Alternate History Thread III

-More successful American campaigning against Canada in the War of 1812 or perhaps a generally more successful war for America there; perhaps this could be tied to a brief revival of Napoleon's Empire in Europe at the same time.

I did a guess-the-PoD map with a related idea (if you mean that the PoD is in Europe but the main divergence is in Canada), way back.

-A generally different pattern of barbarian migrations into Europe in the early Dark Ages; I actually drew about eleven maps for this, putting it into about 1100, but never wrote anything up.

Am curious! Can you post said maps, or at least explain what exactly do you mean under the "different pattern"?
 
OOC: I realise its not exactly top-notch, but it should do.

IC:

The Eastern Whirlwind.

By comparison with the previous two-three decades, the 1720s were a comparatively quiet and boring time for much of the world. This made the events in the Middle East, the Caucasus and South-Eastern Europe all the more noticeable.

Historians have often been uncertain as to how those events should be regarded and classified; because of the geographic and chronologic distances between these events they were sometimes considered entirely separate, but at the same time they were interconnected considerably and so others declared them a single, albeit multi-sided, war. It probably makes most sense to call it a "great game"; a complex military and diplomatic struggle between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Tsardom along the then ill-defined frontiers of their respective spheres of influence, with various factions caught in between fighting against both or allying with one to survive and possibly gain something from it all.

It all begun in Persia. In chaos since 1708, the Safavid Empire was disintegrating exponentially. Between the Georgian revolt in the west and the Hotakid Afghan rising in the east, there was growing military infighting, opportunistic revolts by local governors and relentless peasant uprisings. By 1721 central authority outside of the capital, Isfahan, was gone. In 1721 itself, a particularily ambitious Hotakid raid succeeded in taking the city, plundering it and slaughtering the royal family. After that, what little semblance of the Safavid Empire's existance as a state remained had disappeared. No successor state arose; the tribes and the generals that might've claimed power were more or less in stalemate, while the Hotakids simply retreated back east, unwilling to fight angry mobs and riotous peasants for the despoiled capital. While the Hotakids consolidated their power in the east, the Georgians secured Azeri territories, George XI ("Gurgin Khan") of Kartli hoping to carve out a new empire for himself. And in the meantime, the foreign intervention begun.

In truth the intervention begun back in the late 1710s, with a cautious Ottoman advance into southwestern Persia, most notably the wealthy Arabic region of Luristan. But back then the Ottomans were simply not interested in launching a serious intervention; Ahmad III and his more domestically-oriented Viziers did not think it worth the effort, and so the intervenning army stopped upon encountering serious resistance at Tabriz. However, early in the 1720s, numerous changes prompted a more vigorous policy in the regard of the Persian anarchy - those included the Safavid collapse, the Georgian expansion, the intervention of other foreign powers, the apparent stabilisation of the post-reform situation in the Ottoman Empire and the rise of a new Vizier-i-Azam - Topal Damat Ali Pasha, who had previously been a military commander and reformer, and was now eager to test out the Ottoman armies, as well as to deny certain potential enemies any advantages. So the Ottomans moved into Persia en masse in 1722 and 1723, capturing Hamadan and Tabriz; as the latter was occupied by the Georgians, the diplomatic uncertainty that existed between the king and the Sultan was no more. The Georgians quickly organised uprisings in the Ottoman vassal western Georgian principalities, while the Ottomans readied major forces for a conquest of eastern Georgia and the Azerbaijan.

As for other interventions, the Dutch sent in troops to secure the VOC's interests by occupying key Persian ports, such as Bander-Abbas, Hormuz and Gwadar; they also signed alliances with local warlords and supported them with firearms and cannons in exchange for trade agreements. The dramatic rise of the Dutch military and mercantile presence in the Persian Gulf was an important development in its own right, but not really relevant to the Russo-Turkish Great Game. More relevant was Semyon Vasilyevich Kochubey's Cossack expedition to conquer the northern Persian Gilan region, followed up by a more regular Russian expeditionary force that had succeeded in taking Tehran in 1723. In the eastern Azerbaijan, initial clashes between Russian and Georgian forces ensued, but as the Ottomans advanced the Georgians hastily agreed to cede Azerbaijan to Russia in exchange for military assistance. The ever-cautious Alexius II hesitated, but the Russian Orthodox Church and the more bellicose of the boyars insisted on helping the co-religionists, reasoning that they probably were going to have to fight the Ottomans in Persia anyway. So the Treaty of Ardabil was signed and the third Russo-Turkish War begun, promising to be as peculiarly limited and as surprisingly small-scaled as the previous two clashes of the empires.

Immediately in 1724, things went badly for the Georgians. Though Russian reinforcements allowed them to defend much Kartli and rebel Imeretia, the Ottomans crushed all the other insurgents and expelled the Georgians from their part of Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, in Persia itself, the Ottomans and a few local warlords that chose to align with them took control over Isfahan and so asserted their predominance in central Iran, soon moving to expel a Russian detachment from the city of Qom and thus limiting the Russians to the northernmost parts of Persia (especially as the Russians mostly failed to procure local support, thanks to the poor disciplinne of the Cossacks and the adroitness of the opposing Ottoman diplomats). The battles in Georgia particularily demonstrated the superiority of the reformed Ottoman armies over the Russian ones; in truth it was the terrain that saved Kartli from immediate defeat. However, the Russians had only deployed comparatively minor forces in Georgia so far, and planned to send many more reinforcements in 1725. However, two complications arose in the steppes and the plains of southern Russia. The first was the Circassians, and some other north Caucasian Muslim peoples that had pledged allegience to the Turkish Sultan in the beginning of that year, after some crafty manipulation by the Vizier-i-Azam; these tied down the Kuban Cossacks and raided all and any nearby Russian military (or civilian) targets. The second was an uprising in the Ukraine.

Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, who came to power in 1717, was never friendly towards Moscow. Well-educated and quite Westernised, he couldn't but hold the Muscovites in some contempt; and much more so because he was at the same time a true Cossack at heart. Furthermore, whether he liked it or not, the Hetmanate was by its nature in a state of constant conflict with the Russian central authorities - especially after the Eleven Years War, which saw major western Ukrainean lands conquered by the Tsar and contested between the Hetman of Kiev and the Russian governor of Vinnitsa, an issue that Alexius II was very slow to definitely settle. So debates raged, dissent grew and Pylyp Orlyk prepared a grand uprising. His agents contacted all the Cossack Hosts, while his own Zaporozhians readied to rise up in arms. Alexius II was warned of the preparations in advance, but for some reason did nothing at all, perhaps not believing them, or perhaps underestimating Orlyk's capabilities. The outbreak of the war with the Ottoman Empire distracted everyone for a while, as the Zaporozhian Cossacks fought the Crimean Tartars in a flurry of raids, counter-raids and skirmishes. But by 1724 Pylyp Orlyk had already reassessed the situation and reasserted his control. The Ottoman victories and the rumours of Cossacks being used as cannon fodder provided an excellent opportunity, and in 1725 the Kiev Defenestration (of largely-irrelevant Russian officials) occured, soon followed up by the Declaration of the Independence of the Republic of the Hosts ("the Cossack Republic"). The Zaporozhians and the Don Cossacks quickly mobilised, and their brethren and urban sympathisers in western Ukraine rose up as well; the leadership of the Kuban Host was bitterly divided, but ultimately followed as well. However, from the start it was apparent that Pylyp Orlyk's preparations were not quite as succesful as he had hoped; no other Hosts defected to him in their entirety, though many smaller units from them rose up in the name of the Republic, causing the war to spill over into Siberia. The Terek Cossack Host, completely preoccupied with the war in Caucasus and distrustful of Pylyp's western and even pro-Turkish leanings, remained almost entirely loyal. The Kuban Host fell into infighting, and even some of the Zaporozhian Cossacks remained loyal to the Tsar. So instead of an united Cossack front against Moscow, a civil war among the Cossacks begun. Still, the rebels easily prevailed in the Ukraine itself and along the Don and the Kuban, while the lower Volga valley became bitterly-contested, rebel Cossacks besieging Russian garrisons. The Russians were clearly shocked, and even as they begun to recover their plans fully fell apart as the infighting reached the armies in Persia and Georgia, allowing the Ottomans to rout them all and conquer Kartli, though with serious losses and an onset of a drawn-out mountain guerrila war.

After the initial chaos receded, Orlyk called for a meeting of the representatives of the rebel Hosts (including the more significant splinter groups that rebelled against the loyal Hosts and now usurped their names) in the Cossack capital of Baturyn. A progressive and egalitarian constitution of the Hetman's own writing was accepted, and the initial plans were made. As peaceful separation was obviously out of question from the start, the Cossacks decided to hold on to the initiative and to secure the Volga valley. To help with this and to generally destabilise Russia, it was decided to free the serfs in captured territories in exchange for them helping the war effort; that policy had a helpful side-effect, as a kholop named Ivan Gvozd launched a major serf uprising in northern Russia later in 1725, to be followed up by lesser uprisings elsewhere. For a while it seemed as if a general peasant revolution may occur in Russia, but Pylyp Orlyk was not so optimistic, and rightly so; by 1726 most rebellions were either isolated, either crushed, and though dissent remained high due to the new war taxes and heavy-handed measures, the same measures - carried out by local governors and in more serious cases by the Tayniy Prikaz ("the Secret Order"), which grew in size, funding and powers considerably after 1725 - kept most of the countryside in line. Lastly, the Cossacks tried to court foreign support, but had no such luck; Sweden was unwilling to engage in further military adventures and was in the middle of a political crisis due to Carl XII's illness, France had little interest in Russia at the moment and Hungary did the opposite of what the Cossacks asked it for, granting military assistance to the Tsar in order to secure his gratitude and to thwart any Ottoman designs for an Ukrainian puppet state. Ironically, the Ottomans themselves, though naturally supporting the rebels, for now also chose to refrain from granting them real military assistance, instead focusing on consolidating their new gains.

