionary Tokugawa dynasty was ousted in favor of the imperial side because of the Boshin War, who were in favor of modernization; thus allowing Japan to become a world power.
I doubt that. Europe was pretty much the antithesis of nice weather for Arabs and Muslims from the South. Add to that the dismal conditions, smelly people, and general lack of things worth conquering, and you get bands of Umayyads in Al-Andalus interested in no more than raiding France and taking what they could back home. The force at Tours was more concerned about their booty than beating the Franks, which is why they stopped pressing the attack, and quickly withdrew the moment they even thought their camp was in danger, which it very vaguely was.
Very true, heck the two armies never really actually fought. Small skirmishes and the Moors just withdrew cause they wasnt anything reason to fight.
In one of the instances where medieval infantry stood up against cavalry charges, the disciplined Frankish soldiers withstood the assaults, though according to Arab sources, the Arab cavalry several times broke into the interior of the Frankish square. "The Muslim horsemen dashed fierce and frequent forward against the battalions of the Franks, who resisted manfully, and many fell dead on either side."[26]
Despite this, the Franks did not break. It appears that the years of year-round training that Charles had bought with Church funds, paid off. His hard-trained soldiery accomplished what was not thought possible at that time: infantry withstood the Umayyad heavy cavalry. Paul Davis says the core of Charles's army was a professional infantry which was both highly disciplined and well motivated, "having campaigned with him all over Europe," buttressed by levies that Charles basically used to raid and disrupt his enemy, and gather food for his infantry.
I still think Çaldiran was insanely important. Actually, now that I know more about the period, it's gotten to be even more critical if anything.
The significance of Tours, again, was that it resulted in the Carolingian dynasty remaining in power. Charles was on the verge of being overthrown due to friction with the Church and military repossessions.
Well, I suppose it's more for the circumstances leading to the battle and the reasons it was concluded in the fashion it was, not for the tactical result, because yeah, Isma'il's chance had pretty much been lost. But those Safaviyeh nearly drove the Ottomans out of Anatolia during the preceding years when they were hit hard with weak rulers, crop failures, and then suddenly BOOM here comes an insanely awesome grass-roots religious movement that's making warlords out of all these Anatolian clans and playing havoc with the Turks' very uncomfortable relationship with religious issues in general during this century (lol shaykh bedreddin) and even suborning some of the provincial governors. Even after Mehmed II fixed the mess that was around during the last years of Murad II, in other words, the Ottoman Empire was by no means solidly on its feet and was destructible. Fiddle with the circumstances leading up to Çaldiran - maybe get those Portuguese to actually give ma boi Ismai'l some gunsWhy? An ottoman defeat would have changed history, but it really appears unlikely. And they didn't expand eastward after it, did they?
Regarding Tours in 732, it's not in the top five but it should be in the top 20.
Well since this thread is bumped, I have a bit of a problem with these comments. There was a lot happening in France at this time; they were on the road to becoming the Holy Roman Empire. The Umayyuds and subsequent dynasties from North Africa certainly found Spain more preferable to place their capital, and France is both generally more fertile, and southern France in particular has one of the most equitable climates in Europe. The smell ? well that was the reaction of Arabs later in the crusades after encountering armoured knights who sweated in their metal suits without the benefit of a wash after crossing desolate Anatolia and Syria, but I don't think it was a relevant factor in the Muslim decision to leave this battle prematurely.
Historians seem to be deeply divided now on this one - but the numbers according to the latest views are 30-50,000 each side, pretty significant for their time. Abd-al Rahman was a great general and wasn't here for just a plunder-and-run holiday. The so-called 'reconnaissance in force' had already happened 11 years earlier when Duke Odo (Eudes) repulsed about 20,000 Arab cavalrymen intent on conquering Acquitaine; Rahman wanted a rematch and he got it. Before Tours, Odo's army was wiped out on the Garonne. And if France didn't interest the Muslims, why did they continue to launch large scale attacks on France (which largely failed), and stubbornly cling to Narbonne and other pockets along the SE coast and Pyrennes for 27 more years ? But fall they did, largely to Charles Martel, after this battle.
