Grant or Lee?

[G-Max]

I find it extremely interesting that the popular myths about Grant and Lee - the former a methodical juggernaut seemingly intent on losing men so long as the enemy was driven back, the latter a genius of maneuver who relied on turning movements and indirect attacks to try to gain advantage - are actually ass-backwards.

Well, to be fair, Grant did have a habit of turning battlefields into meatgrinders that saw astronomical casualties on both sides without decisive victory for either, whereas Lee faced some pretty incompetent opponents who made him look like a genius by comparison.

 

[Dachs]

Well, to be fair, Grant did have a habit of turning battlefields into meatgrinders that saw astronomical casualties on both sides without decisive victory for either, whereas Lee faced some pretty incompetent opponents who made him look like a genius by comparison.

Uh, no, actually, my whole point was that that's completely wrong.

 

[G-Max]

Burnside and Hooker weren't the sharpest tools in the shed.

Battles like Shiloh, the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor were notorious for their high body counts.

I'm not saying you're wrong about the generals' respective tactics; I'm just saying that their reputations are understandable.

 

[vogtmurr]

Uh, no, actually, my whole point was that that's completely wrong.

uh, no, actually it isn't

 

[Dachs]

uh, no, actually it isn't

cf. seven days battles, vicksburg campaign

 

[LightSpectra]

Battles like Shiloh, the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor were notorious for their high body counts.

Color Habor is the only example here that demonstrates your point, since Grant was desperate for a final victory such that he was willing to incur unusually high casualties here. In all of the other cases, it was mere defensive advantages that lead to higher Union casualties. No credible historian still holds that Lee was a strategic mastermind that lost campaigns because of Grant's "meat grinder".

 

[vogtmurr]

cf. seven days battles, vicksburg campaign

true enuff - but those weren't between Grant and Lee. I thought the most relevant were three the previous poster just mentioned.

 

[Dachs]

true enuff - but those weren't between Grant and Lee. I thought the most relevant were three the previous poster just mentioned.

I already discussed the Overland Campaign in considerable detail earlier in this thread. If you can't be assed to read the whole thing, that's not my problem.

The shortest and simplest refutation of such a characterization lay with those two campaigns, and that's why I took that route.

 

[vogtmurr]

I already discussed the Overland Campaign in considerable detail earlier in this thread. If you can't be assed to read the whole thing, that's not my problem.

The shortest and simplest refutation of such a characterization lay with those two campaigns, and that's why I took that route.

I read it - I just totally disagreed with it. Since we are on the topic - calling the Overland campaign a Union victory because Lee's losses were unsupportable (they actually weren't) fails to make sense to me. Grant gave up because his losses were, his command was about to be impeached, and his army I suspect, in near mutiny. The fact that Lee subsequently defended Petersburg was his decision. It is a separate battle that turned into a 10 month Union debacle, before other events basically decided the war anyway. In short - Overland Campaign is a Union loss, and Petersburg is a pyrrhic Union victory. I don't see whats so hard to accept about that - I reckon most would agree.

edit: Anyway as a previous poster noted, Grant's presidency was uh, a pretty mixed bag. When we are talking greatest generals, his role as commander in chief has to be considered too.

 

[Dachs]

I read it - I just totally disagreed with it. Since we are on the topic - calling the Overland campaign a Union victory because Lee's losses were unsupportable (they actually weren't) fails to make sense to me. Grant gave up because his losses were, his command was about to be impeached, and his army I suspect, in near mutiny. The fact that Lee subsequently defended Petersburg was his decision. It is a separate battle that turned into a 10 month Union debacle, before other events basically decided the war anyway. In short - Overland Campaign is a Union loss, and Petersburg is a pyrrhic Union victory. I don't see whats so hard to accept about that - I reckon most would agree.

How were Lee's losses not unsupportable? That's a total departure from even the narrative that refers to Grant as the bloody attritive Douglas Haig butcher with no imagination.

Most of the rest of the post is kinda...similarly disconnected from things. Mutiny and removal from command were not factors in Grant's decisionmaking in the late summer of 1862, and I have no idea how you could characterize what he did do as "g[iving] up". I am unsure how "other events basically decided the war" when it was the Army of the Potomac that won the Battle of Five Forks and the related engagements, and the Army of the Potomac that stormed the entrenchments in front of Richmond and Petersburg, and the Army of the Potomac that mounted the chase and ultimately cornered the ANV at Appomattox.

