On the Insitute for Historical Review;
I read the article from this site, Sidhe, and it is not worth taking seriously.
The 'Institute for Historical Review' has a video link on it's
front page in which Mark Weber, Director of the Institute, claims that Holocaust rememberance is a Zionist conspiricy designed to garner support for Israel and further Jewish interests. He hails
David Irving as 'couragous' in the video.
The Institute is also known for
Holocaust denial
I think the credibility of this source is a bit questionable.
The other article put forward (from lewrockwell.com) is better, and much more credible. The Japanese did send out peace feelers to the USSR in early July 1945, however these were half-hearted efforts, and in any case Stalin was keen to prolong the Pacific conflict in order to grab Manchuria from the Japanese, and perhaps get his foot onto Japan itself. So appealing to Stalin as a mediator to peace was a bad move anyway.
The Japanese also did not look to offer unconditional peace, as they wanted to preserve the Imperial system of 'Tenno', which had committed horrific crimes during the war, as much intact as possible. In fact, as far as possible, they wanted to keep the Allies out of post-war Japan; they wanted no occupation of Japan, to try their own war-criminals, and to oversee their own disarmament with as little involvement from the Allies as possible. Stalin reported the peace-feeling to Truman and Chruchill later in July, probably with a little spin of his own, and Truman stuck to his insistance on unconditional surrender. Afew days later Truman announced the Potsdam Declaration re-iterating the demand for unconditional surrender; the Japanese refused.
The Japanese made no offers of surrender directly to the Western Allies, AFAIK, until after the two nuclear bombs had been dropped on their home-islands on 6 and 9 August.
Even then, the descision was taken just barely - the highest council of the Imperial government was deadlocked 3-3 over the issue of weather to offer a surrender. Even then *none* of them wished to surrender on America's terms, which were quite generous. Especially when compared with the horrors that the Japanese themselves inflicted on for example the Chinese, or indeed, I think, the peace terms the Japanese would offer America if, somehow, the Japanese had won the war. Even at this point, half of the council still wanted Japan to refuse to accept Allied occupation, have no Allied involvement in war-crime trials, and insist on seeing to their own disarmament. In effect, more an offer of 'lets stop fighting' than surrender. However the Emporer's intervention saw to it that they offered surrender as long as the Emporer's power remained intact, and only when this offer was refused, did they finally offer total unconditional surrender.
It is easy to understand, from the Western Allies perspective, why they would want to distmantle as much of the Imprerial Japanese regime as they could, lest it rise again. Looking at it this way, it is easier to understand Truman's insistance on total surrender, including the surrender of the Emporer, who had overseen some terrible crimes during the war, especially in China.
Personally, I agree with Irish Caesar that it is disgusting that Hirohito remained Emporer, even with reduced powers.