Great unknown Generals in History

[Squonk]

I'm sure they are reknown in Greece or / and Armenia, but:

Heraclius - he inherited Byzantine Empire when Persians conquered Syropalestine, roman Mesopotamia and Armenia, Egypt and most of Asia Minor, plus Avars and Slavs were ravaging through Balkans. Yet he defeated all in a brilliant "hit the core of the enemy" campaign, much like Stefan Batory in Livonian War between Poland and Russia, or Khevenhueller in the war of austrian succession. As Runciman wrote, he would be remembered as the greatest roman general since Caesar if not that the Arabs came. He, who led all the campaigns against Persians, didn't lead a single battle against them, so it is not as if he was completely responsible for these defeats.

Pompeius the Great - in the shade of Caesar, but for me, getting rid of pirates, having part in defeating Pont, Armenia and conquering Syria is enough to place him in teh greatest generals evah list.

Nikeforos Fokas, Joannes Tzimiskes and Basilios Bulgaroktonos - the greatest rulers and generals of in the byzantine revival in X and XI century, they conquered, among others, Bulgaria (Basilios), and the heavy fortified boarderland (ath-thughur) in Cilicia, Syria, Al-Gazirah and Armenia, having also defeated Sayf ad-Dawlah at the peak of his power.

 

[Dachs]

That is an absolutely amazing book.

Indeed - put it together with von Clausewitz and de Jomini, and you've got all you need for warmongering...

Herakleios is probably on a par with Belisarius - most Eastern Roman historians differ amongst themselves. I personally would put the former first; not only did the Emperor win the war, he turned defeat at Chalcedon - on the very banks of the Bosphorus - into victory at Ispahan, Issos, all throughout Armenia, and finally to Nineveh in 627...in only six campaigns. His Empire repelled the Avar/Bulgar and Sassanid threats (indeed, the latter went from the very pinnacle of their power crashing down to ignominy and chaos that would last to the Arab conquests) brilliantly. He created the thema system which would serve the Empire so well later. You really can't blame him for getting dropsy at an inopportune moment, or the sandstorm what destroyed the Byzantine army at Yarmuk.

 

[Sovin nai]

General "Black Bob" Crauford.
Commander of Wellington's Light Division in Spain and Portugal. He died during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, after charging into a hail of fire with his entire division. He wasn't exactly nice to his men, but he sure did inspire them. One of his main "peeves" was that men would always walk around water, taking a longer path, rather than going straight through the water. He managed to force his division to never walk around water, always through. The day after he died, the division saw a bit of water--really a puddle more than anything--and as a last tribute to him walked straight through it. No one in the entire division said a word about it, or even tried to move out of the way.
He also was amazingly cool under fire. He once held a court-martial of two men in a square, surrounded by enemy cavalry. The two men went to take a pistol and a sword from a dead enemy officer just outside, who was shot and fell off his horse. When they came back, General Crauford, who had seen them, court-martialed them, right then and there. The whole time of the court-martial, they were marching through hordes of cavalry, with almost no support.

Indeed - put it together with von Clausewitz and de Jomini, and you've got all you need for warmongering...

What about Sun Tzu, or the elder Moltke? Although most of Moltke came from Clausewitz, it still was a little different, and Sun Tzu's Art of War is the classic strategy book.

 

[Dachs]

What about Sun Tzu, or the elder Moltke? Although most of Moltke came from Clausewitz, it still was a little different, and Sun Tzu\'s Art of War is the classic strategy book.

To be honest, Sun Tzu really doesn\'t say anything that isn\'t particularly obvious, and many of his lessons, IMHO, are rather inapplicable in this day and age (technology-specific, for example). I mean, who the devil doesn\'t know to not waste time besieging fortifications? (A: Louis XIV.) Many of his more cogent lessons are boiled down, distilled, and reinterpreted in a far more useable form in Liddell Hart\'s work.

von Moltke\'s writings really were more of a Clausewitzian style, and his major innovations were in the sphere of telegraph communications and railroads; again, more of a technology-specific thing than anything else.