Characterizing the campaign as a "Union loss" is probably the most extreme thing you put in there. Lee accomplished zero of his positive objectives and only two of his negative ones (keep the army intact, prevent the fall of Richmond). The ANV lost any ability to maneuver. It lost ground. It proportionately lost more men than did its opponents. How that can even sort of be considered a Federal defeat is beyond me.

 

[vogtmurr]

How were Lee's losses not unsupportable? That's a total departure from even the narrative that refers to Grant as the bloody attritive Douglas Haig butcher with no imagination.

- Lee's losses in the overland campaign were not 'unsupportable' - given the relative casualty count, demoralizing failure of the Union army at Cold Harbour, and subsequent 10 month defense of Petersburg. Three pretty solid reasons. (Even if they were in a demographic sense - taking lesser losses while defeating a superior enemy invasion force is still generally considered a victory)

Most of the rest of the post is kinda...similarly disconnected from things. Mutiny and removal from command were not factors in Grant's decisionmaking in the late summer of 1862, and I have no idea how you could characterize what he did do as "g[iving] up". I am unsure how "other events basically decided the war" when it was the Army of the Potomac that won the Battle of Five Forks and the related engagements, and the Army of the Potomac that stormed the entrenchments in front of Richmond and Petersburg, and the Army of the Potomac that mounted the chase and ultimately cornered the ANV at Appomattox.

- late summer of 1864 I assume you are referring to. It is true Lincoln never gave up on Grant - but I think you have to admit the political situation had seriously deteriorated for both of them at that point. Grant wisely disengaged to try a different approach.
- other events are the accummulated CSA defeats on all fronts - Hood and Early, Atlanta, etc. while their own political situation deteriorated. The only option left for Lee, other than surrender was a guerilla war which he wisely rejected.

Characterizing the campaign as a "Union loss" is probably the most extreme thing you put in there. Lee accomplished zero of his positive objectives and only two of his negative ones (keep the army intact, prevent the fall of Richmond). The ANV lost any ability to maneuver. It lost ground. It proportionately lost more men than did its opponents. How that can even sort of be considered a Federal defeat is beyond me.

- wiki calls it a Union victory - at a cost of around 55-65,000 casualties to 32-35,000. But wiki also calls every major engagement in the campaign 'inconclusive' with the exception of Cold Harbour, which is a CSA victory. It is true some of the minor actions associated with the campaign were union victories, but they don't compare in importance or casualty counts. Overall - at the very best it is a stalemate.
- not to take the Douglas Haig analogy seriously, but if the Overland is such a clear Union victory, then the Somme is also an allied victory. After all, it gained three miles in places, and the slightly lower casualties suffered by the slightly smaller German armies were unsupportable compared to allied resources.
- more appropriate analogy: Shiloh and Seven Days.
Johnston's attack at Shiloh is equivalent to Grant's attack at Cold Harbour; brave but foolhardy. (and a bit of luck saved Grant's a$$ that time.)
- Lee's victory at Seven Days is equivalent to Grant's at Petersburg - both won at terrible cost but nonetheless obvious strategic successes. (ie forcing a massive Union invasion force to evacuate, turning the tide of War, and the morale for the next two years) So if you can criticize Seven Days what does that say for Overland and Petersburg ?

 

[Dachs]

- Lee's losses in the overland campaign were not 'unsupportable' - given the relative casualty count, demoralizing failure of the Union army at Cold Harbour, and subsequent 10 month defense of Petersburg. Three pretty solid reasons. (Even if they were in a demographic sense - taking lesser losses while defeating a superior enemy invasion force is still generally considered a victory)

The ANV was completely incapable of mounting offensive actions of any serious scope (you know, that thing they had to do if they wanted any chance of surviving the war) for the remainder of the conflict. Its sole operation that was even close to that sort of thing was a one-corps raid that ended up being unceremoniously crushed. If your army is put in a position in which it is effectively awaiting the inevitable because it has suffered too many casualties, that casualty count is unsupportable.

Odd that you mention the relative casualty count because that favors the Federals (as I mentioned in the last post and as you yourself mention later); Lee lost over half of his army, and Grant, uh, didn't.

- late summer of 1864 I assume you are referring to. It is true Lincoln never gave up on Grant - but I think you have to admit the political situation had seriously deteriorated for both of them at that point. Grant wisely disengaged to try a different approach.
- other events are the accummulated CSA defeats on all fronts - Hood and Early, Atlanta, etc. while their own political situation deteriorated. The only option left for Lee, other than surrender was a guerilla war which he wisely rejected.

