Worst military commander-who is the worst general?

Though I think Pavlov merely reflected the disarray of the Red Army at that time. Too many holes to plug after the purge, resulting in too many inexperienced officers given higher-level commands. Even if Pavlov were 200% more gifted than historically, he would still have become creamed by the Germans and shot by Stalin. The problem was much greater than Pavlov; what about subordinate units commanded by even more inexperienced officers?
"resulting in too many inexperienced officers given higher-level commands"

I agree to that, but still he failed to see that tanks should be used in mass formations instead of diluted among infantry units, he saw what happened in France but stubbornly kept his opinion. And he even had Zhukov talking to him about it.
Yes, Pavlov has a quite horrendous general.:mad:

I wonder how much more effective the USSR would have been in 1941 if the USSR had used its tanks on mass formations...:rolleyes:
 
"resulting in too many inexperienced officers given higher-level commands"

I agree to that, but still he failed to see that tanks should be used in mass formations instead of diluted among infantry units, he saw what happened in France but stubbornly kept his opinion. And he even had Zhukov talking to him about it.
Yes, Pavlov has a quite horrendous general.:mad:

I wonder how much more effective the USSR would have been in 1941 if the USSR had used its tanks on mass formations...:rolleyes:
I think the Russians would still have been creamed even if they had massed their tank formations. On paper, they had over 20,000 AFVs, but less than 2000 were more recent designs. The majority of old tanks were not terribly worse off than their German counterparts, but their lack of experienced crews and abysmal logistics -- lack of fuel, spare parts, and maintenance crew -- would have cut them to the ribbons. Not to mention that the entire army suffered from lack of transports: Not enough infantry and artillery would have marched with tanks to make combined-arms operations possible. To add insult to the injury, the Germans obtained absolute air superiority from the Day One, making large mechanized movements in daylight pretty dangerous. Their communications were just as horrible -- not enough radios to go around (both in quality and in quantity) and not enough officers familiar with wirelessly directing their forces. Finally, largely inexperienced Soviet tank crews had to face their veteran German counterparts.

Too many cards stacked against the Russians in the early months of the war.
 
The naming of the attack caused considerable argument in the south during and after the war. Pickett himself disliked being associated with it and blamed Lee for destroying his division. There was also an argument between the states involved (principally between Virginia and North Carolina) as to which state's troops got the furthest during the attack, and who was to blame for its failure. At least part of why the name stuck was due to Virginian papers glamourising Pickett's role in the attack as his division was made up almost entirely of Virginia units. The same papers tended to blame Pettigrew and Trimble's divisions for not supporting Pickett enough, and some in North Carolina went as far as to accuse Pickett of hanging back during the attack i.e. cowardice.

I wish I still had an audiobook about the attack because it went into much more detail. Suffice to say however that both during and after the war there was a great deal of arguing and blame being thrown around by former generals.
 
Not to mention the artillery barrage by the Rebel forces was utterly ineffective due to poor quality of their fuses...all the shot they thought was exploding on the Union line was actually overshooting the line, leaving the fortifications intact and the Union troops alive to repulse the Rebel attack.
 
True but ultimatley I'm afraid blame for the costly assault lies not with men like Pickett or Alexander but at a higher level, principally with Lee and Longstreet. In my opinion Lee was more at fault than anyone else.
 
Didn't Longstreet advise against the attack? I seem to remember somebody mentioning that when we were talking about various generals...and Longstreet said no, but Lee said yes, and the fight was lost.
 
Longstreet is said to have told Lee that "It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle can take that position.". He also showed marked reluctance to order the attack, and possibly even tried to leave responsibility for judging the moment to commence the attack on Alexander's shoulders. Ultimately Longstreet had seen it all before, he after all had commanded the Rebs at Marye's Heights (during Fredericksburg), so he knew the folly of attacking across open ground against troops deployed behind a stone wall on heights.

