Why did Germany take so long to unify?

[Sharwood]

I think anything Friedrich Wilhelm did was by definition crazy. After all, he was insane. Though not at that time, I would assume.

 

[Dachs]

I think anything Friedrich Wilhelm did was by definition crazy. After all, he was insane. Though not at that time, I would assume.

He only became 'mad' in 1857.

 

[Sharwood]

He only became 'mad' in 1857.

I claim the right to declare his decisions prior to that date retroactively insane. You know, there may well be a legal precedent for that.

 

[Dachs]

I claim the right to declare his decisions prior to that date retroactively insane. You know, there may well be a legal precedent for that.

Whatever his mental state at the time, throwing the Imperial crown into the gutter was the right move at the time.

 

[Agent327]

Fixed it for you.

I think Bismarck pursued a very aggressive foreign policy until he achieved his goal: a unified German empire under Prussian leadership; after that he was all diplomacy on the international scene. (Realpolitik he called it. IMO, underlying his apparent opportunism was a very serious aggressiveness, which he wasn't afraid to put to the test, even in domestic policy, where he outmanoeuvred the social-democrats - by making use of social measures proposed, in part at least, by these very same social-democrats he abhorred.)

 

[Dachs]

I think Bismarck pursued a very aggressive foreign policy until he achieved his goal: a unified German empire under Prussian leadership; after that he was all diplomacy on the international scene.

And I've already told you why I disagree.

 

[Camikaze]

At Alvensleben, the Russians, having been successfully detached from the French alliance over the issue of Poland (because the French denounced their actions there, France always having liked the Poles and, being a typical Western nation, getting annoyed at the often brutal methods used to repress minorities in Eastern states), wanted a new combination, and thus offered von Bismarck an even better deal than the bases agreement that he and Gorchakov had already agreed upon: an alliance that would proceed to attack Austria and France. This was rejected by the Prussians.

Would this have been a situation in which Prussia could effectively ensure that it had dominance over the Germany? I assume that at the time a war with Austria would have caused a war with the rest of the German Confederation, and with France at the same time. This would be quite hard, I imagine, with the army reforms not having been in place for a long time. Perhaps Prussia felt that a victory, or lasting Prussian dominance, could not be achieved in this way.

 

[Agent327]

And I've already told you why I disagree.

Actually, you did not; you just crossed out aggressive and replaced it with opportunistic in my post. Any good politician will be opportunistic, but they don't all pursue an aggressive foreign policy. (But I'd be interested to know why you think Bismarck pursued an opportunistic, rather than aggressive foreign policy prior to 1871, keeping in mind his willingness to go to war first with Denmark, then with France, while badgering the smaller German states into his Prussian empire.)

 

[Dachs]

Would this have been a situation in which Prussia could effectively ensure that it had dominance over the Germany? I assume that at the time a war with Austria would have caused a war with the rest of the German Confederation, and with France at the same time. This would be quite hard, I imagine, with the army reforms not having been in place for a long time. Perhaps Prussia felt that a victory, or lasting Prussian dominance, could not be achieved in this way.

That's a good point, but I hardly think that barely-completed army reforms would have mattered compared to the somewhat outdated Austrian army, the totally outmatched Germanic states, and faraway France, which was already sending the cream of its army into Mexico anyway. A Russo-Prussian combination would have been able to win the proposed war; hell, Prussia could have had its choice of Kleindeutschland or Grossdeutschland if it wanted, and because iron would have drenched everybody in blood nobody could do much of anything about it. As for relying on Russia for all this - Russia may have been able to break Austria and totally alter the Balkan situation, but projecting power into Germany was clearly beyond its means. Postwar Russia wouldn't be nearly so interested in Germany anyway, what with Hungary and the Balkans to settle.

Anyway, I maintain my position that von Bismarck wasn't really looking for unification, but Prussian diplomatic and strategic advantage, primarily. The Alvensleben incident? Von Bismarck backs off from war as soon as it becomes clear that in order to create a Russo-Prussian entente he will need to engage in one. 1864 was an incident in which he could hardly act without making his state a pariah in Germany, and 1866 was a choice between the Devil and the deep blue sea; either lose all of the gains from the last war, or fight a war yourself. 1870 seems to me to have been more of an attempt to embarrass France and have a shot at securing a long-term threat to them instead of having been the precursor to a unification conflict, because if he had wanted he could have slowly integrated the southern German states into the NGC - the process was half-complete by the time the war started, after all. It would have probably all come to nothing if Benedetti hadn't tried to make the king go any further, and probably all have come to something somewhere around nothing but not quite there if von Bismarck hadn't creatively edited the telegram for some more short-term diplomatic embarrassment. Frankly, I think the press situation got out of his control in the summer of 1870.

I find it rather amusing that virtually everyone is taught exactly what von Bismarck wanted people to think about the events of the 1860s; not even classical historians, after all, look at texts like Thukydides' or Polybios' without some historiographical backing. I can't imagine why people generally don't try to think about it from a different angle.

