Alternate History Thread III

[Thlayli]

To the above PoD: A simple comparison of American and French naval strengths and doctrines indicates that a naval war would probably go America's way, particularly if they're bolstered by the remnants of the British Navy. Just look at the Quasi War. Louisiana was also quite infiltrated by American colonists and frontiersmen, even before the territory was transferred to France. France would lose the interior pretty quickly, and they'd also have only a slim chance of retaining New Orleans.

Sym's PoD: Cool.

Ok. And another thing, is Greater Georgia supposed to have only the parts of Georgia proper colonized by the 1770's? I suppose the Spanish might have established control over the southern and western portions, but there would have been significant friction. Those areas probably have an English-speaking majority.

 

[Insane_Panda]

Symphony, very exciting PoD. I cannot wait until you have written more.

 

[Thlayli]

I updated the Atlantic seaboard. The Republic's borders with Spain were shifted west to the Ohio, and adjusted to include New Jersey. Philadelphia was moved. I think that Lake Champlain is a little too far northeast, so the next generation of world map should move it closer to upper New York.

Greater Georgia's cities are all pretty accurate. Not sure about the southern border. It depends on whether you wanted it to include all of the British territorially claimed Georgia, or only the colonized parts.

*crawls back to the updating corner*

 

[North King]

I think that Lake Champlain is a little too far northeast, so the next generation of world map should move it closer to upper New York.*

The world map is a Robinson projection, so everything on the edges is skewed heavily over towards the poles when they should be in a different direction.

 

[das]

A simple comparison of American and French naval strengths and doctrines indicates that a naval war would probably go America's way, particularly if they're bolstered by the remnants of the British Navy.

How does one do that (the comparison)? In this world, the French (Franco-Spanish) navy will be far stronger than in OTL (due to not being dealt huge amounts of damage by the British over the course of several years), whereas the Americans still did largely rely on British protection for their trade, so I am not sure that naval strenghts will be in the American favour early on. I suspect that by the time a real naval war comes the Americans will build up a stronger fleet - but so will the French.

Louisiana was also quite infiltrated by American colonists and frontiersmen, even before the territory was transferred to France.

Source!

France would lose the interior pretty quickly, and they'd also have only a slim chance of retaining New Orleans.

It took the Americans several years to properly claim their gains, you know. I doubt that they will be able to do so if resisted, and the French only need to hold on to the few key riverine cities and forts, whilst allying with the natives and the Spaniards. American infiltration will inevitably occur, but I doubt that a bunch of frontiersmen would be able to dislodge any proper military garrisons. Whereas Nouvelle-Orleans would be difficult to take even with a proper army.

Ok. And another thing, is Greater Georgia supposed to have only the parts of Georgia proper colonized by the 1770's?

Border is supposed to be around the OTL Proclamation Line.

I suppose the Spanish might have established control over the southern and western portions, but there would have been significant friction. Those areas probably have an English-speaking majority.

The friction was already described. The Georgians were basically forced out, so no, no English majority, though some illegal immigrants keeping sneaking through.

 

[Thlayli]

Well, American colonization of Spanish Louisiana is partially discussed here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manuel_Gayoso_de_Lemos

I'm still looking for something more conclusive, but the Mississippi was also heavily travelled by American farmers and merchants. Gayarré's History of Louisiana might have some more information.

As for your arguments of frontiersmen being unable to dislodge "proper" military garrisons, I only refer you to the Battle of Vincennes, and several others, during the western theater of the Revolutionary War. Not to mention, the Americans would certainly have more than militia detatchments in the West, and the Spanish garrisons and administrative systems weren't even officially replaced with French ones even up until the Louisiana Purchase.

The American navy of the early 19th century focused on building "heavy frigates", ships that were smaller and more maneuverable than ships of the line, but had more firepower than the standard frigate of the time. The naval doctrine focused on privateering and commerce raiding, which with the assistance of the British Navy would probably have devastating effects on the Franco-Spanish merchant marine. Regardless of fleet strengths, the English speaking navies had a superior tradition of discipline and crew organization, along with the presence of Marine detatchments that the Americans quickly copied from the British. I'm not sure if the French had a similar force.

 

[North King]

I agree with Thlayli. Combine the British and American navies, and the French would simply not be able to maintain a hold on the Western Hemisphere, nor even just the Caribbean. It was proven again and again by Nelson that the French just could not stand up to the British, ship for ship. The French would need an incompetent British admiral, favorable weather, excellent geographical conditions, or some massive stroke of luck to beat them any time of day.

 

[Symphony D.]

