Hi Cartfart!Dr. MindBender said:Try reading the 2nd Wittgenstein. That will make your head implode.

Hi Cartfart!Dr. MindBender said:Try reading the 2nd Wittgenstein. That will make your head implode.
This seems to be obfuscationese for
1) Jones promised to pay Smith $5. (an "is")
2) Promises ought to be kept. (an "ought")
3) Jones ought pay Smith $5. (another "ought")
ie., we've derived an "ought" from the combination of an "is" and another "ought", which no-one disputed is possible.
Objection. Those paragraphs should be taken out and shot. At the very least they should be rephrased until the various plurals, cases, dangling subordinate clauses, demonstrative pronouns and the like are consistent so that it's possible to tell what the hell they point to without precognition or telepathy.I am certain that many abstract concepts of whatever term that denote a universal applicability can in fact be scrutinized as something to be doubted upon. Is it true that you can be impressed by the indubitable fact that anneshm and you is lived from a single point of view on the concept of "natural" and by the apparent fact that everything in it, including your and his understanding of it, might have been different except the point of view itself?
Abstract concepts of anything claims only things that exist belong in the mental world. So, in consequence of that, you are only detaching the abstraction of the word from the mental world from the physical world in which it is somehow nested.
I always love your posts.Objection. Those paragraphs should be taken out and shot. At the very least they should be rephrased until the various plurals, cases, dangling subordinate clauses, demonstrative pronouns and the like are consistent so that it's possible to tell what the hell they point to without precognition or telepathy.
I am certain that many abstract concepts of whatever term that denote a universal applicability can in fact be scrutinized as something to be doubted upon. Is it true that you can be impressed by the indubitable fact that anneshm and you is lived from a single point of view on the concept of "natural" and by the apparent fact that everything in it, including your and his understanding of it, might have been different except the point of view itself?
I cunningly said that it seems to be obfuscationese, allowing myself to claim that appearances were deceptive should it turn out he was honestly mistaken (or, Grog forbid, right). What argument does he advance that his 3-4) are not a misleading restatement of something like my 2)?I pretty much agree with you, which is why I said I'm not sure I accept the argument. I wouldn't say its "obfuscationese", though. I presented the argument without the context of the rest of Searle's article, where he goes into some technical semantics stuff about how it represents a genuine derivation of an ought from an is. So I still disagree with Searle, but its unfair to call it "obfuscationese" just becaue he may be wrong.
If consciousness is anything at all. I see your ostentation.I agree, but if one examines the neostructural paradigm of the discourse, one is faced with a choice: either reject the fallacy or conclude that expression must come from the collective unconscious, given that consciousness is equal to truth.
I always love your posts.
I truly believe some of you guys were brought up from birth by wolves (or is under-trained by reading one solitary silly minded author or professor in some god-forsaken University). It goes with the territory I guess. That the possibility of philosophy students are like that human child brought up in that way for the reason to set up a language for his own use based only on the links between own idiosyncratic tastes of style and contaminations from sickly wolves.![]()
We've got natural capacity for it, read some Pinker.I have to concede that speaking a language is an acquired skill.
Well you're doing a horsecrap job. Deciding the meaning of words and phrases should be based on previous usage. The naturalistic fallacy is a commonly used term that has a pretty standard usage, Aneeshm was violating it.I am sure you agree as well. Of course this point entails the need for a criterion of success which can be used not only to settle dispute about the correct application of the word "natural"; but also, more importantly, to enable us together to judge our progress of settling such dispute. My aim is success, homeboy, not to something which might only be the illusion of success.
I truely believe you're an incarnation of a previously expelled poster, so let's not play the origins game.I truly believe some of you guys were brought up from birth by wolves (or is under-trained by reading one solitary silly minded author or professor in some god-forsaken University). It goes with the territory I guess. That the possibility of philosophy students are like that human child brought up in that way for the reason to set up a language for his own use based only on the links between own idiosyncratic tastes of style and contaminations from sickly wolves.![]()
Most philosophers were engineering students. So don't hold that against yourself.
English isn't even my first language. Furthermore, I'm studying engineering. In an environment where my inner pedant has repeatedly attempted suicide, due to being forced to bear the tortures of the horribly mangled English spoken by most of my peers.
I cunningly said that it seems to be obfuscationese, allowing myself to claim that appearances were deceptive should it turn out he was honestly mistaken (or, Grog forbid, right). What argument does he advance that his 3-4) are not a misleading restatement of something like my 2)?
Searle said:Second Objection: Ultimately the derivation rests on the principle that one ought to keep one's promises and that is a moral principle, hence evaluative.
I don't know whether 'one ought to keep one's promises' is a 'moral' principle, but whether or not it is, it is also tautological; for it is nothing more than a derivation from the two tautologies:
All promises are (create, are undertakings of, are acceptances of) obligations,
and
One ought to keep (fulfill) one's obligations.
What needs to be explained is why so many philosophers have failed to see the tautological character of this principle. Three things I think have concealed its character from them.
The first is a failure to distinguish external questions about the institution of promising form internal questions asked within the framework of the institution. The questions 'Why do we have such an institution as promising?' and 'Ought we to have such institutionalized forms of obligations as promising?' are external questions asked about and not within the institution of promising. And the question 'Ought one to keep one's promises?' can be confused with or can be taken as (and I think has often been taken as) an external questions roughly expressible as 'Ought one to accept the institution of promising?' But taken literally, as an internal question, as a question about promises and not about the institution of promising, the question 'Ought one to keep one's promises?' is as empty as the question 'Are triangles three-sided?' To recognize something as a promise is to grant that, other things being equal, it ought to be kept.
A second fact which has clouded the issue is this. There are many situations, both real and imaginable, where one ought not to keep a promise, where the obligation to keep a promise is overridden by some further considerations, and it was for this reason that we added those clumsy ceteris paribus clauses in our derivation. But the fact that obligations can be overridden does not show that there were no obligations in the first place. On the contrary. And these original obligations are all that is needed to make the proof work.
Yet a third factor is the following. Many philosophers still fail to realize the full force of saying that 'I hereby promise' is a performative expression. In uttering it one performs but does not describe the act of promising. Once promising is seen as a speech act of a kind different from describing, then it is easier to see that one of the features of the act is the undertaking of an obligation. But if one thinks the utterance of 'I promise' or 'I hereby promise' is a peculiar kind of description--for example, of one's mental state--then the relation between promising and obligation is going to seem very mysterious.
I am not an engineering student any more and in fact haven't been since you registered. This raises an interesting question...Perfection, on the other hand - well, I am not sure about him....![]()
Most philosophers were engineering students.
The only activities I could think of that had no animal equivalent were: smoking, bodybuilding and writing. And thats not much considering how special we seem to think we are.
- Douglas Coupland