Well, the "distinction" I was looking for was his defection, as the Lieutenant-General commanding the 14th Division of the IV Corps, to the allies on the evening of the 14th June, just hours before the commencement of the Waterloo Campaign.
This provided the Prussians with an initial warning of around twelve hours to commence their concentration; and when the information was passed along to Wellington, it provided him with an opportunity to similarly begin concentrating his forces. While it is difficult to precisely estimate exactly what effect this had on the outcome of the campaign, some historians argue that without this defection, Napoleon would have succeeded in defeating Blucher and Wellington in detail.
(I actually tend to support this argument; the prior allowed Blucher to concentrate much further forward at Sombreffe/Ligny on the 16th, forcing Napoleon to fight the Prussians first instead of the Anglo-Allied army, as he had initially planned. This allowed Wellington to overcome his initial errors of deployment and concentrate his forces sufficiently to offer battle against Napoleon with a necessary degree of coordination with the Prussians.)
For what it is worth, Blucher -- despite what must be called a personal hatred of all things Napoleon and French -- nonetheless called Bourmont a "son of a *****" for his defection.
[This message has been edited by Andu Indorin (edited July 30, 2001).]