So, other than Dis, nobody has any concerns with any of the details, like G. H. W. Bush nuking Baghdad? If not I'll procedere.

 

[das]

On Americans in Louisiana: I still don't think that this infiltration was sufficient to create anything beyond nuisance level. Quite honestly the only thing that matters is the Mississippi, and I think they could hold on to it for a while. Ofcourse, eventually they will be overrun if they don't take the war to the Americans themselves, and succesfully at that.

On the French at sea: The reason they fared so poorly was that they didn't put much effort into rebuilding their fleet's officer corps after the revolution (the French did do quite well in the ARW for instance, look up de Saint Tropez for instance). Basically, had they actually been given a good opportunity to take real naval supremacy (which is the PoD), they may have taken it, I believe (or not, but that's a different althist); and had they done so, they would probably have invested more national resources into building up a proper fleet to replace the one they had at present. It would be reinforced with Spanish and captured British ships. Again, I do agree that the Anglo-Americans have a generally superior naval tradition, and that the gap is too wide... but it could be narrowed down some, and if the French coerce enough other European fleets (Dutch, Portuguese) they might at least gain a significant numerical advantage that can even the odds somewhat.

I do agree that in the long run a French defeat is more likely, although political developments in USA itself should also be taken into consideration.

 

[alex994]

So, other than Dis, nobody has any concerns with any of the details, like G. H. W. Bush nuking Baghdad? If not I'll procedere.

That was because I thought that scenario was a joke?

 

[Insane_Panda]

Yeah, would Bush Senior really drop a nuclear bomb on Baghdad over Iraqi use of Chemical and Biological weapons? How many Americans were killed by such attacks?

Also, would not America have significant airpower (via the carrier groups) to wipe out a huge amount of Iraqi ground forces?

 

[Symphony D.]

That was because I thought that scenario was a joke?

No. Got something you want to say?

Yeah, would Bush Senior really drop a nuclear bomb on Baghdad over Iraqi use of Chemical and Biological weapons? How many Americans were killed by such attacks?

The primary reason Saddam didn't use NBC's is because we basically did threaten to nuke him behind the scenes. We threaten to nuke people surprisingly often, actually... it's part of the policy to appear erratic in our threats--keep people on their toes. Anyway, if you use any part of NBC that pretty much opens up the door for the other elements, and since (B) and (C) are really nasty, if America was going to use them, it'd probably go (N). It would seem logical to hit more isolated military infrastructure first, but Iraqi command and control was so centralized that most everything of note is in Baghdad. They could nuke forward forces, I suppose, but that would be in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, which would probably be none-too-highly looked upon by either nation. On casualties, dunno. Probably not many more than a thousand or so, but civilian casualties in population centers (Saudi Arabian and Israeli) would likely be much higher.

Also, would not America have significant airpower (via the carrier groups) to wipe out a huge amount of Iraqi ground forces?

Again it depends on when all of them were assembled. The Iraqi Air Force was no pushover, it was just ridiculously overwhelmed in addition to being outclassed--when Desert Storm proper launched, the Coalition had enough airpower in place to launch over 1,000 sorties on the first night alone. The earlier Iraq strikes the harder it will be for the Coalition to assert air superiority--though it is pretty much a guaranteed thing in the end.

 

[Insane_Panda]

Very interesting, Symph. Could you give some examples of when we threaten to nuke people? I find that highly amusing and a smart thing to do.

 

[Symphony D.]

Actually, I have extensive resources on the matter from arguing with people over whether the US would or would not nuke North Korea provided it were to use a weapon first. Here are some:

U.S. nuclear threats: Then and now
US POLICY nuclear strategy
Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence
A Revolution in American Nuclear Policy

There's a lot of really interesting statements within these documents, although the most interesting one is the third one because it's an actual declassified Pentagon document. The most prudent information is the following, however:

During Operation Desert Storm in January 1991, the George H. W. Bush administration issued a formal threat of retaliation in response to chemical or biological weapons use and also against Iraqi support of any kind of terrorist actions. During a meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz on January 9, 1991, Secretary of State James Baker handed Aziz a letter from Bush and warned that, if "God forbid . . . chemical or biological weapons are used against our forces--the American people would demand revenge."

"This is not a threat," Baker continued, "but a pledge that if there is any use of such weapons, our objective would not be only the liberation of Kuwait, but also the toppling of the present regime." Baker later explained that he "purposely left the impression that the use of chemical or biological agents by Iraq would invite tactical nuclear retaliation." The letter listed three "sorts" of "unconscionable actions" by Iraq that would demand the "strongest possible response": use of chemical or biological weapons; support of any kind of terrorist action; and the destruction of Kuwait's oilfields and installations.

