Are you familiar with Peter H. Lindert's "Free Lunch Paradox", and have you formed an opinion about it?
Spoiler :
27 November 2002 draft
Why the Welfare State Looks Like a Free Lunch
Harvard University, 18 November 2002
Peter H. Lindert
University of California - Davis
ABSTRACT
The econometric consensus on the effects of social spending confirms a puzzle we
confront in the raw data: There is no clear net GDP cost of high tax-based social
spending on GDP, despite a tradition of assuming that such costs are large. This
paper offers five keys to this free lunch puzzle. First, it shows conventional
analysis imagines costly forms of the welfare state that no welfare states have
ever practiced. Second, better tests confirm that the usual tales imagine costs that
would be felt only if policy had strayed out of sample, away from any actual
historical experience. Third, the tax strategies of high-budget welfare states are
more pro-growth and less progressive than has been realized, and more so than in
free-market OECD countries. Fourth, the work disincentives of social transfers
are so designed as to shield GDP from much reduction if any. Finally, we return
to some positive growth and well-being benefits of the high welfare budgets, and
then pose theoretical reasons why democracy may exert a crude form of cost
control.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
This paper draws on Chapters 10, 12, 18, and 19 in a two-volume book on Social
Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century, forthcoming in late 2003
from Cambridge University Press. The seminar presentation begins with overall
conclusions, and then emphasizes Parts III and beyond.
Page 2
It is well known that higher taxes and transfers reduce productivity. Well known --
but unsupported by statistics and history. This paper dramatizes a conflict between intuition
and evidence. On the one hand, many people see strong intuitive reasons for believing that
the rise of national tax-based social transfers should have reduced at least GDP, if not true
well-being. On the other, the fairest statistical tests of this argument find no cost at all.
Multivariate analysis leaves us with the same warnings sounded by the raw historical
numbers. A bigger tax bite to finance social spending does not correlate negatively with
either the level or the growth of GDP per capita. How can that be true? Why havent
countries that tax and transfer a third of national product grown any more slowly than
countries that devote only a seventh of GDP to social transfers?1
This paper shows the width of the gap between intuition and evidence, and then tries
to explain it. All our well-known demonstrations of the large deadweight losses from social
programs overuse imagination and assumption. There are good reasons why statistical tests
keep coming up with near-zero estimates of the net damage from social programs on
economic growth. Its not just that the tales of deadweight losses describe bad policies that
real-world welfare states do not practice. Its also that the real-world welfare states reap
offsetting benefits from a style of taxing and spending that is pro-growth.
The keys to the free lunch puzzle are:
(1) For a given share of social budgets in Gross Domestic Product, the highbudget
welfare states choose a mix of taxes that is more pro-growth than the mix chosen
in the United States and other relatively private-market OECD countries.
(2) On the recipient side, as opposed to the tax side, welfare states have adopted
several devices for minimizing young adults incentives to avoid work and training.
(3) Government subsidies to early retirement bring only a tiny reduction in GDP,
partly because the more expensive early retirement systems are designed to take the least
productive employees out of work, thereby raising labor productivity.
(4) Similarly, the larger unemployment compensation programs have little effect
on GDP. They lower employment, but they raise the average productivity of those
remaining at work.
Page 3
(5) Social spending often has a positive effect on GDP, even after weighing the
effects of the taxes that financed the spending. Not only public education spending, but
even many social transfer programs raise GDP per person.
(6) The design of these five keys suggests an underlying logic to the pro-growth side
of the welfare state. The higher the social budget as a share of GDP, the higher and more
visible is the cost of a bad choice. In democracies where any incumbent can be voted out of
office, the welfare states seem to pay closer attention to the productivity consequences of
program design. In the process, those countries whose political tastes have led to high social
budgets have drifted toward a system that delivers its tax bills to the less elastic factors of
production, in the Ramsey tradition.
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzlinder/Freelunch/HarvardFreelunch1.pdf
Why the Welfare State Looks Like a Free Lunch
Harvard University, 18 November 2002
Peter H. Lindert
University of California - Davis
ABSTRACT
The econometric consensus on the effects of social spending confirms a puzzle we
confront in the raw data: There is no clear net GDP cost of high tax-based social
spending on GDP, despite a tradition of assuming that such costs are large. This
paper offers five keys to this free lunch puzzle. First, it shows conventional
analysis imagines costly forms of the welfare state that no welfare states have
ever practiced. Second, better tests confirm that the usual tales imagine costs that
would be felt only if policy had strayed out of sample, away from any actual
historical experience. Third, the tax strategies of high-budget welfare states are
more pro-growth and less progressive than has been realized, and more so than in
free-market OECD countries. Fourth, the work disincentives of social transfers
are so designed as to shield GDP from much reduction if any. Finally, we return
to some positive growth and well-being benefits of the high welfare budgets, and
then pose theoretical reasons why democracy may exert a crude form of cost
control.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
This paper draws on Chapters 10, 12, 18, and 19 in a two-volume book on Social
Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century, forthcoming in late 2003
from Cambridge University Press. The seminar presentation begins with overall
conclusions, and then emphasizes Parts III and beyond.
Page 2
It is well known that higher taxes and transfers reduce productivity. Well known --
but unsupported by statistics and history. This paper dramatizes a conflict between intuition
and evidence. On the one hand, many people see strong intuitive reasons for believing that
the rise of national tax-based social transfers should have reduced at least GDP, if not true
well-being. On the other, the fairest statistical tests of this argument find no cost at all.
Multivariate analysis leaves us with the same warnings sounded by the raw historical
numbers. A bigger tax bite to finance social spending does not correlate negatively with
either the level or the growth of GDP per capita. How can that be true? Why havent
countries that tax and transfer a third of national product grown any more slowly than
countries that devote only a seventh of GDP to social transfers?1
This paper shows the width of the gap between intuition and evidence, and then tries
to explain it. All our well-known demonstrations of the large deadweight losses from social
programs overuse imagination and assumption. There are good reasons why statistical tests
keep coming up with near-zero estimates of the net damage from social programs on
economic growth. Its not just that the tales of deadweight losses describe bad policies that
real-world welfare states do not practice. Its also that the real-world welfare states reap
offsetting benefits from a style of taxing and spending that is pro-growth.
The keys to the free lunch puzzle are:
(1) For a given share of social budgets in Gross Domestic Product, the highbudget
welfare states choose a mix of taxes that is more pro-growth than the mix chosen
in the United States and other relatively private-market OECD countries.
(2) On the recipient side, as opposed to the tax side, welfare states have adopted
several devices for minimizing young adults incentives to avoid work and training.
(3) Government subsidies to early retirement bring only a tiny reduction in GDP,
partly because the more expensive early retirement systems are designed to take the least
productive employees out of work, thereby raising labor productivity.
(4) Similarly, the larger unemployment compensation programs have little effect
on GDP. They lower employment, but they raise the average productivity of those
remaining at work.
Page 3
(5) Social spending often has a positive effect on GDP, even after weighing the
effects of the taxes that financed the spending. Not only public education spending, but
even many social transfer programs raise GDP per person.
(6) The design of these five keys suggests an underlying logic to the pro-growth side
of the welfare state. The higher the social budget as a share of GDP, the higher and more
visible is the cost of a bad choice. In democracies where any incumbent can be voted out of
office, the welfare states seem to pay closer attention to the productivity consequences of
program design. In the process, those countries whose political tastes have led to high social
budgets have drifted toward a system that delivers its tax bills to the less elastic factors of
production, in the Ramsey tradition.
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzlinder/Freelunch/HarvardFreelunch1.pdf