Exploring Political Ideas and Ideologies

[Gary Childress]

This is a rather ambitious thread. We'll see if it "get's off the ground" or not.

I've been reading "For Love of Country" a collection of Essays from various philosophers and thinkers regarding cosmopolitanism and patriotism. The short book is based on an apparently famous essay by Martha Nussbaum which appeared in the Boston Review in 1994. The book starts off with an essay by Nussbaum entitled: Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism in which she argues the merrits of cosmopolitanism and the dangers of patriotism. Following her essay are over a dozen (mostly critical) replies to her essay from noteworthy philosophers and thinkers such as Sissela Bok, Charles Taylor, Hilary Putnam, et al. just to name the ones I'm most familiar with.

I originally bought the book as part of the materials for an online course on politics. After buying the books for the course I discovered much to my dissappointment that the course was only being offered "on campus" and not online after all. So here I am stuck with a bunch of text books for a class I am unable to take. So I thought I'd have a little fun and create my own dialogue over the materials here among my learned fellow world citizens here at CFC.

The books I have which I will be reading and commenting on in this thread or asking questions about are:

For Love of Country, edited by Joshua Cohen
Resistance, Rebellion and Death, by Albert Camus
Justice as Fairness, by John Rawls
The Portable Karl Marx, edited by Eugene Kamenka

I will try to pose questions or talking points based on my reading and let others here at CFC comment on what they think of the questions or talking points. And certainly if you are familiar with one or more of the authors and or texts feel free to correct me where I may be mistaken. Or make your own observations or talking points. This will be a classroom for open discussion of anything having to do with political ideas or ideologies in general and also more specifically the authors and texts mentioned above.

So here's the first of part I, section A, subparagraph 1.1 of the course, based on Nussbaum's essay:

First off, what is meant by cosmopolitanism? On page 4 of the text Nussbaum seems to give us a rough definition of what she calls the cosmpolitan; "[T]he person whose allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings." She makes a couple references to Diogenes and Crates, both Cynic philosophers who called themselves "citizens of the world" as opposed to identifying themselves with their fellow Greeks. Of course the Cynics are also widely known for some rather interesting social behavior such as masterbating, copulating and defecating in public. Nussbaum also cites the Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius in several places as a noteworthy cosmopolitan. One thing also noteworthy about Aurelius is that he was a Roman emporer and a rather ruthless one on some occasions from what I understand. So what are we to make of Nussbaum's plea for cosmopolitanism as opposed to being a patriot? What does it mean to be a "cosmopolitan" in today's world? What are we to make of the examples of cosmopolitanism listed above (the Cynics and Stoics)?

You can find Nussbaum's entire essay here: http://bostonreview.net/BR19.5/nussbaum.php

Thoughts, opinions?

 

[Gary Childress]

Gertrude Himmelfarb concludes her essay in response to Nussbaum with the following:

Above all, what cosmopolitanism obscures, even denies, are the givens of life: parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage, history, culture, tradition, community--and nationality. These are not "accidental" attributes of the individual. They are essential attributes. ...

To pledge one's "fundamental allegiance" to cosmopolitanism is to try to transcend not only nationality but all the actualities, particularities, and realities of life that constitute one's natural identity. Cosmopolitanism has a nice, high-minded ring to it, but it is an illusion, and, like all illusions, perilous.

[unfortunately I couldn't find a copy of Ms. Himmelfarb's essay accessible online]

Is cosmopolitanism truly unrealistic, if not for all of us, then at least for the majority of us? Are things like race, religion, culture, etc. truly "essential attributes" to everyone? Himmelfarb notes earlier in her essay that Nussbaum seems to ignore the fact that many of her own values such as "reason and the love of humanity" are themselves not values held in common with much of the world. In fact most of the values Nussbaum seeks to attribute to humanity in general, "reason, love of humanity" et al. are "Western values" according to Himmelfarb.

Funny enough, in her rebuttal to her critics, Nussbaum doesn't appear to think Himmelfarb's critique merrits reply. I don't recall seeing any response to Himmelfarb there.

At first glance I sort of think Himmelfarb goes a little overboard in her critique. She tends to sound a bit like a jaded child (especially given the fact that she starts out her critique basically stating how as a child she believed in all those things Nussbaum espouses but later realized they were false hopes or something along those lines). Charles Taylor, Sissela Bok and Hilary Putnam seem much more levelheaded in their critical replies.