Bush had secretly decided that U.S. forces would not use nuclear weapons, but Baker and other former officials from the George H. W. Bush administration have since revealed that they used Arab intermediaries and even Japanese diplomats to convey an explicit nuclear threat to Saddam Hussein. Although the third "unconscionable action"--destruction of the Kuwaiti oilfields--was not deterred, Baker concluded, "We do not really know whether [the nuclear threat] was the reason" that Iraq did not use chemical or biological weapons. "My own view is that the calculated ambiguity regarding how we might respond has to be part of the reason."

If so, that lesson was not lost elsewhere in the world. After the 1991 Gulf War, the former deputy defense minister of India concluded, "Never negotiate with the United States unless you have a nuclear weapon."

My notion basically presumes that neither Saddam nor Bush were as morally objectionable (more that the former wasn't concerned with the consequences and the latter was outraged and had little recourse).

 

[das]

Threatening and even promising to do something is one thing, and actually doing it is another (as 21st century history in particular teaches us); nevertheless, I do agree that if one side uses unconventional weapons it kinda unties the hands of the other one. So in the end I don't think it is beyond plausibility. In any case, there is precedent for breaking tough resistance with potential for causing heavy casualties for the Americans in such a manner, so why not?

 

[alex994]

You know, the people of the world at the end of World War II saw the atomic bomb after her usage on Japan differently then the people of the world would today if one was used on Baghdad

 

[Symphony D.]

I honestly fail to see what public opinion has to do with it at all, particularly when that opinion is so easily molded by the government and news agencies.

Even radiation sickness is at its worst only equivilent to the horrors anthrax, sarin and VX inflict upon the human body. Instant incineration or disintegration by blast and shockwaves are rather quick and painless as deaths go.

If chemical or biological weapons were used on military personnel--let alone civilian populations--a response with nuclear weapons could easily be considered the moral high ground. Particularly as the military would likely be very apt to capitalize upon the devastation with imbedded reporters to sway public opinion and support the President's decision. Resultant outrage would make 9/11 look like a picnic.

Even the European governments and populace, anti-Zionist and American as they tend to be (and as apt to turn a blind eye toward large-scale attrocities as they are), would probably fold to such rage. France, in particular (which has under Chirac threatened the use of nuclear weapons for mere terrorist actions) has a history in modern-times for disproportionate actions (such as seriously requesting the US deploy four nuclear bombs to relieve Dien Bien Phu during its siege in 1954).

Americans, at least, would be of the opinion "they had it comin'" and as real world events show, when Americans think that way, very little in the realm of opinion elsewhere will stop them. With the Cold War still officially on, and Europeans suffering similar casualties within their own forces present, I wouldn't seriously expect them to have objected. The Soviets (especially under Gorbachev) would probably empathize, and the Japanese would probably be conflicted but silent. The Iranians would be laughing it up at seeing their two most hated enemies decimate one another. China probably wouldn't care. With those out of the way, nobody else's opinion really matters.

 

[das]

I honestly fail to see what public opinion has to do with it at all, particularly when that opinion is so easily molded by the government and news agencies.

Problem is, the latter play for both sides. Plus people are whiney. But then again, I do agree that they are ultimately irrelevant, at least until the elections (how might the greater Gulf War affect that, btw?).

I do agree that the American government in such a situation is unlikely to be affected by many outside factors. The question is whether or not it itself is up to this. And as you already know, I think it might be.

 

[Symphony D.]

Problem is, the latter play for both sides.

Chronology assists the victim. Firstly there will be images of American soldiers and Israeli and Saudi Arabian civilians in endless numbers in make-shift hospitals, laid up, drooling, twitching, defecating and soiling themselves, or covered in sores and drowning in their own fluids. Public opinion will support massive retaliation and retribution.

By the time you'd see Iraqi civilians covered in burns, vomitting blood, so forth, it'd be too late to stop the process. The United States military was also particularly apt in controlling media perception in the Gulf War, compared to say Vietnam, or even Gulf War II.

By being struck first, and struck horribly, you can justify just about any response. The scope and measure of the American campaign against Japan in WWII over a measly two and a half thousand dead, or in Afghanistan and Iraq over a similar number demonstrates this perfectly. A chemical and biological attack is infinitely more horrific than either of these, and with even sophomoric handling of the material it'd be easy to cultivate a response magnitudes greater.

 

[Insane_Panda]

(how might the greater Gulf War affect that, btw?).

Bush would win, hands down. Clinton wouldn't stand a chance in that kind of environment with a near-global war going on.