 

[Sovin nai]

To be honest, Sun Tzu really doesn't say anything that isn't particularly obvious, and many of his lessons, IMHO, are rather inapplicable in this day and age (technology-specific, for example). I mean, who the devil doesn't know to not waste time besieging fortifications? (A: Louis XIV.) Many of his more cogent lessons are boiled down, distilled, and reinterpreted in a far more useable form in Liddell Hart's work.

Sun Tzu has many other lessons than that, though, I will concede that some of it is either obvious or technology specific. But, you would be suprised how many people miss the obvious, even right under their very nose. Also, some of his lessons are a little different. For example, things about economy relating to warfare, or not to attack a cornered enemy, always leave a way out. I haven't read Liddel Hart's books other than his history of World War II, but it can't have all of Sun Tzu's lessons in it. Sun Tzu also has great historical value, which is important to a military history buff like me. I don't care whether it is applicable now, just how it worked then.

von Moltke's writings really were more of a Clausewitzian style, and his major innovations were in the sphere of telegraph communications and railroads; again, more of a technology-specific thing than anything else.

Although that is very true, it has lessons for any era in military strategy. As long as it isn't take too seriously. (Schlieffen Plan, anyone?)

 

[Dachs]

But, you would be suprised how many people miss the obvious, even right under their very nose.

I don\'t think so...not if you spend time on the Internet at all. But yeah, I get the point. Everyone goes to kindergarten.

For example, things about economy relating to warfare, or not to attack a cornered enemy, always leave a way out. I haven\'t read Liddell Hart\'s books other than his history of World War II, but it can\'t have all of Sun Tzu\'s lessons in it.

It doesn\'t copy the various Art of Warfare texts verbatim, but he does offer a condensation of the basic principles behind the work. Reading the Art of Warfare itself, it is difficult to extract the gems of insight that occasionally appear. Liddell Hart gives a history of the use of the indirect approach in warfare, then sits down and codifies his ideas concisely and understandably. IMHO it is far superior to the old \"Master Sun said\" formula that you get whenever you try to stumble through the older work.

Sun Tzu also has great historical value, which is important to a military history buff like me. I don\'t care whether it is applicable now, just how it worked then.

Fair enough - but if his principles (the better ones, anyway) had been better applied, then China ought have stumbled out of the Warring States period faster. Even after the Qin fell and while the Han were coming to power, the main feature of the war between Liu Bang and Xiang Yu was the sheer political incompetence of the eventual loser - all that the later Emperor Gaozu had to do was sit there and not die, and he became the Han Emperor practically without trying. Modern Chinese military thought was more affected by the Little Red Book than any other text until about the late 1980s. For historical value, von Clausewitz\'s and de Jomini\'s works are far better, since people actually read them and retained at least some idea of what they were trying to convey.

Although that is very true, it has lessons for any era in military strategy. As long as it isn\'t take too seriously. (Schlieffen Plan, anyone?)

IMHO the Schlieffen Plan was the exact opposite of everything that von Moltke the elder ever wrote. Looking at the Prussian and North German operations in the two wars that he fought, the German plan was first early (or \"good\") Napoleonic in conception (a \"net\" of armies acting on a wide front, very loosely cooperating, draw together at the first impact by the enemy army and enact a battlefield concentration - i.e. Sadowa) and then \"middle\" Napoleonic (based mainly on the strength of their artillery and again the ability to concentrate on the battlefield than any overriding plan) than Clausewitzian. Von Clausewitz actually lays out a plan for the invasion of France at the end of Vom Kriege, and while some of the major prerequisites were not there in 1914, the basic idea was to advance directly on Paris from easy concentration points and not screw around with Belgium or crap like that. The Schlieffen Plan was far more an imitation of Napoleon\'s plan in Russia than anything else - \"load\" one end of the line with most of your troops and blow on through there, relying on the ultimate success of that wing to work. Von Clausewitz does refer to that as the best possible scheme available to Napoleon (noting that his ultimate failure wasn\'t in his hands but those of the Tsar of Russia, and he didn\'t cave), but he doesn\'t advocate anything like that in France.