So in spite of the Cossack victories along the Volga, the Republic of the Hosts soon enough was on its own against the Tsardom, which by then had gotten its act together, and a Hungarian army. The Ukrainian guerrila warfare took its toll on the Hungarians, but with the help of some loyalists they managed to capture Vinnitsa and some other western Ukrainian cities. As for the Russians, in 1726 they had won a string of victories: at Slutsk they nipped a Belarusian uprising in the bud, at Tula an ambitious Cossack raid towards Moscow itself was defeated, and at the fortress-cities of Voronezh and Saratov the Cossack advance in general was checked, albeit an attempted attack along the Dnieper towards Kiev ended in a disastrous massacre of Tsarist troops. Later in the year a new offensive begun along the Volga, with the help of the loyal Hosts (by then most of the eastern Cossack rebels had been crushed) and the Bashkirs that were able to match the Cossacks quite well at steppe warfare. Early in 1727 Ivan Gvozd was betrayed by his men and brutally executed on the Red Square; at about the same time, Astrakhan was recaptured.

The Hetman, increasingly desperate, conscripted ex-serfs en masse, and requested Turkish and Tartar assistance. These unpopular measures and the perception of a turning tide - in spite of the fortutious recapture of Vinnitsa - had further splintered his supporters, and several atamans defected with their forces, in exchange for the Tsar's promised amnesty for those who would "fight for the autocrator and the Russian land against the Baturyn Antichrist". Those that remained with the Hetman were more determined than ever to fight to the last, though, and as a degree of Ottoman military assistance actually arrived (by now an easily-defensible perimeter was secured in Persia, east of the Isfahan, while the Georgian insurgents were being gradually isolated and rooted out) the hopes were rising again. To balance this, however, the Austrians sent a new, larger army, while the Russians assembled several huge ones along the Volga and at Voronezh and Kursk. It was expensive, but worth it; with help from the new artillery bought from the Hungarians and the aforementioned loyal Cossacks and Bashkirs, the Russians were able to steamroll the Don region and northern Caucasus in spite of an Ottoman presence there. Though actually securing the gains tied down an army, the Russians had enough to spare. Knyaz Vasily Vladimirovich Dolgorukov, the supreme Russian commander for the campaign, pressed on further west, and despite heavy losses and persistant harrasment managed to fight his way towards Baturyn, blasting its defenses aside with artillery fire. Most of the inhabitants, including Pylyp Orlyk, managed to flee southwards soon enough, evading pursuit and regroupping at the old Zaporozhyan Sich fortress while Russo-Hungarian forces accepted the capitulation of Kiev. The countryside still remained in Cossack control, and the Knyaz' supply lines were suffering for it, while some new serf uprisings begun. Pylyp Orlyk clung on to hope, how ever futile, that the situation could yet be reversed. But as the Ottomans refused to send any more troops and defections starter anew, he and his retainers eventually had to accept the more modest Turkish counter-proposal - to resettle along the Danube and come into the Sultan's service in exchange for retaining their traditional freedoms. They fled just ahead of the Russian forces that razed the Zaporozhyan Sich. With that, the central resistance to the Tsar collapsed, but isolated peasant and Cossack rebellions continued for some time still.

Anyhow, after this uprising no talk of Cossack autonomy remained. While the loyalists retained numerous freedoms and priveleges, the remaining rebels that had failed to flee or to redeem themselves were demoted to serfdom, while the Ukraine was brought under direct Russian control.

As for the clash with the Turks, it pretty much petered out. There was some talk of a new Crimean campaign, but that clearly would have required a lot of effort and funds, while the Russians were busy restoring order. Likewise, some suggested a new intervention in Persia - but as the Ottomans signed an alliance and border agreement with the Hotakids, partitioning Persia approximately in half with the Afghans, their positions there became simply too unassailable. So after a few more cross-border raids and attempted rebel support, the 1728 Treaty of Azov was signed; it was quite bland, the Russian and the Turkish sovereigns declaring an end to their hostility and pledging future fraternity. Uncomfortable issues - such as the political enemies both sides have been hiding from each other, most significantly the Danubean Host for the Ottomans and several Georgian princes for the Russians - were simply ignored per a tacit agreement. Meanwhile, the new situation between Russia and Turkey was also quietly confirmed and recognised; the Ottomans had made significant gains in Persia and the Southern Caucasus, while the Russians asserted their power in the Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus. The new boundaries of the empires would soon become marked with strings of fortifications on both sides, spies and envoys sneaking through to incite uprisings of co-religionists and other enemy dissidents, and armies waiting for the orders to attack or defend. However, a fourth Russo-Turkish war would be long in the coming...

Meanwhile, the World.

The rest of the world in the 1720s was, as already mentioned, quite uneventful; still, it wasn't totally event-less, and certain developments occured in that period that would come to greatly influence history later on.

Many of the old trends that dominated the world since the Eleven Years War - or earlier - continued, but not always quite as before. Most significant of those would be the continued development of Britain's American colonies, with increasing clashes between colonial authorities, central British ones and the assorted native tribes and confederacies, spilling out into a few Indian wars and a single petty colonial uprising in Maryland. The Spanish colonial empire continued to decay, but Carlos III now paid more attention to it and made some efforts towards administrative reform, and also introduced laws encouraging and rewarding immigration from elsewhere in Europe (most notably, as it turned out, from Germany). Meanwhile, the power transfer from Portugal to Brazil progressed further, and a major city expansion, improvement and beautification programme took place in Salvador de Bahia, allowing it to rival Paris itself by the decade's end. Also expeditions were launched into the Amazon rainforests, tribes and runaway slave communities were fought (with uneven results, but time was definitely working for the Brazilians) and colonists from all over Europe migrated to the promised land that was Brazil.

Europe itself was in part calming down after the political coups of the last two decades, and in part undergoing a new round of sociopolitical turmoil. Sweden during Carl XII's illness was already mentioned; various court factions, would-be successors and the Riksdag vied for power, but in the end Carl XII recovered and imposed an even more hardline version of absolute monarchy, dismissing the Riksdag and disinheriting all of his potential successors (such as his sister Ulrika and his nephew Karl Friedrich zu Holstein-Gottorp), instead imposing succession by adoption (as was practiced in Rome). He ended up adopting a capable and popular Swedish nobleman and commander, Magnus Stenbock. Popular though Stenbock might have been, this radical step had greatly outraged the Swedish nobility and populace, and several revolts and conspiracies against Carl XII ensued. All were crushed, for now.

Carlos III in Spain too faced some more revolts, but generally his policies of compromise between central and regional authorities - reinforced by the "stick" of the new and improved Spanish army and its French collegues - helped calm Spain down. Not a terribly competent ruler, Carlos still knew well enough to support competent ministers and organise administrative reforms in the colonies and economic ones at home. James III in Great Britain too had consolidated and improved his position, gradually winning over the majority of the British populace and political elite. All in all, French diplomacy in Europe had reached its zenith, as both Britain and Spain, as well as the rebounding Ottoman Empire, became its de facto allies; this allowed Melchior de Polignac and King Philippe VII to plot the next stage of their plan. At home, absolute monarchy was defended and strenghthened, and the policies of enlightened despotism were embraced; the French Enlightenment was in full bloom, and spreading across Europe.

In 1728, Maximilian II Emanuel, the Holy Roman Emperor and King of Bavaria, had finally died; a half-hearted Habsburg attempt to retake power in the HRE had failed, and his son Karl Abrecht took power as Emperor Karl VI. He generally worked towards strenghthening the unity and coordination of the Holy Roman Empire, taking steps towards reconciliation with the Hungarian Habsburgs while noticeably beginning to clash with France over the French policies in Alsace and the former Palatinate. All in all the political climate in the Holy Roman Empire calmed down and a period of prosperity set in, with added cultural flowering and such. It was hard to say whether or not the HRE could be considered in any way united, though.

The Saxons continued to pay most attention to the consolidation of Poland. Major rebel confederacies of the szlachta arose and were battled with Hungarian assistance; the Sejm was eventually dismissed and an absolute monarchy was enforced; at the same time, various other, non-political priveleges of the Polish nobility were guaranteed, and at the same time efforst were made to win over the Polish bourgoise by granting it greater rights and lifting some of the restrictions. This failed to pay off significantly, as both social stratas wanted more still for themselves and no such improvements for the other. Trade and the crafts did flourish somewhat, though; however the agriculture remained in deep crisis and decline, even worsened after the chaos of the Eleven Years War.