In any case, is a cosmopolitan education feasible for the average citizen of a country? In the final analysis, is there such a thing as a "cosmopolitan" education or is it essentially a Eurocentric ideal? I'll admit these are questions which sort of defy my rational abilities to analyze things. But in the final analysis, my opinion is that a cosmopolitan education is not realistic for everyone, nor is it desireable that everyone should be so inclined. Someone has to tend the garden at home, as it were. Someone must be there to protest where the city dump gets placed (hopefully not in my backyard, as they say). We can't all be internationally renown professors or what not.

 

[Glassfan]

This is where sociology and psychology come to loggerheads. Many say we are genetically programmed to recognized and trust our family and immediate community. But as we move in larger circles we become less trusting and even racist.

Yet, over time, civilization has gradually grown to encompass the clan, the tribe, the region, the nation. And what comes after Nationalism?

In Europe they're attempting a super-state based on economic ties, but it's faring poorly so far. Large empires have existed by force and conquest, but they usually fail eventually. Consider the former Yugoslavia, held together by communist coersion. Once force failed, the state immediately broke up into warring, genocidal kingdoms. The Soviet Union (epic fail) as well, though not so violently. Maybe China someday. Consider the limited success of the League of Nations and the UN.

I guess what I'm getting at is that cosmopolitanism may someday evolve on it's own, but can't be forced or artificially created. Not until people are ready for it.

Some of my college professors pretended to be cosmopolitan, but were actually just cynical about patriotism and nationalism. They weren't cool unless they were in the cynic's club.

Nussbaum and Himmelfarb (snicker) sound like made-up names. Hildebrandt and Morgenstern. Abbot and Costello.

 

[lovett]

I am sympathetic to Nussbaum's conclusions, but this paper is manifestly insufficient to establish them. It is more of a polemic then a piece of comprehensive philosophical argument. Crucially, the premise on which her entire (normative) argument rests 'National borders are morally arbitrary' is unsubstantiated. She does not argue for it, she assumes it. And of course, if you're going to assume a premise like that, it won't be hard to conclude that we should ignore national borders.

What Nussbaum is trying to do, so it seems, is establish her conclusions on the basis of some 'Kantian' ethics which takes seriously the separateness of persons and what-not. It would be nicer if she were a lot clearer about what her ethics actually are. A perspicuous statement of her ethics is absolutely crucial, because it is from these ethics that she (presumably) reaches the conclusion 'national borders are morally arbitrary'. And it is this premise on which her argumentative edifice rests.

The problem is that there are many ways to dispute this conclusion. Much of political philosophy has been devoted to explaining the moral relevance of national borders. Locke's entire theory is concerned with explaining the particularistic nature of political obligation - that we have particular obligations to our own government and to fellow citizens we do not have to other governments and non-citizens.

And particular obligations are not philosophically fraudulent. Prima facie, it seems we definitely have particular obligation to our family; I am obliged to keep and visit my decrepit parents, but not yours. I am obliged to bail out my delinquent brother from jail, but not yours. I am obliged to give my child a good education and a loving home, but not yours. The notion of having particular obligations -in this case family obligations- is intuitively plausible.

Moreover, it is hardly bereft of theoretical support. We can explain them with a bunch of (deontologically) morally relevant actions. I have obligations to my parents because of the benefits they have given me. My obligations stem from reciprocity - I owe people things if I have freely taken their largess. I have special obligations to my child because I act such as to bring them into the world. It is not implausible to tie my obligation here with consent - by consenting to certain types of association with people (parenthood, friendship) one undertakes certain obligations as regards those people.

Both theoretical justifications are relevant to why we might have special obligations to our own government or our fellow citizens. We freely receive benefits given by both - if we take reciprocity seriously that means we have special obligation to both. We should support our citizens, and our government, more than others. Concurrently, we (debateably!) consent to the government under which we live. This consent again demands of us special obligations (this is the content of Locke's doctrine) to a particular government. If either of these things are true moral borders are not morally arbitrary - they are morally relevant because we consent to existing within our own political society or we owe that society something from the benefits it has given us.

Nussbaum must, obviously, repudiate this reasoning. I am not sure how easy that take will be. Certainly, it is not one achieved in the linked article.