In any event, the Schlieffen Plan itself wasn\'t even properly followed, due to Kronprinz Rupprecht and von Moltke the Younger, who tried to turn it into Cannae with a basic failure to understand what the hell was going on. Even so, given its similarity to the Napoleonic invasion of Russia, it would have been appropriate if the two had failed due to the same reason: supplies. Indeed, even if the Schlieffen Plan had been implemented correctly, there were only a few railroad bridges over the Meuse in Belgium that were capable of bringing them supplies, and those had been destroyed by the Belgians themselves. Von Kluck\'s First Army was already suffering from exhaustion when it brilliantly repulsed the Allies at the battles of the Marne and the Ourcq (and then was forced to withdraw by Lt. Col. Hentsch, mainly because of those supply difficulties). With the extra strain of more men on the same amount of low supplies, the right wing wouldn\'t have been able to make Paris - maybe not even the Marne itself.

 

[Sovin nai]

It doesn't copy the various Art of Warfare texts verbatim, but he does offer a condensation of the basic principles behind the work. Reading the Art of Warfare itself, it is difficult to extract the gems of insight that occasionally appear. Liddell Hart gives a history of the use of the indirect approach in warfare, then sits down and codifies his ideas concisely and understandably. IMHO it is far superior to the old "Master Sun said" formula that you get whenever you try to stumble through the older work.

Well, if you get a copy with commentary, it gets better. There are examples of each principle, and explanations. However, some of it is rather hard to understand. Some very interesting examples occur, but some aren't explained very well.

IMHO the Schlieffen Plan was the exact opposite of everything that von Moltke the elder ever wrote. Looking at the Prussian and North German operations in the two wars that he fought, the German plan was first early (or \"good\") Napoleonic in conception (a \"net\" of armies acting on a wide front, very loosely cooperating, draw together at the first impact by the enemy army and enact a battlefield concentration - i.e. Sadowa) and then \"middle\" Napoleonic (based mainly on the strength of their artillery and again the ability to concentrate on the battlefield than any overriding plan) than Clausewitzian. Von Clausewitz actually lays out a plan for the invasion of France at the end of Vom Kriege, and while some of the major prerequisites were not there in 1914, the basic idea was to advance directly on Paris from easy concentration points and not screw around with Belgium or crap like that. The Schlieffen Plan was far more an imitation of Napoleon\'s plan in Russia than anything else - \"load\" one end of the line with most of your troops and blow on through there, relying on the ultimate success of that wing to work. Von Clausewitz does refer to that as the best possible scheme available to Napoleon (noting that his ultimate failure wasn\'t in his hands but those of the Tsar of Russia, and he didn\'t cave), but he doesn\'t advocate anything like that in France.

In any event, the Schlieffen Plan itself wasn\'t even properly followed, due to Kronprinz Rupprecht and von Moltke the Younger, who tried to turn it into Cannae with a basic failure to understand what the hell was going on. Even so, given its similarity to the Napoleonic invasion of Russia, it would have been appropriate if the two had failed due to the same reason: supplies. Indeed, even if the Schlieffen Plan had been implemented correctly, there were only a few railroad bridges over the Meuse in Belgium that were capable of bringing them supplies, and those had been destroyed by the Belgians themselves. Von Kluck\'s First Army was already suffering from exhaustion when it brilliantly repulsed the Allies at the battles of the Marne and the Ourcq (and then was forced to withdraw by Lt. Col. Hentsch, mainly because of those supply difficulties). With the extra strain of more men on the same amount of low supplies, the right wing wouldn\'t have been able to make Paris - maybe not even the Marne itself.

