Conservative revisionism of WW1

[Flying Pig]

There's an excellent essay on CFC on the subject called Ninety Years of Contemplation. Dachs used to be able to explain it very well, but he isn't around these days - he would have emphasised more the role of Franco-British policy in bringing the war about, I think. Have a read through the rest of this thread; there's some good long posts.

 

[Domen]

I've read the essay and haven't found anything debunking German & Austro-Hungarian responsibility for the start of WW1. Vrylakas argues that Germany is not solely responsible, but admits that it was Germany which decided it was a good time to start an inevitable war aimed at achieving German domination.

Russian involvement (backing up Serbia to prevent Serbia from getting invaded) was about defending its already existing sphere of influence. It seems that the only of major players (great powers) really interested in changing the existing status quo was Germany, which felt being (still) not powerful enough.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

One thing you omit is mobilizations, which were not started by Germany.
Another thing to keep in mind is that Germany was in a weak position. The general idea was that it would have to win quickly in the West if it wanted a decent chance of actually winning the war. Which brings us to what Germany was good at - moving troops quickly, getting its war machine going. The efficiency and organization of it were apparently simply astounding at the time. And the earlier they got it rolling, the better. And once it rolled, it could basically not be stopped anymore. Not without making a mess of German war preparation.

So for simple strategic reasons - Germany was the logical one to declare war first and go all-in.

Btw - there is a German historian of some respect who one stated "Germany lost the war because the Bavarians were too brave"
This refers to the strategy of the revolving door - the idea being to let the French advance in the south-west while the Germans would advance in the north and out-flank them. A strategy that worked marvelously - until the Bavarian King thought "screw that - I am not gonne retreat from some French". He defeated the French with his troops, stopped their advance and rolled them back, - and by that blew the whole plain.
And that was btw even possibly because at least in the beginning of the war there was no unified German army. There was a separate Bavarian army, for instance, and you couldn't discipline the Bavarian king for not following orders.

 

[Wastl]

I've read the essay and haven't found anything debunking German & Austro-Hungarian responsibility for the start of WW1. Vrylakas argues that Germany is not solely responsible, but admits that it was Germany which decided it was a good time to start an inevitable war aimed at achieving German domination.

Russian involvement (backing up Serbia to prevent Serbia from getting invaded) was about defending its already existing sphere of influence. It seems that the only of major players (great powers) really interested in changing the existing status quo was Germany, which felt being (still) not powerful enough.

That is incorrect. Germany didn't feel the need to change the status quo at all.

Maybe you should read some papers or books about the way Serbia worked at that time. It was a convoluted mess with lots of secret societies involving both the government and the military, that where connected to lots of illegal activities outside its own borders. They even went so far to send their own soldiers on "holiday" so they could fight as "volunteers" right across the border. I guess that is where Putin got the idea from

They mastered the art of doing illegal things without anyone being able to blame them.

There were most definately parts of Austria-Hungary that were in favour of war (on a small scale). But that is also true for pretty much every country involved. All that transpired had nothing to do with anyone wanting to grow bigger, and everything to do with stupid sets of guarantees and reactions that had to happen, plus lots of coincidences going the wrong way.

Lets not forget that it were the Russian who mobilised first. They feared that Austria would try to annex Serbia, which is something the Austrians didn't even have in mind. What Germany wanted was a quick reaction, regardless of what they would choose to do. If Austria would opt for war, they should do it quickly, so it's over with before it can escalate into a large conflict. When Serbia answered the ultimatum, Wilhelm II saw no further need for action. When Austria rejected it, Germany offered the idea to take just Belgrade and stop right there, to prove to anyone that annexion was out of question. The British were very much on board with that idea. It was meant to allow everyone to save face. The Austrians would get their revenge, Serbia would remain independent, which would also please the Russians, and so on.

You simply cannot ignore the circumstances of the time. Russia mobilising automatically meant that Germany needed to mobilise, as not being mobilised if your "enemy" was, meant that you were done for (see France 1870). This in turn meant that France had to mobilise, not only to uphold their alliance with Russia, but also to react to Germany being mobilised.

