As you probably know, Ludendorff's offensive relied heavily on fast infantry attacks coordinated with artillery bombardments.
That was what everyone else did for four years. The main difference Ludendorff had was numbers.
Backwards Logic said:
This attack was so strong it nearly broke the British lines, with the British 5th Army completely collaspsing.
Yes, that's absolutely correct.
But Ludendorff still did not puncture the Allied front. The Fifth Army was able to withdraw successfully along with the remainder of the BEF with forces intact, and were reinforced in short order by the Allied general reserve. With the speed of march (i.e. attacking speed) vastly shorter than the speed of reinforcement (i.e. the speed of a railroad car), Ludendorff could kiss any major offensive success good-bye even if he achieved short-term tactical success.
Backwards Logic said:
And to say Ludendorff attacked allied strongholds is incorrect: The initial wave simply bypassed them. This offensive relied so much on surprise and speed that they didn't have time to deal with the fortified areas. He left those for later, when his regular infantry caught up to them.
Yes, that was his plan. However, as B.H. Liddell Hart has said (even Wiki agrees), Ludendorff failed to follow his own "brilliant plan". After initial successes, he dispatched troops towards areas where his offensive had
already stalled (viz. Arras as the main example), losing disgusting amounts of men and material, along with time (perhaps even more critical given the AEF's buildup). His
Sturmtruppen didn't win everywhere, and true to the famous quote "We chop a hole, and the rest follows", he kept trying a dull blade on the firm Allied oak until his troops were exhausted.
Backwards Logic said:
The problem with Ludendorff here is that his stromtroopers outran his artillery. Infantry - Artillery = death. Only after the stormtroopers were spent did he throw mass numbers at everything. That's when he destroyed Germany's chances at driving the British into the sea.
I agree that his handling of the infiltration tactics was extremely poor, but I fail to see the possibility for Germany to "drive the British into the sea". The German Imperial Heer simply doesn't have the speed to exploit any tactical success without exhausting itself and leaving itself open to a counterattack. This was true for the
entire war on the Western Front. Ludendorff temporarily succeeded due to a few new innovations, but the iron law of speed caught up with him and his offensive stalled, leaving an exhausted German Army open to Allied counterattack. My point is proven even more when we look at the aftermath of German failure in Operation Michael. The German Heer, despite massive numerical and technological inferiority, leadership issues at the top (Ludendorff fell apart emotionally after the failure of his grand offensive), and the fact that it suffered a huge morale breakdown, was able to maintain cohesion and retreat to the frontiers of the Reich without being annihilated. This is what would have happened had Ludendorff had more success: the Allies would have retreated some more, but they would have been able to reestablish a firm line of defense later on as the Germans ran even lower on supplies.
Also, it's true that infantry without artillery equals major pain for the infantry, but only if the other side has their own artillery. Ludendorff was expecting to be able to capture many enemy artillery pieces and/or prevent the Allies from using their own due to the fluid nature of the front, so both sides would lose their advantage. The German failure to rupture the Allied lines combined with the Allied ability to retreat better led to the situation at the catastrophic end of "Michael"; it was an issue inherent in the German offensive mindset.
Which I believe amounts to Ludendorff not really having much of a plan beyond smashing through, and then things would somehow take care of themselves, or so it was expected. Same as every other commander in WWI basically.
Actually, the other commanders in the First World War counted too much on the plan later and didn't think about breaking through in the here and now. Haig is a pretty good example of this (for a funnier and slightly overblown portrait of this, look at General Melchett in
Blackadder Goes Forth). Ludendorff just went to the other extreme.
Well, he did have a pretty good plan, just poor execution. He knew he had to wipe out the French and British before the Americans got involved. So to do that, he wanted to split the French and British armies in half and drive the Brits into the sea. Once that happened, he could turn towards Paris and capture it before the Americans arrived. He expected the Brits to fall quickly, as they had been pretty exhausted after 1917, but they didn't (other than the 5th army). Once his advance was halted, the allies turned it around at Amiens on Aug 8th of 1918 (with the help of the doughboys). So there was a plan, it just didn't work out.
Yes, there was a plan of sorts. Did it make any sense given the material he had? No.
In sum, out-casuality the enemy, if they lose 100x times much more people then you, then eventually they will stop comming.
Yes, all of that is quite intelligent, and were I in charge I'd do the same, but according to the first post in thread we're looking for a way to get a breakthrough, not a way to win.
Actually, I personally think that getting a breakthrough involves losing later on due to overextension, but that's just me.
EDIT: w00t! 4000 posts!