Actually, you did not; you just crossed out aggressive and replaced it with opportunistic in my post. Any good politician will be opportunistic, but they don't all pursue an aggressive foreign policy. (But I'd be interested to know why you think Bismarck pursued an opportunistic, rather than aggressive foreign policy prior to 1871, keeping in mind his willingness to go to war first with Denmark, then with France, while badgering the smaller German states into his Prussian empire.)

This thread: read it.

 

[Masada]

keeping in mind his willingness to go to war first with Denmark, then with France, while badgering the smaller German states into his Prussian empire

You just answered your own question, he was willing to go to war and did when the opportunity presented itself but he himself never actively planned decades ahead for them.

 

[Camikaze]

That's a good point, but I hardly think that barely-completed army reforms would have mattered compared to the somewhat outdated Austrian army, the totally outmatched Germanic states, and faraway France, which was already sending the cream of its army into Mexico anyway. A Russo-Prussian combination would have been able to win the proposed war; hell, Prussia could have had its choice of Kleindeutschland or Grossdeutschland if it wanted, and because iron would have drenched everybody in blood nobody could do much of anything about it. As for relying on Russia for all this - Russia may have been able to break Austria and totally alter the Balkan situation, but projecting power into Germany was clearly beyond its means. Postwar Russia wouldn't be nearly so interested in Germany anyway, what with Hungary and the Balkans to settle.

Anyway, I maintain my position that von Bismarck wasn't really looking for unification, but Prussian diplomatic and strategic advantage, primarily. The Alvensleben incident? Von Bismarck backs off from war as soon as it becomes clear that in order to create a Russo-Prussian entente he will need to engage in one. 1864 was an incident in which he could hardly act without making his state a pariah in Germany, and 1866 was a choice between the Devil and the deep blue sea; either lose all of the gains from the last war, or fight a war yourself. 1870 seems to me to have been more of an attempt to embarrass France and have a shot at securing a long-term threat to them instead of having been the precursor to a unification conflict, because if he had wanted he could have slowly integrated the southern German states into the NGC - the process was half-complete by the time the war started, after all. It would have probably all come to nothing if Benedetti hadn't tried to make the king go any further, and probably all have come to something somewhere around nothing but not quite there if von Bismarck hadn't creatively edited the telegram for some more short-term diplomatic embarrassment. Frankly, I think the press situation got out of his control in the summer of 1870.

In all three wars that Bismarck got involved in, he did so with diplomatic reasoning. I think that simply going to war without this reasonable reasoning might have created a Prussian dominance that was not accepted by the other Germanic states. Perhaps Bismarck had the foresight to realise that this war would not lead to Prussia being well liked at all. And maybe he thought this would make achieving Prussian dominance in the long run a lot harder, i.e. it would make it harder to rule over Germany than if Prussia didn't alienate itself from the German Confederation. Yes, in the Seven Weeks War, Prussia was, in a way, alienating itself from the German Confederation, but the concessions made at the end serve as proof that Prussia didn't want to alienate itself in the long run. I imagine that after a war against the whole German Confederation in 1863, it would've been hard to get back on their good side, making the short term extension of Prussian power unsustainable. So basically what I'm saying is that this opportunity was not taken not due to a lack of willingness to go to war, but because it may've been deemed a risk not worth the reward, whereas the three subsequent wars (with the debatable exception of the Franco-Pussian War in the long run), were calculated as acceptable risks, which proved to be true.

 

[Dachs]

In all three wars that Bismarck got involved in, he did so with diplomatic reasoning. I think that simply going to war without this reasonable reasoning might have created a Prussian dominance that was not accepted by the other Germanic states. Perhaps Bismarck had the foresight to realise that this war would not lead to Prussia being well liked at all. And maybe he thought this would make achieving Prussian dominance in the long run a lot harder, i.e. it would make it harder to rule over Germany than if Prussia didn't alienate itself from the German Confederation.

That's a nice picture you paint there. Why doesn't it apply to this:

Yes, in the Seven Weeks War, Prussia was, in a way, alienating itself from the German Confederation, but the concessions made at the end serve as proof that Prussia didn't want to alienate itself in the long run. I imagine that after a war against the whole German Confederation in 1863, it would've been hard to get back on their good side, making the short term extension of Prussian power unsustainable.

Prussia wouldn't have been able to fob the German states off with Confederation and back it up with the Army in 1863, but in 1866 it was totally different?

So basically what I'm saying is that this opportunity was not taken not due to a lack of willingness to go to war, but because it may've been deemed a risk not worth the reward, whereas the three subsequent wars (with the debatable exception of the Franco-Pussian War in the long run), were calculated as acceptable risks, which proved to be true.