It was Germany who tried to prevent this escalating any further. Wilhelm even got Nikolai to take back the order for mobilisation in an effort to cool things down. Sadly, his ministers got him to change his mind again. Germany's embassador was virtually begging the Russian foreign secretary to take back mobilisation, as he feared that the war that would follow would bring down all the monarchies (which it did).
Germany didn't declare war because that's what everyone wanted, it declared war because the only possible way to win a two-front war was holding the innitiative and taking one opponent out before the other could react. There was no possible way for Germany to wait for the war to happen. If war was inevitable, Germany needed to strike first.

Now, maybe the war could still have turned into a smaller affair if Wilhelm had told Moltke to shut it and call back the Armies that were moving into Belgium, but for some reason he couldn't. You can find similar possibilites for all the nations involved, a leader having the right idea but getting stopped by someone from the government who didn't really mind what was happening.

Simply put, attacking France through Belgium and Luxembourg had little to do with what started WW1, and everything to do with the situation at hand.

The whole mess was created by Serbian ultranationalists with connections to parts of the government. What followed was Austria-Hungary not reacting quickly enough at first and then screwing up over the longrun. It had nothing to do with Austria or Germany being interested in changing the status quo. All the bogus claims about big imperial aspirations have nothing to do with this war, they are merely ideas that popped up when the war was there and no one knew what could possibly be done after it was over. This existed on both sides as well. None of the actions prior to the start of the war fit the idea of Germany being interested in changing the status quo, on the contrary, they all oppose it.

All the big powers had more than enough chances to stop the war. They all had people who tried just that in some capacity, and some who escalated things. There is nothing which can put blame solely on one side. Trying to blame one side is simply bogus.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

Now, maybe the war could still have turned into a smaller affair if Wilhelm had told Moltke to shut it and call back the Armies that were moving into Belgium, but for some reason he couldn't.

Ah I can't swear it but I think I recall reading that Wilhelm made an effort in that direction, but was basically brushed off by being told that it was too late for that. This relates to the war-machine narrative I posted before your post. Everything was already set in motion, the whole meticulous planing and execution and this mere fact seems to have dictated its own politics.

 

[Evie]

It was Louis XXIV who mentioned declarations of wars, it is not "my standard".

Wars start either by formal declarations or by military invasions without declaring war (the latter was for example the case on 01.09.1939).

Assassination of Franz Ferdinand was neither a military invasion nor a declaration of war.

The attack on Pearl Harbor was obviously a military invasion.

So if my army stay on my side of the border, and start shooting artillery across the border at the other side, is that the start of the war or just something else?

Or are the artillery shells considered an invading army? If artillery shells are an invading army, where is the line then? Is one gun bullet an invading army? Two? Ten? A hundred? One artillery shell? A hundred artillery shell? A guided missile? A drone? What about a satellite with some kind of laser or EMP weapon firing from orbit without even being above your territory? What about, for that matter, taking out your entire electronic infrastructure via a coordinated hacking attack, can that be starting a war?

For that matter, what about attacking a government's assets outside their own territory? If in July 14, a British sub (for some unfathomable reason), had torpedoed a German battlecruiser in international water, would that be the start of the war? You cannot possibly argue invasion of territory in that case. What about granting foreign troops right of passage and then ambushing them while they're in your territory? Your forces never even left or attacked something outside your territory!

An invasion isn't the only alternative to a declaration of war. There are such things as acts of war. And a terror attack is part of the group.

The key difference between a terror attack and the other methods is that terror attacks tend to often be the work of individuals held at arms length by the state, rather than the state itself. That's why it's seen as proper to send the involved state an ultimatum detailing how they're to deal with the warmongers hiding in their midst, before actually attacking them.

 

[Louis XXIV]

So can you please tell us what was the Casus Belli for:

Which was really what made that war a World War.