There is not much to speak about in Italy; the loose Hungarian hegemony there continued to exist, Venice continued to slowly decay and Genoa was undergoing a renaissance thanks to its banking system - as they had financed Habsburg Spain in the 16th and 17th centuries, so now they financed Habsburg Hungary.

Aside from that, not much else occured in Europe apart from public works and architectural development, sovereigns generally doing their best to make their courts and capitals more illustrious by encouraging all kinds of arts and sciences. You get the idea. The Habsburg realms in particular saw a lot of building as local semi-autonomous authorities and the king (Karoly III) himself alike all did their best to improve the communications and infrastructure and build a lot of fine buildings, and generally out-civilise, out-culture and out-French France itself.

In Africa, not much occured, really; Iyasu II came to power in Ethiopia, the Kongolese scored some minor victories over the Brazilians, and Mamari Kulibali rampaged on in West Africa. Denmark-Norway set up some trade outposts in West Africa, the Dutch expanded Sudafrika and the French campaigned on the Ile de Dauphine, gradually bringing its eastern half under the heel. From there and from the allied Turkish ports the French extended their influence in the Indian Ocean...

...where the colonial race generally intensified, with the VOC's intervention in Persia, British outposts in the Moluccas and on Sumatra and growing French presence in the Nizamate of Hyderabad, which effectively became a French client state and military protectorate after the disastrous defeat at Maratha hands in the Battle of Pune in 1726. Dutch, French and British military presence generally increased, the Dutch negotiating a military protection agreement for VOC holdings with the Chinese Empire to even out the odds. Denmark too increased its presence in India somewhat, though not too significantly.

The native states of India too were not in a state of peace. Under the energetic leadership of Peshwa Baji Rao I (firmly supported by the Maratha emperor Shahuji), the Maratha Confederacy scored numerous significant victories, humbling the Nizamate of Hyderabad and claiming the western half of its territory, and then turning around to attack the shambling Mughal Empire. Although Muhammad Shah did manage to reassert his authority in Delhi, the countryside had largely fallen to warlordism; furthermore, many of the warlords were persuaded to defect to Baji Rao I, attracted by the prospects of defeating the stronger warlords, dividing their territories and then ruling as more or less autonomous Marathan governors. Gujarat and the Narmada Basin fell soon enough, and by the decade's end the war was already being waged in the Gangetic Plain (which was all the Mughals had left; the Hotakids and the Sikhs carved up the northwest, and Bengal's nawab, Murshid Quli Khan, had by then declared independence). Also Baji Rao I improved relations with the VOC to counterbalance the Anglo-French influences, and introduced a social revolution by promoting meritocracy in the Maratha Empire.

In Southeast Asia, a grand Vietnamese rebellion that occupied almost the entire decade was ruthless put down by the Chinese; this was followed by a full annexation of Annam to the Chinese Empire, its partition into two provinces and the beginning of its rapid Chinese colonisation (lots of various incentives were offered to those who would settle there). Ayutthaya underwent a general Sinification as General Thaisingh assumed higher and higher degrees of power, eventually taking power for himself in 1727. His Chinese-inspired reforms had generally strenghthened the realm in spite of some traditionalist dissent, and while Cambodia remained out of his grasp, with the defeat of a 1724 expedition, he did manage to conquer Pegu in 1729, though allowing it to retain a large degree of autonomy. Also the various petty tribes of the north were reminded that, yes, they were indeed loyal subjects of the Ayutthayan Empire (Thaisingh took on a new grandiose title for his coronation, which the Europeans had translated as "emperor", as they are wont to do).

Ming China went on as before, fighting southern ethnic rebellions and corruption back at home. Albeit a Neoconfucian, the Xuantai Emperor was, first and foremost, a Nan Ming and so naturally interested in commerce and seapower. Accordingly he modernised and expanded the Chinese fleet considerably, and established new bases in the East Indies in accordance with the agreement with the Netherlands.

Elsewhere around China, the Dzungar Khanate continued to collapse in fits of rebellion, Korea continued to quietly prosper and stagnate, and Japan, well... Japan was slowly sinking into chaos, Tokugawa Inoue desperately resorting to ever-harsher measures as rebellions wrecked the countryside and the cities alike. As underground intellectual movements flourished and social tensions worsened, organised revolutionary societies begun to spring up, united around the ideology of kokugaku (OOC: an earlier, more radical and more politicised version of the OTL Kokugaku; basically this is an egalitarian, nationalist, anti-Shogunate, pro-Emperor movement). By 1731 entire prefectures - especially in Kyushu, the populace of which existed in general misery since the downfall of the Shimazu Clan in 1684 - had been overran by the rebels, and a new generation of kokugaku leaders ensured greater coordination. Still, the Shogunate refused to surrender.
 
The Long Due Storm.

Though the immediate causes of the Second Dutch War lie in the state of European diplomacy after the Eleven Years War and the Jacobite Revolution, as well as in the growing colonial and commercial competition between the Anglo-French and the Sino-Dutch blocks in the 1710s and the 1720s, the war's origins can also be traced back to the First Dutch War (also, the Franco-Dutch War or the Third Anglo-Dutch War; 1672-1678), when France and England - then under Louis XIV and Charles II respectively - tried to crush the Dutch Republic, to avenge past injustices, crush the perfidious commercial power of the "nation of shopkeepers" and generally carve it up. But the capture of various Dutch ports and whatnot wasn't really as important as the neutralisation of Dutch interference; the Dutch had provided fierce colonial and commercial competition to England, and at the same time frustrated Louis XIV's territorial ambitions by putting their economic weight behind his enemies. Anyhow, the Dutch had warded off the attackers long enough to receive foreign assistance and survive. Since then, a series of wars was fought between France and a coalition that inevitably included the Dutch Stadtholder, Willem III. In 1688 said Willem even pulled quite a coup by stealing Britain, tying its foreign policies to those of Holland and then using the resultant combination to parry the latest French thrust. But in 1704, things changed. Willem III died. The Eleven Years War was won by France, and numerous border territories long denied to Louis XIV were annexed. After the death of Louis XIV came the death of Queen Anne, the widow of Willem III. The Dutch, in a Stadtholderless period once again, had planned together with the said widow to retain England (now Britain) as a Dutch ally by arranging a transfer of power to Georg I of Hannover; but the Tory leaders and Cardinal Melchior de Polignac thwarted them by capitalising on popular dissent with the pro-Hannoverian Whigs and with the idea of foreign rule in general, and managed to organise the aforementioned Jacobite Revolution.

Thus Britain was pulled out of the Dutch sphere of influence. Although in the early years of James III's reign any strong foreign policy - especially a binding alliance with France - was impossible, as time went on the regime stabilised, while the public opinion increasingly shifted in the support of closer ties with France, with a view towards an united front against the Dutch. The reason the Dutch came to be so hated was the importance of international commerce for the British society as a whole, or at the very least for those in position to seriously influence public opinion - and the fierce colonial and commercial competition that the Dutch once more put up in the face of the British efforts to get a better slice of the East Indian market. The VOC, already hegemonic in the Indian Ocean, was doing its best to seize a virtual monopoly over the maritime commerce there, and acted ruthlessly against all competition, using mercenaries, local allies or even direct military attacks (claimed to be in retaliation). That worked quite well against the Portuguese, forcing the Brazilian Empire to focus on Africa in the new century. Britain and France proved more persistant, however, securing native allies of their own and increasing their commercial and military presence in their colonies and their allied states (the military part mostly applied to the French, in Ile de Dauphine, Hyderabad and Cambodia). The latter fact was particularily alarming, causing the Dutch to grow their own military presence and to seek out militarily-potent allies; although they did improve their relations with the Maratha Confederacy and the Ayutthayan Empire, their main ally remained Nan Ming China, which was building up its naval capacity anyway. So an agreement was signed; in exchange for the participation of an Imperial representative in the VOC's decision-making process and some other concessions, the Chinese pledged to protect the VOC holdings in the East Indies themselves.

As the best information the British and the French had about Chinese naval capacity came from the rather badly mishandled 1709 invasion of the Philippines, that did not actually inspire much fear.

Anyway, united in the holy feeling of hatred for all things Dutch, as well as in the goals of opening the Indian Ocean up to their own commerce (and in French case of stealing some Dutch border territories; Maastricht was particularily desirable, being an enclave and a good fortress), Britain and France had since the mid-1720s been preparing for a major world-wide coordinated campaign against the Dutch colonies. At the same time, a considerable military buildup had been occuring in Europe. It was hoped that even if the Indian Ocean campaign doesn't go as planned, the capture of the Dutch metropoly would force the VOC to its knees anyway - plus the British were eager to take a revanche on the Dutch fleet, while the French expressed hope for loot and territorial aggrandisement. Also plans were in discussion that war should be brought to Hannover, which still was a Dutch ally; its defeat would allow France to extend its influence into the northwestern HRE, and would remove a potentially significant threat to the Jacobite regime. However, the cooler heads on both sides of the Channel (such as Cardinal de Polignac and Jonathan Swift) were opposed to that last plan; Hannover, they argued, was really insignificant unless things got really bad in Britain itself - and it certainly wasn't worth a likely war against the Holy Roman Empire. Indeed an attack on Hannover would likely benefit Karl VI most of all, as he would be able to rally the HRE against France and Britain, and so perhaps make it a real and hostile force - and nobody really wants that, right? Still, the plans against the Dutch, though also still vague and half-formed as far as the specifics of the war itself went, were agreed upon by all that mattered. Now all that was needed was a cause, and the completion of a "public relations" campaign against the Dutch in Britain and on the international arena.