The only options left for Lee by April 9 were surrender or dispersal. This is solely because of the actions of the Army of the Potomac. Sherman's troops did not arrive on the scene in Virginia before the surrender. Early's defeat was part and parcel of Grant's overall strategy, and down to him and to Sheridan after the reorganization of the Shenandoah commands following Hunter's cockup - but it did not fundamentally change the extremely unfavorable military situation in Virginia (for the Confederacy) that had been created by fall 1864. And Lee's inability to join up with Johnston's or Hood's commands is a direct consequence of Grant's operational generalship and the campaigning of the Army of the Potomac in late March and early April 1865, not of any other body.

- wiki calls it a Union victory - at a cost of around 55-65,000 casualties to 32-35,000. But wiki also calls every major engagement in the campaign 'inconclusive' with the exception of Cold Harbour, which is a CSA victory. It is true some of the minor actions associated with the campaign were union victories, but they don't compare in importance or casualty counts. Overall - at the very best it is a stalemate.

News flash: (semi-)favorable tactical outcomes are irrelevant if you are working within a fundamentally flawed operational framework. See: German Spring Offensive of 1918. You can "win" every battle and still see the campaign come out an abject failure.

- not to take the Douglas Haig analogy seriously, but if the Overland is such a clear Union victory, then the Somme is also an allied victory. After all, it gained three miles in places, and the slightly lower casualties suffered by the slightly smaller German armies were unsupportable compared to allied resources.
- more appropriate analogy: Shiloh and Seven Days.
Johnston's attack at Shiloh is equivalent to Grant's attack at Cold Harbour; brave but foolhardy. (and a bit of luck saved Grant's a$$ that time.)
- Lee's victory at Seven Days is equivalent to Grant's at Petersburg - both won at terrible cost but nonetheless obvious strategic successes. (ie forcing a massive Union invasion force to evacuate, turning the tide of War, and the morale for the next two years) So if you can criticize Seven Days what does that say for Overland and Petersburg ?

I uh, specifically disagree with the characterization of Grant as Haig, so okay?

I also don't see how Shiloh is similar to Cold Harbor. Cold Harbor was a meeting engagement featuring several abortive probes by either side; it is probably best known for Humphreys' massively overinflated casualty count generally re-reported to discredit Grant, for Lee's repeated success at tactical improvisation despite losing several senior commanders, and for the reintroduction of the Federal cavalry corps as an operational factor after having been effectively out of the fight for weeks. Shiloh was a classic example of disorganization and lack of command authority, combined with adept improvisation by the opponent, squandering initial successes.

All throughout this thread I have tried to bang home the comparison of Lee's Seven Days campaign with Grant's Overland campaign. Both achieved operational success at a fairly high cost in casualties. Where the two campaigns differ is that the ANV incurred proportionately higher casualties both times, not just in the Overland campaign. If anything, describing the Seven Days battles as a victory for Lee is less understandable than describing the Overland campaign as a victory for Grant. Of course, the cult of personality surrounding Lee the Butcher would never permit him to have the reputation afforded to a plebeian drunk braggart and fool like Grant.

 

[LightSpectra]

edit: Anyway as a previous poster noted, Grant's presidency was uh, a pretty mixed bag. When we are talking greatest generals, his role as commander in chief has to be considered too.

Oh okay, if you want to open that bag. Lee fought for a country whose sole reason for existing was to continue malicious ownership of black people, whereas Grant's presidency was the first in American history to grant significant rights to black people in the American South. By this measure, Grant is not only a better operational commander, but the only one among the two that can be considered a worthwhile human being.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

I'm going to have to go with Lee. In particular, Grant's Overland strategy doesn't much impress me. It reeks too much of March 1918. Grant wasn't particularly imaginative in his strategies, either. Lee showed an almost artistic genius with regards to his waging of the war. Audacity, always audacity. Even right up to the end, in terribly outnumbered situations like Wilderness-Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and Petersburg, he was able to keep up a fantastic effort for quite a long time.

 

[vogtmurr]

The ANV was completely incapable of mounting offensive actions of any serious scope (you know, that thing they had to do if they wanted any chance of surviving the war) for the remainder of the conflict. Its sole operation that was even close to that sort of thing was a one-corps raid that ended up being unceremoniously crushed. If your army is put in a position in which it is effectively awaiting the inevitable because it has suffered too many casualties, that casualty count is unsupportable.

Odd that you mention the relative casualty count because that favors the Federals (as I mentioned in the last post and as you yourself mention later); Lee lost over half of his army, and Grant, uh, didn't.