Well, I'll cherrypick a few. The cassus belli for Russia was a belief that Russia would attack them and a need to strike while they had the upper hand. I'd argue preemptive strikes are at least justifiable if the other side actually has an intent to attack (the more important question is usually about whether a reasonable belief is enough). We can debate that if you want, but it's important to at least consider it.

Since we're talking about what really made the war a World War, you can't leave out the UK's war actions as well (who declared on who and why). You stopped at Belgium without considering whether the UK's entry was motivated by any of the events that preceded it or if that mattered.

Like I said above, I don't blame France for World War II's western front even if they declared war first.

 

[jackelgull]

World War one was a defensive war by all sides based on mistaken assumptions. At least that is the way I interpret it.

Germany felt it had to protect its sphere of influence through its ally Austria Hungary by declaring war on Russia. Germany felt that France would back stab it. Britain felt its dominance of the high seas would be challenged. America I'm not entirely sure about. I think that the Americans felt they had to protect their merchant shipping. Russians felt the need to defend their influence in the Balkans.

What I wonder is why Germany felt it had to support its ally Austria Hungary no matter what? Was there a serious attempt to pressure Austria Hungary into backing down over Serbia? I mean the Austria Hungary was going to receive most of its demands.

 

[PhroX]

While by the strictest definition, Germany could be said to have started the war, that says nothing about who was responsible for the war.

Two people are having a heated argument. One of the reaches for the gun they have tucked into their trousers. In response, the other punches the first before they can reach the gun. Who started it? Well, the puncher was the first to actually attack his opponent. But was it his fault?

To some extent, the Russian decision to fully mobilise was the equivalent of reaching for the gun. Once they had made the decision to do so, Germany was inevitably going to respond with a pre-emptive attack. The German strategic situation was not a good one - they were going to be fighting a war on two fronts, against an alliance with a combined military stronger than theirs - so, as they saw it, they had to start the fight on their terms, and do everything possible to defeat one of their two main enemies as quickly as possible. To do otherwise would have been to invite defeat.

However, even then, blaming everything on the Russian decision to mobilise is just as simplistic and wrong as blaming everything on Germany. It was merely the point of no-return after a long and complex series of events that lead to war. All 4 of the main continental powers had chances to pull back from the brink (A-H could've pulled back from invading Serbia, Germany could've not backed them to the hilt, Russia could've let Serbia accept the A-H ultimatum (Serbia was about to before Russia intervened and told them not to) or, indeed, not fully mobilised, France could've not supported the Russians - if the French had made it clear they would not countenance a war, the Russians would not have mobilised, they did so only because they were certain (correctly) of French support in the inevitable war with Germany), and yet none of them took those chances. Part of the reason for was through mistaken assumptions, miscommunication and a failure to understand the other parties involved. But at the same time, there were significant factions in the leadership of all of the major powers that wanted a war - not necessarily a war on the scale that WWI turned out to be, but war none-the-less - and they wanted war for understandable, if not correct, reasons.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire wanted war to re-establish their waning influence over the Balkans, and, in the shorter term, as a response to the murder of Franz Ferdinand. The Russian Empire likewise wanted to increase its power and influence in the Balkans, as well as seeking to reduce or eliminate the threat from Germany. The Germans meanwhile found themselves between two allied powers hostile to them, and wanted a war to remove those threats - and they wanted such a war quickly, as the belief was that Franco-Russian military power would increase significantly faster than German in the future, meaning their best opportunity for a victory was a war sooner rather than later. The French wanted to recover the land (and pride) lost in the Franco-Prussian war, as well as generally weakening German power to prevent a repeat of said war. Note that none of these reason were "large scale conquest". They were about weakening rivals, expanding influence, and reclaiming lost land. The Germans seeking war weren't trying to achieve what their successors were trying 25 years later.