Unfortunately Longstreet's reputation after the war took a bit of a nosedive in the south due to his criticism of Lee and his post war politics. He was viewed by many (including former generals) as a traitor, and some even "reasoned" that if he was a traitor after the war he could well have been one during it. Lee on the other hand tended to be viewed almost as an untouchable perfect ideal of a Southern gentleman, the perfect soldier, the very embodiment almost of what the average Southern soldier fought for.

There were a lot of rather confused and partisan arguments put forward after the war. From what I recall of the audiobook the author mentions that Pickett's charge created a problem in the minds of many southerners afterwards. They could not believe that Lee would order an attack that was beyond the means of the troops involved, for that would break the image of Lee as a perfect general. To look at the flip side however if it was a viable assault (and it obviously couldn't have been Lee's fault that it failed) that meant that the soldiers and officers had failed in their duty. That's how some arrived at the notion that Longstreet caused it to fail, perhaps even wanted it to fail, because it the concept that Lee made a mistake, or that Southern soldiers failed their beloved general was totally alien to them.

It all rather reminds me of Napoleon's supporters blaming Ney and Grouchy for the defeat at Waterloo.
 
And I've read somewhere that what you need for a Battle of Cannae is a Hannibal on one side and Gaius Terentius Varro on the other.

That was the first name that popped into my head upon reading the title of this thread, but I just don't know enough about military history to say whether he's the absolute worst general of all time. Besides, he was up against one of history's greatest generals--no Roman commander before Scipio could defeat Hannibal in the field, and Scipio could only do so by copying his tactics.
 
Grand Moff Tarkin. Started off well, but in the end he got his ass kicked by a hillbilly and his imaginary friend. Not an impressive way to go.
 
"Let us understand each other. I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary and to beat him when he was found; whose policy has been attack and not defense. In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our Western armies in defensive attitude. I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving. That opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. Meantime I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases, which I am sorry to find so much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of "taking strong positions and holding them," of "lines of retreat," and of "bases of supplies." Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance, disaster and shame lurk in the rear. Let us act on this understanding, and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed and that your names will be dear to your countrymen forever"

– John Pope, message to the Army of Virginia
 
didnt the american civil war generals just throw large masses of units at one another with no regards to the casualties?

Not all of them no that would be an exaggeration frankly.

There were always men like Burnside and incidents where even the best generals like Lee (Gettysburg) or Grant (Cold Harbour) dropped the ball but overall the generals didn't simply fling their men thoughtlessly into the face of their enemy's firepower. The longer the war went on the more generals appreciated that the napoleonic tactics that suited muskets were outdated in the face of massed rifle fire.

Custer's something of an unusual character. If the Civil War hadn't come along he'd have probably never made it as an officer, let alone achieved higher command and the notoriety that came with his death.

I think i read somewhere once that after the failed charge at Gettysburg Lee said it was all his fault. IIRC

Yes he did, he also tried to resign after the campaign finished. Davis flat out refused citing (something along the lines of) he could not think of a single general who was better than Lee. Unlike his subordinates and the people who later idolised him Lee was aware that any failure was his responsibility, and would not blame anyone else.

The squabbles surrounding Gettysburg and the war in general usually had the decency to wait until Lee had passed away, but once he did...
 
"resulting in too many inexperienced officers given higher-level commands"

I agree to that, but still he failed to see that tanks should be used in mass formations instead of diluted among infantry units, he saw what happened in France but stubbornly kept his opinion. And he even had Zhukov talking to him about it.
Yes, Pavlov has a quite horrendous general.:mad:

I wonder how much more effective the USSR would have been in 1941 if the USSR had used its tanks on mass formations...:rolleyes:

I don't think you should blast the tactic of "diluting tanks". A mass armor charge has its purposes but, in the end, the ground troops need support.
 
John Talbot

Two battles two defeats ( Patay Castillon )
The French count is 40 engagements won, 2 lost, and Talbot was a bloody scourge for the French in his day.:confused:

The two lost battles would have been a worse blot on his carreer, if warfare in his day hadn't been decided by sieges rather than field-battles.
 
Oh shoot, I started a whole 'nother conversation.

Pickets charge could have been coordinated better by Picket. The specifics were left up to him, not Lee.
 
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