As pamphlets and diplomats spoke of the Dutch atrocities and ruthlessness, and their criminal attacks on peaceful British merchants, a suitable cause for war finally appeared - it was, indeed, too suitable, as the Dutch had beaten both the British real and proclaimed expectations when in 1732 they launched what is now usuallly regarded as a preemptive attack; operating from their local forts and outposts, VOC mercenaries and Dutch soldiers attacked Fort William (also known as Calcutta), where a large British force was preparing for a campaign against the Dutch colonies in Bengal. A fierce night battle ensued, but in the end the Dutch initiative and superior numbers prevailed; Fort William fell, and the British assets in Bengal were seized.

Genuinely outraged, the British declared war and soon were joined by the French and the Spanish. In Europe, Holland was initially backed by Hannover alone, Denmark-Norway not yet daring to honour its alliance. In Asia, the diplomatic situation was much more confusing, as neither the Marathas nor the Ottomans chose to join the war directly, but still provided a degree of assistance to their allies. China, however, was clearly intent on honouring its agreement, and also prepared a new attack on the Philippines. Ayutthaya was always eager to fight the French (especially in Cambodia), though it was yet to make any definite gestures.

The Anglo-French diplomacy in Europe had mixed results. While managing to bring in Spain and Munster on their side, it failed to convince the Brazilians to launch a war of revanche; the Brazilians were, as already mentioned, more interested in Africa, specifically in Kongo where war was heating up. Also, no definite pledge of neutrality could in the end be procured in Copenhagen. In Asia, there was more success; the Mughals, backed by French and British arms and advisors, managed to tie down the Marathas, while Hyderabad and Cambodia were by default obliged to assist.

As the Dutch attack took the Anglo-French by surprise, real campaigning - aside from a few raids and naval skirmishes in 1732 - could only begin next year. But when it begun, it begun indeed. As befits a world war, the first major battle occured in the sea, at the West Frisian island of Texel. In this Second Battle of Texel the combined Anglo-French armada had tricked the Dutch fleet into sallying by providing it with the apparent opportunity to defeat the enemy in detail, only to then bring out the reinforcements and so trap the Dutch fleet. The modern, professional and well-motivated Dutch fleet fought well, Admiral Jan Cruys trying to execute a fighting retreat, but as fate would have it the Dutch flagship, De Zeven Provincien - quite possibly the most powerful ship in Europe - sunk during the fearsome bombardment. Disordered and demoralised, the Dutch fleet took significant casualties, and the encouraged Anglo-French admirals pursued it further, effectively crippling Dutch naval power in Europe. After that the British Marine Regiments and the French Troupes de marine secured the West Frisian islands, and the navy initiated an effective blockade of the Dutch coasts. It wasn't actually all that effective, especially at first - many of the surviving Dutch squadrons slipped away and along with the privateers took to commerce raiding and suchlike. Others rushed to reinforce the Dutch forces in the West Indies, but came too late as, later in the same year, the British defeated the West Indies squadron and (over the rest of 1733 and the early 1734) seized the Dutch possessions in the Lesser Antilles and the Suriname.

In the Indian Ocean theatre, the naval campaigns naturally saw an Anglo-French initiative early on; the Dutch admirals there were aware of the enemy's supremacy and so decided not to face him in futile open battles, instead conserving their strenght for the deense of Java itself in coordination with the Chinese. In accordance with this strategy much of the Dutch squadrons in the Ocean were gathered at Batavia, while the rest went to defend various important ports elsewhere, with the support of local coastal artillery. The Anglo-French forces executed attacks on diverse targets. The British immediately and foolhardily attacked the Dutch-ruled city of Padang, on Sumatra; surprisingly enough they succeeded, but a raid against Batavia itself was defeated very thoroughly. Meanwhile, the French chiefly operated in the western parts of the Ocean, securing the recently-abandoned island of Mauritius, and seizing numerous Dutch outposts in southern India. Although a Dutch squadron - the strongest one outside of Batavia - had repulsed the invasion of the Persian Gulf, the French were nonetheless surprised at the comparative weakness of the resistance generally offered. This allowed them and their British allies to launch a coordinated assault on Ceylon, in alliance with the native kingdom of Kandy. That alliance proved decisive, and the multi-pronged eliminated the local Dutch presence; key forts were seized by the allies, and the rest of the coastland was awarded to the king of Kandy. Aside from the British campaign, not much yet occured in the East Indies themselves, but the French shored up their presence there, and confirmed their alliance with Cambodia, while also signing a new one with the Sultanate of Achin, a local trade power eager to reclaim its old commercial hegemony that was ruined by the VOC in the 17th century. Ayutthaya yet remained impassive.

Back in Europe, the overland campaign begun sonn after the conquest of the West Frisians. The United Provinces came under attack from three directions. First, the French - sporting their formidable artillery and other siege engines that had gained quite a reputation since the Third Siege of Vienna in 1712 - besieged and captured Maastricht; then they divided their attack force into two parts, and while one advanced to besiege Breda, Tilburg and Eindhoven, the other linked up with the forces of the Prince-Bishop of Munster and attacked northern Holland, besieging Groningen. Lastly, an Anglo-French force landed in Friesland and took the city of Leeuwarden by surprise. Other, less serious naval raids terrorised the Dutch coast, although an amphibious attack on Amsterdam failed miserably.

In 1734 the situation in Europe changed dramatically when, in response to the pleas of Georg I Ludwig of Hannover, Karl VI did indeed decide to rally the Holy Roman Empire against the Anglo-French "Entente", and also against the Bishop of Munster, to whose lands he felt his family had a legitimate claim. Naturally that was easier said than done, but ultimately the northern German princes at least were persuaded to assist their co-religionists, if only out of fear that after Holland's fall they might be next. The southwest was less eager to fight the French more than absolutely necessary, but did gave some formal support; so did the Habsburgs, who also immediately concluded a gentlemen's agreement with the French to not extend this war into Italy or the Mediterranean, i.e. anywhere where they could realistically fight. Still, fresh troops now begun to arrive to help defend Holland, and the Bishop of Munster was forced to withdraw his forces from Groningen to defend his own realm. Also, Denmark-Norway was encouraged by this and pledged to honour its alliance with Holland. To the dismay of the Anglo-French, a genuine coalition was rising against them, though still far from their match as long as the Habsburgs remained virtually neutral. This meant that the assault had to be sped up. After a coastal naval battle with the surviving elements of the Dutch European fleet, the Anglo-French forces captured the virtually defenseless Hague. Fortunately for the Dutch, the Staten-Generaal had realised the vulnerability of a deliberately wall-less capital, and so prudently evacuated to Amsterdam after the first raids occured in the Hague's vicinity. Still, the attackers now gained a new foothold and a propaganda victory. At the same time, in the south, Tilburg and Eindhoven surrendered, though Breda - being one of Holland's stongest and oldest fortresses - still held (that and the water lines prevented further northwards advance). The Entente Marines also secured much of Zeeland. Affairs in the northeastern theatre went badly, as expected - the Bishopric of Munster was overran by Hannoverian and Prussian forces, and the siege of Groningen was lifted, though Friesland remained British.

In the next year, the Entente suffered another diplomatic defeat. Sweden, in a political crisis since the death of the mentally-unstable Carl XII in 1731, restabilised again. After a brief civil war, Magnus Stenbock, Carl's appointed heir, managed to reach a compromise with the noble factions rising against him; he married Ulrika Eleanora, Carl XII's sister, and reconvenned the Riksdag, granting it some real legislative power. Also he rescinded some of Carl XII's more controversial reforms, but was allowed to retain the new succession law due to his own respectable age and the Queen's doubtable fertility. Apart from this compromise, Magnus V of Sweden generally worked to form a secure power base for himself on the foundations of Protestantism and nationalism (indeed much of his appeal amongst the common populace stemmed from being a genuine Swedish noble, as opposed to a German related to the Holy Roman Emperor, as even Carl XII was, being a Swedish Wittelsbach). So to make his power base all the more secure - and to improve Sweden's international prestige - and to distract the Riksdag from various domestic issues - he pledged support for the United Provinces, and sent an expeditionary corps to Friesland. There, Swedish, Danish, Imperial and Dutch forces expelled the British from Leeuwarden and then from the rest of the province, in spite of the reinforcements James III kept sending there. Eastern Holland was now for all purposes well out of the Entente's reach. That made the conquest of the western seaboard all the more imperative, and so more forces (British and French) were sent in to conquer the province of Holland itself. A costly failure of an assault on Breda occured as well.

