It occurred to me recently that there are two schools of thought on the effectiveness of mathematics in science. The first school views the power of this abstract language that we use to describe the universe as highly improbable, perhaps almost mystical.
The second point of view is that maths works in science because we have constructed it to do so.
In the blue corner of this heavy-weight bout we have Einstein,
"How can it be that mathematics, being after all a product of human thought which is independent of experience, is so admirably appropriate to the objects of reality? Is human reason, then, without experience, merely by taking thought, able to fathom the properties of real things?".
In the red corner we have Russell,
"It can be shown that a mathematical web of some kind can be woven about any universe containing several objects. The fact that our universe lends itself to mathematical treatment is not a fact of any great philosophical significance."
I lean towards Russell. Any thoughts?
The second point of view is that maths works in science because we have constructed it to do so.
In the blue corner of this heavy-weight bout we have Einstein,
"How can it be that mathematics, being after all a product of human thought which is independent of experience, is so admirably appropriate to the objects of reality? Is human reason, then, without experience, merely by taking thought, able to fathom the properties of real things?".
In the red corner we have Russell,
"It can be shown that a mathematical web of some kind can be woven about any universe containing several objects. The fact that our universe lends itself to mathematical treatment is not a fact of any great philosophical significance."
I lean towards Russell. Any thoughts?