Furthermore, this battle was a significant reversal of the trends of the day, Papal propaganda aside:
In one of the instances where medieval infantry stood up against cavalry charges, the disciplined Frankish soldiers withstood the assaults, though according to Arab sources, the Arab cavalry several times broke into the interior of the Frankish square. "The Muslim horsemen dashed fierce and frequent forward against the battalions of the Franks, who resisted manfully, and many fell dead on either side."[26]
Despite this, the Franks did not break. It appears that the years of year-round training that Charles had bought with Church funds, paid off. His hard-trained soldiery accomplished what was not thought possible at that time: infantry withstood the Umayyad heavy cavalry. Paul Davis says the core of Charles's army was a professional infantry which was both highly disciplined and well motivated, "having campaigned with him all over Europe," buttressed by levies that Charles basically used to raid and disrupt his enemy, and gather food for his infantry.
Both sides and most historians agree this battle was hard fought, and Rahman was killed to boot. I think this one has to count as much as Teutoburgerwald in 9 AD.
Well the Umayyads retreated from the battle because their camp, and thus their massive amounts of plunder, were threatened by another group of Frankish troops, not because the Europeans were odorous. I meant that as a reason, among many, that they had no wish to conquer farther into Europe.
As for the Frankish infantry and their resilience against Umayyad cavalry, this is largely explained by the fact that they were standing on a wooded hill when receiving these cavalry assaults. They were charging uphill against the Franks, and in a broken formation, hardly ideal conditions for such a movement. It was Charles' absolute refusal to offer battle off of that hill that largely made the Umayyads consider saying "screw it" and going home. When their camp was threatened, they took the opportunity to evacuate France completely, there being little more to be gained from staying to fight, Charles proving willing to hold his high ground indefinitely, and the risk of more Frankish troops arriving.
And finally, the claim that the Arabs were there to conquer Aquitaine: says whom?
Strategically, and tactically, Charles probably made the best decision he could in waiting until his enemies least expected him to intervene, and then marching by stealth to catch them by surprise at a battlefield of his choosing.
According to Muslim accounts of the battle, in the midst of the fighting on the second day (Frankish accounts have the battle lasting one day only), scouts from the Franks sent by Charles began to raid the camp and supply train (including slaves and other plunder).
Charles supposedly had sent scouts to cause chaos in the Umayyad base camp, and free as many of the slaves as possible, hoping to draw off part of his foe. This succeeded, as many of the Umayyad cavalry returned to their camp. To the rest of the Muslim army, this appeared to be a full-scale retreat, and soon it became one. Both Western and Muslim histories agree that while trying to stop the retreat, Abd-al-Raḥmân became surrounded, which led to his death.
wat tencharthere would likely be no unified command against the Avars and Magyars, and Italy
wat tenchar
there would likely be no unified command against the Avars and Magyars, and Italy
I really think the importance of First Poitiers is underestimated. If the Muslims had won, and then felt that France was there for the taking, who doesn't say a larger invading force wouldn't have been possible?
2. Battle of the Nile (1789) - the decimation of the French navy meant that economically choking off Britain by holding the Suez Canal would be impossible. Britain's monopoly on naval power in the Napoleonic Wars and their trade deal with Russia are what sealed Bonaparte's fate.
2. Battle of the Nile (1789) - the decimation of the French navy meant that economically choking off Britain by holding the Suez Canal would be impossible. Britain's monopoly on naval power in the Napoleonic Wars and their trade deal with Russia are what sealed Bonaparte's fate.
3. Battle of Gettysburg (1863) - a Confederate victory would have garnered European support for their cause. After Lee's retreat, their war bonds fell to fifteen cents on the dollar. An inability to fund the war cause, in addition to Grant's taking of the Mississippi a day earlier, allowed for a Union invasion of the South, thus ensuring the survival of the Republic and the end of slavery.*
*I imagine that this is going to be debated, but my studies have given me the impression that if the Confederacy had survived the war, the credibility of popular republicanism would have been lost forever; thus likely changing the fate of France and World War I.
What's the opinion about the Battle of Plassey in important battles. It resulted in the British annexing Bengal, which was a great source of wealth allowing a great takeoff of the British Empire and the eventual colonization of India. However, tactically, it was not much a battle since most of the Bengali troops did not fight, meaning that the political dealings were more important than the battle itself in regards to its result.