1734 and 1735 saw the war in the Indian Ocean theatre intensify immensely, with many new campaigns launched. Thus, for instance, a British expedition captured Kaapstad, the capital of Sudafrika, and went on to take over much of the coastline, though many of the Dutch colonists retreated into the interior and pledged to fight a guerrila war from there, tying down more British troops still. An invasion of Bengal failed due to the VOC being assisted by the local governor thanks to the tactless behaviour of the British diplomats trying to coerce him into helping the Entente. Fierce fighting ensued as major Ayutthayan and Chinese forces invaded Cambodia, slowly but surely advancing and taking fortress after fortress, in spite of the stalwart Franco-Cambodian resistance. However, in 1735 a series of battles occured around Phnom Penh and Prey Nokor, the realm's two most prosperous and most important cities; the invaders failed to take both and took major casualties thanks to the Cambodian guerrila warfare and major French reinforcements that had now arrived. And, ofcourse, there was fighting in the East Indies themselves, where a major Anglo-French fleet had by now converged. The Malay Peninsula and Sumatra were largely cleansed of the Dutch presence after the 1734-1735 Siege of Malacca, but further east the situation was more complicated; the attack on Borneo failed, while the Spanish, who were supposed to help in its conquest, came under attack from a Chinese armada. This time the local viceroy's luck had ran out; with the help of local insurgents, the Chinese had overrran Luzon and besieged Manila. Spanish colonial authority elsewhere in the islands begun to collapse. The central objective, as far as both sides were concerned, remained Java however. After the first few Anglo-French raids and naval skirmishes, a major naval battle between the Sino-Dutch and Anglo-French flotillas occured at Pulaupanjang island. As far as epic clashes between two huge fleets go, it was extremelly anticlimatic; the Anglo-French fleet was repulsed, but managed to retreat without too much loss. Later in 1735, a Sino-Dutch counterattack occured in Sumatra, as the pro-Chinese kingdom of Palembang - as well as a fairly large Sino-Dutch contingent - moved against Bengkulu, the main British outpost on Sumatra. After some confused skirmishing the fort was besieged, though supplied from the sea. That caused the 1736 naval Battle of Bengkulu. Again, the Sino-Dutch fleet clashed with the Anglo-French one. This time, the results were slightly more decisive, as the Anglo-French - who had made the mistake of not concentrating their forces here and instead detached some of their fleet to raid Ayutthaya and some to control the Java Sea - were defeated and forced to retreat northwards, while the city surrendered.

Also in 1736, however, a major Entente victory occured back in Europe, when Amsterdam was captured. Also this time the Staten-Generaal failed to get away; that is, individual members managed to flee the city in the last moment, but many were arrested by the Anglo-French troops that suddenly besieged, bombarded and assalted the city. In the same time fell the rest of the Holland province, and the conquest of North Brabant was complete with the surrender of Breda. All that caused no small degree of disorganisation and demoralisation in the United Provinces, though fortunately these Provinces were decentralised enough to avoid falling into anarchy. Also, the Swedo-Imperial forces prevented further advance, defeating Entente troops at Utrecht and at Leerdam. On the naval front the Danish-Swedish fleet managed to unite with the Hannoverian one and the remnants of the Dutch one to score a strategically-insignificant, but still encouraging victory at Helgoland. All attempts to lift the Anglo-French blockade of the United Provinces failed, though.

By this moment the continuation of the war seemed increasingly senseless to the Entente leaders; in spite of the setbacks of the East Indies, they now held both Amsterdam and the Hague, as well as many other significant cities, and also occupied many of the Dutch colonies. However, the VOC, believing that the tables have been turned, refused to capitulate, as did the emergency council in Groningen that passed for the Dutch government now. The Dutch allies - for varying reasons - were also adamant in continuing to support the United Provinces. And meanwhile, the assorted campaigns were beginning to seriously hurt the economy of the Entente kingdoms (especially when combined with the major disruption of trade both in Europe and in the East Indies). Also disconcerting was the death of James III (from widely-debated and ultimately unestablished causes) and the subsequent two-year regency in Great Britain.

Anyhow, the war continued into 1737. In Holland, that year saw a lot of bloody and indecisive battles. Confused naval skirmishing occured through the North Sea, with a singular (and purely symbolic) Danish raid in Scotland. In the East Indies, mutual frustration has resulted in the Battle of Pagai Selatan (a middling-to-small island west of Sumatra), where both sides attempted to achieve decisive results. In the end, however, all that was achieved were major losses for both sides; the Sino-Dutch fleet was forced to retreat and abandon the plans for the reconquest of Sumatra, but their enemies were too weakened themselves to launch any kind counter-offensive.

After that, apart from the fierce fighting in Cambodia - where the tides of war kept alternating wildly - the Second Dutch War begun to peter out, as both sides reached what essentially was their limits in the face of the present opposition. The cost of the war had by then become unacceptable for both sides. In 1738 a treaty was worked out between the provisional government of the United Provinces and the governments of Britain and France; the Lesser Antilles and most of the Indian outposts were restored to the respective Dutch companies, but Britain annexed Suriname and South Africa, while France took Maastricht, Mauritius and the Ceylonese ports, as well as some of the Indian outposts and European enclaves. Calcutta and Bengkulu were restored to Britain, while the VOC regained Malacca in exchange for conceding western Sumatra to the British sphere of influence. The British were also allowed to set up a fixed number of trade outposts in the Moluccas and the Bandas, in reparation for those that the Dutch had previously destroyed. The United Provinces themselves, apart from the annexed enclaves, were evacuated; the attackers were mostly content with decimating the Dutch fleet, razing the border fortifications during the occupation and pillaging the more resistant cities a bit. Thus the Dutch colonial and commercial empire was preserved, but gravely weakened, and the VOC's monopolistic aspirations were thwarted for good. In a separate treaty war with the Holy Roman Empire was concluded; the Hannoverian elector surrendered his claim to the British throne in exchange for a certain secret deal with the British government, and the Bishopric of Munster came under Wittelsbach rule. The war in Cambodia grinded to a halt, and in 1738 a treaty was signed; the French were forced to withdraw their troops from Cambodia, but Cambodia retained its independence, though losing a few border territories and fortifications there. It also had to pay out a comparatively small tribute to Ayutthaya. A formal treaty on the Philippines was signed by the Spanish and Chinese officials in 1739; by then Spanish presence on the Philippines was virtually nonexistant, so all that they bargained out was an evacuation, a limited compensation and the Emperor's guarantee of the safety of the Spanish and other Christian population in the islands as long as they stay in line.

The Fallout.

Although considerably less intense, damaging or dramatic than, say, the Eleven Years War, the Second Dutch War nonetheless left an important mark on history - perhaps less by its direct outcome and more by its unintended consequences.

During and immediately after the war, the endless political crisis that has dominated the United Provinces since the death of Willem III - the last stadtholder - had reached its climax. The United Provinces themselves were devastated and Dutch power world-wide severely shaken; and the Staten-Generaal were effectively dispersed by the loss of the Hague and of Amsterdam. After all those cataclysms, it was clear that a new strong central leadership was required. However, with the Dutch political elite in disarray, the rise of such a leadership became a more difficult question than usually. At first it was proposed that a new stadtholder is given power; the stadtholder of Friesland seemed to be in a fairly good position. However, as a result of some complex intrigues and backroom deals in the Republic and on the greater diplomatic arena, a new option appeared and gained popularity. With the support of Magnus V and Karl VI, as well as of significant fations in the House of Orange and ofcourse in the Republic itself, Georg Ludwig I of Hannover (who was related to the House of Orange) took upon the newly-created Dutch royal title and accepted a constitution that essentially made the Dutch king roughly equivalent to a stadtholder under the old system, but still with a bit more power, and much more pomp and prestige. Although Hannover and Holland were united by little more than their monarch de jure, de facto they also had major commercial ties (especially now when tariffs between the two were lowered further) and, from now on, an unified foreign policy. That included the colonies, where the incipient Hannoverian colonial ventures were now integrated with the Dutch ones, as part of the general colonial reforms.

Those reforms were quite uneven. On one hand, the WIC (West-Indische Compagnie) - having been crippled and bankrupted by the war and the loss of Suriname - was taken over by the government, along with its territories; its resources and those of the new Dutch and Hannoverian colonial ventures were directed to West and Central Africa, where considerable gains were made. On the other hand, the VOC now effectively slipped out of the Dutch government's grasp, its headquarters fully moved to Batavia and greater ties being established with China (the government and the guilds) as well as various foreign European ventures. The VOC thus asserted its already existant effective autonomy, and as the treasury was reliant on East Indian trade King Joris I had to live with it. In any case, it still did remain a Dutch company, and so it was provided with the troops it needed to conquer Soccotra and put down a Javan rebellion. All in all things weren't really all that bad.

The apparent British support for the new Hannoverian maneuver had put a significant dent in the Entente. That was a risk the new British king, Charles III, was willing to take as he focused on securing his position at home, a task in which the abandonment of Hannoverian claims and the distraction of the elderly King-Elector could only help. Unlike his father, and like his two namesakes on the English throne, Charles III was unwilling to be a puppet of the Parliament. Fortunately, the parliamentary forces too were considerably weakened - first by the Jacobite Revolution and then by the interfaction strife and failed pro-Hannoverian conspiracies of the Second Dutch War. Also, having inherited the throne directly as opposed to claiming it in a parliamentary coup, Charles III was in a much better position to dictate his conditions. Drawing back upon the new generation ultra-loyal and ultra-nationalistic Tories (most notably the Prime Minister William Doleridge), whom he had managed to place in most important positions by 1740 (as the more parliamentary and moderate Tory "old guard" retired), he decimated the Whig opposition after a series of new investigations into the war-time conspiracies and into James III's suspicious death. Many Whig leaders were exiled or imprisoned; many of the radical Whigs were even executed. Beheaded, the opposition was too weak anyway to try and act against the popular and ruthless monarch. While actual legal changes were kept to a minimum, a radical political change had occured within the very loose and vague bounds of the British political laws - if before, it was the Parliament that dominated, now the king made it clear that the assorted Royal Prerogatives were not solely nominal.
 