[As an aside, the only major nation which doesn't seem to have any reason to push for a war was Britain. Had their ultimate entry into the war been a reluctant one as a result of honouring their alliances, then it would be understandable, but there were significant elements in the government, including the leadership, actively seeking war with Germany, something Britain had very little to gain from. Germany wasn't a threat to the Empire - the closest they had been to one was in the naval race which had ended a couple of years earlier - while on the other hand, Russia most definitely was, (witness the action in Persia in the years immediately prior to WWI). A war in which Germany and Russia beat the crap out of each other was far more in Britain's interests, even if it results in the former winning, than one in which Britain helps Russia beat Germany. I really cannot understand why people like Gray were actively looking for a war].

Of course, there were significant elements in all said nations, looking to avoid war, and the relative influence of each faction within each nation varied considerably over the years and months immediately prior to war. However, particularly in France and Russia, but also to a considerable extent in the other powers, those seeking war were dominant in June-July '14. Many of the missed opportunities to avoid war were not missed accidentally. Only had their enemies backed off almost completely would they have stopped pushing for war, and neither side was prepared to do that - too much, as they saw it, was a stake - and pressure from such factions, combined with the misunderstandings and poor communications, meant that no one took the steps needed to turn away from conflict. Ultimately, no one nation was to blame. Personally, if I had to proportion the blame out, I would put Russia and Germany roughly equal as the most responsible, but neither would have caused a war without significant influence from the actions of the other major powers, and quite possibly, a certain Mr. Princip.

 

[Carolus I]

Honestly, I am a bit bored about this discussion who was responsible for the outbreak of the war. This topic has been discussed since 1914.

Possibly the best approach is provided in this video:

http://www.frequency.com/video/frightful-first-world-war-causes-of-ww1/177511092/-/Vimeo

 

[Terxpahseyton]

A war in which Germany and Russia beat the crap out of each other was far more in Britain's interests, even if it results in the former winning, than one in which Britain helps Russia beat Germany. I really cannot understand why people like Gray were actively looking for a war

Didn't the UK as a sort of traditional policy oppose the strongest European power? You know, in the interest of a 'balance of power'`? I am not sure how this makes sense in this case, or at all, but that is what comes to mind.

 

[Traitorfish]

"Balance of power" was more of a legitimising fiction rather than an actual policy. If the British had wanted balance in 1914, they would have supported the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires against over-mighty Russia- what "balance" is there to be found in a Russian sphere of influence stretching from Prague to Istanbul?- but their preoccupation with a semi-imaginary German menace on the High Seas meant aligning themselves squarely with Russians equilibrium-unfriendly plans for continental domination.

 

[ParkCungHee]

I don't think it was the high seas fleet that did it. In fact I think Tirpitz was spot on when he thought a sufficiently powerful navy would win Germany an alliance with Britain.

Britain's actual traditional policy was to ally with the more threatening powers. This certainly guided their policy in the Pacific, where they allied with the rising threat of Japan, and then dropped them for the even faster rising threat of America.

In 1914 the greatest threat to Britains colonial empire and naval supremacy was France. And for this reason, any sort of Pro-German alignment was impossible. When 1914 rolled around, domestic concerns, and a desire to shape the post-war world necessitated involvement in the conflict.

 

[Flying Pig]

"Balance of power" was more of a legitimising fiction rather than an actual policy. If the British had wanted balance in 1914, they would have supported the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires against over-mighty Russia- what "balance" is there to be found in a Russian sphere of influence stretching from Prague to Istanbul?- but their preoccupation with a semi-imaginary German menace on the High Seas meant aligning themselves squarely with Russians equilibrium-unfriendly plans for continental domination.

'Maintaining the balance of power' didn't mean keeping (or making) everyone equal, only that any change to the relative distribution of power in Europe (a continent, if not a world, in which Britain felt itself on top) was seen as contrary to British interests.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

double post

 

[Terxpahseyton]

Britain's actual traditional policy was to ally with the more threatening powers. This certainly guided their policy in the Pacific, where they allied with the rising threat of Japan, and then dropped them for the even faster rising threat of America.