Armies on the defensive still win battles - and if that is the best they can do under the circumstances it is still a victory. With a 2 to 1 preponderance over a half starved enemy Grant kept Lee pinned till the end of the war, but it didn't come quick. I don't know what relative measure you consider appropriate, but the fact that the 'victorious' army suffered almost twice as many casualties and still lost a smaller proportion of its total strength while failing to crush or dislodge the smaller enemy, only serves to emphasize that point. Not to be ungenerous but none of this analysis particularly speaks to Grant as a superior general. It does maybe speak to the difficulty in overcoming a determined foe in prepared positions in the rifle age.

News flash: (semi-)favorable tactical outcomes are irrelevant if you are working within a fundamentally flawed operational framework. See: German Spring Offensive of 1918. You can "win" every battle and still see the campaign come out an abject failure.

I uh, specifically disagree with the characterization of Grant as Haig, so okay?

The spring offensive failed to meet its overall quixotic strategic objective, but tactically it would have to be considered a partial success. Overland campaign doesn't have the necessary qualifications to even meet that criteria. Grant isn't a Haig but the analogy to Somme is still valid and you failed to address that point. Seven days saw the evacuation of a massive invasion force that should have ended the war early. What did Overland accomplish ? zilch

I also don't see how Shiloh is similar to Cold Harbor. Cold Harbor was a meeting engagement featuring several abortive probes by either side; it is probably best known for Humphreys' massively overinflated casualty count generally re-reported to discredit Grant, for Lee's repeated success at tactical improvisation despite losing several senior commanders, and for the reintroduction of the Federal cavalry corps as an operational factor after having been effectively out of the fight for weeks. Shiloh was a classic example of disorganization and lack of command authority, combined with adept improvisation by the opponent, squandering initial successes.

You're right. Shiloh is quite different - it was a daring gamble through a day and a night before Johnston was killed. Grant persisted at Cold Harbour for almost two weeks. Grant's determination and success on the western front isn't being denied but against the ANV he didn't seem to have an innovative solution.
Anyway it looks like a split decision, within statistical error. Maybe more to do with personal sentiment or preference than objective measure in the end.

Oh okay, if you want to open that bag. Lee fought for a country whose sole reason for existing was to continue malicious ownership of black people, whereas Grant's presidency was the first in American history to grant significant rights to black people in the American South. By this measure, Grant is not only a better operational commander, but the only one among the two that can be considered a worthwhile human being.

I'm not going to open it all the way, but Grant's early civil rights is maybe the sole redeeming quality - though it was left to the individual states to enforce it. Other than that he weathered a lot of controversy through two terms which speaks to some Machiavellian abilities. The Indian wars in the west, well.... forget it.

 

[LightSpectra]

I'm not going to open it all the way, but Grant's early civil rights is maybe the sole redeeming quality - though it was left to the individual states to enforce it. Other than that he weathered a lot of controversy through two terms which speaks to some Machiavellian abilities. The Indian wars in the west, well.... forget it.

I remember somebody doing a study of how many battles against the Natives were fought by presidential terms. There's a noticeable decline during the Grant administration. Take that as you will.

 

[vogtmurr]

I remember somebody doing a study of how many battles against the Natives were fought by presidential terms. There's a noticeable decline during the Grant administration. Take that as you will.

Grant actually made some pretty bold proclamations on that for his time, so I don't take the view he sanctioned unjust wars. And Lee wasn't the perfect general either, he lost bad at Gettysburg which was strategically worse than Cold Harbour.

 

[Antilogic]

I'm going to have to go with Lee. In particular, Grant's Overland strategy doesn't much impress me. It reeks too much of March 1918. Grant wasn't particularly imaginative in his strategies, either. Lee showed an almost artistic genius with regards to his waging of the war. Audacity, always audacity. Even right up to the end, in terribly outnumbered situations like Wilderness-Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and Petersburg, he was able to keep up a fantastic effort for quite a long time.

I haven't read the entire thread, but have Grant's earlier campaigns entered consideration? I'm thinking of the battles in the West leading up to Vicksburg.

 

[Core Imposter]

The further away from the conflict we get the more regard that goes Grant's way. Right after the war and for decades after Grant's claim to fame was that he fought the greatest general in the war to a draw in the East. Any suggestion that Grant was remotely in the same league as Lee (or a dozen other generals) would have been regarded as ridiculos on its face. Any honest accounting of the performance of the two would clearly show that.

History however is written and rewritten by the victors.

 

[Dachs]

I haven't read the entire thread, but have Grant's earlier campaigns entered consideration? I'm thinking of the battles in the West leading up to Vicksburg.

They have entered consideration, at least among the people who haven't been spending their time in this thread giving Lee the Butcher a blow job.