Although the principle of the plan was based on Napoleon, many of the details were Moltke's, at least in general idea. The whole "The First Army will arrive then, so the Second Army will have to arrive then" idea was based on Moltke. Schlieffen based his entire plan on a rigid time schedule, and it was doomed to begin. He decided that the plan will take place in exactly six weeks, then they will switch over to the east in exactly a certain ammount of time, then defeat the Russians in a certain ammount of time, etc, etc. He based it on almost impossible speeds of marching at the time, and the whole plan needed perfect railroad handling-scheduling of trains, switching tracks-that they did not have enough experience for. Even if they could get to Paris in the amount of time alloted, he put six army corps appearing out of nowhere for the assualt on Paris itself. The beginning of the plan was brilliant, the middle was okay, but the end was mediocre. The only things that Moltke the younger and the rest of the Prussian staff did to the plan was to detach even more men from the main Belgian force, to defend Alsace and Lorraine, and to defend Prussia. Schlieffen wrote his plan over ten years or more before it was used, and during those years, the parts of Germany that he neglected to defend, or barely defended, grew tenfold. The Prussian staff was just reacting to pressure from the economic sectors of the government, by placing more men to defend the industrial centers. The main problem of the whole plan in the end was that it was based on out-of-date information. It put the Russian "Steamroller" as being able to mobilize in a little over six weeks, and other countries mobilizing at faster speeds, but not too fast. Since he had wrote the plan, many of these countries had already increased mobilization speeds, and Russia mobilized in record breaking times. It took less than a week to start invading Prussia, and the German government had to redirect even more troops to Russia, that could have been used attacking Belgium and the rest of the western part of Europe. Another problem was that it was a purely military plan, and forgot about diplomatic repurcussions resulting from the capture of Belgium, and Luxemburg. It was a product of it's times, and was used badly by the government, and military staff.

Von Clausewitz actually lays out a plan for the invasion of France at the end of Vom Kriege, and while some of the major prerequisites were not there in 1914, the basic idea was to advance directly on Paris from easy concentration points and not screw around with Belgium or crap like that.

Attacking directly at Paris was exactly what the French staff wanted the Germans to do, and would have resulted in a head on collision, with half of the respective armies dead, and history would have been completely rewritten. The war probably wouldn't have ended up as trench warfare, and the French wouldn't have suffered the early reverses that they did. The British would be prominent in world affairs, not the Americans, there would never be half of the technology, and many other things would have changed. But, that is all "What If." The war turned out as it did, and if it did something else, we might be saying right now "Why did the idiots in the German General Staff not use the Schlieffen Plan." And talking about what would happen if they did.

 

[Eran of Arcadia]

And how much did the Schlieffen Plan depend on war being declared in a relatively short time frame? How did the month between the ultimatum and the declaration of war affect mobilization timetables?

 

[Sovin nai]

Most of that was spent trying to keep from going to war. There were telegrams flying in between the relative headquarters. The military staffs were set on war, but the rest of the governments were trying to keep peace. The ultimatum was due in two days, then two days later, the Austrians declared war and mobilised. After a week, the Russians mobilised. Then the German's declared war on Russia, the Russians declared war on Austria, and Germany sent an ultimatum to Belgium, after declaring war on France, too. This took place in about 3 weeks, while everyone was sending telegrams. "The lights [were] going out all over Europe" so to speak.
The reason that the Kaiser declared war when he did was because the General Staff told him that if he didn't start the plan soon, they would be completely overrun. The Plan needed to attack France at the same time as Russia started mobilising, or they would be caught off guard. They had NO alternate plan, for war with only Russia, or with only France. They had to declare war on them both at the same time for the plan to suceed. In their view, of course. Other's views didn't matter, as the others weren't deciding whether to start the war or not.

 

[Adler17]

At first France was eager to fight Germany. In any ways war would have declared, sooner or later. Also the Germans did indeed underestimate the Russians, but the Russian forces attacking were everything else than battle ready. Most soldiers had no shoes, as the shoes were still in a storage. And not all had even guns. And when passing the German border their supply broke down as the Russian trains, which were driving on broad railways, were unable to drive on smaller German ones. So the whole operations were problematic and indeed also a major point why Tannenberg made it to an end.
However the point is, if Paris fell, war would be over. Paris is the key for France. Without that traffic centre the French would be lost. They were unable to continue the fightings after the fall of Paris in 1814, 1871 (and 1940). But you all underestimate the German plan. The plan worked. If Moltke didn't sent the troops to East Prussia he would have won with these reserves the Marne battle and the whole war. That was the only mistake why the plan did not work.