As Charles III asserted royal power in Britain, he faced surprisingly little opposition, but in the American colonies the political climate has changed considerably. British North America had already received its share of new political opponents fleeing or being exiled from the Islands, and they helped strenghthen the political opposition there as a whole; but that wasn't really as important as the fact that by now the colonies had grown independent from Great Britain in most regards. They were no longer all that dependant on it economically or demographically, having attained a degree of self-sufficience at this level of development and immigration; they were not dependant on it for their security neither, as the locals already formed militias that proved more than enough against the local Amerinds, while any European threats were by now gone or far away. Ever since the Jacobite Revolution the colonies had drifted away from Great Britain in culture and ideology, but that wasn't too noticeable due to their already considerable autonomy. However, as Charles III turned his eyes to his colonies - his prosperous colonies that nonetheless gave little or no income due to an obsolete system of administration (and this when the realm was in an economic crisis!) - and as he introduced his rather clumsy reforms, reordering the colonies into three somewhat arbitrary Governor-Generalships, setting up a new colonial bureaucracy and creating a new, seemingly severe system of taxation - he had put an end to the quiet state of the Anglo-American detachment; his efforts to bring the British empire closer together instead incited the nascent colonial nationalism and riled up the already discontent colonists. So in 1743, on the 5th of May, the House of Burgesses in Virginia proclaimed its dissention against the new colonial reform. The other traditional colonial authorities (including that in New France, by then also more or less a normal colony despite a somewhat abnormal military presence) joined it later in the year, and when ordered to submit and disband they instead declared independence and sent representatives to the Congress of Albany.

The American Independence War was on. As is usual for insurgencies, the beginning was very chaotic and confusing, as it was unclear who was on whose side. Cities with divided loyalties saw vicious street battles and incendiary campaigns, while Tory loyalists in the countryside launched guerrila uprisings. Although most of the militias immediately pledged their allegience to the Congress, some joined the Tories and a few struck out to fight against both sides for regional independence or whatnot. Most of the colonies didn't have major garrisons present; some of the garrisons joined the rebellion, some resisted and some surrendered without actively joining the insurgency. Things were different in New France, which as already mentioned had a major military presence. The older garrison troops (a fault of the lack of proper troop rotation in the British colonial empire) had to a large extent become more loyal to the developing colony than to the metropoly that they hadn't seen for decades, but the newer ones were clearly more loyal to Britain. Therefore a fierce civil war begun there in particular. Also a particularily serious Tory or loyalist presence was in Carolina (OOC: undivided; also, in this world there is no Georgia, though there are some Anglo-American claims and settlements there), with similar consequences, though the Tory militias weren't quite the same as professional garrison troops.

What largely saved the rebellion in its early months was the "tyranny of distance" that delayed and hindered the British response considerably as the government struggled to understand what exactly was going on while more and more late news arrived. That gave the Americans time to prepare their defenses, their native military leaders (most famously, Gustav Bamberger, Nathan Pickering and John Washington) to rise to prominence and rally their forces, and the said forces to score a series of early victories. Perhaps the most important was that in New France, where the German emigre Gustav Bamberger - whose leadership was an important factor in winning over the significant Rhenish community in New France over to the rebel side - succesfully secured all the key cities and most of the forts and defeated the early British reinforcements at Quebec. Meanwhile, Nathan Pickering, who eventually rose to be the commander supreme of the American armies, repulsed a British invasion of the New York colony and generally worked towards building a real, regular army out of the disparate American militias. In that he was greatly helped by Dutch and Hannoverian clandestine military advisors and other European volunteer specialists. At the same time good use was also made of the irregular militias, as every British invasion was met with a guerrila war. The Americans had generally performed very well on the diplomatic front, securing the aforementioned Dutch-Hannoverian assistance and the French neutrality.

As the war dragged on, various political and regional factions in Albany had alternatingly fallen into bickering or united despite their differences. In spite of coordination issues and dissent caused by Pickering's centralisation efforts and increasing interference in Congress politics (which some feared as a sign of "Caesarism", though thus far Pickering's interventions were merely to prevent the whole thing from falling apart), the Rebel Colonies managed to retain an essential coherence. Although some coastal cities - most gravely, Boston - were lost to the British forces for good (that is to say, the British had dug in there well, especially later in the decade, and so proved impossible to dislodge in the present circumstances), the American forces proved capable of holding on to the interior. They also quickly nipped the pro-British Amerind rebellions in the bud in 1747, and gradually pushed the British troops and loyalists out of New France, though Hudson's Bay remained out of their reach. Still, it had taken supreme concentration, thorough mobilisation, ingenious tactics and lots and lots of luck, as well as British distractions, most notably the 1746 American-inspired Whig rebellion in London and a 1748 Irish insurrection. Both were defeated, but they considerably delayed Charles III's plans for a reconquest of North America. Meanwhile, as the war grinded on, the people and the elites on both sides of the Ocean grew increasingly tired of it; and while the British were in position to reasonably promise a new major campaign or two that would bring the rebels to their knees, the Americans could only hope to win by attrition agianst the invading British troops, so understandly the war exhaustion was stronger amongst the rebels. Thus in 1750 the rebellion's fate hung in the balance, due to threats both internal and external. Still, the British themselves were also uncertain whether or not they should go to the trouble of reconquering the colonies by force as opposed to negotiating with them.

Meanwhile, on a completely different side of the world, war was also in the air, though it was much more one-sided. The Ayutthayans naturally did not long remain content with Cambodia's mere disarmament, and as the French were apparently no longer interested in trying to save the country, Emperor Thaisingh begun preparations for an ultimate invasion. In 1742, one of his assassination attempts on the Cambodian king (Chetthe V) had surprisingly enough succeeded; eager to use this sudden, yet excellent opportunity, Thaisingh ordered and led a massive invasion. It was massively anticlimatic, as the Cambodians were routed quickly in battle after battle, overwhelmed by sheer numbers (though Thaisingh's troops also had very good organisation and disciplinne). Phnom Penh was besieged and captured after a powerful artillery bombardment, and the rest fell soon after; the Cambodian nobles were allowed to retain their priveleges and a small degree of autonomy in exchange for surrendering quickly and helping impose the Ayutthayan rule in the newly-conquered land. Many of the Cambodians were deported to the Malay peninsula, though, to help with the colonisation and public works there, while many Malays were sent to help keep the Cambodians in line.

China too was in a conquering mood. In 1739, the militarily-distinguished Paowudi Emperor rose to the throne and lived up to his name, leading campaigns into eastern Tibet and Ava, conquering both; his commanders also finished the subjugation of the Philippines, imposed a protectorate over Palembang after a failed attempt by a local ruler to break away from Chinese domination and made gains in the crumbling Dzungar empire. The campaigns were costly, but China was wealthy. The fleet was comparatively neglected now, though.

Thus to summarise, the war has put Britain and Holland into major political crises causing large changes and weakening their ties with the colonies (whether mostly amiably or very violently), and allowed for major redrawing of the borders in Southeast Asia. There were other consequences, too; the Entente and the anti-Entente coalition had disintegrated soon after the Second Dutch War, throwing the diplomatic system into chaos, while the colonial race was once more spurred on. Magnus V's Sweden consolidated itself in spite of occasional lesser political crises. The Holy Roman Empire remained as vague as always but somewhat more of a real force (though more of a military alliance rather than an actual confederacy, much less empire). The Spanish colonial empire was thrown into a new crisis after the loss of the Philippines, as an important trade route had collapsed; still, though the insurrections were widespread, they were also quite weak and insignificant. Change, as usual, was in the air.

The World Today.

The year now is 1750, and the world is getting only more unsettled since the Second Dutch War. Around the world, old conflicts intensify and new ones appear. The brief lull that followed the Eleven Years War is over, and humanity is heading headfirst into a new Interesting Time.

In North America, mostly quiet since the Eleven Years War, a great many events were occuring, and many more about to occur. Along the western coast, colonial activities were intensifying; a Spanish expedition made gains in California, VOC fur trade outposts were established in Alaska and Ouragon (OOC: Oregon, in this case virtually all the lands between Alaska and California), and Siberian Cossacks fleeing from increasing Muscovite scrutiny and control established Russian colonies in Alaska. Obviously all this also stirred up conflcits with the natives, which were often brutal but quite isolated and indecisive. Meanwhile, the Viceroyalty of Nueva Espana was increasingly shaken by uprisings of the lower and middle classes, though these rebellions were too weak and disorganised to achieve anything but all-around misery. Meanwhile, the French colony in Louisiana grew, both in population and in territory as new lands were claimed in the north and the west. Lastly, the British colonial empire was aflame. Most of the colonies were in the hands of Nathan Pickering's rebels, but they came under attacks from Tory loyalists, separatists, British army troops (such as those fortified in Boston) and the assorted Amerind tribes that were still fighting their doomed battle in the Appalacheans, even though the mountains, along with the Great Lake region, were firmly in the rebel hands as were most of the colonies. The most notable exceptions were the British holdings in Newfoundland and Hudson's Bay. As the British leadership prepared for its definitive counterattack, the former island was being prepared as one of the forward bases. It still was a too early to say whether or not the American revolt was doomed to failure, though.