I don't disagree with this, because it's not the point I'm arguing against. I'm arguing against the classical von Bismarckian interpretation that from the outset he planned to exclude Austria from the Confederation and create Kleindeutschland in a series of short aggressive wars. Into most of these crises and conflicts, he was led by the nose and lucked into a great deal; he did not plan the 1864 conflict as an act of aggression, nor did he plan it with the intent to draw Austria into a inter-German tangle; he did not plan it at all, and instead was swept along with German public opinion when the Danish king made his foolish error. Austria cornered him into the 1866 conflict, and it's quite clear from the terms of Gastein that he didn't plan to invade Austria either, but merely made the most of what he had. And in 1870, an attempt to secure a diplomatic advantage over France went horribly awry. (I am starting to come around to the idea that Germany lost the Franco-Prussian War, frankly. )

 

[Camikaze]

That's a nice picture you paint there. Why doesn't it apply to this:

Prussia wouldn't have been able to fob the German states off with Confederation and back it up with the Army in 1863, but in 1866 it was totally different?

Three years can be a long time, especially so soon after military reforms. And I suppose it's also possible that they miscalculated the first time, realised their mistake, had rid themselves of any apprehension, and went for the next opportunity.

 

[Agent327]

You just answered your own question, he was willing to go to war and did when the opportunity presented itself but he himself never actively planned decades ahead for them.

I wasn't asking a question. Also, as Dachs pointed out, Bismarck only went to war when he reckoned it served his purpose, as Prussian Chancellor that is. Planning decades ahead isn't part of any politician's mindset. Bismarck's Realpolitik after 1870-'71 was basically necessary to maintain a balance of power in Europe - were Germany had just been created. After 1871 Bismarck was very unwilling to go to war, and the wisdom of this policy was proven by the disastrous events that led to WW I following his dismissal by the emperor. (Within Germany Bismarck could indeed act aggressively, with Germany he could not; it simply lacked the power base of a Britain or even Russia on the international scene.)

 

[Dachs]

Three years can be a long time, especially so soon after military reforms. And I suppose it's also possible that they miscalculated the first time, realised their mistake, had rid themselves of any apprehension, and went for the next opportunity.

Eh? The reforms simply involved the alteration of the intake process, which was basically done in a year. It's not like the Prussians had to work out the kinks, especially since Wilhelm and von Roon had already been forming the new regular regiments by the time von Bonin resigned. The Prussian Army was not significantly less ready to go to war in 1863 than it was in 1864. And it's similarly doubtful that such a thing played a part in von Bismarck's calculations; it's not as though Russia would insist upon an immediate offensive following the Alvensleben Convention or anything like that, and besides, von Bismarck consistently made light of military implementationary difficulties in war. As for the second: perhaps von Bismarck didn't know what he was doing and rejected an action that would have fit the policy that has been assigned to him, but it seems like that's rather impossible to use to prove a point, hmm?

Also, as Dachs pointed out, Bismarck only went to war when he reckoned it served his purpose, as Prussian Chancellor that is.

That's not exactly what I said.

(Within Germany Bismarck could indeed act aggressively, with Germany he could not; it simply lacked the power base of a Britain or even Russia on the international scene.)

Prussian 'aggressiveness' within Germany has not been sufficiently proven within this thread, dude. Do you have any specific examples that indicate an aggressive policy?

 

[Camikaze]

Eh? The reforms simply involved the alteration of the intake process, which was basically done in a year. It's not like the Prussians had to work out the kinks, especially since Wilhelm and von Roon had already been forming the new regular regiments by the time von Bonin resigned. The Prussian Army was not significantly less ready to go to war in 1863 than it was in 1864. And it's similarly doubtful that such a thing played a part in von Bismarck's calculations; it's not as though Russia would insist upon an immediate offensive following the Alvensleben Convention or anything like that, and besides, von Bismarck consistently made light of military implementationary difficulties in war.

The army reforms not only increased conscription, but also amalgamated the Landwehr with the regular army, in order to lower the Landwehr's power, due to the liberal influences it exerted. So this amalgamation would experience a few teething problems, me thinks. But I suppose my argument is a bit better if I stick with the 'it maybe wasn't an acceptable risk' angle.

As for the second: perhaps von Bismarck didn't know what he was doing and rejected an action that would have fit the policy that has been assigned to him, but it seems like that's rather impossible to use to prove a point, hmm?

Fair enough. I guess I can't substantiate this angle, but it is a small possibility.

 

[Agent327]

That's not exactly what I said.

Prussian 'aggressiveness' within Germany has not been sufficiently proven within this thread, dude. Do you have any specific examples that indicate an aggressive policy?

Dude:

Any good politician will be opportunistic, but they don't all pursue an aggressive foreign policy. (But I'd be interested to know why you think Bismarck pursued an opportunistic, rather than aggressive foreign policy prior to 1871, keeping in mind his willingness to go to war first with Denmark, then with France, while badgering the smaller German states into his Prussian empire.)

Whether Bismarck's policy within Germany tends to the opportunistic, rather than the aggressive, remains ofcourse a matter of opinion.

 

[Sharwood]

Dude:



Whether Bismarck's policy within Germany tends to the opportunistic, rather than the aggressive, remains ofcourse a matter of opinion.

How about aggressively opportunistic?

Or opportunistically aggressive? Hang on, that last one is correct. Bismarck was an opportunistic politician - an oxymoron, I know - who used aggressive actions and posturing when it suited his purposes. That applies both to his international and domestic actions.