 

[Gary Childress]

I am sympathetic to Nussbaum's conclusions, but this paper is manifestly insufficient to establish them. It is more of a polemic then a piece of comprehensive philosophical argument. Crucially, the premise on which her entire (normative) argument rests 'National borders are morally arbitrary' is unsubstantiated. She does not argue for it, she assumes it. And of course, if you're going to assume a premise like that, it won't be hard to conclude that we should ignore national borders.

What Nussbaum is trying to do, so it seems, is establish her conclusions on the basis of some 'Kantian' ethics which takes seriously the separateness of persons and what-not. It would be nicer if she were a lot clearer about what her ethics actually are. A perspicuous statement of her ethics is absolutely crucial, because it is from these ethics that she (presumably) reaches the conclusion 'national borders are morally arbitrary'. And it is this premise on which her argumentative edifice rests.

The problem is that there are many ways to dispute this conclusion. Much of political philosophy has been devoted to explaining the moral relevance of national borders. Locke's entire theory is concerned with explaining the particularistic nature of political obligation - that we have particular obligations to our own government and to fellow citizens we do not have to other governments and non-citizens.

And particular obligations are not philosophically fraudulent. Prima facie, it seems we definitely have particular obligation to our family; I am obliged to keep and visit my decrepit parents, but not yours. I am obliged to bail out my delinquent brother from jail, but not yours. I am obliged to give my child a good education and a loving home, but not yours. The notion of having particular obligations -in this case family obligations- is intuitively plausible.

Moreover, it is hardly bereft of theoretical support. We can explain them with a bunch of (deontologically) morally relevant actions. I have obligations to my parents because of the benefits they have given me. My obligations stem from reciprocity - I owe people things if I have freely taken their largess. I have special obligations to my child because I act such as to bring them into the world. It is not implausible to tie my obligation here with consent - by consenting to certain types of association with people (parenthood, friendship) one undertakes certain obligations as regards those people.

Both theoretical justifications are relevant to why we might have special obligations to our own government or our fellow citizens. We freely receive benefits given by both - if we take reciprocity seriously that means we have special obligation to both. We should support our citizens, and our government, more than others. Concurrently, we (debateably!) consent to the government under which we live. This consent again demands of us special obligations (this is the content of Locke's doctrine) to a particular government. If either of these things are true moral borders are not morally arbitrary - they are morally relevant because we consent to existing within our own political society or we owe that society something from the benefits it has given us.

Nussbaum must, obviously, repudiate this reasoning. I am not sure how easy that take will be. Certainly, it is not one achieved in the linked article.

Interesting you bring up obligation and reciprocity. I haven't read all the essays in the book but so far I haven't seen one that brings up the issue of reciprocity in the same sense you do and it seems to me like a good point. As a scholar at a public university it would seem that Nussbaum owes a certain debt to the people who direclty fund her position or make her life style possible. A person living in Southern Italy, for example, may not play as much a role in her life as someone living in Chicago (The book advertises her as holding a professorship at the University of Chicago, not sure if that has since changed or not). Should professor Nussbaum be equally beholden to a person living in Southern Italy as to someone living and paying taxes in Chicago?

In her response to her critics, Nussbaum comments:

"...f I tried to help all the world's children a little bit, rather than to devote an immense amount of love and care to Rachel Nussbaum, I would be no good at all as a parent...But that should not mean that we believe our own country or family is really worth more than the children or families of other people--all are still equally human, of equal moral worth."

I wonder if in a sense we DO think our own children are of more worth than other people's children, so to speak? It seems to me that Nussbaum pays lipservice to cosmopolitanism, essentially "talks the talk" but does she "walk the walk"? If she truly does NOT believe that her own children are of more worth than other people's children, then why does she pay more care to her own? It seems to me that we MUST take care of our own foremost and that the very fact that we care for our own first means that we DO put more worth in our own.

 

[lovett]

I think Nussbaum's response here is inadequate for establishing her conclusions, but not in the way you describe. That is to say, it is surely possible to treat people differently (even radically so) without affirming that they are of unequal moral worth. If a child is drowning in front of me I jump in and save him; I am treating him radically differently to how I am treating a child drowning on the other side of the world. That does not imply I think one of more moral worth than the other.