They didn't ally with Napoleon, though.

In 1914 the greatest threat to Britains colonial empire and naval supremacy was France. And for this reason, any sort of Pro-German alignment was impossible. When 1914 rolled around, domestic concerns, and a desire to shape the post-war world necessitated involvement in the conflict.

Okay that makes a lot of sense.

If the British had wanted balance in 1914, they would have supported the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires against over-mighty Russia- what "balance" is there to be found in a Russian sphere of influence stretching from Prague to Istanbul?- but their preoccupation with a semi-imaginary German menace on the High Seas meant aligning themselves squarely with Russians equilibrium-unfriendly plans for continental domination.

Yes, I see your point.

 

[r16]

america was London's greatest concern ; as events after 1945 proved . Where one side of the Anglosaxons supplanted the other easily . Fighting Germany was risky and fighting Germany was a must in case they ever managed to reach some sort of agreement with the Americans and defeating Germany would also enpower Russia creating further risks . In 1914 the French and the British were eye to eye .

 

[gyozelemlg]

Nominally, the reasons leading to the first world war are closely related to the South Slav problem in the Balkans. Britain had very little concern here. Britain used this state of affairs to help foment a war to her benefit. So there was no way for Britain to stay out. Main idea of WW1 was this: destroy the German navy and break commercial ties between Germany and South America and Turkey. So WW1 was really an Anglo-German war. Certainly, the Monarchy was interested in weakening Serbia, the main source for South Slav agitation. Certainly, Russia was inundated by Pan-Slavism and New Byzantium always wanted old Byzantium. Germany wanted to develop further, extend her influence toward Iraq and keep the Monarchy intact. France wanted revenge. But the root of the problem was the German navy-military and commercial-perceived to be a serious competitor by people like Sir Edward Gray and....well who...Winston Churchill whose only successful agenda was the German threat failing in everything else he tried during his political career. So how could Britain stay out of a war that she perceived as both desirable and unavoidable to guard her interests? There was no way for this to happen. In fact, the party least likely to benefit and most reasons to avoid such a war were Germany and the Hungarian part of the Monarchy. Interestingly, among the German-Austro-Hungarian war aims the main one were actually realized by the temporary removal of both Serbia and the Russian Empire as a threat. By 1917 only the entry of the USA could save the Western Powers from catastrophy and one more thing....naval blockade. So again, the British navy and Winston Churchill did it. If they could temper French revenge and created a more stable Central Europe, the British Empire could perhaps have stayed with us longer.

 

[Future PM]

Ah I can't swear it but I think I recall reading that Wilhelm made an effort in that direction, but was basically brushed off by being told that it was too late for that. This relates to the war-machine narrative I posted before your post. Everything was already set in motion, the whole meticulous planing and execution and this mere fact seems to have dictated its own politics.

This is true. There was a last-minute attempt by both the British and German monarchies to halt mobilisation, combined with a proposal for a private conference between the Kaiser, Tsar Nicholas II, and King George V in neutral Denmark (remember, all three monarchs were blood-relatives, and all three had spent their childhoods playing together in Danish summer palaces) but it was completely brushed off by their respected governments. The Tsar also attempted to restrain his military to only conduct a partial mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, but was told (probably truthfully) that such a mobilisation wasn't really possible under the Russian system, and might even threaten full mobilisation should the war escalate despite an attempt to keep it localised. The old adage about "war by timetable" definitely has some truth to it, albeit that it is massively overplayed.

 

[Tahuti]

"Balance of power" was more of a legitimising fiction rather than an actual policy. If the British had wanted balance in 1914, they would have supported the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires against over-mighty Russia- what "balance" is there to be found in a Russian sphere of influence stretching from Prague to Istanbul?- but their preoccupation with a semi-imaginary German menace on the High Seas meant aligning themselves squarely with Russians equilibrium-unfriendly plans for continental domination.

Britain was actually fairly Pro-Ottoman before the two went to war.