Britain also had considerable possessions in the Carribean - notably, Suriname and numerous islands, such as Jamaica, Puerto Rico, St. Vincent and Trinidad (that is not mentioning assorted other Lesser Antilles). There, the plantation agriculture was prospering, the Tory refugees from the mainland were arriving and the war preparations generally helped stimulate the economy further. The French, the Dutch and the Danish colonies in the sea were also prospering, though not as much, while Spain's were plagued by slave revolts.

South America was rather quiet. There were a few revolts against the Spanish rule, and a few border clashes between Spain and Brazil in the Rio de la Plata region; also, the Brazilians were making rapid progress as they imposed their rule over the vast Amazon rainforest (or, at least, over the region regions and the most convenient paths of communication and travel; the rest was usually); that was done both for the sake of prestige and safety (due to runaway slaves and Amerinds and other potential threats that had gathered in the interior over the centuries), and to better exploit various native resources, especially exotic goods that sold so well back in Europe. The only other noteworthy development in the region was a revival of an Incan national identity; as the Viceroyalty of Peru generally fell into crisis in the wake of the collapse of Spain's Far Eastern trade routes, the balance shifted away from the newly-impoverished port cities (which also happened to suck up most of the garrison troops due to endemic social uprisings) to the interior, where Incan pretenders were reported more and more often, while Spanish control over the countryside gradually detiriorated. A good leader to rally the Incans - and, ofcourse, a little bit of luck - was all that was really needed to break Peru away from Spain now.

Europe itself was actually in a somewhat peaceful state for once, but opportunities for conflict still abounded. Great Britain, by now fully detached from Continental affairs, was much more involved with internal and colonial affairs, as Charles III struggled to strengthen his control over all spheres of life; though not totally destroying the British traditions of parliamentarism and self-government, he sought to dominate them via his ultra-Tory supporters. Although the 1740s saw some uprisings, by 1750 all were put down but the biggest of them all, the aforementioned American rebellion. That had by now become the primary issue on the British agenda, ofcourse; and Charles III was yet to make many of the most important decisions, which also included the course of action that should be taken in the regards of the Dutch, whose government has been discovered to be actively helping the rebels.

Meanwhile, France, under Philippe VII, continued to pursue the policies of classical Enlightened Despotism at home, most notably taking steps towards the meritocratisation of military and civil service. Though hindered by the traditional nobility, the reforms were assisted by elements of the clergy and the first "meritocrat" officials that were more dedicated to the service of the Crown than to anything else (the creation of dedicated and capable cadres being one of the main objectives of Enlightened Despotism). Those policies, as well as French culture in general, were being as usual imitated all over Europe to one extent or another. Foreign policy was more complicated and confused, after the collapse of the semi-formal Anglo-French Entente after 1737 and the death of Melchior de Polignac in 1740. While the state remained comitted to strenghthening its colonial empire world-wide, its European diplomacy was quite ill-defined. Relations with Britain were completely unclear (i.e. they could range from direst foe to closest friend); Spain was a junior partner, but the French were more than a bit reluctant to patch up the Spanish colonial empire with their troops; a curious detente existed with the Habsburg empire, but it was threatened by the Parmese succession crisis in Italy, where the French ultimately managed to impose a junior Bourbon to replace the extinct Farnese dynasty. The relations with the rest of the HRE were as amorphous and vague as the HRE itself, and elsewhere was no better; France too was falling into diplomatic isolation, Spain notwithstanding, and as it begun making enemies again it also required potent allies.

Spain, as already mentioned, was still rotting, though the previous compromises between central and local authorities in the metropoly held for the moment. As for Portugal, it was more and more a colony of Brazil, and a breeding ground for unhealthy revolutionary ideas.
 
Denmark-Norway, under the young king Christian VII, was a regional power of uncertain future. While for now focused on trade and colonisation, it also had to involve itself in European issues, being hemmed in between the great powers of Britain and, most gravely, Sweden. A lot depended on what would happen in Sweden, for it was not a very stable nation, and if it were to slip up a glorious opportunity would have arisen. At the same time the state was also in close ties (economic and dynastic) with the Dutch-Hannoverian personal union, and closer integration was an option, especially in the event of the extinction of either the House of Hannover or the House of Oldenburg; neither king presently had any male offspring, so that too was a distinct possibility. Lastly, Denmark maintained good relations with Prussia and Russia, having reached a secret accord to keep Swedish power in check.

That was quite reasonable, as Sweden - now led by Erik XV, a child of Magnus V's previous (pre-royal) marriage - was, in spite of its dynastic and political instability, a military and economic powerhouse. Though Erik XV was not a particularily outstanding monarch, this merely meant that the power shifted further to the Riksdag, which was blessed with enough brilliant statesmen to make Sweden flourish and prosper, while retaining impressive military power on the land and the sea (the emphasis being always placed on quality rather than quantity, ofcourse). Manufactories and mines were being constructed, Finland and the other eastern lands were being gradually colonised and Swedified, and in general all was going well, but for the various alliances forming to keep Sweden in check and for the vengeful, envious neighbours eager to exploit any major blunder. So here, too, the diplomatic situation was quite poor, even worse than in France.

The Holy Roman Empire was, as mentioned before, more of an alliance than anything else, but a pretty strong alliance it was, helping ward off any potential landgrabs. The Holy Roman Emperor also took upon the part of arbiter, diffusing territorial tensions within the Empire. All this made the Empire fairly static. While the smaller states, like Baden, Wurttemberg or Lippe, that were content to merely exist and were being protected by their big brothers, were in the majority, there was also a fair amount of regional and even great powers within the Holy Roman Empire, each with its own ambitions. There was Hannover, which had (for now) abandoned its dreams for an union with Britain, but instead concentrated on securing its personal union with Holland and so defending Dutch interests in general. Now under Georg II, it had indeed made the Dutch union long-term, and managed to achieve greater integration between Hannover and Holland. Also, royal power in Holland was generally strenghthened, but great care was made to avoid excesses such as those done in Britain, as that would've been harder for a foreign monarch to get away with than for a national one such as Charles III. Aside from that, the fleet was being rebuilt, closer ties with Denmark-Norway were achieved, and colonial ventures were underway. Also secret assistance was being provided to the rebels in America; not just to distract (and get back at) the British, but also because of the strongly pro-Hannoverian stance of the significant (though not nearly predominant) monarchist-separatist faction in the Albany Congress. Then there was Prussia, under King Friedrich III; a fairly militaristic state, it was eager to expand at the expense of its neighbours, and so became the most dissatisfied member of the Empire; however, the Prussians did not yet dare make a move against the Saxons, because they hoped to receive Imperial support for a war against Sweden, another preffered target. For now, Friedrich III was waiting for opportunities and building up his war machine; an elaborate system of military settlements had been set up, and a Prussian fleet was created in Danzig to challenge Swedish maritime supremacy when that becomes necessary. Saxony-Poland had somewhat calmed down now, under Augustus II, but the Polish realm remained under the dual threat of national feudal insurrection and foreign expansionism; the Saxons, reasonably enough, particularily feared the Prussians, though the Russians were also suspect. Perhaps naively, perhaps not, the Saxons chose to trust their fate to the Habsburgs of Hungary, remaining true to the alliance with them, though no longer using Hungarian troops to keep the Poles in line. And ofcourse there was Bavaria and the other disparate Wittelsbach holdings, now ruled by Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian IV (a.k.a. King Maximilian III Emanuel of Bavaria). Maximilian IV was commited to strenghthening the ties within the Holy Roman Empire, while also expanding the Wittelsbach holdings as may appear possible. In the greater European politics he for now remained remarkably neutral, as opposed to his pro-French grandfather and his anti-French father.

And ofcourse there was Habsburg Hungary, which was already mentioned before as it was pretty hard not to mention, seeing as it was one of Europe's leading great powers. Now ruled by Josef/Jyzsef II, the Habsburg Realms were undergoing another bout of reorganisation, as stronger central control was introduced and the bureaucracy was extended, although the local feudal parlements still retained some power and importance. Central administration was also somewhat overhauled, to provide for a more efficient and realistic ministerial system. The army - and moreso, the navy - was expanded. As tensions with France and the Ottoman Empire increased, the House of Habsburg was practically forced to begin assorted military preparations.

Italy remained the same as a few decades before; Venice stagnated some more, Genoa revived some more. Also the aforementioned Parmese succession crisis took place, with aforementioned results.