Our different situations sometimes means we should respond to different people differently. Nussbaum's own example instnatiates this well; we are specially placed in relation to our own family. This special positioning means we do more good by being partial to them than by not. However, that doesn't entail we must affirm they are independently of more moral worth than some stranger (only, that it is benign to cultivate feeling of partiality towards them).

This sort of reasoning is often seen in defence of utilitarianism; although we must maximize welfare the best way to do that is by developing special bonds with people, such that we favour these people over others. We can think of this as a double tiered system of motivation; although our basic motivation is impartial and universalistic ('maximize welfare'), to satisfy this motivation we are advised to create 'first-order' partial motivation ('favour friends and family'), simply because partiality is a necassary part of incredible valuable personal relationships.

It doesn't look like Nussbaum is a utilitarian, but her reasoning comes to much the same. By her references to Kant and separateness, I suppose she is more fixated by human dignity than human welfare. It doesn't matter overly much, these are explanatory remarks. The point is that, in general, her remarks are (now!) best construed in some consequentialist framework.

On either case, the problem is that the exact same comments can be made about partial political association. People find it difficult enough to consent to re-distribution and helping the needy within their own countries. They find it difficult enough to engage politically and work collectively when operating on the purely national scale. One of the things that helps them, indubitably, is the bonds provided by national identity. Nussbaum provides no evidence that these bounds -this source of motivation- is replicable on the international level. She provides no evidence that the destruction of this source of ethical motivation will be compensated once we view ourselves as citizens of the world.

In short, the consequentialist case against her proposals is the case that, by conceiving ourselves as citizens of a nation, we create a potent source of motivation such that we are prepared to fulfill our moral obligations to fellow citizens. In the exact way the partiality of family and friendship is justified so can the partiality of nationhood be justified. We can better help are fellow citizens, know their needs better and are morel likely to be motivated to act ethically towards them. Disparaging this particular source of partiality in the name of cosmopolitanism will not improve our behavior from a moral perspective. It will destroy one thing that was motivating and engendering that behavior. Simply, conceiving of ourselves as citizens of the world will not motivate us as much as conceiving of ourselves as citizens of a nation (and perhaps, reciprocity, consent and so on come back in her in an explanatory way).

 

[Gary Childress]

In short, the consequentialist case against her proposals is the case that, by conceiving ourselves as citizens of a nation, we create a potent source of motivation such that we are prepared to fulfill our moral obligations to fellow citizens. In the exact way the partiality of family and friendship is justified so can the partiality of nationhood be justified. We can better help are fellow citizens, know their needs better and are morel likely to be motivated to act ethically towards them. Disparaging this particular source of partiality in the name of cosmopolitanism will not improve our behavior from a moral perspective. It will destroy one thing that was motivating and engendering that behavior. Simply, conceiving of ourselves as citizens of the world will not motivate us as much as conceiving of ourselves as citizens of a nation (and perhaps, reciprocity, consent and so on come back in her in an explanatory way).

I think one thing Professor Nussbaum is reacting against is that not only does patriotism motivate us to fulfill our moral obligations to fellow citizens but that it tends at times to mask our moral obligations to other peoples in the world. Patriotism seems to degenerate at times into chauvinism. I can see her concern in this respect. But it seems to me that cosmopolitanism isn't realistic for the vast majority of people on earth. In fact, some might argue that cosmopolitanism is, perhaps, an open invitiation for exploitation of the weak. By breaking down national identity of the weaker nations, the weak lose their ability to control their own resources.

One responder to Nussbaum is Kwame Anthony Appiah who brings up the point:

"No liberal should say "My country, right or wrong," because liberalism involves a set of political principles that a state can fail to realize; and the liberal will have no special loyalty to an illiberal state, because liberals value people over collectivities."

What do others think of the notion that liberals have no speical loyalty to an illiberal state. I can't think of anything that rouses nationalists up more.

 

[Traitorfish]

I think that Himmelfarb is right to observe the essentially historic character of human beings, and so be wary of Nussbaum's claim to ally herself with such a grand abstraction as "the worldwide community of human beings". She seems to believe that we can simply will ourselves into communion with a universal humanity, regardless of our historical circumstances, that we can simply say "I am a citizen of the world" and it will be so. This seems to me misguided, because it neglects the essentailly concrete nature of human existence, and just the concrete nature of human communities; that for you to be a citizen of the world, there must be an identifiable world-community for you to be a citizen of. I am by all means an enthusiast for a universal humanity, but for me it is something that actually has to be brought into being, something which requires us to overcome our particularities, rather than simply to look "under" them for some shared essence.