Adler

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

At first France was eager to fight Germany. In any ways war would have declared, sooner or later. Also the Germans did indeed underestimate the Russians, but the Russian forces attacking were everything else than battle ready. Most soldiers had no shoes, as the shoes were still in a storage. And not all had even guns. And when passing the German border their supply broke down as the Russian trains, which were driving on broad railways, were unable to drive on smaller German ones. So the whole operations were problematic and indeed also a major point why Tannenberg made it to an end.
However the point is, if Paris fell, war would be over. Paris is the key for France. Without that traffic centre the French would be lost. They were unable to continue the fightings after the fall of Paris in 1814, 1871 (and 1940). But you all underestimate the German plan. The plan worked. If Moltke didn't sent the troops to East Prussia he would have won with these reserves the Marne battle and the whole war. That was the only mistake why the plan did not work.

Adler

Belgian resistance was much more than was expected, too. Part of the Schlieffen Plan revolved around the idea that a violated Belgium would lie down and accept defeat. They didn't, and though they didnt' stop the Germans, they delayed them, and that's all a time-based plan like Schliffen's needs to go FUBAR.

 

[Sovin nai]

At first France was eager to fight Germany. In any ways war would have declared, sooner or later. Also the Germans did indeed underestimate the Russians, but the Russian forces attacking were everything else than battle ready. Most soldiers had no shoes, as the shoes were still in a storage. And not all had even guns. And when passing the German border their supply broke down as the Russian trains, which were driving on broad railways, were unable to drive on smaller German ones. So the whole operations were problematic and indeed also a major point why Tannenberg made it to an end.
However the point is, if Paris fell, war would be over. Paris is the key for France. Without that traffic centre the French would be lost. They were unable to continue the fightings after the fall of Paris in 1814, 1871 (and 1940). But you all underestimate the German plan. The plan worked. If Moltke didn't sent the troops to East Prussia he would have won with these reserves the Marne battle and the whole war. That was the only mistake why the plan did not work.

Adler

Not quite. The plan was flawed from the start. Schlieffen needed six more army corps for the attack on Paris than existed when he wrote his plan. And he although more corps were raised, it ended up being less on the main attack because of the peripherel defenses. However, even if they had gotten the six extra corps, they wouldn't have been able to get to Paris. The roads would have already been crowded, even if the Belgians hadn't kept fighting, if barely. When Schlieffen wrote his plan, he didn't even say how the extra army corps would arrive. He just said that they would be there at the critical moment.

 

[Adler17]

But with the three corps sent to East Prussia the German troops would have been able to win the Marne battle and take Paris thus finishing the war. We can argue that plan was bad. But it (nearly) worked.

Adler

 

[Sovin nai]

True. But at the time, they did not know that the Russians would be turned back so quickly.

 

[aelf]

But suppose Germany hadn't diverted troops to the Eastern Front and that allowed the Russians to break through...

 

[Sovin nai]

Then the country would have risen up in rebellion, and the Russians wouldn't have been able to forage for food, or anything. They would be stuck where they were, not able to advance or retreat.

 

[rilnator]

I mean, who the devil doesn\'t know to not waste time besieging fortifications? (A: Louis XIV.)

Or Hitler (Stalingrad 1942).

 

[ParkCungHee]

Stalingrad wasn't a Seige though, nor was it a fortification...nor was the problem of going after Stalingrad in Stalingrad itself...

 

[BEHIND_THE_MASK]

Stalingrad wasn't a Seige though, nor was it a fortification...nor was the problem of going after Stalingrad in Stalingrad itself...

Besides the fact that Stalingrad wasn't really that important in itself. The Germans didn't even need to head that way, that had plenty of oil and didn't need a push to the caucasus (or however its spelled)

They should have used those men to take Moscow or Leningrad.

Silly Nazis, Victory is for Russians

 

[ParkCungHee]

Besides the fact that Stalingrad wasn't really that important in itself. The Germans didn't even need to head that way, that had plenty of oil and didn't need a push to the caucasus (or however its spelled)

They should have used those men to take Moscow or Leningrad.

Silly Nazis, Victory is for Russians

No, there was a serious oil shortage in Germany. The problem was that they diverted troops from the Caucasus Offensive into Stalingrad, when they were within site of the Baku Oil Fields.