Russia was still recovering from the effects of the Great Cossack Rebellion and associated events; serf uprisings continued well into the late 1730s, causing even heavier degrees of feudal oppression as the landowners struggled to make any further rebellions impossible; at the same time, the crippled Cossack communities kept taking blow after blow, losing priveleges and freedoms; while the more loyal of the Cossacks tolerated this and lived on as before, this still caused a major exodus, as Cossacks defected to the Ottoman Empire as Hetman Pylyp Orlyk had done himself, or moved into Siberia and beyond, away from the central bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the nobility also secured for itself the supreme power in the state; after the short reign of Peter II (1729-1733), during which the new Secret (or Privy) Council, consisting of the most powerful of Russia's noblemen, separated from the main bulk of the boyar duma, came the time of the idiot Tsar Fyodor IV, under whom the aforesaid Council imposed an effective oligarchy upon the country. The Dolgorukovs - headed by Knyaz Vasily Vladimirovich Dolgorukov - rose to particularily great power, and there were rumours that Mikhail Ivanovich Dolgorukov, a grandson of the old Knyaz from a marriage into the Romanov bloodline, was to be the heir after Fyodor IV dies. All in all this picture was unpromising for Russia as a whole, as it reminded too vividly of the magnate-dominated Poland at its worst. Still, Russia's geographic position was better than Poland's; the economy was beginning to recover, and the Dolgorukovs, along with the Golitsyns (another powerful noble family), took particular interest in European developments, Vasily coming to lead a pro-French faction and the Golitsyns following the path of Buda.

The Ottoman Empire's latest renaissance was again petering out, and stagnation was beginning to set in. Sultan Suleiman III was actually quite proactive as far as the later Sultans went, and so did his best to keep the empire running, but lacked a true vision or real administrative experience, while his most able advisers were busy fighting rebellions on the empire's fringes, particularily European ones. Their zeal in this only made things worse as border clashes with Hungary and Russia increased. The empire remained quite great, but it was also overstretched and still quite rotten inside. Still, its survival was not really threatened; not yet, anyway.

Africa's native kingdoms saw fairly little development in this time, though some changes did occur. Most notably, Mamari Kulibali had stretched his highly-militarised Segu Empire far and wide, putting fear into the hearts of his neighbours while also trading extensively with them and with the Europeans that sold, amongst other things, many interesting weapons. Segu was now in all regards the hegemon of West Africa, usurping the position once held by Mali and Songhay. Ethiopia was preparing to explode in a feudal war as Iyasu II was on his deathbed and the assorted court factions made their plans for the near future. And lastly, Kongo succumbed to the relentless Brazilian onslaught after over two decades of costly warfare. Speaking of the Brazilians, they were focusing on Africa for the last few decades, and though much of it was in Kongo it clearly showed elsewhere as well; the Angola and the Mozambique colonies grew, and the expeditions against the unstable Omani possessions in East Africa resulted in Zanzibar and Mogadishu being restored to Portuguese protection, though they remained in the governance of local merchant and noble families. Kilwa and Mombasa remained in Omani hands for now, though, and the Omanis had concluded a deal with the VOC, recognising its hold on Soccotra and granting trade priveleges in exchange for help against the Portuguese. A colonial war was looming, then.

As for the other European powers, West Africa and the Cameroons were getting increasingly cluttered with various European trade outposts. Britain was in the lead, but Hannover-Holland had the largest presence in the Cameroons, and France, Denmark-Norway, Sweden and Prussia (as well as the aforementioned Hannover-Holland) all had decent presence in West Africa's Coasts. France ofcourse also had Senegambia; that colony was growing quickly thanks to the developing trade with Segu.

Back in the Middle East, the Hotakid Khanate increasingly fell into disrule and warlordism, as extensive tribal empires are wont to do; still, for now it remained more or less united, especially in the face of Persian popular uprisings, like the one led by the Turk Nadr Qoli Beg. That one was hard to defeat, but in the end all ended well for the Afghans. Meanwhile, the VOC slowly and quietly increased its influence and control over large parts of southern Persia.

In Central Asia, the Kazakh lands were conquered by the Cossacks and other Russian forces, while the lands further south remained in the Arabashid Empire, which did little nowadays except for border conflicts with the Hotakids and lots of overland trade. The Dzungar Khanate ceased to exist altogether, giving way to tribal violence. In the Himalayas, the Nepalese state existed much as always, and to its north most of Tibet still was independent, but increasingly in conflict with China.

In India, assorted Brazilian, Dutch, British, Danish and, last but most, French outposts and forts were widespread... but still mostly petty when compared to the large Indian states emergent now. That included the Sikh Empire in Punjab, the Nawabate of Bengal and, in Ceylon, the kingdom of Kandy. The rest of the subcontinent was, since the fall of Delhi and Agra in 1742, unified as the Maratha Confederacy. It was really fairly decentralised and so forth, but the facts remained that a new, vigorous state had virtually united India. Whether or not it would finish the job, as well as what policies will it pick in the regards of the Europeans, remained to be seen.

The Urga Empre remained much as always, though suffering from the downturn of trade on both sides (as Russia generally suffered, while China reoriented more towards maritime trade). The Paowudi Emperor's Chinese Empire remained militarily vigorous, but stagnated somewhat economically, in part because of assorted new restrictions. Further south the Chinese strenghthened their hold on the protectorate of Ava. South of China was Ayutthaya; still ruled by the elderly Thaisingh, this empire was undergoing serious administrative reorganisation, patterned, as most of Thaisingh's reforms, on the Chinese model. In the East Indies, the VOC remained predominant; at the same time defended by both China and Holland and independent from both (ironically, more so from Holland than from China; there was real, though likely unmotivated, fear that VOC would become a Chinese company). Still, Britain in particular strove to leave its own mark on the East Indies, establishing numerous new outposts on West Sumatra and in the Moluccas. Also, as a sideeffect, greater attention came to be paid to the giant southern wasteland of a continent, the supposed Terra Australis.

Korea remained much as always.

Lastly, Japan's long-term sociopolitical and cultural crises had all entered a climatic phase in the mid-1730s. As the kokugaku rebellion gradually overwhelmed the Shogunate, the court - and the Emperor Sakuramachi was persuaded to pledge it full support. So the Sakuramachi Revolution occured after the fall of Edo to the rebel armies. After its success, the country nearly fell to anarchy again, but eventually Ishida Jusaburo, one of the rebel leaders, had managed to rise to power by manipulating and intimidating the court. Although formally the direct imperial rule was restored, what came now was merely a reformed, kokugaku version of the Shogunate - the Kokuate, from Ishida Jusaburo's new title, Koku-o ("nation-king"). Nonetheless, the change was significant. Not only did the political elite get renewed - with most of the Tokugawa household dead from the fighting or the mass seppuku - but so did the state ideology. Principles of meritocracy were imposed, and land reform went into place, effectively sabotaging the traditional feudal system (which was already in shambles after the Revolution anyway) - other, lesser reforms of a like character were introduced as well. A more pragmatic approach to external trade was taken, and so Japan begun to open up somewhat. It was hard to say what course it would now pursue in foreign policy; just as it was unclear whether or not the assorted "victories of the Revolution" would survive its actual victory.
 
Very Nice das. Now a map?

Thanks; as for a map, that depends on how soon NK makes that 1648 map I asked him for. Though maybe I won't wait for that and will start working on it soon; we'll see.

What do you mean sir?

He means that seeing as I myself obviously can't be bothered to do stats, someone else should get working on it. ;)
 
He means that seeing as I myself obviously can't be bothered to do stats, someone else should get working on it. ;)

I was under the train of thought that he meant for me to hurry up with the stats for my NES which I have not begun. :lol:
 
Well, that looks sort of cool; this way I can play as Bavaria and be somewhat powerful at the same time! ;)
 
And here is an attempt at a map. I had to simplify some areas, such as the HRE, West Africa and India, but that's nothing new. Tell me if you find any errors (factual or counterfactual).

For my next number, I'm going to kill a Corsican.
 

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What do you mean sir?

He means that seeing as I myself obviously can't be bothered to do stats, someone else should get working on it.

I was under the train of thought that he meant for me to hurry up with the stats for my NES which I have not begun.

You're both correct!
 
are u making a new nes

Yes...

anytime soon?

No! :p

However, do look a few (~10) pages back; the map that I intend to use for it is there, with all sorts of information.

Also the Maratha capital should be at Delhi.

Err... why? Really? They just conquered it, and its way too far from the Maratha homelands. There is no reason to abandon Satara.

Napoleon?

I know few or no other Corsicans worth killing.

I've killed him before, but that was a different country and a different year. Feel free to guess when and where am I going to kill him this time. ;)
 
Speaking of that, what's the story on that thing in Germany, and strongly Roman-Catholic Australia? Also:

Didn't mention it yet, but this world is comparatively behind technologically (the most advanced countries are on the 1840s-1850s Britain level, though it isn't really as linear as that, i.e. steam-powered vehicles (ships, artillery-haulers, armour) have been around for some time now, and theoretical physics are more advanced as well).
Informationsayswhat?

I suppose I'll revive the tradition of asking for potential recommendations too. :p
 
Err... why? Really? They just conquered it, and its way too far from the Maratha homelands. There is no reason to abandon Satara.

Its a more central posotion to their new Empire, and its easier to administer from Delhi. Evey subcontinent spanning Empire in India had their capital and Delhi at one point or another. Also Pune is too close to foregin territory and vulenrable to attack.
 
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