However, at least from the extract, Himmelfarb doesn't actually seem to offer an alternative humanism so much as a bitter resignation, the bitterness (as Gary observed) not particularly well-masked by the posture of aloofness. Her retreat into particularities is just that, a retreat, which rather than reconciling universalism with historical particularity simply abandons it. That, to me, seems just as misguided as the most idealistic cosmopolitanism.

 

[innonimatu]

On page 4 of the text Nussbaum seems to give us a rough definition of what she calls the cosmpolitan; "[T]he person whose allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings." She makes a couple references to Diogenes and Crates, both Cynic philosophers who called themselves "citizens of the world" as opposed to identifying themselves with their fellow Greeks. Of course the Cynics are also widely known for some rather interesting social behavior such as masterbating, copulating and defecating in public.

Erm... no. Diogenes was an outlier even among the cynics, or at least I haven't seen any source about others imitating his more "scandalous" behavior.

About that definition of cosmpolitanism: she makes it so vague as to be meaningless. Owing allegiance to a worldwide community means owing allegiance to no one. It's just a particular form of anarchism, one married with a system of ethics that basically says "don't harm the other people". Nice, but when the other people are of a different mind tings turn out ugly. Because those who have no allegiances will find it hard to get others to stand with them in a fight...

I sympathize with that Gertrude Himmelfarb when she points out how isolationist that definition of cosmpolitanism is. Feelings are bred from particular experiences, and we then generalize them from there. Taking "cosmpolitanism" to its logical conclusions we would repress those particular experiences of love and mutual obligation, out of a misguided belief that everyone should receive them in some equal proportion, which necessarily would be much less intense that what people feel towards their closest social circle. But by rejecting those privileged relations we'd undermine that which makes it possible for us to feel empathy towards strangers: their identification with those we especially love, with their or our own history and experience. We'd reject interpersonal emotion and have to replace that with pure cold rationality. It would not end well.

Equality under the law, yes, that I want to see. Equal respect for everyone, ditto. Meaning a lot more equal things, and Rawls and Marx at least had some interesting things to say about that. But equal emotional attachment for everyone? No! Not for loved ones, not for social circles and even large communities. This Nussbaum is someone I wouldn't trust. And I don't like Camus either - only read his "the sranger" and found it abhorrent.

 

[Gary Childress]

Erm... no. Diogenes was an outlier even among the cynics, or at least I haven't seen any source about others imitating his more "scandalous" behavior.

Are you sure about that? What have you read on the Cynics? From my readings, Diogenes was the prototypical model for later cynics. He set the standard for generations of Cynics to come. Nussbaum herself comments on Crates and Hipparchia copulating in public in her essay. "Cynic shamelessness" was well known in the ancient world and was a prominent feature of the movement. At least that's what I gathered from reading, The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiguity and Its Legacy, ed by R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Caze published by The Univeristy of California Press. Coincidentaly enough Martha Nussbaum is the author of one of the reviewer's blurbs on the back of the book. It's been a while since I last broke the pages on it but I'm pretty sure about the Cynics. It's supposed to be one of the better sources on the Cynics in print.

 

[innonimatu]

Are you sure about that? What have you read on the Cynics? From my readings, Diogenes was the prototypical model for later cynics. He set the standard for generations of Cynics to come. Nussbaum herself comments on Crates and Hipparchia copulating in public in her essay. "Cynic shamelessness" was well known in the ancient world and was a prominent feature of the movement. At least that's what I gathered from reading, The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiguity and Its Legacy, ed by R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Caze published by The Univeristy of California Press. Coincidentaly enough Martha Nussbaum is the author of one of the reviewer's blurbs on the back of the book. It's been a while since I last broke the pages on it but I'm pretty sure about the Cynics. It's supposed to be one of the better sources on the Cynics in print.

Thanks for the information, I won't argue with that. I have the impression of having read of later cynics as just one more school competing with the others, and Diogenes having stood out not only for being the first but for being the most uncompromising. But I know I never read anything specifically about the ancient cynics.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

Nussbaum and Himmelfarb (snicker) sound like made-up names. Hildebrandt and Morgenstern.

Those are all German names. I don't know what seems so made up about them.