Thlayli
Le Pétit Prince
I don't have that problem. God frowns on your free verse. BACK TO THE METER.
1: you see the all-volunteer force leads to the increasing ease of being imperialist because it disassociates the civilian populace from the military because they have no stake or risk involved with military actions
2: ...
1: what do you mean all actors involved wanted this split because the military was sick of dealing with conscripts and civilians were sick of being conscripted no it's a conspiracy
2: ...
1: haha what do you mean the only way to relink the two would be to do something like reimplement the draft or some sort of compulsory government service or actually producing citizens educated on and interested in foreign policy and affairs i mean that's dumb i only point out the problems i don't offer solutions (secretly: i mean really i am an inheritor of the pre-wwii isolationist strain of thought we should just demilitarize what's the worst that could happen it's not like there are historical references to consult on this matter)
An interesting American phenomenon: martyrizing the armed forces ("suport are truups") while denying them the funds or resources necessary to do their job, thus making them more likely to be combat ineffective (read: die), making them martyrs. Of course we slashed your budget in the name of our fake self-serving ideology. But I mean, we put you on a pedestal, so it's okay, right? Right?
something something similar pattern to sexist objectification of women
Actually several Western European militaries are unionized and have historically received greater benefits and have had greater leverage over such things as overtime, benefits, and so on, than our forces do. The Dutch, Belgian, Danish, Austrian, Swedish, and Norwegian militaries were all set up this way, as was the FRG. There was at one time a push to unionize the American military. Military wages relative to responsibility have consistently shrunk and although pay and benefits makes up an increasing portion of the budget, the military is losing competitiveness with the civilian job market. Also, really, I was talking about systems acquisition and the logistics train and such, given Congress repeatedly drops the ball on things like Sequestration and BRAC.Admittedly, less money for our troops is still way more money than anyone else's troops get. Not that it's okay to stiff them, but.![]()
Actually I want to come back to this more because I hate this kind of way of thinking about these things like it's just "Well, we threw 43EP at the military, what more do you want?"I was just talking about spending as a proportion of GDP.
Hypothesis: politicans = (approximate to) corporations and banks. Corporations and banks want indefinite militarisation / military adventurism (for profit) but don't want to pay for it (or the conditions that allow it). Therefore resulting in the state of affairs Symphony described.
The Yalu would probably still be contaminated. Given the warhead counts were:On 9 December MacArthur said that he wanted commander’s discretion to use atomic weapons in the Korean theatre. On 24 December he submitted “a list of retardation targets” for which he required 26 atomic bombs. He also wanted four to drop on the “invasion forces” and four more for “critical concentrations of enemy air power”.
In interviews published posthumously, MacArthur said he had a plan that would have won the war in 10 days: “I would have dropped 30 or so atomic bombs . . . strung across the neck of Manchuria”. Then he would have introduced half a million Chinese Nationalist troops at the Yalu and then “spread behind us - from the Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea - a belt of radioactive cobalt . . . it has an active life of between 60 and 120 years. For at least 60 years there could have been no land invasion of Korea from the North.” He was certain that the Russians would have done nothing about this extreme strategy: “My plan was a cinch” (12)
[...]
Although Ridgway said nothing about a cobalt bomb, in May 1951, after replacing MacArthur as US commander in Korea, he renewed MacArthur’s request of 24 December, this time for 38 atomic bombs (13). The request was not approved.
The US came closest to using atomic weapons in April 1951, when Truman removed MacArthur. Although much related to this episode is still classified, it is now clear that Truman did not remove MacArthur simply because of his repeated insubordination, but because he wanted a reliable commander on the scene should Washington decide to use nuclear weapons; Truman traded MacArthur for his atomic policies. On 10 March 1951 MacArthur asked for a “D-Day atomic capability” to retain air superiority in the Korean theatre, after the Chinese massed huge new forces near the Korean border and after the Russians put 200 bombers into airbases in Manchuria (from which they could strike not just Korea but also US bases in Japan) (14). On 14 March General Vandenberg wrote: “Finletter and Lovett alerted on atomic discussions. Believe everything is set."
This was Korea, “the limited war”. The views of its architect, Curtis LeMay, serve as its epitaph. After it started, he said: “We slipped a note kind of under the door into the Pentagon and said let us go up there . . . and burn down five of the biggest towns in North Korea - and they’re not very big - and that ought to stop it. Well, the answer to that was four or five screams - ‘You’ll kill a lot of non-combatants’ and ‘It’s too horrible’. Yet over a period of three years or so . . . we burned down every town in North Korea and South Korea, too . . . Now, over a period of three years this is palatable, but to kill a few people to stop this from happening - a lot of people can’t stomach it” (19).